Under the Act on the Prohibition of Unfair Trading Practices in the Agricultural and Food Supply Chain, what injunctions may the Competition Authority issue in respect of consignment arrangements — that is, where the goods remain in the supplier's ownership until resale? [TEISINIS_PAGRUNDAS]: The source material does not contain an explicit statutory provision, and I therefore rely on the logic of the court judgment reported in the news item and on a general principle of law: the supervisory authority's power to intervene is a competence conferred by statute and must not be applied more broadly than the statute's scope of application permits (a fundamental-rights-derived requirement that state interference with private property requires a clear statutory basis). In its judgment of 23 October 2026, the Tallinn Administrative Court concluded that the Act governs sale and purchase relationships but not consignment, in which a wholesaler stores and handles goods that remain in the supplier's ownership; moreover, goods with a shelf life of less than three months do not constitute "wasted goods", so an agreement on the return of such goods is not prohibited by the Act.
What case law says: The source material does not include a broader extract of case law, but the Tallinn Administrative Court's judgment of 23 October 2026 in the cases concerning the complaints of Allium UPI OÜ and Magnum Medical OÜ is the leading decision on this question; it quashed the Competition Authority's injunctions of July 2025. The case law on this issue rests so far on a single decision, and the appellate stage may still change it. [PRAKTILINE_REIKSME]: Parties to consignment contracts now have a specific, court-confirmed argument: where the goods remain in the supplier's ownership until resale, requiring return from the supplier or prohibiting return falls outside the regulation of unfair trading practices, and the authority's injunction lacks a legal basis. At the same time, the wording of the contract must be examined — if the contract in fact provides for transfer of ownership upon delivery and the consignment arrangement is merely nominal, the authority can turn the same argument to its own advantage (the court's analysis is based on the actual nature of the relationship, not the contract's title). It is worth monitoring whether the Competition Authority challenges the judgment, and whether the review of the Act under discussion in the Riigikogu's Rural Affairs Committee and the proposed amendment to the EU directive will introduce an express regulation of consignment, which is currently absent from the Act.
Animals arriving at shelters often have an unknown state of health, and therefore a veterinarian with an overview of the animals' state of health must be designated at the shelter, although there is no obligation to employ a full-time veterinarian.
Under the stray animal capture procedure, the local authority must arrange for the placement of stray animals in a shelter; the animals must be examined by a veterinarian without delay, and animals of different sexes, different species and sick animals must be housed separately.
The animal shelter licensing obligation, which enters into force from 2028, will make animal keeping facilities state-regulated business activities, but does not close down voluntary animal rescue. The news item concerns the Animal Protection Act and Veterinary Act Amendment Act passed by the Riigikogu on 21 October (899 SE), regarding which the public debate centres on the future licensing and requirements system for shelters. Legally, shelters and foster homes face differentiated liability: a shelter requires an activity licence, while a foster home does not, because a foster home operates on the basis of an agreement concluded with a shelter and the organising body of the foster home network bears responsibility. The Veterinary Act's activity licence system (including the specific provisions of § 28 on the suspension and revocation of activity licences) provides the framework under which the granting of a licence is tied to veterinary inspection and liability for violations of veterinary requirements. Under the Animal Protection Act, the protection of animals against diseases is regulated by the Veterinary Act, so that shelter requirements sit at the intersection of the two statutes.
In applying the activity licence system, a distinction must be drawn between activities for which applying for a licence is mandatory and activities for which the law excludes the need for a licence — the visible portion of the Veterinary Act provisions stipulates that an activity licence need not be obtained for the activity referred to in Article 176(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/429. When operating a shelter, a veterinarian must be designated who has an overview of the animals' state of health, but the law does not impose an obligation to employ a full-time veterinarian. The procedure for the capture, keeping and euthanasia of stray animals obliges the local authority to arrange for the placement of stray animals in a shelter and provides that animals placed in a shelter must be examined by a veterinarian without delay, and that animals of different sexes, different species, and sick or injured animals must be housed separately. The amendments adopted under the Animal Protection Act — the gradual prohibition of keeping dogs permanently on chains, the prohibition of zoophilia and of the production and distribution of material depicting it, strengthened supervision and increased penalties — remain in force irrespective of the dispute over shelters. Administrative proceedings under the licensing system are governed by the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, taking into account the specific provisions of Regulation (EU) 2017/625 on official controls. Case law is not among the sources provided, and accordingly no reference can be made to judicial resolution of similar disputes. The six-cat limit, the number of litter boxes and the requirements for partitions are not established by the Riigikogu's statute, but belong to a draft implementing regulation that is still being discussed with veterinarians and animal rescuers.
In practice, small animal rescue organisations and volunteers will be most affected by the changes, as their activities must, by 2028, either fall within the activity licence model or the foster home model. Local authorities must resolve the issue of financing the care of stray animals and covering the costs of longer-term maintenance, which, in the author's assessment, requires a separate solution. Before 2028, the implementing requirements must be worked through, including a review of the wording of the obligation to implement disease control measures, which may be too broad.
Correction. The author of the article asserts that if the city itself is not a VAT-liable person, it cannot recover VAT on its own input costs — a statement formulated in overly general terms. On the basis of the present source material (Section 35(8) of the Value Added Tax Act), it must be clarified that a person who has no right to deduct input VAT and who cannot apply for a refund of VAT under subsection (1) of that section shall be refunded the VAT paid upon the importation of goods, if that person proves that the corresponding right would exist in another Member State — that is, the absolute formulation "cannot recover" does not always hold, and exceptions are provided for in the law. The article also failed to mention that Section 3 of the KOKS establishes the principle of organising public services "on the most favourable terms" and the principles of openness and transparency of activities — it is precisely on these grounds that the city's deficient calculations and disclosure should be criticised, not merely on the basis of economic reasoning. A more precise formulation would be that the city's right to provide the service itself derives from the competence under Section 6(1) of the KOKS and from the choice of form under the KOKS provisions on institutions administered by a municipal agency, rather than from "the city's whim".
Under subsection 17 (4) of the KOKS, the formation of an institution administered by a municipal or city authority and the termination of its activities are decided by the council; the municipal government's public justifications are therefore not binding before the council's decision.
Under clause 4 (2) 7 of the KOKS, a principle of local government is the organisation of high-quality and accessible public services on the most favourable terms, which provides grounds to demand the presentation of a calculation of the annual savings of one million euros.
Tartu is facing a situation in which the manner of organising street maintenance will be decided by the council rather than by the municipal government alone, because the establishment of a maintenance unit falls within the competence of the representative body. The news report claims that the city wishes to municipalise street cleaning in order to allegedly save one million euros per year. Legally, this is an exercise of local government's right of self-organisation: under subsection 6 (1) of the Local Government Organisation Act (KOKS), the city organises public order and the upkeep of its roads, where these tasks have not been assigned by law to anyone else. The specific legal question is whether, and on what conditions, the city may establish a street-cleaning unit as an institution administered by an authority, and on what principles it must operate. The answer is found in the KOKS: under subsection 17 (4) of the KOKS, the formation of an institution administered by a municipal or city authority and the termination of its activities are decided by the council, whereas the adoption of its statutes and the approval of its structure and composition take place in the procedure established by the council.
An institution administered by an authority is not a legal person and does not exercise public authority; the unit therefore operates within the composition of the city as a legal person governed by public law and represents the city in the manner prescribed in the city statutes or other legislation. The institution is registered in the state register of state and local government institutions, which makes its activities publicly traceable. The council's decision-making power means that the public justifications offered by representatives of the municipal government — cost savings, better understanding of costs, and crisis resilience — are not legally binding until the council has decided on the establishment. The law imposes limits on the city: under clause 4 (2) 7 of the KOKS, one principle of local government is the organisation of high-quality and accessible public services on the most favourable terms, which gives the council and residents grounds to demand that the establishment decision be justified precisely in light of that principle. At the same time, the openness and publicity of activities provided for in clause 6 supports the demand for precise calculations to be presented, because the right of self-organisation (KOKS subsection 2 (1), subsection 3 (3^1)) does not release the city from the obligation to proceed from the legitimate needs and interests of the municipality's or city's residents. Under subsection 3 (3^1) of the KOKS, in resolving matters of local life assigned to the local government unit by law, the right of self-organisation must remain, under which it independently determines the more specific content of tasks and the procedure for their performance — this means that reducing maintenance volumes and quality requirements is likewise for the city itself to decide. The sources contain no case law, so no specific court case concerning similar disputes can be cited.
What is practically significant is that the decision rests with the council, so opposition or support voiced in public debate influences decision-makers who are accountable to the electorate. If the council establishes the unit, the costs are borne by the city budget, meaning that the tax burden is distributed among all residents of Tartu and less money remains for other tasks — this is the principal harm to the author of the news report, not unlawfulness, because the establishment of the unit is lawful. If the council decides to establish it, a resident may use participatory instruments: section 32 of the KOKS provides for the right of local popular initiative, and under clause 2 (2) 2 of the KOKS, a public opinion poll and popular initiative are also named as forms of participation in matters of local life. If the unit is not established, street maintenance remains to be organised through procurement, where competition and the procurement terms — the volume to be maintained, quality requirements, equipment and staff requirements — determine the level of costs.
Correction. The news report's assertion that the hearings are closed only to the extent and during the time when the accused's personal health data are disclosed or discussed is incomplete, because the grounds for closure listed in points 1–4 of subsection 12(1) of the CCP are broader: protection of state or commercial secrets and classified foreign information, protection of morals and of family or private life, the interests of a minor or a victim, and the interests of the administration of justice in the event of a security risk. The protection of health data is one possible protected interest within the framework of private-life protection, not an independent ground expressly named in the statute. A more precise formulation would be that the court applied partial closure under subsection 12(1), restricting the principle of publicity only in respect of the part concerning health data, and declined to grant the defence's argument based on the protection of family and private life as regards the remainder.
In the procedure for publishing the time of the court hearing, the case number of the criminal matter, the name of the adult accused, the initials of the minor accused, and the classification of the offence under the relevant section of the Penal Code are indicated on the website.
The court hearings are closed only to the extent and during the time when the accused persons' personal health data are disclosed or discussed, and the close relative of the victim's EUR 9,150 civil claim has been accepted for proceedings.
Kaie Kruusamägi, Kermo Rajamets and two minors as accused persons are facing a public trial, even though the defence counsel requested that the hearings be closed — the Tartu County Court granted the request only in part. The decisive factor was that, under subsection 12 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), the court may close a hearing only on the grounds enumerated therein: the protection of a state or commercial secret, public morals, family or private life, the interests of a minor or of the victim, or the interests of justice, including the protection of the security of a party to the proceedings or a witness. The court therefore has no competence to close a hearing solely because of media and social media attention directed at the accused's children and family, since that sphere of interests does not fall directly within the enumerated grounds. The court chose a compromise solution: the hearings are closed only during the time when the accused persons' personal health data are discussed, which falls under the ground of protection of private life. The principle of publicity is the starting point of the CCP — any person may observe the hearing, and it applies, subject to restrictions, until the pronouncement of the decision.
The court resolved the question of restricting publicity by a ruling reasoned on the basis of subsection 12 (2) of the CCP, acting of its own motion or upon a party's application, thereby adjudicating the defence counsel's request by way of the prosecutor's application. The accused persons' close relatives may not attend a closed hearing as private individuals; only persons named in the law may be present with the court's permission, including a close relative of the accused within the meaning of subsection 12 (3) of the CCP. At the same time, the court is nonetheless able to protect minors and their close relatives in several ways: under subsection 12 (4) of the CCP it may remove a minor from a public hearing where necessary in the minor's interests, and under subsection 38¹ (4¹) it may, by a reasoned ruling, oblige parties to the proceedings, even at a public hearing, to maintain confidentiality. The limit of the protection of a minor accused's personality rights is also visible in the provision of § 169¹: only the initials of a minor accused are published on the court's website, whereas the name of an adult accused is published in full. As regards the civil claim — a close relative of the victim is demanding EUR 9,150 from the accused persons — the court is guided by §§ 37 and 38 of the Civil Procedure Code, under which the grounds for closing proceedings are narrower, and under which proceedings are not closed if opposed by the person whose interests the closure is sought to protect.
The defence counsel can no longer have the entire proceedings closed; their option going forward is to request closure only at partial moments connected with the protection of health data or private life, or to request, under § 290¹, the pre-trial video-recorded testimony of a minor witness without summoning the witness to court. The accused persons and their counsel must bear in mind that at a public hearing journalists and the public have the right to observe and record the hearing, which entails an increased risk to their public profile and reputation. At the most practical level, this affects the close relative of the victim, whose EUR 9,150 civil claim is being heard in the same court proceedings, and the minor accused persons, whose names are not published. The hearing of the case will begin in November 2026 at the Tartu County Court.
If, after correction of the declaration data, the amount transferred by the tax authority to the registrar on behalf of an obligated person remains smaller than it should have been, the amount referred to in subsection 2 is deemed unpaid in full only with respect to that obligated person.
Withheld payments are declared on Annex 1 (TSD) of the tax declaration and transferred to the bank account of the Estonian Tax and Customs Board by the 10th day of the month following the month in which the payment was made.
A technical error in the accounting of Pillar II of the mandatory funded pension (TSD) means that, for some employees, an erroneous funded pension payment obligation may have arisen, and employers and the tax authority need to clarify whether the payment data already submitted and the amounts transferred correspond to the actual obligation. Legally, the situation is resolved under § 13 of the Funded Pensions Act, under which the provisions governing tax in the Taxation Act apply to the payment, and the Estonian Tax and Customs Board (MTA) verifies the correctness of payment and, where necessary, determines the amount payable. The procedure for correcting errors is established by the minister responsible for the field through the Procedure for Units of Mandatory Pension Funds, which specifies when the transfer to the registrar takes place at all.
The transfer to the registrar takes place only if the amount payable on the basis of the declaration has been paid in full, the declaration complies with the requirements, and all individuals have been identified in the annex and entered in the register of taxable persons (Procedure for Units of Mandatory Pension Funds § 2(2)). If, after correction of the declaration data, the amount transferred on behalf of an obligated person remains smaller than it should have been, the amount referred to is deemed unpaid in full only with respect to that person (same Procedure § 2¹(2¹)). If the amount has been partially paid or written off, these amounts are distributed among the obligated persons proportionally to the declared amounts (§ 2²). In administering the payment, the MTA has the authority to apply the enforcement measures of the Taxation Act, and the obligated person is subject to the sanctions of the Taxation Act and other penal legislation (Funded Pensions Act § 13(2)). As regards the employee, it is significant that the funded pension component of social tax (4%) is calculated and transmitted by the MTA itself out of the social tax payable on the employee's own wages; thus, the erroneous payment obligation may have arisen precisely due to an error in that accounting. Under the procedure for the reallocation of Pillar II of the funded pension, the withholding of the payment begins and ends three times a year — from 1 January, 1 May, or 1 September — so the scope of the error's impact depends on the date on which the erroneous obligation fell.
In practice, this matters to three parties:
If the correction results in a situation where an amount has remained untransferred, the person has the right to demand that the situation be rectified in accordance with the correction procedure established by the minister. Monitoring point: the MTA released additional information about the TSD error on 26 October 2026 and announced that the error has been corrected; going forward, more detailed guidance from the MTA must be awaited on which specific declaration periods were affected by the error and whether, and when, the corrected data will be transmitted to the registrar.