⚖️ Legal prism — 2026-07-28

Kaunas’s legal progress is measured not by the number of events, but by whether each new property, boundary, and plan becomes a mandatory heritage protection regime.

Accordingly, implementation of UNESCO recommendations is not merely a matter of international reporting; it directly corresponds to the purpose of national law.

Core issue

UNESCO’s assessment of Kaunas legally signifies not the confirmation of a title, but a review of the management system against national heritage protection obligations. The question is whether the actions of Kaunas City Municipality and the State already constitute a sufficient chain of inventorying, territorial protection, funding, and public engagement. The news item is narrow in scope: at the 48th session of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee, Kaunas’s progress was assessed favorably, and the next report is scheduled for December 2027. The assessment is determined by Articles 1, 4, 5, 6, 11, 16, 27, and 36 of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage. The institutional logic for the protection of UNESCO properties is supplemented by paragraphs 25, 26, and 27 of the concept approved by Government Resolution No. 1210 of 31 October 2007.

Legal assessment

Under Article 1 of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage, the protection of Kaunas modernism must reconcile preservation, transmission to future generations, knowledge, and use. Accordingly, implementation of UNESCO recommendations is not merely a matter of international reporting; it directly corresponds to the purpose of national law. Under Article 4(1) of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage, protection consists of:

• inventorying;
• declaration as protected;
• safeguarding, including management works and use;
• knowledge and dissemination;
• revitalization.

This structure is reflected in the indicated inventory of interwar buildings, the GIS database, and the addition of 43 modernist properties to the Register of Cultural Property. Kaunas’s legal progress is measured not by the number of events, but by whether each new property, boundary, and plan becomes a mandatory heritage protection regime.

Under Article 5(5) of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage, the Government is responsible for implementing heritage protection obligations assumed under international treaties. The municipality does not act autonomously from the State, but under Article 5(3) and (4) and Article 6, because its institutions issue conditions, approve designs, and grant permits in protected areas. Under Article 6(3), municipal heritage protection units inspect condition, collect information, submit it to the Department, and may issue binding requirements to managers.

Under Article 11(2), (3), and (6) of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage, the clarification of boundaries and the buffer zone must be based on research data and embedded in spatial planning documents. This means that the expansion of the buffer zone will become significant when its consequences are transferred into the planning and permitting system. The excerpt from the Kaunas heat supply special plan confirms the direction of local law: at later design stages, the preservation of cultural heritage properties must be taken into account.

Under Article 27(3) and (4) of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage, maintenance rests primarily with managers, but management works may be partly financed from municipal budget funds. The Kaunas heritage management programme therefore has a clear legal basis when it finances works on buildings located within the UNESCO property and its buffer zone. Under Article 16(3), (5), and (6), protection agreements may serve as an additional instrument; they are registered in the Real Property Register and bind a new manager.

Under Article 36(1) and (2) of the Law on the Protection of Immovable Cultural Heritage, guided tours, publications, workshops, and cultural events are lawful means of disseminating knowledge. Public engagement is not merely an adjunct to communication here, because paragraph 27 of the Government concept provides for public participation in protecting and fostering World Heritage properties. Paragraph 25 of the concept also indicates a stricter model for UNESCO properties: plans and building permits should be linked to a positive review conclusion by a competent State authority.

Consequences

The realistic first scenario is a smooth one: Kaunas completes its management and action plans this year, and the protection plans are consolidated into an integrated protection management plan. In that case, what will matter most to owners, architects, and developers will not be UNESCO wording, but specific spatial planning documents, design conditions, and binding requirements.

The second scenario is administrative tightening, if the amendment of the buffer zone or the protection plans establish new restrictions on construction, reconstruction, or additional storeys. In that case, the practical burden will fall on project developers and managers, because Article 6(2) links the issuance of permits to the special regime applicable to protected structures.

The third scenario is growth in demand for funding, because more registered properties mean greater need for management works. Under Article 27(3), the manager’s funds remain the primary basis, but the municipal programme becomes important where heritage protection requirements increase the cost of works.

Procedurally, the following are to be expected:

• submission of the amendment to the buffer zone boundaries to the World Heritage Centre;
• completion of the Kaunas UNESCO management and action plans in 2026;
• consolidation of the protection plans for Naujamiestis, Žaliakalnis I, and Žaliakalnis II into an integrated plan;
• the next report on the state of conservation of Kaunas to the World Heritage Centre in December 2027.

⚠ Correction. The article’s statement that an application to the Constitutional Court must be made by not less than one-fifth of all members of the Seimas is incomplete. Under Article 106 of the Constitution as cited, applications concerning acts of the Seimas may also be made by the Government and the courts, while the range of applicants differs for other types of acts. It would be more accurate to write that, in this specific political process, a group of members of the Seimas must collect the signatures of not less than one-fifth of all members of the Seimas. More precisely still: the signatures confer the right to initiate proceedings before the Constitutional Court, but the admissibility of the application will also depend on the content required by Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

The central question is this: if the Government Programme was registered in the name of the Government before the officially approved composition of the Government entered into force, the Constitutional Court will have to determine whether the subsequent presentation in the Seimas cures the initial defect in submission.

In this case, the decisive issue is not the text of the Programme, but the constitutional regularity of the procedure for adopting the Seimas act.

Core issue

The issue is not merely one of signatures or political comparison: the Constitutional Court should assess whether, in the procedure concerning the Seimas resolution on the Government Programme, the defect arose before the deliberation stage. The dispute should be resolved under Article 106 of the Constitution and Articles 63, 64, 65 and 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. The news fact is narrow: the LSDP parliamentary group states that it has collected more than 30 signatures regarding the Seimas resolution of 11 December 2020. Under Article 106 of the Constitution and Article 65 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas may apply regarding an act adopted by another Seimas. Since the Seimas has 141 members, the practical threshold is 29 Members of the Seimas; therefore, “more than 30” signatures satisfies the quantitative threshold. The Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction follows from Article 63 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, because the challenged act is a Seimas resolution.

Legal assessment

Under Article 64 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the basis for a case is a legally reasoned doubt as to an act’s conformity with the Constitution, including the procedure for adoption established by the Constitution. Accordingly, the LSDP must not prove political inconsistency, but must formulate a legal doubt concerning the procedure for the 2020 Seimas resolution. The central question is this: if the Government Programme was registered in the name of the Government before the officially approved composition of the Government entered into force, the Constitutional Court will have to determine whether the subsequent presentation in the Seimas cures the initial defect in submission.

The applicants’ obligations under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court are specific:

• to indicate the exact title, number, date of adoption and source of publication of the challenged Seimas resolution;
• to identify the constitutional and statutory provisions conferring the right to apply;
• to set out the specific grounds for hearing the case;
• to substantiate the position that the act conflicts with the Constitution;
• to formulate the request to the Constitutional Court;
• to attach a list of documents.

Under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, a petition by a group of Members of the Seimas must be signed by all applying Members of the Seimas. Those same signatures must be certified by the signature of the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker of the Seimas. This means that a political statement about collected signatures is not yet a procedural application until a petition in proper form has been submitted.

The Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction to examine cases is not limited to acts currently in force, as indicated by the sources referring to the Constitutional Court ruling of 19 September 2002 in case No. 34/2000-28/01. In that case, it was held that the Constitutional Court may examine Seimas acts that have been adopted and officially published even where the start of their application is set for a later date. For the present situation, this means that the dispute concerning the 2020 resolution is not eliminated merely by the passage of time or subsequent political events.

The precedential context of the 1996 Government Programme is also relevant: the sources refer to Government Resolution No. 1429 concerning the examination of the Seimas resolution of 10 December 1996 under Article 92(4) of the Constitution and Article 65 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. This demonstrates that a Seimas resolution on the Government Programme is a proper object of constitutional review. In this case, the decisive issue is not the text of the Programme, but the constitutional regularity of the procedure for adopting the Seimas act.

Consequences

There are three realistic scenarios. First, the Constitutional Court may accept the petition and examine whether the procedural chronology breached the procedure for adopting a Seimas act established in the Constitution, within the meaning of Article 64 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. Second, the Constitutional Court may find that the petition is insufficiently legally reasoned, because Article 106 of the Constitution permits refusal to accept an application based on non-legal grounds. Third, the Constitutional Court may hold that the challenged Seimas resolution is not contrary to the Constitution if the later stages of the procedure were legally sufficient.

The practical significance extends not only to the Programme of the Eighteenth Government, but also to this year’s dispute concerning the Programme of the Twenty-First Government. A uniform standard will depend on whether the Constitutional Court regards the starting point of the procedure as independently significant. If it does, the date of registration and the submitting entity will become essential criteria for future submissions of Government Programmes.

Procedurally, the next step is to await not a political announcement, but a formal petition to the Constitutional Court with certified signatures of Members of the Seimas under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. If the application were submitted by a Seimas resolution, Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court provides for a preliminary examination of the material within no later than three days and a decision on admissibility at an administrative sitting.

The registration calendar is not an independent subject matter of a Constitutional Court case if the petition does not show its connection with the challenged act of the Seimas.

If the 29 signatures are merely a form of political counter-initiative, the petition is weakened even before substantive examination.

Core issue

The core of the dispute is not political consistency, but the admissibility of the petition and the identification of the challenged act of the Seimas. The Constitutional Court will assess not the symmetry between the conduct of the LSDP and the opposition, but whether the request complies with Article 102 of the Constitution, Article 106 of the Constitution, and Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

The factual background is narrow: the disputed issue is the starting point of the 2020 Government Programme approval procedure, where the draft was registered before the entry into force of the Presidential decree. Under Article 102 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court decides whether laws and other acts of the Seimas are in conflict with the Constitution. Under Article 106 of the Constitution, the Government, courts, or not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas may apply concerning acts of the Seimas. According to this news report, the practical threshold is at least 29 signatures of Members of the Seimas.

Legal assessment

A petition to the Constitutional Court cannot be framed merely as a political question concerning equal standards. Under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, it must specify the exact title, number, date of adoption, and legal reasoning of the challenged act. This means that the LSDP must challenge a specific act of the Seimas concerning the 2020 Government Programme, not an abstract practice. The procedural chronology becomes a legal argument here only insofar as it is linked to the compliance of a specific act of the Seimas with the Constitution.

• The applicant would be a group of Members of the Seimas under Article 106 of the Constitution and Article 31 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.
• The interested party would be the state institution that adopted the challenged legal act, under Article 31 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.
• All authors of the application must sign the petition, indicate a representative, and the signatures must be certified by the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker, pursuant to Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

If the application were submitted by a resolution of the Seimas, Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court would apply regarding preliminary examination within 3 days. Upon accepting the petition for examination, the President of the Constitutional Court would publish a notice on the Court’s website and submit it to the Register of Legal Acts. Under Article 106 of the Constitution and Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the validity of such an act of the Seimas would be suspended from the publication of the notice in the Register of Legal Acts.

The timing of the registration of the 2020 Programme is legally significant only if it demonstrates a constitutional defect in the adoption of the act of the Seimas itself. The registration calendar is not an independent subject matter of a Constitutional Court case if the petition does not show its connection with the challenged act of the Seimas. At this point, the LSDP’s argument must move from political analogy to a normative link between the entry into force of the decree, the consideration of the Programme, and the resolution of the Seimas.

The Constitutional Court case concerning the Seimas resolution of 10 December 1996 on the Government Programme shows that approval of the Government Programme is a proper object of constitutional review. The source’s reference to the Constitutional Court ruling of 10 January 1998 underscores the Government’s special position within the executive branch as a collegial institution of general competence. This strengthens the premise that the procedure for approving the Programme is not merely an internal technical matter of the Seimas. Where the dispute is directed at the procedure for granting powers to the Government, the Constitutional Court’s competence under Article 102 of the Constitution becomes direct.

The ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania of 2 July 2012 in administrative case No. A662-2007/2012 states that a referral is determined by the court’s reasoned doubts, not by the position of the parties. This rule does not directly transfer to the competence of a group of Members of the Seimas, but it illustrates the general procedural logic. A constitutional case must be based on legal grounds, because Article 106 of the Constitution allows the Constitutional Court to refuse an application based on non-legal grounds. If the 29 signatures are merely a form of political counter-initiative, the petition is weakened even before substantive examination.

Consequences

There are three realistic scenarios: the petition fails to collect the required signatures, the petition does not meet the formal requirements, or the Constitutional Court accepts it for examination. If the case is accepted, the Constitutional Court, under Article 71 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, will have to declare the challenged act either not contrary to, or contrary to, the Constitution. If a conflict were established only in respect of part of the act, the ruling would have to specify precisely that part and the violated provisions of the Constitution.

In practical terms, this matters not only for the former Government, but also for the standard applicable to the current dispute over the Programme. The Constitutional Court’s conclusion on the 2020 procedure could define whether registration of the Programme before the entry into force of the Presidential decree has constitutional significance. The next point to monitor is whether 29 signatures will be collected and whether a petition complying with Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court will be submitted; upon receipt of a Seimas resolution, the issue of acceptance by the Constitutional Court must be decided within 3 days under Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

The sharp line is this: a final and enforceable judgment is still not the trigger for impeachment if the fact of the criminal offence may yet be reviewed in cassation.

Revocation of a mandate is not a temporary procedural measure, because Article 63 of the Constitution does not provide for restoration of the mandate as an independent ground.

Core issue

The threshold for impeachment here is not political intolerance, but the point at which the commission of a criminal offence becomes constitutionally sufficiently final to justify the removal of a mandate. The issue is to be resolved under Article 74 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 63(5) of the Constitution, Article 62 of the Constitution, and Article 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The news fact is narrow: consideration is being given to whether impeachment of a member of the Seimas is possible already after a conviction by an appellate court. Article 74 of the Constitution permits the Seimas, by a three-fifths majority vote of all its members, to revoke the mandate of a member of the Seimas where it transpires that a criminal offence has been committed. Article 63(5) of the Constitution identifies such a decision as an independent ground for the termination of the powers of a member of the Seimas. Article 62 of the Constitution also explains the initial precondition for criminal proceedings: a member of the Seimas may not be held criminally liable without the consent of the Seimas.

Legal assessment

When these provisions are applied, the procedure divides into two separate planes: the criminal case and constitutional liability. Article 225(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure assigns such cases to a regional court where the accused was a member of the Seimas at the time of the criminal act. Article 225(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for a panel of three judges in cases in which the accused were members of the Seimas at the time of the criminal act. The sequence of duties and competences arising from the provisions cited is as follows:

• Under Article 62 of the Constitution, the Seimas decides whether to consent to holding a member of the Seimas criminally liable.
• The criminal case is heard under Article 225 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where special rules of jurisdiction apply.
• Under Article 74 of the Constitution, the Seimas may revoke the mandate only through impeachment proceedings.
• The constitutional ground for loss of mandate is recorded in Article 63(5) of the Constitution.

The sharp line is this: a final and enforceable judgment is still not the trigger for impeachment if the fact of the criminal offence may yet be reviewed in cassation. The Constitutional Court ruling of 24 February 2017 referred to in the report means that the circumstances relevant to impeachment must be established beyond doubt, that is, finally. This conclusion is consistent with the constitutional nature of cassation identified in the Constitutional Court ruling of 28 March 2006: cassation resolves questions of the application of law and cannot be negated by statute. Therefore, under Article 76 of the Constitution, the Statute of the Seimas establishes the procedure for the Seimas’ work, but it cannot expand the condition laid down in Article 74 of the Constitution itself. The competence of the Constitutional Court is important here not as arbitration of a political dispute, but as protection of the supremacy of the Constitution. Article 1 of the Law on the Constitutional Court provides that the Court guarantees the supremacy of the Constitution and constitutional legality. Article 56 of the Law on the Constitutional Court also provides that a ruling must state its operative part and that the ruling is final and not subject to appeal. If doubt arose as to the conformity of a legal act with the Constitution, Article 64 of the Law on the Constitutional Court would require legally reasoned doubt.

Consequences

In practical terms, this means that a rushed impeachment would create constitutional risk if the cassation court were later to quash the conviction. Revocation of a mandate is not a temporary procedural measure, because Article 63 of the Constitution does not provide for restoration of the mandate as an independent ground. A political majority therefore cannot correct a premature impeachment by later analogy with procedural codes. There are three realistic scenarios:

• if no cassation appeal is lodged within the prescribed time limit, the Seimas may proceed to impeachment under Article 74 of the Constitution;
• if a cassation appeal is lodged, the decision of the Supreme Court of Lithuania on whether to accept or examine the appeal is awaited;
• if a dispute arises as to the conformity of the Statute of the Seimas or another act with the Constitution, the relevant entities may initiate constitutional review under Articles 64-65 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

This is practically important for the Seimas, because the three-fifths majority of all members required under Article 74 of the Constitution must be gathered only when the constitutional ground has already matured. It is also important for voters, because Article 63 of the Constitution protects the continuity of the mandate against grounds not provided for by the Constitution itself. Procedurally, the next step is to await the expiry of the time limit for lodging a cassation appeal or a procedural decision of the Supreme Court of Lithuania concerning cassation; only then does a clear basis emerge for impeachment action by the Seimas.

The possibility of cassation does not alter the fact that the judgment has become final, but it does alter the assessment of impeachment risk.

In this case, the cost of haste by the Seimas is not a procedural error, but the possible termination of a mandate on a basis that the Supreme Court of Lithuania may still remove.

Core issue

The possibility of cassation does not alter the fact that the judgment has become final, but it does alter the assessment of impeachment risk. The real dispute is not about the political weight of guilt, but about when an offence should be regarded as having been established with sufficient stability to terminate a mandate. The reported fact is that, following the final judgment of the Court of Appeal, R. Žemaitaitis intends to file a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court of Lithuania. The issue is to be assessed under Article 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Articles 381–382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 47 of the Criminal Code, and Articles 238 and 239 of the Statute of the Seimas as cited in the source.

Legal assessment

Under Article 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a cassation appeal is filed precisely against a final judgment or ruling. This means that finality and cassation review coexist under this model; they do not negate one another.

• R. Žemaitaitis, as the convicted person, has the right under Article 367(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to appeal a final judgment by way of cassation.
• His defence counsel may file an appeal under Article 367(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, provided this does not conflict with the defendant’s written expression of will.
• Under Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court of Lithuania may not only dismiss the appeal, but also quash or amend the judgment, or remit the case for a fresh hearing.

These powers of the Supreme Court of Lithuania are the principal argument against automatic termination of the mandate before the cassation proceedings have concluded. Impeachment initiated solely on the basis of an appellate judgment would rest on an act that Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure still permits to be amended or quashed. In this case, the cost of haste by the Seimas is not a procedural error, but the possible termination of a mandate on a basis that the Supreme Court of Lithuania may still remove.

Under Article 47(1) and (5) of the Criminal Code, a fine is a monetary penalty imposed by the court, and its amount is determined by the court. The EUR 10,000 amount stated in the report shows that criminal liability has already materialised in the form of a penalty, but it does not answer the question of the proper timing of impeachment. On the impeachment procedure side, the source refers to Article 74 of the Constitution, under which the procedure for impeachment is established by the Statute of the Seimas. The same source states that, under Article 238 of the Statute of the Seimas, impeachment proceedings may be terminated, while under Article 239 of the Statute of the Seimas they may be initiated and are linked to an application to the Constitutional Court. The Seimas applies to the Constitutional Court for a conclusion in impeachment proceedings by way of resolution, as this is also connected with Article 76 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court’s ruling of 19 September 2002 in case No. 34/2000-28/01 is relevant to this situation in terms of the limits of competence. It held that the Constitutional Court may examine the conformity with the Constitution of acts adopted and officially published by the Seimas. This means that a resolution of the Seimas in impeachment proceedings is not merely a political gesture; it falls within the logic of constitutional review.

Consequences

Realistically, there are two possible paths. The first is that the Seimas initiates the procedure now, relying on the final judgment and the mechanism set out in Article 239 of the Statute of the Seimas. That path accelerates the process, but leaves it dependent on the Supreme Court of Lithuania’s decisions under Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The second path is that the Seimas waits for the Supreme Court of Lithuania’s selection decision or for the conclusion of the cassation case. This path reduces the risk that the basis for impeachment will later be amended or quashed. It is politically slower, but legally more consistent with the function of cassation as review of a final decision. In practical terms, this matters for three addressees.

• The Seimas, because a resolution to initiate impeachment must be based on procedurally sustainable grounds.
• R. Žemaitaitis, because Article 367 of the Code of Criminal Procedure gives him the right to seek review of the final judgment.
• The voters, because the question of the mandate should not be decided while disregarding the powers of the Supreme Court of Lithuania under Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Procedurally, the next expected step is a cassation appeal or a decision on its admissibility; thereafter, the Seimas will have to decide whether to adopt a resolution under Article 239 of the Statute of the Seimas or to wait until the Supreme Court of Lithuania adopts one of the rulings specified in Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Intensive supervision is not a technical issue concerning an electronic ankle tag, but a court-controlled remand measure with an autonomous regime.

Following the regional court’s decision, that argument no longer rewrites the district court’s ruling at this stage of appeal.

Core issue

Intensive supervision is not a technical issue concerning an electronic ankle tag, but a court-controlled remand measure with an autonomous regime. The dispute is governed by Articles 120, 121, 125, 131¹ and 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. The newsworthy fact is narrow: Kaunas Regional Court upheld the ruling of Vilnius City District Court concerning intensive supervision.

• Article 120 of the CCP lists intensive supervision among remand measures.
• Article 121(1) of the CCP permits it to be imposed only by order of a pre-trial investigation judge or a court.
• Article 131¹(1) of the CCP defines it as control of a suspect by electronic monitoring measures.
• Article 139 of the CCP establishes the route for revocation, replacement or mitigation.

Legal assessment

Under the provisions cited, the status of a member of parliament does not alter the legal nature of intensive supervision. What is decisive for the court is not the convenience of performing official duties, but whether the grounds and conditions for the remand measure remain in place. Article 121(2) of the CCP requires sufficient data to support the belief that the suspect committed a criminal offence. Article 125(1) and (2) of the CCP require a reasoned ruling specifying the suspicion, the data and the purpose of the remand measure.

• The suspect has the right to access the material submitted by the prosecutor before the hearing.
• The court has a duty to state in its ruling the purpose and factual basis of the measure.
• Under Article 131¹(6) of the CCP, the suspect must wear an electronic monitoring device and comply with the schedule.
• Under Article 131¹(7) of the CCP, the suspect is prohibited from removing, damaging or destroying the device.

The ankle tag here is not, in itself, a restriction on work, but the form of implementation of Article 131¹ of the CCP. If it interferes with a member of the Seimas’s schedule, the dispute must become an argument for changing the conditions under Article 139 of the CCP.

A short-term permission not to wear the device is legally consistent with mitigation of the conditions, provided it is granted by a decision of the competent authority. Article 139(2) of the CCP specifically assigns to the prosecutor, during the pre-trial investigation, the duty to revoke or mitigate the conditions of intensive supervision when the grounds or conditions cease to exist. Skvernelis’s argument concerning duties in the Seimas could have been relevant only insofar as it negated the need for the measure or justified less restrictive conditions. Following the regional court’s decision, that argument no longer rewrites the district court’s ruling at this stage of appeal.

Consequences

The practical consequence is clear: intensive supervision remains in force under the conditions set by the district court’s ruling. If the obligations concerning wearing the device or complying with the schedule are breached, Article 131¹(5) of the CCP permits a warning that detention may be imposed, if there are grounds for it. Three procedural routes remain possible:

• The measure is enforced until the expiry of the term set in the court ruling.
• The prosecutor revokes or mitigates it under Article 139(2) of the CCP if the grounds or conditions cease to exist.
• The pre-trial investigation judge extends the term for up to 3 months under Article 131¹(4) of the CCP, with no limit on the number of extensions.

This is practically important for planning by the suspect, defence counsel, the prosecutor and the Seimas. The next monitoring point is the expiry of the intensive supervision term or a prosecutor’s decision under Article 139 of the CCP on revocation or mitigation of the conditions.

The core of this dispute is not the comfort of the ankle monitor, but whether prior breaches of the prohibition on communication justify stricter supervision.

In this case, the legal rationale for the ankle monitor is straightforward: a suspect who breaches a less severe non-communication regime himself creates grounds for examining the need for stricter electronic supervision.

Core issue

The core of this dispute is not the comfort of the ankle monitor, but whether prior breaches of the prohibition on communication justify stricter supervision. This is determined under Articles 119, 120(1), 121(1)–(3), 125, 1311 and 139 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. The factual sequence is narrow: the Kaunas Regional Court upheld intensive supervision because systematic communication with another suspect had been established. Under Article 119 of the CCP, a remand measure is imposed to ensure an unobstructed pre-trial investigation and to prevent new offences.

Legal assessment

Under Article 120(1) of the CCP, intensive supervision is an independent remand measure, and under Article 1311(1) of the CCP it means supervision of the suspect by electronic monitoring devices. The ankle monitor is therefore not a punishment for communication, but a procedural measure intended to ensure that the investigation is not obstructed.

• Article 121(1) of the CCP requires a ruling by a judge or court when intensive supervision is imposed.
• Article 121(2) of the CCP requires sufficient data to believe that the suspect committed a criminal offence.
• Article 121(3) of the CCP permits the simultaneous imposition of several remand measures less severe than detention.
• Article 125 of the CCP requires a reasoned ruling specifying the purpose and the data justifying the measure.

Systematic communication with another suspect is directly linked to the purpose of Article 119 of the CCP: protecting the unobstructed conduct of the pre-trial investigation. Where a written undertaking not to leave, coupled with non-communication obligations, proves ineffective, the court may consider that the less severe measure has failed to achieve its purpose. In this case, the legal rationale for the ankle monitor is straightforward: a suspect who breaches a less severe non-communication regime himself creates grounds for examining the need for stricter electronic supervision. The complaint argument concerning restrictions on work and personal activities is relevant, under the cited provisions, only to the proportionality assessment, but it does not negate the purpose of Article 119 of the CCP.

Under Article 1311(6) of the CCP, the suspect must wear an electronic monitoring device and comply with the prescribed daily schedule. Under Article 1311(7) of the CCP, he is prohibited from removing, damaging or destroying the device.

Consequences

In practical terms, upholding the ruling may lead to three procedural outcomes. First, intensive supervision continues until the expiry of the term set in the ruling under Article 1311(4) of the CCP.

• If the grounds do not cease to exist, the prosecutor may request an extension of up to 3 months.
• If the grounds cease to exist, under Article 139(2) of the CCP the prosecutor must immediately revoke the measure or mitigate its conditions.
• If the conditions are breached, under Article 1311(5) of the CCP the suspect is warned of possible detention, provided that grounds for it exist.

Temporary departure from Lithuania does not alter the status of the remand measure itself if it has not been revoked or varied under Article 139 of the CCP. When the person returns, the practical issue becomes one of enforcement: who restores electronic supervision, and when, under the ruling in force. This is important not only for S. Skvernelis but also for other suspects, because compliance with the prohibition on communication becomes the central criterion for protecting the investigation. The next expected step is police action to reattach the device and, before expiry of the term set in the ruling, a procedural decision by the prosecutor or the court under Article 139 of the CCP on continuation, variation or revocation of the measure.

A cassation argument must target not the emotion of the dispute, but an error of law: incorrect classification, incorrect application of the general provisions of the Criminal Code, or a material procedural defect.

Until a final judgment has been quashed or amended, under Article 346(1) CCP it is binding and enforceable throughout the Republic of Lithuania, and under Article 346(3) CCP its enforcement is supervised by the prosecutor.

Core issue

Cassation here is not a third examination of the facts: the Supreme Court of Lithuania will only review whether the conviction is based on the proper application of criminal law and whether there were any material procedural violations.

A. Vyšniauskas’s request to terminate the case or remit it to the appellate instance will be decided under Articles 369, 372, 382, and 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

• The news item is narrow in scope: on 27 July 2026, the Supreme Court received a cassation appeal challenging the conviction and seeking litigation costs.
• Under Article 369(1) CCP, cassation is possible only on two grounds: improper application of the criminal law or material violations of the CCP.
• Under Article 369(2) CCP, improper application of the criminal law includes incorrect application of the general provisions of the Criminal Code and incorrect legal classification of the act.
• Under Article 369(3) CCP, a material procedural violation is one that restricted the accused’s rights or prevented a comprehensive and impartial examination of the case.

Legal assessment

The appeal’s rhetoric about “erroneous interpretations of factual circumstances” is relevant before the Supreme Court only insofar as it is linked to the legal grounds for cassation set out in Article 369 CCP.

A cassation argument must target not the emotion of the dispute, but an error of law: incorrect classification, incorrect application of the general provisions of the Criminal Code, or a material procedural defect.

If the appeal merely retells the facts of the case, that alone does not bring it within the cassation framework of Article 369 CCP.

• Under Article 372(1) CCP, the President of the Supreme Court, the Chair of the Criminal Cases Division, or a judge acting on their instruction first checks for obstacles to admissibility.
• The review examines whether the appeal is repetitive, whether the time limit under Article 370(1) CCP has been missed, whether there is any prohibition on appeal, and whether the appeal has been signed.
• If there is no ground for return, under Article 372(2) CCP the case file is requested and transferred to a selection panel of three judges.
• Under Article 372(3) CCP, the appeal is deemed admitted if at least one member of the selection panel votes in favour.

The request for procedural costs is not merely a declaration of unfairness: under Article 105(5) CCP, if proceedings are terminated or the accused is acquitted, procedural costs are paid from state funds.

If the conviction remains in force, Article 105(1) CCP allows the court to recover procedural costs from the convicted person.

Any civil claim or compensation component, if present in the case, would be based on Article 109 CCP, under which a person who has suffered damage may bring a civil claim in criminal proceedings.

If the accused or persons responsible for the accused’s actions lack funds, Article 118 CCP provides for possible compensation of damage from state funds in cases established by law.

The financial sanctions framework in the sources provided is reflected through Article 47 CC: a fine is calculated in MGL amounts.

For a criminal misdemeanour, it ranges from 15 to 500 MGL; for a minor crime, from 50 to 2,000 MGL; and for a less serious crime, from 100 to 4,000 MGL.

For a serious crime, the fine may range from 150 to 6,000 MGL, while for a negligent crime it ranges from 20 to 750 MGL.

If offences under Chapter XXXIII of the Criminal Code apply, Article 47(6) CC provides that the fine may not be lower than the value of the subject matter of the offence, the damage caused, or the benefit obtained or sought.

Consequences

The first scenario is that the appeal is returned under Article 372(1) CCP if a formal obstacle is identified.

The second scenario is that the selection panel admits the appeal, and the Supreme Court examines issues of law under Article 369 CCP.

The third scenario is that, after examining the case, the Supreme Court may, under Article 382 CCP, dismiss the appeal, quash the judgment and terminate the case, remit it for re-examination, or amend the judgment.

If the appeal is dismissed, Article 384(5) CCP requires reasons explaining why the appeal is unfounded and the judgment is lawful.

If the case is terminated, Article 384(6) CCP requires the ground for termination to be specified.

If the case is remitted for re-examination, Article 384(7) CCP requires identification of the specific material violations of the CCP or the error in the application of the criminal law.

Until a final judgment has been quashed or amended, under Article 346(1) CCP it is binding and enforceable throughout the Republic of Lithuania, and under Article 346(3) CCP its enforcement is supervised by the prosecutor.

Procedurally, the next expected step is the ruling of the Supreme Court’s selection panel under Article 372(3) CCP: it will show whether the appeal proceeds to cassation review or whether the case ends at the admissibility stage.

⚠ Correction. The article’s statement that 29 signatures of members of the Seimas are required for an application to the Constitutional Court is incomplete. Article 106 of the Constitution does not set a fixed number, but formulates a rule: “no fewer than one-fifth of all members of the Seimas”. It would be more precise to state that an application concerning an act of the Seimas requires the signatures of no fewer than one-fifth of all members of the Seimas; 29 is merely the arithmetical result of that rule where the Seimas has 141 members. This is not a minor point, because the applicant’s right to apply to the Constitutional Court must be directly substantiated in the application under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

The Government Programme cannot be constitutionally detached from the composition of the Government, because Article 91 of the Constitution defines the Government through the Prime Minister and ministers.

The procedural challenge will be strong only insofar as it demonstrates a link between the timing of the registration of documents and the competence of the Seimas to approve the Government Programme.

Core issue

The dispute is not merely about the political calendar: it will test whether the Seimas empowered the Government to act in a constitutionally recognizable composition.

The legal axis is procedural, because even a proper voting result does not cure the defect, identified in the basis of the application, concerning the moment of competence.

• The issue will be determined under Article 91 of the Constitution, because the Government consists of the Prime Minister and ministers.
• Article 101 of the Constitution is also applicable, as it links the Government’s powers, responsibility, and the consequences of resignation.
• The right to apply and its limits are established by Article 106 of the Constitution and Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.
• Of the cited case law, the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 10 January 1998 is relevant, in which the granting of powers to the Government was assigned to the competence of the Seimas.

Legal assessment

Under Article 106 of the Constitution, not less than one-fifth of all members of the Seimas may apply to the Constitutional Court concerning an act of the Seimas.

The threshold of 29 signatures of members of the Seimas referred to in the news item corresponds to this constitutional proportion.

Under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the application must precisely identify the contested resolution of the Seimas, its date, number, and legal arguments.

An application by a group of members of the Seimas must be signed by all applying members of the Seimas, and the signatures must be certified by the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker.

If the application is submitted electronically, the cited version of Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court requires qualified electronic certification.

The procedural challenge will be strong only insofar as it demonstrates a link between the timing of the registration of documents and the competence of the Seimas to approve the Government Programme.

Not every early movement of a document in itself invalidates a resolution of the Seimas, but an unlawful submitting authority for the programme may affect the procedure for adopting the act.

The Government Programme cannot be constitutionally detached from the composition of the Government, because Article 91 of the Constitution defines the Government through the Prime Minister and ministers.

If the programme was considered before the cabinet of ministers had been officially formed, the dispute will turn on whether the Seimas was in fact deciding on the Government, rather than on a political project.

The Constitutional Court’s ruling of 10 January 1998 means, for this situation, that the Seimas’s approval of the programme forms part of the granting of powers to the Government to act.

The same cited case law states that the Seimas considers the Government Programme submitted by the Prime Minister and decides whether to approve it.

This narrows the applicants’ argument to a specific question: whether the programme was submitted by the proper subject at the proper procedural moment.

If the application is based solely on a political counter-reaction to another faction’s application, Article 106 of the Constitution allows the Constitutional Court to refuse to accept it.

Consequences

If the Constitutional Court accepts the opposition’s application, it will review whether the Seimas resolution on the Programme of the XXI Government complies with the Constitution in terms of the procedure for its adoption.

If the Social Democrats’ application is formulated with the same degree of specificity, the Seimas resolution of December 2020 may be assessed analogously.

These two initiatives are not legally identical merely because both concern the Government Programme.

Each will depend on the identification of the contested resolution, the factual procedure, and the legal substantiation under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

The practical significance concerns three addressees:

• members of the Seimas, because their signatures and representation determine the admissibility of the application;
• the Government, because approval of the programme is linked to its powers to act;
• the Constitutional Court, because it will have to distinguish a legal procedural defect from a political response.

If the application is submitted only by a group of members of the Seimas, the validity of the contested resolution will not be automatically suspended under Article 106 of the Constitution.

The validity of the act would be suspended by a submission from the President of the Republic or by a resolution of the Seimas to examine the act’s conformity with the Constitution.

The nearest procedural point to monitor is the submission of the application to the Constitutional Court itself and the decision on its acceptance under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court.

⚠ Correction. The article’s statement that a person may approach the State Security Department on their own initiative and be released from criminal liability is formulated too broadly. Article 119(3) of the Criminal Code links exemption not merely to approaching the authorities, but to confession before being recognised as a suspect and to active cooperation in identifying representatives of a foreign state or organisation. In addition, according to the text provided, this provision applies to conduct under Article 119(1) of the Criminal Code, whereas the suspicion described in the news report is in substance based on the elements of paragraph 2. It would be more precise to state that approaching the authorities may be relevant only before suspect status is acquired and only where the conditions set out in Article 119(3) of the Criminal Code are met.

The crux of this case is not merely photographing near military facilities; the decisive element is the assignment and the addressee.

The boundary in this case is simple and strict: collecting military information pursuant to an assignment from Russian services is not curiosity, but a risk under Article 119(2) of the Criminal Code carrying up to 15 years’ imprisonment.

Core issue

The crux of this case is not merely photographing near military facilities; the decisive element is the assignment and the addressee. If the data were collected in execution of an assignment from another state or its representative, the conduct falls within the stricter scope of Article 119(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania.

• News fact: charges have been brought against a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania for collecting information about military facilities, equipment, and movements through “Telegram” communications. The precise legal issue is whether the described acts constitute espionage under Article 119(2) of the Criminal Code, rather than merely unlawful handling of a secret under Article 124 of the Criminal Code. This will be determined by assessing whether there was:
• an assignment from another state, its organization, or their representative;
• collection or transmission of information;
• a state or official secret, or other information of interest to the intelligence service of a foreign state;
• purposeful conduct in assisting another state.

Legal assessment

On the facts presented, the prosecution will have to prove not only the sensitivity of the object, but also the connection with an assignment from the Russian Federation intelligence service. Article 119(2) of the Criminal Code also covers other information of interest to a foreign state’s intelligence service, and is therefore not limited to state secrets alone. Recording military facilities, a manufacturer of radar systems, an army battalion, and movements of military equipment directly corresponds to the element of intelligence interest. The dangerousness of the conduct is heightened by the fact that the information was allegedly not only collected but also transmitted to a person linked to the Russian Ministry of Defence.

In this case, the “Telegram” channel is not a technical detail: it is a potential evidentiary trail of the assignment, communication, and transmission. Article 17(1) of the Law on Intelligence limits the use of intelligence information to assigned tasks and collection purposes. Article 17(2) of the Law on Intelligence permits a criminal intelligence investigation to be initiated on the basis of intelligence information concerning acts under Article 119 of the Criminal Code where the data are not yet sufficient for a pre-trial investigation. Once a criminal intelligence investigation is initiated, the collection of intelligence information about that person must be immediately discontinued under Article 17(3) of the Law on Intelligence.

Court-authorized measures in this situation are consistent with Article 13(1) of the Law on Intelligence, as it permits monitoring and recording information transmitted by electronic communications. Authorization under Article 13(2) of the Law on Intelligence is granted by a regional court judge upon a reasoned submission by the head or deputy head of an intelligence institution. The submission must specify the data concerning the person or object, the reasons for necessity, the data of the communications device, the requested measures, and their duration.

If it is established that locations within intelligence institutions’ areas or military territories were photographed, Article 5(3) of the Law on Intelligence is also relevant. It prohibits filming, photographing, or otherwise visualizing such territories, as well as operating unmanned aircraft over them and within a 200-metre radius. This does not alter the constituent elements of Article 119(2) of the Criminal Code, but it may strengthen the assessment of unlawful information collection.

The defence could seek classification under Article 124 of the Criminal Code if the elements of espionage were rebutted. However, that alternative applies only where the elements of espionage are absent, meaning that evidence of the assignment and transmission becomes central to the case. If the assignment, addressee, and intelligence interest are confirmed, the dispute over the secrecy of individual photographs is no longer decisive.

Article 119(4) of the Criminal Code provides for exemption from criminal liability for an act under paragraph 2 only before a person is recognized as a suspect. There are two conditions: confession and active cooperation in identifying the representatives and their activities. Since the news report states that the person has already been recognized as a suspect, this special possibility no longer appears available to him under the provision as presented.

Consequences

In practical terms, the case is primarily important for anyone who collects visual information about military facilities and sends it to unclear addressees. The boundary in this case is simple and strict: collecting military information pursuant to an assignment from Russian services is not curiosity, but a risk under Article 119(2) of the Criminal Code carrying up to 15 years’ imprisonment.

Three procedural paths are possible next:

• the investigation continues by collecting evidence of communications, photographs, transmission, and the assignment;
• remand measures are imposed under Articles 119 and 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if necessary to ensure participation in the proceedings or an unobstructed investigation;
• the investigation is terminated under Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if sufficient data substantiating guilt are not collected.

Participants in the proceedings or other persons may submit relevant objects and documents under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Time limits will be calculated under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: in hours, days, or months, excluding the starting day. The next point to monitor is the procedural decision, adopted within the time limit set by the prosecutor or the court, concerning the direction of the investigation, remand measures, or termination.

A Baltic-wide contract is legally robust not when signing is fast, but when an evidentiary basis is created in advance for each type of signature.

If the start-up’s solution uses non-qualified signatures, the contracting process must begin not with a “sign” button, but with a written agreement between the parties under Article 5(1).

Core issue

A Baltic-wide digital signing service is assessed legally not by reference to convenience, but by reference to the type of signature, the parties’ agreement, and the status of trust services. For businesses, the decisive question is when an electronic signature is equivalent to a handwritten signature and when an additional evidentiary basis is required. The news item is merely background: the start-up is expanding digital signature and document approval services in the business segment across the Baltic region. The issue is determined under Articles 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, Article 18(4), and Article 184 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions. The applicable limits are as follows:

• Article 5(1) permits a non-qualified electronic signature to be equated with a handwritten signature only where there is a prior written agreement.
• That agreement must be preserved on a durable medium.
• Article 5(4) gives the qualified electronic signature of a representative of a legal person the same effect as a handwritten signature with a seal, where a seal requirement is established.
• Articles 6 and 7 create presumptions concerning validation of the qualified signature and long-term preservation.

Legal assessment

Expansion for business is not merely a technical deployment, because each link in the contractual chain must be aligned with the legal effect of the signature. If the start-up’s solution uses non-qualified signatures, the contracting process must begin not with a “sign” button, but with a written agreement between the parties under Article 5(1). Business parties have the following practical obligations:

• to agree in advance that a non-qualified electronic signature is to be treated as equivalent to a handwritten signature;
• to ensure that the agreement is preserved on a durable medium;
• to verify whether the representative of a legal person signs with a qualified electronic signature where the effect under Article 5(4) is sought;
• to use validation and long-term preservation services where the document must remain verifiable after the period of technological validity.

A Baltic-wide contract is legally robust not when signing is fast, but when an evidentiary basis is created in advance for each type of signature. Article 6(1) gives businesses a procedural advantage, because a qualified validation service allows reliable validation and the correctness of the procedural result to be presumed. Article 7(1) is particularly significant for long-term contracts, because a qualified long-term preservation service maintains the reliability of the signature even after technological validity has expired. The function of electronic registered delivery must not be confused with a signature. Under Article 8, it creates presumptions concerning data integrity, the sender, the recipient, and the time of sending and receipt, but only where there is a prior written agreement and a durable medium. In the field of public procurement, a private tool is subject to an additional limitation. Under Article 22 of the Law on Public Procurement, communication in procurement procedures takes place through the Central Public Procurement Information System, not through an optional business platform. However, Article 22(3) permits communication by means other than that system when signing, terminating, performing, or amending procurement contracts. An analogous rule applies under Article 34 of the Law on Procurement by Contracting Entities Operating in the Water Management, Energy, Transport or Postal Services Sectors. Article 34(3) permits communication relating to the signing, performance, amendment, and termination of procurement contracts to be moved outside the Central Public Procurement Information System.

The competence of the supervisory authority is not merely declaratory. Under Article 18(4), authorisation for supervisory actions is obtained through an administrative court, while in urgent cases actions may be carried out by decision of the director, with a subsequent application to the court within 24 hours. Under Article 184, a qualified electronic identification service provider is subject to administrative liability also for damage caused intentionally or negligently.

Consequences

First scenario: companies use qualified electronic signatures, validation, and long-term preservation, and therefore rely in a dispute on the presumptions under Articles 5 to 7. This model is practically important for long-term supply, employment, lease, and services contracts. Second scenario: companies use non-qualified signatures but do not enter into a prior written agreement. In that case, the route under Article 5(1) to equivalence with a handwritten signature is lost. Third scenario: the service is used in a procurement environment, but at the procedural stage Article 22 of the Law on Public Procurement or Article 34 of the special-sector law is disregarded. The risk then arises not from the signature technology, but from the improper choice of the mandatory communication channel. In practical terms, businesses will next need to verify the type of signature, the form of agreements, the archiving solution, and the validation service. If the supervisory authority suspects infringements, an application to the administrative court of first instance under Article 18(4) can be expected, which must be examined within 72 hours.

⚠ Correction. The assertion that 29 signatures of Members of the Seimas are required in order to apply to the Constitutional Court is incomplete. Article 106 of the Constitution does not set a fixed number, but a requirement: at least one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas. Only where there are 141 Members of the Seimas does this threshold in practice mean 29 signatures. It would be more accurate to say: an application requires at least one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas, which currently amounts to 29 Members of the Seimas.

Registration of the Programme in the name of a non-existent Government is not a calendrical error, but a problem concerning the source of authority under the principle of the rule of law.

In proceedings before the Constitutional Court, what will be decisive is not political rhetoric about chronology, but whether the contested procedure is shown to constitute a constitutional defect in a specific act of the Seimas.

Core issue

The dispute is not merely about a date: the Constitutional Court will have to assess whether an act adopted by the Seimas may rely on a procedure initiated before the relevant entity had acquired a clearly confirmed status. This issue falls to be resolved under Article 106 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, Articles 66, 26, 29 and 71 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, and the constitutional principle of the rule of law as described in the doctrine provided. The factual axis is narrow: the draft Government Programme was registered on 3 July 2026, while the Presidential decree on the composition of the Government is indicated as having followed later. The right of referral is determined not by the political position of the opposition, but by the threshold in Article 106 of the Constitution: not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas.

Legal assessment

Under Article 106 of the Constitution, the Government, not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas, or the courts may apply to the Constitutional Court regarding acts adopted by the Seimas.

• Under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, a request by a group of Members of the Seimas must be signed by all Members of the Seimas submitting the request.
• Those signatures must be certified by the signature of the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker of the Seimas.
• The request must specify the exact title of the contested act, the date of its adoption, the applicant’s position and the legal reasoning.

The Constitutional Court will not examine an abstract political dispute over “legality” unless the request is framed as the conformity of a specific act of the Seimas with the Constitution. Article 106 of the Constitution allows the Constitutional Court to refuse to accept a referral if it is not based on legal grounds. The opposition’s procedural argument is strongest where it is linked to the limits of authority and the requirement of legal clarity. Registration of the Programme in the name of a non-existent Government is not a calendrical error, but a problem concerning the source of authority under the principle of the rule of law.

The doctrine provided states that state institutions must act on the basis of law and in obedience to law. It also states that public authorities may not exceed the powers established in the Constitution and may not encroach upon the competence of another institution. The Constitutional Court’s ruling of 13 December 2004 in case No. 51/01-26/02-19/03-22/03-26/03-27/03 links the principle of the rule of law with legal certainty and clarity. In this situation, that means that an undefined circle of entities entitled to register the Programme may be assessed as a problem of regulatory clarity if it permits the commencement of a constitutionally significant procedure in an unclear name.

The Constitutional Court’s ruling of 8 July 2016, No. KT22-N11/2016, emphasised the hierarchy of legal acts and the requirement that implementing acts be adopted on the basis of laws. That case is relevant not because of the Government Programme itself, but because of the general criterion: procedural regulation of lower legal force cannot negate requirements of higher legal force. The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania of 11 September 2017 in administrative case No. I-12-502/2017 shows that a court may examine conformity with the principle of the rule of law where this is necessary to assess the legality of a normative act. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court’s assessment need not be confined to the formal date of registration if the contested regulation concerns the procedure for adopting the act.

Consequences

There are two principal possible outcomes under Article 71 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court may recognise that the Seimas resolution is not contrary to the Constitution, or it may recognise that it is contrary to specific provisions of the Constitution or to laws. If the referral is accepted as a request by a group of Members of the Seimas, the mere submission of that request will not in itself suspend the validity of the contested act. Article 106 of the Constitution links suspension to a submission by the President or to a resolution of the Seimas requesting examination of the act’s conformity, while Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court sets out the notification to the Register of Legal Acts in detail.

The practical significance for the Seimas would be twofold. One consequence would be an assessment of the constitutionality of the specific resolution on the Government Programme; the other would be a clearer boundary as to who may initiate the parliamentary procedure for such a programme and when. For both the governing majority and the opposition, the key issue after the signatures have been collected is not their number, but the legal precision of the request under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. In proceedings before the Constitutional Court, what will be decisive is not political rhetoric about chronology, but whether the contested procedure is shown to constitute a constitutional defect in a specific act of the Seimas.

Procedurally, the next steps are to await submission of the request to the Constitutional Court, verification of its compliance with Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, and commencement of the examination no later than within 7 days under Article 29 of that Law. If the case is accepted, the ruling should generally be expected within 4 months from the date on which the request is received by the Constitutional Court, unless the Constitutional Court determines otherwise.

⚠ Correction. The news item inaccurately formulates the threshold as “exceeding 1.5 per mille”. The precise threshold under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code is “a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more”, so it would be more accurate to state that criminal liability arises from 1.51 per mille. The phrase “possible confiscation of the car” is also too abstract. Under Article 72(3) of the Criminal Code, confiscable property belonging to the offender must be confiscated, whereas property belonging to a third party is subject to the additional conditions set out in Article 72(4) of the Criminal Code.

In this case, 1.89 per mille is not a sentencing detail, but the key to classification, moving the driving from the sphere of administrative liability into a criminal case.

If the Peugeot 5008 belongs to the offender, Article 72(3) of the Criminal Code establishes mandatory confiscation in all cases.

Core issue

The threshold for criminal liability in this situation depends not on the consequences of the traffic incident, but on the established level of intoxication. For a result of 1.89 per mille, it is sufficient to verify whether a motor vehicle was driven and whether the level reaches the 1.51 per mille threshold set out in Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. - Factual line: on 26 July 2026, in Panevėžys, the driver of a stopped Peugeot 5008 was found to have 1.89 per mille. The matter will be assessed under Article 281¹(1), Article 19, and Article 72 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and the provided Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the indictment. Article 281 of the Criminal Code is relevant to this report as the boundary for consequence-based cases, since it covers traffic accidents, bodily injury, or substantial property damage. | Provision | Threshold or consequence |

Legal assessment

Under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code, the offence covers driving a motor vehicle where intoxication of 1.51 per mille or more is established. The 1.89 per mille value stated in the report exceeds that threshold by 0.38 per mille, and therefore the administrative threshold of 0.41-1.5 per mille does not determine the classification. - Under point 3 of the provided Rules, police officers test a driver suspected of intoxication.

• Where more than 1.5 per mille is detected in exhaled air, point 3 of the Rules provides for referral for a medical examination.
• The pre-trial investigation is logically linked to the elements of Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code, not to Article 427 of the Code of Administrative Offences.
• The pre-trial investigation is completed by the prosecutor’s indictment under Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this case, 1.89 per mille is not a sentencing detail, but the key to classification, moving the driving from the sphere of administrative liability into a criminal case. Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code excludes the argument that intoxication in itself exempts a person from criminal liability. The exception under Article 19(2) is linked only to intoxication caused by another person against the individual’s will and to the specified conditions of awareness or control. The issue of loss of the vehicle is resolved through Article 72 of the Criminal Code, since property subject to confiscation includes an instrument or means of a prohibited act. If the Peugeot 5008 belongs to the offender, Article 72(3) of the Criminal Code establishes mandatory confiscation in all cases. If the car belongs to another person, Article 72(4) permits confiscation only where the conditions specified therein are met, for example knowledge that it would be used for a criminal offence.

Consequences

In practical terms, the driver faces not an administrative fine for repeated drunk driving, but a criminal case under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code. The court will be able to choose from three types of sanction: a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. - For the driver, the key contested issues will be the lawfulness of the intoxication test, the fact of driving, and ownership of the vehicle.

• For the prosecution, it is important to collect data supporting the indictment under Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
• For the owner of the car, it is important whether the conditions of Article 72(3) or Article 72(4) of the Criminal Code apply.
• The court will have to decide separately on the penalty and on the property subject to confiscation. If the charge is upheld, a conviction will make the driver a convicted person under the provided excerpt from the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the status of the accused. If the charge is not proven, the same excerpt indicates the procedural consequence of an acquittal. Procedurally, the next expected step is completion of the pre-trial investigation and the prosecutor’s indictment under Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, after which the case will be heard by the court.

The core issue in this case will not be whether the statements were politically radical, but whether, in legal terms, they amounted to assistance to Belarus in acting against the Republic of Lithuania under Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code.

Reopening the investigation is not, in itself, the serving of a notice of suspicion, since, according to reports, no suspicions have been brought against anyone.

Core issue

The issue here is not the fact of the trip, but the prosecutor’s duty to distinguish political expression from assistance to a foreign state in acting against the State. The decision will be assessed under Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 217(1)–(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Article 170(4)(4) of the CCP. - Factual premise: the investigation concerning E. Vaitkus was discontinued on 5 June 2026 and reopened on 3 July 2026.

• Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code requires an assessment of whether assistance was provided to another state or its organisation in acting against the Republic of Lithuania.
• The protected interests are the constitutional order, sovereignty, territorial integrity, defence capacity, or economic power. | Provision | Penalty |

Legal assessment

Under Article 217(1) of the CCP, a prosecutor may reopen an investigation on the basis of complaints by participants in the proceedings or on the prosecutor’s own initiative, where grounds exist. Under the same provision, reopening is effected by a prosecutor’s ruling, after setting aside the ruling discontinuing the pre-trial investigation. - Article 217(2) of the CCP links reopening to essential circumstances relevant to the proper resolution of the case.

• Article 170(4)(4) of the CCP provides that only the prosecutor decides on reopening a discontinued pre-trial investigation.
• Article 170(6) of the CCP allows a superior prosecutor to set aside unlawful or unfounded prosecutorial rulings. Reopening the investigation is not, in itself, the serving of a notice of suspicion, since, according to reports, no suspicions have been brought against anyone. This means that the process has returned to the stage of collecting and verifying data, not to the accusation stage. The core issue in this case will not be whether the statements were politically radical, but whether, in legal terms, they amounted to assistance to Belarus in acting against the Republic of Lithuania under Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code. The Prosecutor’s Office will have to connect public statements, comments, or interviews with a specific course of action by a foreign state or its organisation. - Under Article 178(1) of the CCP, the prosecutor and investigator may question witnesses, apply procedural coercive measures, and carry out other procedural acts.
• Under Article 98 of the CCP, any natural or legal person may submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation.
• Under Article 178(2) of the CCP, requests by participants in the proceedings for procedural acts must be examined within 10 days.
• Under Article 178(3) of the CCP, a refusal to carry out requested acts may be appealed within 7 days, and the judge examines the complaint within 7 days. If the investigation were discontinued again, the ruling, pursuant to Article 216(1) of the CCP, would have to set out the substance of the act, the grounds for discontinuance, and the reasons. Such a ruling may be appealed under Article 214(4)–(5) of the CCP within 20 days from receipt of a copy, and the superior prosecutor must examine the complaint no later than within 20 days.

Consequences

First scenario: after additional steps, the Prosecutor’s Office again discontinues the investigation if sufficient data to substantiate guilt are not collected, pursuant to Article 212(2) of the CCP. In that event, the dispute would shift to the level of the reasoning of the ruling and the time limits for appeal. Second scenario: if sufficient data are collected, a person may be served with a notice of suspicion, and the investigation continues to completion under Article 218(1) of the CCP. The suspect, defence counsel, and other participants in the proceedings would then acquire the right to access the pre-trial investigation file and submit requests to supplement the investigation. Third scenario: if the conditions of Article 118(3) of the Criminal Code were established, a person who confessed and actively cooperated before being recognised as a suspect could be released from criminal liability. This exception does not apply if the person has already been released on such grounds or if a person died or serious consequences arose as a result of the act under Article 118(4) of the Criminal Code. In practical terms, this is important for E. Vaitkus’s procedural position, oversight of prosecutorial decisions, and the limits for legally classifying public statements. Procedurally, the next expected step is either a ruling on procedural acts, a new ruling discontinuing the investigation, or the notice of completion of the pre-trial investigation provided for in Article 218(1) of the CCP.

Where a service is activated automatically and the consumer is forced to stop it, the legal risk does not shift to the consumer’s account, but to the operator’s evidentiary burden.

The 1-2 percent customer scope indicated in the notice does not alter the individual rule: each consumer requires separate consent to an additional charge.

Core issue

The core of the automatic travel insurance dispute is not the form of the SMS, but proof of intent to enter into a paid ancillary service.

If the operator bases the charge on the consumer’s inaction, such a model conflicts with Article 6.22816 of the Civil Code, Article 6.2285(3) of the Civil Code, and Article 38 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection.

The factual premise is narrow: while abroad, the consumer received automatically activated travel insurance, opted out of it, but the fee was nevertheless charged.

The issue will be resolved by reference to three rules: the prohibition on unsolicited services, the requirement of express consent to an additional charge, and the prohibition on financial services provided without consent.

• Article 6.22816(1) of the Civil Code provides that the consumer is under no obligation to pay for unsolicited services.
• Article 6.22816(2) of the Civil Code states that the consumer’s silence is not deemed consent to purchase.
• Article 6.22816(3) of the Civil Code places the burden of proving the order on the trader.
• Article 6.2285(3) of the Civil Code requires the consumer’s express consent to each additional charge.
• Article 38(1) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection prohibits financial services without the consumer’s consent where payment is demanded for them.

Legal assessment

Under the cited provisions, it is not sufficient for the operator to show that an SMS was sent or that the service was deactivated by a later act of the consumer.

The operator must prove the consumer’s affirmative intention to order travel insurance, because Article 6.22816(3) of the Civil Code assigns that burden specifically to the operator.

The travel insurance charge after refusal is the operator’s weakest position, because the consumer’s refusal negates both silence and implied acceptance.

Where a service is activated automatically and the consumer is forced to stop it, the legal risk does not shift to the consumer’s account, but to the operator’s evidentiary burden.

If the operator relied on a default setting that the consumer had to reject, Article 6.2285(3) of the Civil Code applies.

That provision directly grants the right to recover additional charges where consent was inferred from pre-selected options.

Article 38(2) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection further provides that the consumer is released from any liability connected with the use of such a service.

The basis for the competence of the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority arises from Article 6.2282(2) of the Civil Code and Article 7 of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection.

The consumer may apply to consumer rights protection authorities or to a court, and rights may also be defended out of court.

Under Article 3(1)(5) and (6) of the Law on Consumer Rights Protection, the consumer has the right to compensation for damage and to apply for the protection of infringed rights.

If the practice is assessed as an unfair commercial practice, Article 3 of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices applies.

Article 3(2) requires an assessment of professional diligence and the effect on the economic behaviour of the average consumer.

Consequences

The first realistic scenario is an individual refund of the charge under Article 6.2285(3) and Article 6.22816 of the Civil Code.

The second scenario is a broader assessment by the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority as to whether automatic activation of insurance meets the criteria in Article 3 of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices.

The third scenario is a requirement to change the service activation model so that an additional charge arises only after express consent.

In practical terms, this matters for all customers who were charged as a result of the same software error or the same activation model.

The 1-2 percent customer scope indicated in the notice does not alter the individual rule: each consumer requires separate consent to an additional charge.

Procedurally, the consumer should next submit a demand to the operator for reimbursement of the charge and, if it is not satisfied, apply under the procedure established by the Law on Consumer Rights Protection to the dispute-resolution authority or to a court.

The mayor’s political recognisability does not replace the data in registers and nomination documents.

His “good month” may sound politically generous, but legally it must fit within the 83–65-day nomination-document window and the 70-day deadline for party documents.

Core issue

The mayor’s window for deciding is not a matter of political courtesy, but a matter of managing future registration risk under the deadlines for electoral documents.

If the decision is postponed for too long, candidacy will be determined not by a public statement, but by the submission of documents, political campaign status, and the CEC’s review.

In the news report, B. Markauskas says he has not yet made a final decision and has “a good month” to think it over.

The legal question is whether such delay still leaves a real possibility of being nominated as a candidate for municipal council member and mayor.

This is determined under Article 17 of the Law Amending the Law on Elections to Municipal Councils, which amended Article 36, and Article 18, which amended Article 37.

In addition, Article 68(10) and Article 72(1) and (2) of the Electoral Code apply, because the sources specify the conditions for registration of political campaign participants and political committees.

Legal assessment

Under Article 36(1) of the Law on Elections to Municipal Councils, the submission of nomination documents begins 83 days before election day and ends at 5 p.m. 65 days before election day.

Documents submitted after this deadline cannot be recognised as nomination documents.

If a party were to nominate the candidate, under Article 36(2) it must submit to the CEC:

• an application to participate in the elections;
• a list of municipalities in which it intends to nominate candidates;
• authorisations for election representatives;
• a document confirming payment of the electoral deposit.

Under Article 36(3), after receiving and verifying the party’s documents, the CEC decides within 5 working days whether to register the party to participate in the elections.

Therefore, B. Markauskas’s personal decision is not yet candidacy until these formal steps have been completed.

His “good month” may sound politically generous, but legally it must fit within the 83–65-day nomination-document window and the 70-day deadline for party documents.

If the candidate were to be nominated by a political committee, Article 68(10) and Article 72(1) and (2) of the Electoral Code, as identified in the sources, require that only a registered political campaign participant may stand as a candidate or nominate a candidate.

Political committees must be registered in the manner prescribed by law no later than 180 days before election day.

This narrows the scope for improvisation, because a late decision to rely on a new committee may run into the prior registration deadline.

Under Article 37(1) of the Law on Elections to Municipal Councils, the municipal electoral commission verifies whether the candidate meets the requirements of Article 2.

The CEC may apply to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the administrator of the Register of Legal Entities, or other institutions.

Such a request is examined as a matter of special urgency, and the response is provided within 7 days, but no later than 32 days before the election.

Under Article 37(2), if the nomination documents contain deficiencies, the electoral commission immediately notifies the election representative.

This procedure means that an error in the documents may still be corrected only to the extent permitted by the electoral calendar.

Under Article 37-1(1), the CEC publishes on its website for 10 years the candidate’s name, surname, date of birth, workplace, position, membership in parties and associations, biography, extracts from declarations, and declaration of private interests.

Accordingly, the decision to stand as a candidate also entails long-term publicity of data, not merely participation in the campaign.

In case-law bulletin No. 11 of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania, in a case concerning the applicant’s declaration of place of residence, the CEC’s position was based on official data from state registers.

It stated that registration of candidates on the basis of an actual place of residence that does not correspond to registry data is not possible.

For the present situation, that case establishes one practical rule: the mayor’s political recognisability does not replace the data in registers and nomination documents.

Consequences

There are three realistic scenarios.

• B. Markauskas decides in time, the political organisation nominating him submits the documents, and the CEC and the municipal electoral commission verify compliance.
• The decision is delayed, so the documentary route for the party, committee, or candidate himself becomes impossible because of the 65-, 70-, or 180-day limits.
• The documents are submitted, but the commission identifies deficiencies or requests data from institutions, so the registration issue moves into an urgent review.

In practical terms, this matters for voters, the political organisation, and those assessing continuity in municipal administration.

Extracts from municipal acts show that B. Markauskas signed the publication rules for decisions of the Klaipėda District Municipal Council as mayor of the municipality.

However, the fact of holding that office does not replace candidate registration and only falls within the data on current office that must be made public.

Procedurally, what must be awaited next is not a political statement, but the submission of nomination documents within the period from 83 to 65 days before the election and the CEC’s decision on registration for participation within 5 working days.

A child’s poisoning by an electronic cigarette from a retail outlet is legally not merely a health incident; it may indicate a failure of supply-chain obligations under Articles 93, 94 and 97.

For a retailer, the most important practical point is not to assert that age controls exist, but to demonstrate that prohibited supply to a minor did not occur.

Core issue

The legal core of this situation is not a new prohibition, but the traceability, composition and protection of minors in relation to products already placed on the market. If children are poisoned by products obtained from ordinary retail outlets, the matter falls to be assessed under Articles 92, 93, 94, 97, 161 and 171 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Control of Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Related Products, and Article 77 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The news item states that children poisoned by electronic cigarettes or vaping substances of unclear composition are increasingly being admitted to hospitals. Legally, this raises the question whether the product sold could lawfully have been on the market at all, whether it was properly labelled, and whether it was supplied to a minor.

Legal assessment

Under Article 92(1) of the Law on the Control of Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Related Products, electronic cigarettes and refill containers placed on the market must comply with the requirements of the law and other legal acts. Paragraph 2 of the same article lays down quantitative and qualitative restrictions that are directly relevant in the context of poisonings.

Under Article 94(1) and (2) of the Law on the Control of Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Related Products, the package must include a leaflet, chemical substances, nicotine content, nicotine doses, batch number and a recommendation to keep the product out of the reach of children. If medical professionals and consumers cannot identify which substance caused the poisoning, the legal review will first focus on labelling, composition and the product notification data.

• Under Article 93(1), the manufacturer and importer must submit a notification to the Drug, Tobacco and Alcohol Control Department six months in advance for each brand and type.
• Under Article 93(2), the notification must specify all ingredients and substances released during use, including their quantities.
• Under Article 97(2), manufacturers, importers and distributors must collect information on any suspected adverse effects on human health.
• Under Article 97(3), they must immediately take corrective action, withdraw or recall the product from the market, and inform the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority.

A child’s poisoning by an electronic cigarette from a retail outlet is legally not merely a health incident; it may indicate a failure of supply-chain obligations under Articles 93, 94 and 97. Article 97(1) of the Law on the Control of Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Related Products confers competence on the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority to supervise labelling, composition and quality. Government Resolution No. 200 also authorises that authority to supervise compliance of composition, quality indicators and labelling with the requirements of the law.

The protection of minors is separate from the product safety aspect. Under Article 161(1) of the Law on the Control of Tobacco, Tobacco Products and Related Products, the sale of electronic cigarettes and refill containers to persons under 18 is prohibited. Paragraph 2 of the same article prohibits minors from smoking, using or possessing them, while paragraph 3 prohibits purchasing or transferring them for minors.

• For the supply of electronic cigarettes or refill containers to a minor, Article 77(3) of the Code of Administrative Offences provides for a fine of EUR 320 to EUR 580.
• A repeated violation of this kind entails a fine of EUR 580 to EUR 820 under Article 77(4) of the Code of Administrative Offences.

Consequences

Realistically, the first scenario is a product compliance inspection: composition, packaging information, batch number, notification to the Department and the retail outlet’s documentation. If non-compliance is established, Article 97(3) leads to corrective action, withdrawal or recall from the market, and notification of the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority.

The second scenario concerns acquisition by, or transfer to, a minor. In that case, the system of prohibitions under Article 161 applies, together with the fine ranges under Article 77 of the Code of Administrative Offences. For a retailer, the most important practical point is not to assert that age controls exist, but to demonstrate that prohibited supply to a minor did not occur.

The third scenario arises where the product packaging or public presentation encourages purchase or creates a misleading impression as to the product’s characteristics, effects or risks. In that case, Article 94(3)(1) and the prohibition on advertising and surreptitious advertising of electronic cigarettes under Article 171(1) are assessed.

This is of practical importance for retail chains, petrol stations, importers and distributors, because the risk of liability is not confined to the moment of sale at the till. Procedurally, the next expected step would be an inspection by the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority under Article 97(1), an assessment of the retail outlet and supply documentation, and, where grounds exist, a decision on corrective action, withdrawal or recall from the market.

When violence becomes a public spectacle in the city centre, the weight of liability shifts from a personal conflict to the protection of public peace.

Accordingly, R. Sadauskas’s statement that he does not feel he is a victim does not alter the premise for applying Article 284 of the Criminal Code.

Core issue

The legal axis of this case is not the victims’ unwillingness to bring claims, but the autonomous protection of public order. The issue is governed by Article 284 of the Criminal Code, Article 58 of the Criminal Code, Article 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

• Factual sequence: masked men armed with rods, brass knuckles, and knives attacked persons seated in the outdoor area of a restaurant in a public place in Kaunas.
• Under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, liability arises where, in a public place, insolent acts demonstrate disrespect for others or the environment and disturb public peace or order.
• Under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, the sanction includes community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to two years.
• Under Article 58(1) of the Criminal Code, punishment for accomplices is imposed having regard to the type, form, role, and nature of participation.

Legal assessment

The acts described fall within the core of Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code: a public place, demonstrative violence, the use of weapons, profanity, and an actual disturbance of public peace. Restaurant guests, children, disruption of café operations, and the ensuing disorder are not background circumstances, but consequences of the breach of public order. In a public-order case, the victim’s silence does not extinguish the charge, because the protected interest is not solely the victim’s private interest. When violence becomes a public spectacle in the city centre, the weight of liability shifts from a personal conflict to the protection of public peace.

• The prosecution had to prove a public place, insolent acts, a demonstration of disrespect, and a disturbance of public peace or order under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code.
• Under Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused had the right to know the charge, to have defence counsel, to submit evidence, to participate in the examination of evidence, and to appeal the judgment.
• The prosecutor’s appeal is consistent with the prosecutorial function, because under Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the indictment describes the act, the evidence, and the applicable criminal law.
• Under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, relevant objects and documents could be submitted both by participants in the proceedings and by any natural or legal person.

Article 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that, for certain offences affecting more private interests, a victim’s complaint or a prosecutor’s request is required. However, Article 284 of the Criminal Code is not included in that list; therefore, proceedings for breach of public order do not depend on the victim’s will. Accordingly, R. Sadauskas’s statement that he does not feel he is a victim does not alter the premise for applying Article 284 of the Criminal Code. That statement may be assessed within the totality of the evidence, but it does not change the fact of disturbance of public peace.

Article 283(1) of the Criminal Code provides for riots where an assembly of persons is organised or provoked to engage publicly in violence, destruction of property, or another gross breach of order. The information provided describes an attack by masked assailants against a specific group, not the organisation of an assembly characteristic of riots. Therefore, on the facts provided, the more precise provision for analysis is Article 284 of the Criminal Code, not Article 283. Article 146 of the Criminal Code likewise does not become the central provision, because the description concerns assault, not unlawful deprivation of liberty.

Article 58(1) of the Criminal Code allows punishment to be individualised according to each accomplice’s role, but the report states that all convicted persons received two years each. That sentence corresponds to the upper limit of imprisonment under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code. Article 58(2) of the Criminal Code provides that members of an organised group are generally given a more severe punishment than members of a group of accomplices. However, the mere context of criminal groups mentioned in the report does not in itself alter the legal classification absent elements established by the court.

Among the sources provided, the ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 1 March 2024 in criminal case No. 2K-58-489/2024 emphasises the danger of public incitement to violence under Article 170(3) of the Criminal Code. Its relevance to this situation is limited: the issue here is not public incitement to violence, but public violence itself, so the principal provision remains Article 284 of the Criminal Code. The legislative source provided concerning Article 284 of the Criminal Code also emphasises that criminal liability is linked to dangerous consequences where public peace or order has been disturbed.

Consequences

The practical consequence for the convicted persons is actual imprisonment, including credit for time spent in detention. Under Article 100(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, periods of temporary detention and remand custody are calculated from the moment those measures are actually applied. Under Article 100(1)–(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, other procedural time limits are calculated in hours, days, and months, and a time limit expiring on a non-working day is extended to the first working day.

• The convicted persons may exercise the right established in Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to appeal judgments and rulings.
• Under Article 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the court of cassation is the Supreme Court of Lithuania.
• Under Article 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a cassation appeal is lodged against a final judgment or ruling.
• If the case were to be reopened on the basis of a manifestly improper application of the criminal law, Article 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would apply.

There are three realistic scenarios: enforcement of the sentence, cassation proceedings concerning the application of law, or a later question of reopening under special procedural rules. For restaurants and operators of public places, this case is significant in evidentiary terms: video recordings, staff testimony, and disruption of operations directly substantiate a breach of public peace. For victims, it is significant because their unwillingness to bring claims does not close the path to a public-order charge. Procedurally, the next step is to await whether, following the appellate judgment, a cassation appeal will be lodged with the Supreme Court of Lithuania under Articles 24–25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

A registered trademark is not a monopoly over market control; it is a legal filter against specific forms of use of a sign.

Resale becomes legally vulnerable where the registered trademark is used not to identify the product, but to create a false impression of origin, affiliation or reputational control.

Core issue

A registered trademark is not a monopoly over market control; it is a legal filter against specific forms of use of a sign. The dispute should be assessed under Articles 14, 18 and 3 of the Law on Trademarks of the Republic of Lithuania and the obligations applicable to retail trade. The newsworthy point is this: businesses are being told when registration permits them to stop resale, import, misleading presentation or damage to reputation.

• Article 14(1) of the Law on Trademarks of the Republic of Lithuania grants exclusive rights to a trademark.
• Article 14(2) permits the prohibition of identical, similar or reputation-infringing signs.
• Article 14(3)(2) and (3) cover offering, placing on the market, stocking, import and export.
• Article 18 limits the proprietor’s powers where the trademark is used honestly for identification or reference purposes.

Legal assessment

The trademark proprietor is in the strongest position where another person uses an identical or similar sign to designate goods, rather than merely reselling lawfully acquired goods. Under Article 14(2)(1) of the Law on Trademarks, the prohibition is clearest where both the trademark and the goods are identical. Under Article 14(2)(2), a likelihood of confusion is required, including a likelihood of association with the trademark. Under Article 14(2)(3), the proprietor of a trademark with a reputation may rely on unfair advantage, detriment to distinctive character or damage to reputation.

A reseller is not automatically an infringer merely because it is not an official distributor. Its position depends on the form of use, advertising, packaging, information provided to the consumer and honest commercial practice. Resale becomes legally vulnerable where the registered trademark is used not to identify the product, but to create a false impression of origin, affiliation or reputational control. This is the sharp dividing line in this situation: registration protects the trademark against unlawful use, but does not grant the proprietor a general right to divide the market according to preferred sellers.

• The proprietor may seek cessation of use of the sign under Article 14(3).
• The reseller may rely on Article 18(1)(3) where the trademark is necessary to identify the product.
• Such use is protected only if it complies with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters as laid down in Article 18(2).
• Under paragraphs 26.11 and 26.12 of the Retail Trade Rules, the retailer must comply with sales prohibitions and restrictions and suspend the sale of unsafe goods.

According to the sources provided, the competence of the State Patent Bureau is to register trademarks, decide on registration and maintain the register. The source concerning draft law No. XIVP-1110 states that the powers of the SPB do not extend to supervision of the use of trademarks in commercial activity. Accordingly, a dispute concerning actual presentation on the market proceeds not only through the register mechanism, but also through enforcement of rights and the competence of supervisory authorities.

Where advertising or use distorts the economic behaviour of the average consumer, source No. 9 links the consequences to sanctions for unfair commercial practices or breaches of advertising requirements. The case-law source refers to the ruling of 17 May 2007 in administrative case No. A17-515/2007. That ruling identifies two elements required for a trade secret: actual or potential commercial value and reasonable efforts to preserve secrecy. In this situation, that creates a narrow additional boundary: distribution-channel or pricing information will not be protected merely because it is inconvenient for the business. It would have to satisfy the value and secrecy criteria formulated in the case.

Consequences

First scenario: the proprietor sends a cease-and-desist letter and demands cessation of the specific use of the sign in advertising, packaging, listings or import documents. Second scenario: the reseller adjusts the presentation, leaves only an identifying reference to the trademark and relies on Article 18(1)(3). Third scenario: the dispute moves to court, where the proprietor will have to substantiate the conditions under Article 14(2).

In practical terms, this matters to three groups. For the trademark proprietor, it is important to collect evidence of confusion, damage to reputation or unfair advantage. For the reseller, it is important to distinguish lawful product identification from an impression that it is an official distributor. For the consumer, the relevant point is the right under paragraph 27.1 of the Retail Trade Rules to receive necessary, correct, comprehensive and non-misleading information.

The nearest procedural monitoring point depends on the chosen route: if the registration is contested, the relevant milestones are the opposition within 3 months from publication and the examination by the Appeals Division of the SPB within 14 days; if the use on the market is contested, the next step is a cease-and-desist letter, action by a supervisory authority or a claim.

Restrictions on telephones following an incident of violence must be formulated as a preventive safety measure, not as a collective sanction imposed on all pupils.

In this legal construction, the telephone becomes not an independent category of rights, but an object of pupil conduct and the school’s management of a safe environment.

Core issue

The issue of restricting telephones is not about prohibiting an object, but about the school’s duty to manage risks during the educational process. It should be addressed under Articles 46, 47, 49, 51, 59 and 63 of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania. The news event legally falls within the standard of a safe environment following the violence in Marijampolė. Under Article 46(1)(6) and (7) of the Law on Education, a pupil has the right to protection from violence and to a safe environment. Under Article 46(2)(1) and (2) of the Law on Education, a pupil must comply with the education contract and internal rules and must not infringe the rights of others.

Legal assessment

Restrictions on personal telephones may be justified only where they are incorporated into the school’s internal rules and linked to safety, the quality of education, or the protection of the rights of others. In this legal construction, the telephone becomes not an independent category of rights, but an object of pupil conduct and the school’s management of a safe environment.

• A pupil has the right to good-quality education under Article 46(1)(4) of the Law on Education.
• A pupil has the right to protection from violence under Article 46(1)(6) of the Law on Education.
• A pupil must comply with internal rules under Article 46(2)(1) of the Law on Education.
• A pupil must respect teachers and members of the school community under Article 46(2)(2) of the Law on Education.

The role of the head of the school is central here, because under Article 59(5)(3) of the Law Amending the Law on Education, the head ensures a healthy and safe environment that prevents violence. A stricter telephone policy would be lawful not as a political slogan, but as part of the internal rules approved by the head of the school.

Restrictions on telephones following an incident of violence must be formulated as a preventive safety measure, not as a collective sanction imposed on all pupils.

The position of the teacher also strengthens the basis for the restriction. Under Article 49(1)(4) of the Law on Education, a teacher has the right to work in a safe environment and to be protected from violence. Under Article 49(2)(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Education, a teacher must ensure the safety of the pupils being educated and the provision of good-quality education. If telephones in practice impede responses to violence, record it, or facilitate its dissemination, their restriction is directly connected with these duties.

The role of parents is not a veto right over school rules. Under Article 4 of the Law Amending Articles 16, 29, 46, 47 and 49 of the Law on Education No. I-1489, parents must cooperate with the head of the school and specialists in addressing matters relating to the child’s education. Where a child commits violence or experiences violence, they must attend a psychologist’s consultation together with the child at the specified time.

The school community has a channel for participation, but not a mechanism for individual approval of each rule. Under Article 63(1) of the Law on Education, members of the community may participate in education governance and form interest associations. Under Article 63(4) of the Law on Education, governance bodies may invite such associations to provide consultation or act as experts. This means that the restriction model should be coordinated through self-governance, especially where it changes pupils’ daily routine.

Consequences

Realistically, there are three possible routes. The first route is for the head of the school to clarify the internal rules by linking telephone use to a safe environment and pupils’ duties. The second route is for self-governance bodies and community associations to submit proposals under Article 63 of the Law on Education. The third route is for a broader standard to be established by ministerial or legislative amendment, which would require the logic of implementing acts visible in Article 5 of the 2024 amending law.

In practical terms, this matters for pupils, parents, teachers and heads of schools. For pupils, it would mean a clearer duty to comply with rules on telephone use. For parents, it would mean a duty to cooperate where telephone use is connected with violence or an educational problem. For teachers and heads of schools, it would provide a clearer basis for responding not after an incident, but preventively.

The next procedural point should not be an abstract discussion, but the specific text of the rules. The expected document would be an amendment to the school’s internal rules, a self-governance proposal, or a draft legal act clearly establishing when a telephone is prohibited, when it is permitted, and who makes the decision during the educational process.

An AI-generated dismissal list becomes a legality risk where a human signature merely formalises the employee selected by the model.

Applied here, that logic would mean that the employer’s assertion that the decision was made by a human would not be decisive if the factual basis for selection was automated assessment.

Core issue

The employer’s dispute concerning AI-based selection is not about the mere use of technology, but about whether the dismissal was determined solely by an automated assessment of the employee’s characteristics. It should be assessed under Article 22 GDPR, Article 22 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Legal Protection of Personal Data, Article 63 of the Labour Code, and Article 218 of the Labour Code.

The report concerning Meta raises the specific question whether employees may have been selected on the basis of unseen metrics affected by performance, health, or leave-related data. If the dismissal decision was based solely on automated processing, the employee has the right not to be subject to such a decision under Article 22(1) GDPR.

Legal assessment

Under Article 22(2) GDPR, an automated decision is permissible only where it is necessary for a contract, authorised by law, or based on explicit consent. Under Article 22(3) GDPR, even in such cases the employee must be guaranteed the right to obtain human intervention, express his or her point of view, and contest the decision. Under Article 22(4) GDPR, decisions may not be based on special categories of data unless exemptions and safeguards apply.

An AI-generated dismissal list becomes a legality risk where a human signature merely formalises the employee selected by the model.

• Employer obligations under Article 22(2) of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data: before the assessment, to enable access to the assessment criteria and principles.
• Employee rights under Article 22(3) of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data: to object to an automated assessment, express an opinion, and request a repeated non-automated assessment.
• Employer obligations under Article 63 of the Labour Code: where collective dismissal thresholds are met, dismissals are treated as collective redundancies.

If the nearly 8,000 dismissals reported in relation to Meta were assessed by reference to the logic of Lithuanian law, the number alone would exceed the highest threshold under Article 63(1) of the Labour Code. In such a process, employee representatives act under Article 19 of the Labour Code, and the cited Government source identifies their function as defending employees’ interests when decisions on collective redundancies are made. If a member of a European Works Council or special negotiating body is dismissed, Article 13(2) of the Law on European Works Councils applies regarding the required consent.

The discrimination issue arises where performance indicators are affected by health status, disability, or family leave. The cited Government source identifies Article 2(1)(4) of the Labour Code and Article 7(6) and (8) of the Law on Equal Opportunities as mechanisms prohibiting discrimination in employment relations. The case of the enlarged panel of judges discussed in Bulletin No. 11 of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania’s administrative law practice means that the ground for dismissal cannot be formally relabelled contrary to its true substance. Applied here, that logic would mean that the employer’s assertion that the decision was made by a human would not be decisive if the factual basis for selection was automated assessment.

Consequences

If it were established that employees were dismissed without lawful grounds or in breach of procedure, Article 218(2) of the Labour Code would apply. In that case, the body hearing the labour dispute would declare the dismissal unlawful, reinstate the employee, and award average remuneration for the period of forced absence. Under Article 218(2) of the Labour Code, that amount is capped at a period not exceeding one year. Under Article 218(3) of the Labour Code, the employee is reinstated no later than the next working day after the decision becomes final.

If reinstatement is impossible for economic, technological, organisational, or similar reasons, Article 218(4) of the Labour Code applies. The dismissal is still declared unlawful, but the employee is not reinstated; instead, average remuneration and damages are awarded. The practical value of the dispute for employees will depend on whether they obtain the criteria, evidence of the model’s influence, and data on the impact of health or leave on the assessment. Procedurally, the nearest monitoring point is the hearing on 24 August 2026, at which the court’s assessment of additional data and possible interim reinstatement pending the conclusion of arbitration is expected.

The strength of this ruling lies not in changing the end point of the contract, but in temporarily transferring control over waste flows to the entity to which the municipal system assigns the regional waste-management function.

At this stage, the dispute is not about the final outcome of the MBA contract, but about the temporary assumption of factual control so that the future judgment does not become meaningless.

Core issue

At this stage, the dispute is not about the final outcome of the MBA contract, but about the temporary assumption of factual control so that the future judgment does not become meaningless. The legal issue is assessed under Articles 144, 146, 148 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, while also taking into account VAATC’s role in the municipal waste system. - News fact: the Vilnius District Court allowed VAATC to assume operations in the MBA territory and prohibited Energesman from obstructing such actions until the final judgment, but no later than 31 December 2026. Under Article 144(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, VAATC had to plausibly substantiate both the claim and the risk that, without interim measures, enforcement of the judgment would become more difficult or impossible. Under Article 144(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court may also act on public-interest grounds where there is a threat to public rights and legitimate interests. This public-interest dimension is reinforced by the Vilnius City Waste Plan, which links VAATC to regional waste management and treatment facilities.

Legal assessment

The interim measure here operates as a limited adjustment of management, not as a preliminary defeat for Energesman. The Supreme Court of Lithuania’s review No. AC-34-2 of 15 December 2010 establishes that such measures have neither prejudicial nor res judicata effect. The same review requires that restrictions greater than those necessary to secure enforcement of the future judgment should not be imposed. - VAATC’s right: to seek measures under Article 144(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure where enforcement risk arises in the MBA territory.

• VAATC’s duty: to act proactively in procedural terms, because the ruling of the Court of Appeal of Lithuania of 11 June 2012 in civil case No. 2A-1855/2012 links interim measures to the claimant’s initiative.
• Energesman’s right: to seek security for compensation of losses under Article 146(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
• Energesman’s risk: if the claim were dismissed, Article 146(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure would provide a basis for claiming losses caused by the measures requested by VAATC.

The strength of this ruling lies not in changing the end point of the contract, but in temporarily transferring control over waste flows to the entity to which the municipal system assigns the regional waste-management function. Under Article 148(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, an application for interim protective measures must be resolved no later than within three days. The court’s chosen term until 31 December 2026 is consistent with the temporary nature of the measure, since it is not equated with the final judgment.

Renewable-energy and electronic-communications rules do not create an alternative route for this dispute. Article 64 of the Law on Energy from Renewable Sources regulates complaints to VERT concerning networks, systems and renewable-energy installations. Article 34 of the Law on Electronic Communications concerns disputes between electronic communications operators, and therefore does not remove this dispute from civil procedure.

Consequences

First scenario: VAATC enforces the ruling, assumes practical operations in the MBA territory, and Energesman challenges the measure on appeal. Second scenario: if circumstances change, the measure may be modified or revoked in line with the reasoning set out in Supreme Court review No. AC-34-2. Third scenario: if the final claim were dismissed, Energesman could raise the issue of losses under Article 146(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In practical terms, this ruling is most important for residents, municipalities and waste-system administrators, because it protects continuity of service until the end of the case. For Energesman, it matters because of the loss of operational control and the potential need to prove losses. For VAATC, it matters because of the duty actually to stabilise waste flows, since a procedural victory alone is not yet the end of the contractual dispute. Procedurally, the next points to watch are whether a separate appeal will be filed with the Vilnius Regional Court within 7 days, and whether the contractual breaches identified by VAATC will be remedied by 7 August 2026.

Where the child is under 14, the law is directed not at the child as a punishable subject, but at the supervisory duty of parents and institutions.

If the violence occurred at school, the focus of the dispute will not be solely the child’s conduct, but also who in fact had the duty of supervision at that time.

Core issue

The precise question is not simply whether penalties should be made more severe, but onto whom the law shifts the burden of responsibility when children aged 13 to 17 commit violence.

This situation is addressed through the limits of responsibility borne by parents, the school, and the minor himself or herself under Article 6.275 of the Civil Code, Article 6.277 of the Civil Code, Article 73 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and Article 42 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The factual axis of the news item is this: incidents of violence in schools and among adolescents raise the question of whether responsibility lies with the child, the parents, or the institution that had a duty of supervision.

Under Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code, parents or guardians are liable for damage caused by a minor under the age of fourteen unless they prove the absence of fault.

Under Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code, an educational or upbringing institution is liable where the damage was caused during the period of its supervision, unless it proves the absence of fault.

Accordingly, the actions of a thirteen-year-old boy or girl legally become, first and foremost, not a matter of punishment, but a matter of supervision and civil liability.

Legal assessment

Under Article 73(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences, parents face a warning for failure to exercise parental authority or for exercising it contrary to the interests of the child.

• A repeated offence of this kind, under Article 73(2) of the Code of Administrative Offences, entails a fine of EUR 10 to EUR 100.
• Under Article 73(3) of the Code of Administrative Offences, an obligation may be imposed to participate in prevention, resocialisation, improvement of communication with children, or violent behaviour modification programmes.

Under Article 42 of the Code of Administrative Offences, administrative liability of minors must correspond to their age and social maturity.

The same provision links liability to behavioural change, upbringing, removal of the causes of the offence, and deterrence from further acts.

Therefore, the prevention emphasised by the authorities is not merely political rhetoric: it corresponds to the stated purpose of minors’ liability.

Where the child is under 14, the law is directed not at the child as a punishable subject, but at the supervisory duty of parents and institutions.

According to paragraph 174 of the report on the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, a child aged 14 to 18 is liable for damage on general grounds.

If the child has no property or income from which to compensate the damage, the relevant part must be compensated by the parents, guardian, or supervisory institution.

This is practically significant in the case of an attack by a seventeen-year-old, because the chain of compensation for damage may begin with the minor himself or herself.

However, it may pass to the parents or the institution if the minor does not have sufficient property or income.

The Review of the Application in Criminal Cases of Legal Norms Regulating Compensation for Damage Caused by a Criminal Act reinforces this logic procedurally.

It states that the fact of damage caused by a minor gives rise to a presumption of parental fault for improper supervision or failure to perform the duty of upbringing.

Parents may avoid material liability only by proving that they were not at fault or that, at the time of the act, they were not responsible for supervision.

If the violence occurred at school, the focus of the dispute will not be solely the child’s conduct, but also who in fact had the duty of supervision at that time.

Municipal school regulations show a separate chain of duties imposed on schools.

• Clause 28.19 of the regulations of Pasvalys District Joniškėlis Gabrielė Petkevičaitė-Bitė Gymnasium provides for cooperation with parents, the police, social, health, and child rights institutions.
• Clause 28.20 of the same regulations requires timely assistance to be provided to a pupil who has experienced violence and the relevant institutions to be informed.
• Clause 27.30 of the regulations of Širvintos Laurynas Stuoka-Gucevičius Gymnasium provides for notification immediately, but no later than the next working day.

This deadline is a concrete procedural benchmark by which the school’s response after an incident of violence may be assessed.

Consequences

Realistically, the first scenario is an administrative response directed at the parents under Article 73 of the CAO, particularly where the child is under 14.

The second scenario is a civil claim for compensation under Article 6.275 of the Civil Code, directed at the parents or the school depending on the moment of supervision.

The third scenario is subsidiary liability of the parents or institution for damage caused by a minor aged 14 to 18, if the minor himself or herself does not have sufficient property.

The fourth scenario is the application of measures aimed at behavioural change, because Article 42 of the CAO links minors’ liability to the removal of causes.

In practical terms, this matters for the families of injured children, because their claim may be directed not only against the child who committed the violence.

It also matters for schools, because an incident of violence on their premises gives rise to a separate duty to prove proper supervision.

Procedurally, following the events in Marijampolė, the results of the minors’ interviews, the school’s notifications to institutions, and decisions regarding administrative or civil consequences should be awaited.

If the model seen in the Širvintos regulations is applied, notification to the parents and the child rights authority must be made immediately, but no later than the next working day.

The NŽT’s discretion ends where its duty begins to answer whether state-owned land was transferred notwithstanding a non-privatisation solution.

Where an assessment of the privatisation of state-owned land is sought, private ownership following the transaction does not extinguish the NŽT’s duty to examine the basis for defending the public interest.

Core issue

The core of the NŽT’s defeat lies not in the validity of the 2005 transaction, but in the institution’s duty to classify the request as a matter concerning the defence of the public interest. Where an assessment of the privatisation of state-owned land is sought, private ownership following the transaction does not extinguish the NŽT’s duty to examine the basis for defending the public interest. News fact: by a final ruling, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania annulled part of the NŽT’s refusal and ordered the request to be reconsidered. The dispute is governed by Article 32(3)(15), Article 36¹(3)(1), (3) and (4), Article 36²(1), and Article 44(1) of the Law on Land of the Republic of Lithuania.

Legal assessment

Under Article 32(3)(15) of the Law on Land, the NŽT must apply to a court where there are grounds to believe that the public interest has been infringed in the field of use, management, and disposal of state-owned land. If the possible infringement arose from acts or omissions of the NŽT itself or of institutions whose functions it assumed, the NŽT must apply to the prosecutor’s office.

• The NŽT had to determine whether the state-owned land sold in 2005 without auction fell within the field of disposal of state-owned land.
• The NŽT had to assess the significance of the solutions in the 1999 detailed plan and the non-privatisation condition identified by the applicant.
• The NŽT had to adopt a reasoned decision: either to apply to the prosecutor’s office or clearly justify its refusal under Article 32(3)(15) of the Law on Land.

The NŽT’s response that the applicant may itself apply to court does not alter this competence. Article 49(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and Article 55(1) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings, as stated in the cited source, link the defence of the public interest to entities expressly defined by law. In the field of land, such an entity is the NŽT when acting under Article 32(3)(15) of the Law on Land.

In the case between UAB Osterodė and the NŽT examined by the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania, the court distinguished the applicant’s private interest from a request to initiate the defence of the public interest. This means that the NŽT could not recast the dispute as an ordinary matter of private rights enforcement. The NŽT’s discretion extends to the final choice whether or not to apply to the competent authority, but not to a right to remain silent on an alleged infringement of the public interest. The NŽT’s discretion ends where its duty begins to answer whether state-owned land was transferred notwithstanding a non-privatisation solution.

Under Article 36¹(3)(1) of the Law on Land, the NŽT verifies whether transactions and administrative decisions of trustees of state-owned land comply with laws, Government resolutions, and other legal acts. Under Article 36¹(3)(3), it proposes that unlawful transactions or decisions be annulled or amended. Under Article 36¹(3)(4), it applies to court where trustees do not agree to eliminate the unlawfulness or fail to comply with a mandatory instruction.

The source concerning the amendment of Government Resolution No. 260 indicates that used state-owned land plots designated for other purposes may be sold or leased without auction only where this is provided for by law. The same source states that in all other cases the NŽT sells and leases used state-owned land plots. Therefore, UAB Osterodė’s argument concerning the non-auction procedure had to be examined through the relationship between the legal basis for sale and the restrictions imposed by the detailed plan.

Consequences

First scenario: after reconsidering the request, the NŽT finds grounds to believe that the public interest was infringed as a result of actions by the former NŽT or by institutions whose functions it assumed. In that case, under Article 32(3)(15) of the Law on Land, it must apply to the prosecutor’s office.

Second scenario: the NŽT decides that there are no grounds to apply to the prosecutor’s office, but such refusal will now have to be reasoned. In that event, what is practically important for the applicant is not the mere existence of a formal response, but whether the NŽT assesses the detailed plan, the non-privatisation condition, and the legal basis for the non-auction sale.

The third scenario concerns supervision of the activities of a trustee of state-owned land under Article 36²(1) of the Law on Land. If the unlawfulness of an administrative decision is established, the NŽT may submit a reasoned proposal to amend or annul it, and, following a refusal, the 10-working-day time limit for applying to court applies.

Procedurally, the next expected step is a new NŽT decision on UAB Osterodė’s request. It must clearly state whether the NŽT will apply to the prosecutor’s office or refuse to do so under Article 32(3)(15) of the Law on Land.