The specific disputed issue is not whether it is “safe” for a child to ride an ATV, but when an ATV described as a children’s vehicle, by virtue of its technical characteristics, becomes a motor vehicle which requires registration and a driving entitlement in public traffic.
Article 23 of the Law on Road Traffic Safety assigns mopeds and light quadricycles to category AM, and quadricycles to category B1. Paragraph 2 of the amendment to the same article sets the minimum age: 15 years for category AM and 16 years for category B1. Article 22 links the right to drive not only to age, but also to medical fitness, knowledge of the Road Traffic Rules, examinations, an entry in the drivers’ register, and a driving licence.
Accordingly, the L6e-A situation referred to by the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority legally means that a “children’s” product label or CE marking does not alter the vehicle’s classification under road traffic law.
In practice, the stronger argument is based on technical category, not on the buyer’s or seller’s marketing description: if an electric ATV meets the criteria for a registrable light quadricycle category, a child may not ride it in public traffic merely because an adult is supervising or because the product is marketed for children. For parents and sellers, the critical risk is confusing product safety checks with permission to participate in traffic: CE marking, Lithuanian-language instructions, and age or weight limits address product safety, but do not remove the requirements of category AM or B1. For a lawyer, it is worth citing Articles 22 and 23 together, because they show that the decisive threshold in public traffic is the status of a registrable motor vehicle and the right to drive, not general preventive recommendations by the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority concerning helmets or protective equipment.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether children may generally use quad bikes for recreation, but whether the specific quad bike, by legal category, falls within the regime applicable to motor vehicles and whether the child is entitled to drive it in public traffic. This is determined under Article 23(1)(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety, which assigns mopeds and light quadricycles to category AM, and Article 23(1)(5), which assigns quadricycles to category B1. The minimum age is established under Article 23(2), as amended by Article 8 of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety No. VIII-2043: 15 years for category AM, 16 years for category B1, and 18 years for powerful quadricycles. The content of the right to drive is further interpreted in accordance with Article 22(1) of the Law on Road Traffic Safety cited in the source: the right to drive is granted to persons who are not younger than the statutory minimum age, whose state of health is suitable, who know the Road Traffic Rules and other road traffic legislation, are able to drive, have passed the examinations, and hold a driving licence
Legal assessment. If a quad bike intended for a child or adolescent is, by its technical characteristics, to be regarded as a light quadricycle, the category AM rule applies to it in public traffic, and the right to drive may therefore be acquired from the age of 15. If it is not a light quadricycle but a category B1 quadricycle, the minimum age for acquiring the right to drive is 16. If the vehicle falls within the group of powerful quadricycles, Article 23(2)(17), as amended, links the right to drive to the age of 18. Age alone is not a sufficient condition, because under Article 22(1) cited in the source, suitable health, knowledge of the Road Traffic Rules and other road traffic legislation, driving ability, passing the examinations, and possession of a driving licence are also required. Accordingly, the call mentioned in the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority notice that minors should ride only quad bikes appropriate to their age and capacity legally corresponds to the category and minimum-age model laid down in Article 23 of the Law on Road Traffic Safety. The source concerning Draft Law No. XIVP-3742 states that category AM includes mopeds and light quadricycles whose maximum design speed may not exceed 45 km/h; this is important in distinguishing lower-risk AM vehicles from more powerful categories. The same regulatory source emphasises that motorcycles and passenger cars are more powerful, faster, heavier, and more dangerous than mopeds or light quadricycles, so the distinction between categories is not a mere formality. Article 20(1) of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on Road Traffic Safety provides that the owner or operator of a vehicle is responsible for and must take care of the vehicle belonging to them; therefore, parents or guardians in practice have a duty to control who uses the vehicle and under what conditions. Under Article 20(2) of the same law, upon the request of a police officer for the purpose of investigating an offence, the owner or operator must identify the person who was driving or using the vehicle at a particular time. Under Article 20(3), the owner or operator, upon receiving a summons, must appear at the police authority and carry an identity document and the other documents specified in the summons. At the institutional level, Article 4(1) of the Law on Road Traffic Safety assigns the formation of state policy to the Government and the control of its implementation to the Road Traffic Safety Commission. Article 4(3) of that law entrusts the Commission with setting priority directions for improving road traffic safety, coordinating the activities of institutions, analysing the state of road traffic safety, and forming expert groups to determine the causes of particularly serious traffic accidents. The issue of liability is based on Article 32 of the Law on Road Traffic Safety, under which liability is imposed for breaches of legislation regulating road traffic safety in order to protect life, health, and property. The source concerning Draft Law No. XVP-431 additionally states that, under Article 6(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences, administrative liability arises for a person who had reached the age of 16 before committing the offence; this is particularly significant where a category AM vehicle is driven by a younger person. No case law is provided in the sources, and therefore this analysis does not assess similar cases
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is straightforward: if a child drives a category AM light quadricycle in public traffic while being at least 15 years old and holding the right to drive, the situation is assessed under the general category AM regime. The second scenario is where the same child drives a category B1 quadricycle without having reached the age of 16 or without the required right to drive; this creates non-compliance with the requirements of Article 23 of the Law on Road Traffic Safety and Article 22(1) cited in the source. The third scenario is where the quadricycle is a powerful one: the age threshold for the right to drive rises to 18, so use by adolescents in public traffic becomes even more strictly restricted. The fourth scenario concerns the owner or operator: when the police investigate an offence, the owner or operator must identify the person who was driving the vehicle and appear pursuant to a summons. This is practically important for parents and guardians, because the decision to purchase a vehicle or allow its use is not merely a matter of everyday supervision, but may become an issue of compliance with the duties of the owner or operator. For children and adolescents, the key point is that the right to drive a quad bike in public traffic depends on the category, age, and entitlement confirmed by a driving licence, not on the fact that the vehicle is described as “for children”. For state authorities, this issue falls within the field of road traffic safety policy and control under Article 4 of the Law on Road Traffic Safety and, in the event of breaches, within the field of liability under Article 32
Can the Government Programme be regarded as having been constitutionally properly submitted to the Seimas if it was registered before the President of the Republic approved the composition of the Government by decree?
Article 92 of the Constitution establishes a sequence: the Prime Minister is appointed with the approval of the Seimas, forms the Government, the President of the Republic approves it, and only then does the Prime Minister present to the Seimas the Government he or she has formed and the President has approved, and submit its programme for consideration. Article 84(4) of the Constitution reinforces this sequence, since the President not only charges the Prime Minister with forming the Government but also approves its composition. Accordingly, the legally decisive point is not the technical registration of the document itself, but the moment from which the programme is deemed to have been submitted for consideration as the programme of a Government approved by the President.
The stronger argument for the Government would be that the earlier registration of the programme was merely a procedural filing of the document, provided that the actual presentation, consideration and vote in the Seimas took place after the President’s decree. The opposition’s argument would become stronger only if it were shown that the Seimas began considering the programme, or treated it as officially submitted, before the composition of the Government had been approved. The practical risk is not the automatic collapse of the Government, but a possible dispute before the Constitutional Court concerning the procedure by which the mandate was obtained; the safest procedural cure would be an express resubmission of the programme after the President’s decree, so that the sequence required by Article 92 of the Constitution is no longer open to challenge.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether Mindaugas Sinkevičius is beginning his term in politically convenient circumstances, but whether, under the cited provisions, a mandatory ground arises for the resignation of the Prime Minister, a minister, or the entire Government, and whether the sequence for presenting the Government Programme complies with constitutional procedure. This is to be assessed under Article 84, points 4 and 7-9, and Articles 91, 92 and 101 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 91 of the Constitution provides that the Government consists of the Prime Minister and ministers; accordingly, the lawfulness of the composition of the Government depends on the procedure for appointing the Prime Minister, appointing the ministers, and approving the Programme. Article 92 of the Constitution requires that the Prime Minister be appointed by the President of the Republic with the approval of the Seimas, that ministers be appointed by the President on the nomination of the Prime Minister, and that, no later than within 15 days of appointment, the Prime Minister present to the Seimas the Government formed by him or her and approved by the President, and submit its Programme. Under Article 92 of the Constitution, a new Government receives authority to act only when the Seimas approves its Programme by a majority vote of the members of the Seimas participating in the sitting
Legal assessment. If the Government Programme referred to in the report was in fact registered before the Presidential decree approving the composition of the Government, the legal issue arises from the sequence established in Article 92 of the Constitution: first, there must be a Government formed by the Prime Minister and approved by the President of the Republic, and only thereafter does the Prime Minister present it to the Seimas and submit the Programme. The President’s competence is essential in this context, since Article 84, point 4, of the Constitution entrusts the President, with the approval of the Seimas, with appointing the Prime Minister, charging him or her with forming the Government, and approving its composition. The appointment of ministers is likewise not merely a political choice of the Prime Minister: under Article 84, point 9, of the Constitution and Article 10(1) of the Law on the Government, ministers are appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic on the nomination of the Prime Minister. Therefore, criticism of a minister’s qualifications or professional experience is not, in itself, a legal ground for dismissal established in the sources provided; however, an appointed minister becomes accountable to the Seimas and the President of the Republic and is directly subordinate to the Prime Minister, as indicated in the excerpts from ministerial regulations, for example, point 31 of the Regulations of the Ministry of Social Security and Labour, point 17 of the Regulations of the Ministry of Energy, and point 19 of the Regulations of the Ministry of Agriculture. The Seimas may require accountability, since Article 101 of the Constitution provides that, at the request of the Seimas, the Government or individual ministers must report to the Seimas on their activities. Legally, the resignation of the Prime Minister would be decisive for the entire Government: Article 101, point 3, of the Constitution and Article 9(1)(3) of the Law on the Government provide that the Government must resign when the Prime Minister resigns or dies. If the Seimas, by a majority vote of all members of the Seimas in a secret ballot, expressed no confidence in the Government or the Prime Minister, the Government would likewise be required to resign under Article 101, point 2, of the Constitution and Article 9(1)(2) of the Law on the Government. In the case of an individual minister, the consequence is narrower: under Article 101 of the Constitution and Article 10(3) of the Law on the Government, a minister must resign when more than half of all members of the Seimas express no confidence in him or her by secret ballot. If a minister resigns voluntarily, Article 10(2) of the Law on the Government requires the minister to notify the Prime Minister in writing, and the Prime Minister must submit the resignation to the President of the Republic within 5 working days. If the Government resigns, Article 9(2), (5) and (7) of the Law on the Government requires written notification by the Prime Minister to the President, notification on the day on which the ground for resignation arises, and a Presidential decree, upon the entry into force of which the Government is deemed to have resigned. Issues concerning the interests of members of the Government may procedurally be managed through recusal: point 142 of the Rules of Procedure of the Government provides that the Government, by a reasoned resolution, accepts or refuses to accept the recusal of members of the Government from the preparation, consideration or adoption of decisions giving rise to a conflict of interest. The sources provided contain no provision that, solely on the basis of a description of private land transactions, would automatically compel the Prime Minister to resign; therefore, the legal mechanism would arise through his own resignation, a vote of no confidence by the Seimas, or the procedural non-approval of the Government Programme
Consequences. The first scenario is that the Seimas approves the Programme and, under Article 92 of the Constitution, the Government receives authority to act; in that event, the dispute concerning political confidence remains within the sphere of parliamentary oversight, reporting, and possible no-confidence procedures. The second scenario is that, if the Seimas twice in succession refuses to approve the Programme of the new Government, the Government must resign under Article 101, point 1, of the Constitution and Article 9(1)(1) of the Law on the Government. The third scenario is that, if the Prime Minister himself resigns because of the situation that has arisen, the entire Government must resign under Article 101, point 3, of the Constitution and Article 9(1)(3) of the Law on the Government. The fourth scenario is that, if changes in ministers result in more than half of the ministers being replaced, the Government, under Article 101 of the Constitution and Article 8(4) of the Law on the Government, would have to obtain a new mandate from the Seimas and, failing to obtain it, would be required to resign under Article 9(1)(5) of the Law on the Government. The practical significance for the Seimas is that it decides on the approval of the Programme, may require accountability, and may initiate a vote of no confidence. This is important for the President of the Republic because the President approves the composition of the Government, appoints and dismisses ministers, accepts the resignation of the Government and, where necessary, instructs it to continue performing its duties under Article 84, point 7, of the Constitution. For the Government itself, the most important requirement is to comply with the 15-day time limit under Article 92 of the Constitution and to ensure that the Programme is submitted on behalf of a Government whose composition has already been approved by the President. Accordingly, the question whether Sinkevičius “will have to step down”, according to the sources provided, depends not on public assessment but on specific constitutional acts: his resignation, a vote of no confidence by the Seimas, two rejections of the Programme, or failure to obtain a new mandate after more than half of the ministers have been replaced
The crux of the dispute is whether the information identified by Apple concerning hardware development, manufacturing, supply chains and technological research constitutes a protectable trade secret, or merely lawfully acquired experience of former employees that they may use upon moving to OpenAI.
Under Article 1.116 of the Lithuanian Civil Code, a trade secret must cumulatively satisfy three criteria: it must be secret, have actual or potential commercial value because it is secret, and its lawful holder must have taken reasonable steps to keep it secret. The same provision directly weakens an overly broad position by Apple: information is not regarded as a trade secret if, in the ordinary course of employment, it becomes experience, skills, abilities or knowledge honestly acquired by employees. Therefore, the mere move of Tang Tan, Chang Liu or Yu-Ting Peng to OpenAI, even after 24 years of experience at Apple or work on Apple Watch and iPhone systems, would not in itself be sufficient.
The legally stronger part of Apple’s case is not talent migration, but the specific allegations concerning the downloading of confidential files after departure, circumvention of security procedures, and an organised effort to obtain protected information.
In practice, Apple will have to narrow the case to identifiable sets of information, rather than relying abstractly on “hardware experience”, because the logic of Article 1.116 of the Civil Code protects secrecy, not a monopoly over an employee’s professional competence. The strongest quotable argument would not be that OpenAI acquired io for USD 6.5 billion and plans an AI device in 2027, but that the competing project may have been accelerated through the use of specific, secret and reasonably protected Apple files or supply-chain data. OpenAI’s strongest line of defence would be to distinguish general know-how in industrial design, miniaturisation, chips, batteries or mass production from specific documents and data that were not public or readily obtainable on the market.
Procedurally, if a similar dispute were conducted under Article 101 of the Lithuanian Code of Civil Procedure, the parties would need to request restrictions on access to the case file in advance, because the very process of proving a trade secret may become an additional channel for its disclosure.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether a new artificial intelligence device can replace the iPhone, but whether an undertaking’s legitimate interests may have been infringed by acts of unfair competition involving the acquisition, disclosure, or use of trade secrets. On the basis of the sources provided, such a dispute should primarily be assessed under Article 16 of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania, which entitles an undertaking to apply to court for the termination of unlawful acts, compensation for damages, publication of a refutation or explanations, and the confiscation or destruction of measures related to unfair competition. The procedural nature of such a dispute is also linked to Article 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, as cited in source [4], since it provides that competition and intellectual property cases are heard under the rules of that Code, subject to statutory exceptions. Article 21 of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania is significant for the institutional supervision of trade secret protection, as it establishes the duty of the Competition Council and its administrative staff to protect undertakings’ trade or professional secrets learned in the course of supervising compliance with the law. Article 5 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Prohibition of Unfair Practices by Retail Undertakings is relevant here only insofar as it confirms the general rule that the protection of trade secrets in the course of supervision is governed by the Law on Competition
Legal assessment. Under the factual scenario described in the report, Apple’s legal interest would be framed as seeking to stop conduct which, it alleges, enabled a competitor to make use of confidential information concerning hardware development, manufacturing, supply chains, or research. If such conduct were classified as unfair competition, Article 16(1)(1) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania would permit a claim for its cessation. Article 16(1)(2) of the same law would permit a claim for compensation for damages, meaning that the relevant issue would be not only the taking of the information itself, but also its causal connection with the damage suffered. Article 16(1)(4) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania also provides for the confiscation or destruction of goods, their packaging, or other measures directly related to unfair competition, where the infringements cannot otherwise be remedied. In the dispute described in the report, this remedy would in practice be relevant only to those measures or results directly connected with unfair competition. Article 16(1)(3) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania further permits a claim for the publication of statements of specified content and form where it is necessary to refute false information or provide explanations concerning the identity of an undertaking or the goods it produces. The departure of former employees to a competitor is not, in itself, independently assessed under the cited provisions; accordingly, the legally decisive issue would not be the fact of their departure, but whether the acts associated with it infringed Apple’s legitimate interests in the form of unfair competition. If the dispute moved into the supervisory sphere of the Competition Council, Article 21(1) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania would require the Council and its staff to protect trade or professional secrets learned during the investigation. The same provision permits such secrets to be used without the undertaking’s consent only for the purposes for which they were submitted. Article 21(2) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania provides that the Competition Council may disclose trade or professional secrets to entities suspected of an infringement for the purposes of the rights of defence, where this is necessary to prove infringements for which fines may be imposed under Article 36 of that Law. Before such disclosure, the undertaking must be invited to provide explanations within a period set by the Competition Council of not less than three working days. If the undertaking does not substantiate that disclosure of the secrets is unnecessary to prove the infringements, the Competition Council adopts a decision to disclose them; if it does substantiate this, the Council adopts a decision not to disclose them. Thus, even in a dispute concerning trade secrets, the rights of defence and the protection of secrets are not absolute under the cited provisions, but are balanced through a decision of the Competition Council and a short period for submitting explanations. The wording of Article 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure means that a private-law competition and intellectual property dispute would be heard under the rules of civil procedure. Article 50(1) of the Law Amending and Supplementing the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania states that an undertaking has the right, in respect of certain competition-restricting acts, to apply to Vilnius Regional Court for the termination of unlawful acts and compensation for damages; however, the core of the matter described in the report concerns trade secrets and unfair competition, rather than the application of Articles 81 or 82 of the Treaty establishing the European Community
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario would be a claim for cessation of unlawful acts under Article 16(1)(1) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania, since that remedy is directed specifically at allegedly ongoing or threatened unfair competitive conduct. The second scenario would be a claim for damages under Article 16(1)(2) of the same law, the significance of which would depend on whether the damage is linked to the use of misappropriated information to develop a competing product or market position. The third scenario would be a claim to eliminate the consequences of the infringement through the confiscation or destruction of measures related to unfair competition under Article 16(1)(4) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania. The fourth scenario would be proceedings in which part of the disputed material itself constitutes trade or professional secrets, making the rules on their protection and possible disclosure under Article 21 of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania important. This is practically significant not only for Apple and OpenAI, but also for technology companies hiring employees from competitors, because under the cited provisions competitive movement of talent does not eliminate the risk of liability if protected trade secrets are used in parallel. For suppliers and partners, the relevant point is that a dispute concerning manufacturing, supply, or research information may become not merely a reputational matter, but also civil proceedings under competition law. For investors, it is significant that such a case may affect the development of a future device through injunctions, damages claims, or an obligation to remove measures related to unfair competition. The ultimate legal consequence under the cited sources would depend on whether the court establishes acts of unfair competition and their connection with the remedies sought under Article 16 of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania
Whether the information identified by Apple concerning unreleased technologies, processes, products, and hardware plans should be treated as trade secrets, rather than merely as experience lawfully acquired by former employees or as general knowledge.
Article 1.116 of the Civil Code treats as a trade secret only information that is secret, has actual or potential commercial value because it is secret, and in respect of which the holder has taken reasonable steps to keep it secret. The same provision clearly distinguishes confidential information from a trade secret: an internal Apple designation alone is insufficient if the information is readily obtainable in the market or consists of experience, skills, or knowledge honestly acquired by employees. Apple’s strongest argument would therefore not be an abstract assertion concerning former employees, but a specific chain of evidence showing that, during recruitment or the departure process, a specific non-public technical configuration, product roadmap, or process with economic value was elicited.
For OpenAI’s defence, the critical distinction would be one close to Article 1.116(2)(3) of the Civil Code: whether the discussion concerned an individual’s competence or an identifiable unit of Apple’s secret information.
In practice, the case will turn not on whether Apple and OpenAI are competitors in the consumer devices market, but on whether there is provable movement from the mobility of knowledge to the appropriation of secrets. At this stage, Apple’s position is stronger because of the factual details alleged: Tang Tan’s role, the alleged encouragement during recruitment to disclose internal information, and possible instructions to circumvent security procedures when leaving the company. However, the prospect of injunctive relief will not be secured merely by showing a former partnership or a general breach of trust; Apple will need to link a specific secret to a specific consumer device or hardware process being developed by OpenAI.
Practitioners should cite not the general rhetoric of “confidentiality”, but the three-part test under Article 1.116 of the Civil Code, because it reveals the central risk: if the claimant fails to prove reasonable protective measures and does not distinguish the information from employees’ experience, a trade secrets claim may shrink into a weaker contractual or ethical dispute.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the information identified by Apple concerning unreleased technologies, processes, and products satisfies the criteria for a trade secret under Article 1.116(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and whether its alleged acquisition, use, or disclosure may be classified as an unlawful infringement of rights. This issue must primarily be assessed under Article 1.116(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which requires that the information be secret, have actual or potential commercial value because it is secret, and be subject to reasonable steps by its holder to maintain its secrecy. Article 1.116(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, because it distinguishes a trade secret from information that is merely confidential, widely known, readily accessible, or experience and knowledge honestly acquired by an employee. According to the sources provided, the issue of remedies is linked to Article 16(1) of the Law on Competition of the Republic of Lithuania, which allows an economic operator to apply to a court for cessation of unlawful acts, compensation for damage, and, in certain cases, confiscation or destruction of measures connected with unfair competition. If the dispute were classified as a claim for compensation for damage caused by unfair competition, the applicable law would be determined by Article 1.46 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania
Legal assessment. Apple’s assertions regarding unreleased technologies, processes, and products are legally relevant under Article 1.116(1) of the Civil Code only to the extent that such information is not generally known or readily accessible in the relevant technological environment. Internal designation as confidential information alone would not be sufficient, because Article 1.116(2)(1) of the Civil Code expressly provides that confidential information which does not meet the criteria for a trade secret is not deemed to be a trade secret. Accordingly, Apple would need to substantiate not only the existence of confidentiality rules, but also that the information had actual or potential commercial value precisely because it was secret. The security protocols, offboarding procedures, and access management referred to in the report are legally significant as the evidentiary field for establishing the reasonable steps to maintain secrecy referred to in Article 1.116(1)(3) of the Civil Code. A possible defence by OpenAI under the same provisions would be directed at showing that the disputed information was publicly known, readily accessible, or constituted the honestly acquired experience, skills, abilities, or knowledge of former employees under Article 1.116(2)(2) and (3) of the Civil Code. If, during recruitment processes, former Apple employees were encouraged to disclose information that was specifically secret, economically valuable, and protected, such conduct would, under the logic of Article 1.116(3) of the Civil Code, fall within the sphere of protection of trade secrets against unlawful acquisition, use, and disclosure. Article 1.97(1) of the Civil Code is also relevant, because information is recognised as an object of civil rights, meaning that a dispute concerning its unlawful use is not merely organisational or reputational. According to the sources provided, the basis for compensation is linked to Article 6.263 of the Civil Code, which establishes the duty not to cause damage to another person and the principle of full compensation for damage. Article 16(1)(1) and (2) of the Law on Competition correspond to Apple’s stated procedural objectives: to stop the alleged unlawful use and to recover damages. If removal of products, packaging, or other measures directly connected with unfair competition were sought, such a claim would be possible under Article 16(1)(4) of the Law on Competition only where the infringements cannot otherwise be eliminated. Article 1.46 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania would mean that the law applicable to claims for damage caused by unfair competition would depend on the market in which the adverse consequences arose, or, where only the interests of an individual person were infringed, on the injured party’s place of business. According to the sources provided, the competence of the Competition Council does not directly expand the examination of a private dispute between Apple and OpenAI, but Article 21 of the Law on Competition indicates that, when supervising compliance with the law, the authority must protect commercial or professional secrets that become known to it. This provision is practically important because, even in dispute or supervisory proceedings, trade secrets do not become public information merely because they are submitted to an authority. Under Article 21(2) of the Law on Competition, commercial or professional secrets may be disclosed to entities suspected of an infringement for the purposes of the right of defence, but before doing so the economic operator must be given a period of not less than three working days to submit explanations
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is a court injunction prohibiting the use of specifically identified information, if it were established that the information meets the criteria set out in Article 1.116(1) of the Civil Code and was unlawfully acquired or used. The second scenario is compensation for damage under Article 16(1)(2) of the Law on Competition and the principle of full compensation for damage established in Article 6.263 of the Civil Code. The third scenario is a narrowing of the claims if part of the information were recognised as merely confidential, publicly known, readily accessible, or experience honestly acquired by employees under Article 1.116(2) of the Civil Code. The fourth scenario is a shift of the dispute to the question of applicable law under Article 1.46 of the Civil Code, particularly if it were alleged that adverse competitive consequences arose in a specific market. In practical terms, this matters for Apple because its success would depend on its ability to precisely distinguish a protectable trade secret from employees’ general knowledge and to prove reasonable protective measures. It matters for OpenAI because even an interim prohibition on using the disputed information could affect the development of a consumer-facing device if that development relied on information recognised as a trade secret. It also matters for former employees because their right to use honestly acquired experience under Article 1.116(2)(3) of the Civil Code would be distinguished from the obligation not to disclose genuine trade secrets. Finally, procedurally, the dispute would demonstrate that in trade secret cases the decisive factors are not general allegations of “information theft”, but the specific content of the information, its secrecy regime, its economic value, and the proportionality of the remedies sought under the cited provisions
Whether a driver with a blood alcohol concentration of 2.18 per mille driving into a private yard and damaging a fence should be classified only under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code, or whether there is already a basis for a more serious classification under Article 281(2) of the Criminal Code on account of substantial property damage.
Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises the act of driving a motor vehicle where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more is established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. The 2.18 per mille concentration referred to in the news item clearly exceeds the threshold for criminal liability, so the opening of a pre-trial investigation under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code is legally justified irrespective of the fact that a fence was knocked down. Article 281(2) of the Criminal Code would be relevant only if an intoxicated driver, having breached road safety rules, caused a traffic accident resulting in non-serious impairment of another person’s health or substantial property damage to the victim.
Since the news item refers only to damage to a fence and provides no information about substantial property damage or injury to a victim, the stronger classification on the facts provided remains Article 2811 of the Criminal Code, not Article 281(2).
The article’s statement that “such intoxication already entails criminal liability” is correct only in the context of this specific 2.18 per mille case, but is formulated too broadly. More precisely, it should state that criminal liability under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code arises where a person drives with an established blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more. It should also avoid giving the impression that any driving after consuming alcohol is automatically a criminal offence, because the cited Criminal Code provision sets a specific threshold for criminal liability.
In this situation, that threshold has been exceeded, so the inaccuracy does not alter the conclusion as to the basis for the pre-trial investigation itself, but it does affect the general legal formulation.
In practice, the key point is to distinguish between two issues: the intoxication threshold and the consequences of the accident. For the defence or prosecution, on the facts provided, the main point of dispute would not be whether 2.18 per mille falls within Article 2811 of the Criminal Code, because it does, but whether the damage to the fence reaches the level of “substantial property damage” within the meaning of Article 281(2). Until damage of that magnitude is substantiated by specific evidence, it is professionally more accurate to refer to the elements of the offence under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code and to treat any civil or property-damage compensation issue separately.
The provision to be cited at this stage is Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code, while Article 281(2) should be raised only if evidence emerges of substantial property damage or non-serious impairment of health.
Core issue. The precise issue is whether the conduct of a 23-year-old driver, who was found to have a blood alcohol concentration of 2.18 per mille while driving a Toyota vehicle and, having lost control, knocked down a fence, is to be classified as giving rise to criminal liability for driving under the influence, and whether there is an additional basis for assessing the consequences of the traffic accident and property damage. The principal provision is Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, under which a person is liable if he or she drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated, where the established level of intoxication is 1.51 per mille or higher. The same classification is also established in Article 3 of the Law Amending Articles 68 and 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania and Supplementing the Code with Article 281¹. Since the stated concentration of 2.18 per mille exceeds the threshold of 1.51 per mille, the threshold for criminal liability under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is met by the mere fact of driving. Also relevant are Article 281(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, if substantial property damage or a minor impairment of another person’s health resulted from intoxicated driving and a breach of road traffic safety rules, and Article 188(1) and (2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania concerning negligent damage to another person’s property. Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania precludes relying on intoxication itself as a basis for release from criminal liability, because a person who commits a criminal act while intoxicated is not exempt from liability
Legal assessment. On the facts provided, the pre-trial investigation initiated by the authorities under Article 281¹ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania corresponds to the structure of that provision: a motor vehicle was driven, the driver was intoxicated, and the established level of intoxication exceeded the statutory threshold. This provision does not require personal injury or property damage; therefore, the knocking down of the fence is not a necessary element of Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Nevertheless, the damage to the fence and private yard is relevant to the investigation, because it may be assessed whether, in addition to intoxicated driving, there is also a consequence-based offence under Article 281(2) or Article 188 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 281(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies where an intoxicated driver breaches road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules and, as a result, a traffic accident occurs causing a minor impairment of health or substantial property damage to the victim. The report refers to property damage but does not state that any person was injured or that the property damage has already been assessed as substantial; accordingly, at present the most precise core classification is Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 188(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides for liability for negligent destruction of or damage to another person’s property where substantial property damage is caused, while paragraph 2 treats more severely an act committed in breach of special rules of safe conduct. Paragraph 3 of that article is procedurally important for the injured property owner, because liability under Article 188(1) and (2) is linked to a complaint by the victim, a statement by the victim’s lawful representative, or a prosecutor’s request. Article 280 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would be relevant here only in relation to damage to the objects listed therein, such as a vehicle, road, equipment located therein, or communication and signalling devices, where such damage threatened serious consequences or caused the consequences specified in that article. Sources of administrative law indicate the boundary between administrative and criminal liability: Article 423(3) and Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania associate administrative liability with intoxication from 0.41 to 1.5 per mille, whereas in the present case the established level was 2.18 per mille. Procedurally, the injured owner of the house or fence may submit items and documents relevant to the investigation under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Time limits in the pre-trial investigation would be calculated under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: in hours, days, and months, without including the hour or day on which the period begins. If an expert examination were ordered in the investigation, the prosecutor, upon receiving the expert report, must, under the cited provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, notify the suspect, defence counsel, and other specified participants in the proceedings in writing of where and when they may access the report. Coercive measures could be considered only to secure the objectives of the proceedings, since Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania links them to participation in the proceedings, an unhindered investigation, the hearing of the case, execution of the judgment, and prevention of new offences, while Article 120 lists the types of such measures
Consequences. The first scenario is the maintenance of a charge under Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, because the established intoxication level of 2.18 per mille in itself falls within the scope of that provision. In that case, the statutory sanction is a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. The second scenario would depend on the legal classification of the damage and consequences: if substantial property damage or a minor impairment of another person’s health were legally established, there would be grounds to consider the application of Article 281(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The third scenario concerns the procedural activity of the fence owner: under Article 188(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, the issue of negligent property damage may depend on a complaint, a statement, or a prosecutor’s request. In practical terms, it is important for the victim to record and submit evidence of damage under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, because that evidence will determine not only the issue of compensation but also any possible additional criminal-law assessment. For the suspect, the most important practical point is that intoxication does not exempt a person from liability under Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and that under Article 281¹(2) liability remains even where the act was committed negligently. If the accused or persons materially liable did not have funds to compensate the damage, Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides for the possibility, in cases and according to the procedure established by law, of compensating the damage from state funds. Accordingly, the case is practically significant not only from the perspective of the driver’s criminal liability, but also for the private property owner’s ability to substantiate and recover the damage suffered through procedural means
Whether, at the cassation stage, the body of circumstantial evidence was sufficient to rebut the defence’s version that the BMW may have been driven not by A. Šleinius, who was intoxicated at 2.41 per mille, but by the deceased passenger.
Article 281 of the Criminal Code links criminal liability not to the traffic accident as such, but to driving, a breach of the Road Traffic Rules, and a causal link with the consequences. Article 281(2) clearly reflects the logic of classification where an intoxicated driver breaches road safety rules and the consequences specified by law follow. Separately, Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises driving with a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more; therefore, the 2.41 per mille finding in this case is legally significant in two respects: as an independent risk threshold and as an aggravating factual context in assessing the fatal traffic accident.
The essential point of dispute is not the alcohol level or the consequences, but proof of the element “drove”, because without that element the logic of Article 281 does not operate.
In this case, the position of the Supreme Court of Lithuania shows that the principle that doubts are to be resolved in favour of the accused is not a mechanical rule permitting mutually consistent circumstantial data to be ignored. In its first cassation remittal, the Supreme Court emphasised that the lower courts had insufficiently assessed the expert conclusion regarding the woman’s presence in the passenger seat, the nature of the injuries, the possibility of leaving the vehicle only through the driver’s door window, and witness testimony about the accused’s own words concerning the window on “his side”. This is not a new evidentiary standard, but a practical reminder that “no one saw who was driving” does not in itself amount to an irreducible doubt where the chain of physical and testimonial evidence leads to a single rational conclusion.
The statement that “a road offence is punishable by imprisonment and disqualification from driving” should be formulated more narrowly: not every road traffic violation is a criminal offence, and not every such violation entails imprisonment. Under the wording of Article 420 of the Code of Administrative Offences provided, some dangerous breaches of the Road Traffic Rules constitute administrative offences, punishable by a fine and possibly by disqualification from driving, but not by imprisonment. Criminal liability arises only where the elements of the Criminal Code are satisfied, for example, under Article 281, driving, breach of the rules, and the legally prescribed consequences, or under Article 2811, driving with a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more.
In practice, the stronger argument is not an abstract reliance on in dubio pro reo, but an argument based on the totality of the evidence: it is not enough for the defence to point to the absence of a direct eyewitness if the expert evidence, injuries, exit trajectory, and the person’s own statements form a coherent account. For prosecutors and representatives of victims in cases of this kind, it is worth constructing not a list of isolated pieces of evidence, but a closed mechanical reconstruction of the event: where the persons were seated, through where it was possible to exit, which injuries confirm that account, and how this aligns with the explanations given after the incident. The defence risks placing excessive reliance on memory loss caused by intoxication, stress, or shock, because such an explanation does not offset objective data and, at the same time, weakens any request to treat confession or sincere remorse as mitigating circumstances.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not abstract “fault for the accident,” but whether it has been proven that Aivaras Šleinius drove a road vehicle while intoxicated, breached road traffic safety rules or rules governing vehicle operation, and whether this caused the consequences provided for in Article 281 of the Criminal Code. The axis of assessment is Article 281(2) and (4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, because those provisions link liability to driving while intoxicated, breach of rules, and the consequences of a traffic accident. Also relevant is the threshold in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: driving a motor vehicle with an established blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more is criminalised in itself. The property issue is determined under Article 72(1)–(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, pursuant to which the instrument or means of a prohibited act is confiscated, and confiscable property belonging to the offender must be confiscated in all cases. From the evidentiary and procedural perspective, Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, which allows participants in proceedings to submit relevant objects and documents, is significant, as is the provision of the CCP concerning an expert report, under which the prosecutor notifies the participants in proceedings of the expert report received and gives them an opportunity to review it
Legal assessment. On the facts presented, the established minimum alcohol concentration of 2.41 per mille plainly exceeds the 1.51 per mille threshold specified in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code; therefore, the essential issue for legal assessment became not the intoxication threshold but proof of the fact of driving. It was precisely because of this fact that the case was remitted for fresh assessment: the lower court had treated the uncertainty as to the driver in the accused’s favour, but the Supreme Court of Lithuania stated that the evidence had to be assessed as a whole, including expert conclusions, the nature of the injuries, the possibility of leaving the overturned vehicle, and witness testimony. This position of the Supreme Court means that an individual item of evidence, such as a merely probable expert conclusion, does not necessarily determine the outcome, but together with other data may form a sufficient logical chain to identify the person who was driving. The argument of the defence counsel and the insurance company that the first-instance acquittal should be preserved therefore depended legally on whether, after the rehearing, there remained a reasonable, unresolved doubt as to the driver; the regional court and the Supreme Court found that no such doubt remained. The request for mitigation of sentence, based on confession, sincere remorse, and an attempt to avoid more serious consequences, was rejected because, according to the case description provided, the courts found that the convicted person did not admit the criminal offence. The attempt to rescue the victims may have been a factual circumstance, but the sources provided do not establish any rule that such conduct in itself excludes liability under Article 281 of the Criminal Code or mandatorily mitigates the sentence. On the contrary, the source concerning the draft amendment to Article 281 of the Criminal Code indicates that situations involving a driver’s departure and failure to render assistance are separately linked to the issues under Article 144 of the Criminal Code; therefore, the call for assistance described in this case does not alter the central issue of drunk driving and the traffic accident. As regards confiscation, the Supreme Court’s decision to replace confiscation of a monetary sum with confiscation of the BMW itself is consistent with Article 72(2) of the Criminal Code: the vehicle by which the prohibited act was committed is to be regarded as its means. If that means belongs to the offender, Article 72(3) of the Criminal Code formulates mandatory confiscation, so the court’s key task is to establish the connection between the property and the act, and ownership. The submitted Supreme Court ruling No. 2AT-4-2011, in the context of administrative penalties, emphasises proportionality: the sanction must maintain a fair balance between the infringement, the objective pursued, and the measure applied. Nevertheless, in this case the proportionality assessment operates together with the special rule in Article 72 of the Criminal Code, under which confiscable property belonging to the offender is subject to mandatory confiscation. The civil claim also has a procedural basis: Article 118 of the CCP provides for compensation of damage from state funds only where the accused or persons materially liable for his actions lack funds; therefore, the participation of the insurance company as a civil defendant primarily means that the issue of compensation is determined in the case between the victims, the convicted person, and the materially liable entity. The victims’ representative’s request to increase non-pecuniary damage was dismissed, so the stated award of EUR 140,000 for non-pecuniary damage and approximately EUR 9,000 for pecuniary damage remained legally effective
Consequences. The practical consequence of the case for the convicted person is an actual custodial sentence, disqualification from driving for three years, and confiscation of the vehicle into state ownership under the mechanism of Article 72 of the Criminal Code. For the victims’ relatives, the most important point is that the criminal case finally resolved the issue of the person who was driving and left in place a specific amount of compensation for damage. For the insurance company, the case is significant as confirmation of the limits of civil liability: its attempt to restore the acquittal failed, and therefore the obligation to compensate damage remains linked to the final conviction-based assessment. Procedurally, the case shows that an acquittal based on doubts is not immune from review if a higher court finds that relevant evidence was not comprehensively and impartially assessed as a whole. Realistically, the further course after the Supreme Court’s decision is enforcement of the judgment: service of the custodial sentence, application of the restriction on the special right to drive, transfer of the confiscated BMW into state ownership, and enforcement of the awarded compensation. The broader practical significance is the clarification of the limits of the evidentiary standard in fatal traffic accident cases: where there are no direct eyewitnesses to the accident, the driver may be identified from the totality of expert, medical, technical, and witness evidence
Can the increases in permanent social benefits, pension indexation and social assistance pensions envisaged in the Programme of the Twenty-First Government be converted into budgetary commitments if their funding sources have not been aligned with fiscal discipline rules?
Article 8(1) of the Law on the Budget Structure provides that the legal basis for the preparation and implementation of the budget is not the Government Programme in itself, but the Constitution, the Constitutional Law on the Implementation of the Fiscal Treaty, the Law on the Budget Structure, the Law on Fiscal Discipline, the annual law approving budget indicators, and other legislation governing financing. This means that programme commitments concerning child benefits, indexation of old-age pensions or increases in social assistance pensions become legally significant only when they are incorporated into the relevant budgetary and social fund legislation. Article 22(3) of the Law on State Social Insurance further links the preparation and implementation of the Fund’s budget to the Constitutional Law on the Implementation of the Fiscal Treaty, the Law on the Structure of Budgets of State Social Funds, and the Rules on Fund Budgets.
Accordingly, increasing social insurance expenditure is not merely a matter of political choice: it must be aligned with the special budgetary regime applicable to social funds.
The stronger argument here is not that the Government Programme “authorises” an increase in social commitments, but that every permanent increase in expenditure must pass through the filter of fiscal discipline and budgetary legality. In practice, when criticising or defending such decisions, Article 8(1) of the Law on the Budget Structure and Article 22(3) of the Law on State Social Insurance should be cited, because they show that the Programme is not an independent legal basis for financing. The greatest legal risk would arise if permanent benefits were increased without long-term revenue sources and without alignment with the rules governing the annual budget and the budgets of social funds.
In that case, the dispute would not be about preferences in economic policy, but about whether a political commitment circumvents the mandatory architecture of fiscal discipline.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether the pledges in the Programme of the Twenty-First Government are economically justified, but whether increases in social benefits, pensions, environmental protection funding, and other recurring appropriations can be converted into binding budgetary decisions in compliance with budgetary and fiscal governance rules. This question is determined under Article 1 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure, which requires monetary resources to be used efficiently in pursuit of long-term economic and social welfare, sustainable growth, employment, and without endangering price stability. The legal basis for budget preparation and execution is established in Article 6(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure, which also refers to the Constitutional Law on the Implementation of the Fiscal Treaty, the Law on Fiscal Governance, the Statute of the Seimas, the Law on Strategic Management, and the law approving the budget for the relevant year. Under Article 6(3) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure, legal acts affecting the revenue, appropriations, and public debt of the relevant budget year must be adopted no later than the law approving the budget for that year. Under Article 6(4) of the same law, indicators, coefficients, and other amounts used to calculate planned appropriations for three budget years are to be set for a period of not less than three budget years. The fiscal limit is established by Articles 1, 2(1), and 3 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Fiscal Governance: fiscal rules are intended to ensure the long-term sustainability of general government finances, and debt must be assessed so that it does not exceed 60 percent of GDP over several decades
Legal assessment. The increases in child benefits, indexation of old-age pensions, and assistance pensions referred to in the Government Programme become legally relevant when they are transformed into legal acts or budget appropriations. Such decisions fall directly within the scope of Article 6(3) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure, because they affect appropriations and may affect public debt. Accordingly, they cannot be regarded merely as programmatic political declarations if they are also intended to be financed from the budgets for 2026, 2027, or subsequent years. Since, under Article 2(3) of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430, a budget year is the period from 1 January to 31 December, on 19 July 2026 “next year” in this situation means the 2027 budget year. If new recurring social commitments are envisaged for 2027, the amounts used for their calculation must be aligned with the logic of three-budget-year planning under Article 6(4) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure. This is particularly important in the case of pension and benefit indexation, because such mechanisms are, by their nature, not one-off expenditure but formulas determining future appropriations. The concept of appropriations in Article 2(2) of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430 is linked to the planned amount of expenditure approved in the state or municipal budget, which the manager of appropriations is entitled to receive and use to finance programmes. It follows that neither a ministry nor any other institution can acquire, solely by virtue of the text of the Programme, the right to use funds if the appropriations have not been approved in the relevant budget. Under Article 13(2) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure, social security and support programmes are one of the purposes of state budget appropriations; therefore, their financing is possible, but only within the general limits of budgetary and fiscal governance rules. Environmental protection, under Article 13(4) of the same law, is also a purpose of state budget appropriations; therefore, the environmental component of the Programme may be financed, although the legal analysis based on the sources provided is limited to the lawfulness of financing and appropriations. The role of the Minister of Finance in this situation is institutionally significant, because Article 6(2) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure entrusts the Minister with establishing the methodology for the preparation and execution of state and municipal budgets to the extent that it is not established by laws or Government resolutions. If the proposed commitments increase aggregate expenditure, compliance must be assessed against the rule in Article 3(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Fiscal Governance, under which general government finances are managed with a view to ensuring that the general government sector is in surplus over the medium term, subject to the specified exceptions. In addition, where the average of the general government balance indicators for the last five completed calendar years is negative, Article 3(2) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Fiscal Governance limits the annual growth of the aggregate of state budget appropriations, social insurance fund expenditure, and compulsory health insurance fund expenditure. Accordingly, the risk of breaching fiscal discipline mentioned by the economist would, in legal terms, require scrutiny not of the number of pledge formulations, but of whether the implementing acts comply with Articles 1 and 6 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure and Article 3 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Fiscal Governance
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that measures in the Government Programme are included in the draft budget only to the extent that they fit within the rules on appropriations and fiscal governance. The second scenario is legislative adjustment: legal acts concerning benefits, pensions, or other amounts are adopted together with, or no later than, the law approving the budget, as required by Article 6(3) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure. The third scenario is relevant if the budget is not approved on time: under Article 29 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure, monthly appropriations at the beginning of the year may not exceed one-twelfth of the previous year’s appropriations and are allocated only for continuing activities, statutory obligations, and liabilities. This would mean that new programmatic measures could not be implemented solely on the basis of a political commitment if they had not yet become statutory obligations or approved appropriations. In practical terms, this matters for recipients of social benefits, because their right to increased benefits would depend on specific legal acts and budget appropriations, not on the text of the Programme. It is also important for managers of appropriations, because their right to use funds under Article 2(2) of the Law Amending the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Budget Structure No. I-430 arises only once the planned amount of expenditure has been approved in the budget. Finally, it is important for the Ministry of Finance and the Seimas, because it is in the process of budget preparation, approval, and execution that political pledges, three-year appropriation planning, the impact on public debt, and fiscal governance rules must be reconciled
Whether violence by a twelve-year-old against another teenager, where the perpetrator herself does not incur criminal liability on the facts reported in the news item, nevertheless gives rise to a civil obligation on the part of her parents to compensate the victim for the harm caused.
Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code applies directly, since the perpetrator is stated to be only 12 years old: parents or guardians are liable for harm caused by a minor under the age of 14, unless they prove that the harm did not arise through their fault. This does not mean “automatic” criminal or administrative liability of the parents, which the news item rightly rejects, but rather a presumption of civil liability in compensation proceedings. Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code is also relevant in a borderline situation: if the harm was caused while the child was under the supervision of an educational, upbringing, healthcare or guardianship institution, liability passes to that institution unless it proves the absence of fault.
Article 6.276 of the Civil Code operates here only by way of contrast: a minor aged 14 to 18 would be liable personally on general grounds, while the parents’ obligation would be subsidiary where the minor has no property or earnings.
The stronger practical argument in this situation is not that “the child is not punishable”, but that “the absence of criminal liability does not eliminate the civil route to compensation”. The victim’s side should rely on Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code and procedurally formulate the claim against the parents, because it is they who would bear the burden of proving that the harm did not arise through their fault. The critical factual detail is the supervision regime at the time of the incident: if the violence in Poetry Park occurred outside institutional supervision, the primary civil respondent is the parents or guardians; if it occurred in the context of organised educational or upbringing activities, the institution’s liability under Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code must be examined.
It would be a practical error to confine the discussion to the age threshold under the Criminal Code and breach of public order, because the actual compensatory instrument under the provisions cited is a tort claim for harm caused by a minor under the age of 14.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether a twelve-year-old may be punished by a criminal penalty, but what non-punitive and civil consequences apply to a child who has committed an act bearing the elements of a criminal offence before reaching the age of criminal responsibility. This issue must be assessed under Article 13(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, as referred to in the Concept of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of Minors, Articles 10, 12 and 18 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child, and Articles 6.275 and 6.277 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The substance of Article 13(3) of the Criminal Code, as reflected in the sources provided, is as follows: a person who had not reached the age of 14 before committing a dangerous act may be subject, in accordance with the procedure established by law, to educational or other measures. Accordingly, the case of a twelve-year-old child falls within the framework of special child-care measures rather than criminal punishment
Legal assessment. Article 10(1)(1) of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child directly covers a situation in which a child commits an act bearing the elements of a crime or criminal misdemeanour but, at the time of the act, has not reached the age prescribed by the Criminal Code. This means that the legal system does not regard such a child as entirely outside the reach of law, but responds through care and assistance measures. Under the definition in the Juvenile Justice Programme for 2004-2008, minimum care measures consist of social, psychological, pedagogical and other assistance without separating the minor from the family or guardians. Medium care, according to the same source, is associated with assistance in specialised educational institutions. Article 12(2)(1) of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child provides that an application for minimum care may be submitted to the mayor of the municipality of the child’s permanent residence by the inter-institutional cooperation coordinator, the child’s legal representatives, the territorial police authority, the school, the eldership, the prosecutor and the court. Under Article 12(2)(2) of the same law, an application for medium care may be submitted, inter alia, by the case manager, the child’s legal representatives, the territorial police authority, the eldership, the prosecutor and the court. Procedurally, this is therefore not solely a police or court matter, since the principal route identified by the law is an application to the municipal mayor. Under Article 18(1) of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child, the child’s legal representatives have the right to receive information from the school and the case manager, to submit applications or complaints to the specified institutions, and to receive assistance in resolving child-related issues. However, under Article 18(2), they are also required to participate in the preparation and implementation of the individual plan for carrying out the child’s minimum care measure, to participate in the implementation of the measures, and to provide the necessary information. From the perspective of civil liability, the most important provision is Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code: parents or guardians are liable for damage caused by a minor under the age of fourteen, unless they prove that the damage did not arise through their fault. If the damage was caused while the child was under the supervision of an educational, upbringing, healthcare or care institution, Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code provides that that institution is liable unless it proves the absence of fault. Article 6.277 of the Civil Code additionally provides for the liability, on general grounds, of parents whose parental authority has been restricted due to their fault, where the child’s actions are the consequence of improper exercise of parental authority, except where a guardian or curator has been appointed for the minor. Thus, parental liability is not criminal or administrative merely because of the fact of the child’s violence, but the risk of civil liability for damages under Article 6.275 of the Civil Code is clearly established. Article 43 of the Code of Administrative Offences is relevant to older minors who have committed an administrative offence: penalties and measures of influence are imposed on them under the general procedure, taking into account their age, personality, living conditions and upbringing. The same Article 43 allows a court or an authority hearing the case out of court to refrain from imposing an administrative penalty on a minor and to apply for minimum or medium care. This mechanism reflects the general direction of juvenile justice: even where formal liability is possible, the law provides for the possibility of moving to care measures. As regards children who filmed or encouraged the conduct, the sources provided permit legal assessment only insofar as their conduct itself would meet the grounds set out in Article 10(1) of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child, or would raise an issue concerning the dissemination of information about minors, the need to restrict which is mentioned in the Juvenile Justice Programme for 2009-2013
Consequences. The most realistic course is an application to the municipal mayor for minimum care measures, which, under Article 12 of the Law on Minimum and Medium Care of the Child, could be initiated by the police, the school, the prosecutor, the parents or other entities specified by law. In that case, the practical focus would shift to the individual measures plan, case management, information from the school, parental participation and the provision of services under Article 18. If civil damages were at issue, from the perspective of the injured party the principal provision would be Article 6.275 of the Civil Code, since the perpetrators are identified as being under fourteen years of age. In practical terms, it is important for parents that they may defend themselves by proving that the damage did not arise through their fault, while the same burden of proof would arise for an institution only if the damage was caused while the child was under its supervision. For the school and the municipality, the important point is that the law does not leave them merely as observers: the school may initiate the issue of minimum care, and the application of measures is decided at municipal level. For the injured party and her representatives, the key point is to distinguish between two routes: care measures are intended to change the child’s behaviour, whereas compensation for damage is determined on the basis of civil liability. Accordingly, the assertion that a twelve-year-old “bears no responsibility” for such an incident would, on the basis of the sources provided, be too narrow: the child is not subjected to a criminal penalty, but may be subject to minimum or medium child-care measures, and civil liability for the damage caused may arise for the parents, guardians or, in certain circumstances, the institution that was supervising the child
Does the finding of a blood alcohol concentration of 1.85 per mille while driving a Volvo S+V70 in Panevėžys in itself establish criminal liability under Article 281¹ of the Criminal Code, or must the traffic accident and consequences characteristic of Article 281 of the Criminal Code also be proved?
Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code directly criminalises driving a motor vehicle where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more is established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. On the facts provided, the driver’s blood alcohol concentration was 1.85 per mille, meaning that the threshold was crossed not for administrative liability, but for a separate criminal offence. Article 281 of the Criminal Code, as appears from the provision provided, links liability to a breach of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules and to a traffic accident causing minor impairment of health or substantial property damage.
Therefore, if there was no traffic accident or injured party, the stronger classification on the facts provided is under Article 281¹, not Article 281.
The article inaccurately gives the impression that only a blood alcohol limit exceeding 0.4 per mille applies universally to all drivers. According to the wording of Article 1 of the amendment to the Law on Road Traffic Safety provided, the general maximum permitted ethyl alcohol concentration is 0.4 per mille, but it is noted that a stricter rule applies to novice drivers, taxi drivers, moped and motorcycle riders, and drivers in other specified categories. A more precise formulation would be: for most drivers, the permitted limit is 0.4 per mille, but certain categories of drivers are subject to a stricter, effectively zero-tolerance regime.
In addition, the reference in the report to a pre-trial investigation under Article 281 of the Criminal Code is not the most accurate on the facts provided, because driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 1.85 per mille, without any specified traffic accident, corresponds to the structure of Article 281¹ of the Criminal Code.
In a case of this kind, the dispute between the defence and the prosecution should turn not on whether the driving caused a specific dangerous consequence, but on the fact of driving itself, the lawfulness of the intoxication test, and the measurement result, because the offence under Article 281¹ is triggered from 1.51 per mille. In practice, the stronger argument is that a result of 1.85 per mille brings the case within the sphere of criminal liability even in the absence of an accident, so the reference to the general 0.4 per mille limit is secondary here. A professional should check the legal classification: if Article 281 remains in the procedural documents, the consequences required by Article 281 must be identified; if they are absent, the principal citation should be Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the man who drove a Volvo S+V70 in Panevėžys on 17 July 2026 and was found to have a blood alcohol level of 1.85 per mille is subject to criminal, rather than administrative, liability. This issue is determined primarily under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which covers driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or higher. The same provision prescribes the sanctions: a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Article 2811(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant because liability also arises where such conduct is committed through negligence. The threshold for administrative liability is apparent from Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania: it concerns driving with a blood alcohol level of not less than 0.41 per mille but not more than 1.5 per mille. Accordingly, a reading of 1.85 per mille exceeds the administrative-liability range specified in Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences and falls within the scope of criminal liability under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code
Legal assessment. The factual situation satisfies three elements of Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code: the person was driving, the vehicle driven was a motor vehicle, and the established blood alcohol level was 1.51 per mille or higher. The reported blood alcohol level of 1.85 per mille is a sufficient threshold for classification under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code, because the provision does not require a traffic accident or harmful consequences. Therefore, the commencement of a pre-trial investigation is logically linked to the mechanism of criminal liability, although the sources provided specifically formulate the elements of Article 2811 of the Criminal Code. Article 2811(2) of the Criminal Code narrows the potential significance of any defence concerning the form of fault: even if it were argued that the act was committed negligently, the provision itself also establishes liability for negligent commission. Article 3 of the Law Amending Articles 68 and 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania and Supplementing the Code with Article 2811 confirms that this offence was incorporated into the Criminal Code as an autonomous provision criminalising drunk driving. Article 7 of the Law Amending Articles 47, 176, 220, 221, 272, 273, 281 and 284 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania previously established a similar model: driving with more than 1.5 per mille of alcohol in the blood was punishable by a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. This demonstrates the normative distinction between lower-level intoxication, which is governed by administrative provisions, and intoxication exceeding 1.5 per mille, which is associated with criminal liability. The procedure for determining intoxication is governed by the Rules for Determining Intoxication or Impairment of Persons Driving Vehicles and Other Persons, paragraph 1 of which provides that the Rules apply to vehicle drivers and to persons referred for medical examination by the police, pre-trial investigation authorities, the prosecutor’s office, or a court. Accordingly, the practical institutional sequence in such a case includes determining intoxication under those Rules and carrying out pre-trial investigation actions, since the report states that an investigation has already been opened. Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences should not be the principal classification provision in this situation, because its wording is limited to the range of 0.41 to 1.5 per mille. Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences would be relevant only for comparison of the threshold and for the logic of repeat offending, because it covers cases where the driver had previously been subjected to an administrative penalty or has an unexpired or unexpunged conviction for drunk driving. Article 424 of the Code of Administrative Offences regulates driving without the right to drive or where that right has been suspended, but the report does not state that the driver lacked the right to drive. Article 420 of the Code of Administrative Offences concerns dangerous or hooligan driving, but the facts provided are limited to intoxication and driving; therefore, the elements of that provision do not arise directly from the report. If deprivation of the right to drive vehicles were imposed in the context of an administrative measure, Article 682(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences provides for enforcement by taking the driving licence. Article 682(2) of the Code of Administrative Offences also provides that, where the right to drive is withdrawn due to drunk driving, the licence must be submitted on the day on which the decision withdrawing the right is adopted, unless it has been taken earlier. Article 682(3) of the Code of Administrative Offences creates a clear risk for the driver: if the licence is not submitted within the prescribed time, the period of deprivation of the right to drive is extended by the length of time for which the licence was not submitted
Consequences. The most realistic further course is criminal proceedings under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code, in which the essential facts will be the circumstance of driving, the nature of the vehicle, and the finding of a blood alcohol level of 1.85 per mille. If these elements are confirmed, the legal consequences may be a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Because Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code does not require a traffic accident, injury, or damage to property, the centre of the case is not the consequences but the act of driving with a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or higher. For the driver, the most practically important point is that the reading of 1.85 per mille excludes ordinary administrative classification of drunk driving under Article 427(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences. For the police and pre-trial investigation authorities, it is important that the intoxication test and, where necessary, the medical examination comply with the scope of application defined in paragraph 1 of the Rules for Determining Intoxication or Impairment of Persons Driving Vehicles and Other Persons. If enforcement of deprivation of the right to drive were addressed in the proceedings, the practical consequence would be the taking of the driving licence or the obligation to submit it under Article 682 of the Code of Administrative Offences. This case is also important for distinguishing administrative and criminal liability: the threshold visible in Article 427 of the Code of Administrative Offences ends at 1.5 per mille, while Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code begins at 1.51 per mille. Therefore, when assessing the published report as of 19 July 2026, the legally decisive fact is not merely intoxication as such, but its level: 1.85 per mille
Can the violence by eight individuals on Laisvės Avenue be classified not only as minor bodily injury, but as minor bodily injury committed for hooligan motives under Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code, together with a breach of public order under Article 284 of the Criminal Code? The core of the dispute is not the fact of injury itself, but the motive and the public-order element: in their appeals, the convicted persons specifically denied the existence of hooligan motives.
Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code provides for imprisonment of up to three years for minor bodily injury, but Article 138(2)(8), where the injury is inflicted for hooligan motives, increases the sanction to imprisonment of up to five years. Hooligan motives are therefore not a rhetorical label here: they alter both the legal classification of the act and the sentencing range. Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code separately criminalises contempt for others or the environment demonstrated through insolent conduct in a public place, where public peace or order is disturbed; the context of Laisvės Avenue specifically permits an assessment not only of the harm caused to the individual victim, but also of the impact on public order.
Article 75(2) of the Criminal Code explains why, even after L. Ščerbinskas and V. Zakarževski were sentenced to one year’s imprisonment, execution of those sentences could be suspended: for minor or less serious intentional offences punishable by up to four years’ imprisonment, the court may suspend execution of the sentence for a period of one to three years.
It is inaccurate to say that, solely because of the fight, the convicted persons received immediate, unsuspended custodial sentences. A more precise formulation would be: the court imposed fixed-term custodial sentences, but suspended their execution for some of the convicted persons or deemed the sentences served because of time spent in detention and remand custody. In addition, Article 55 of the Criminal Code generally directs courts, in the case of a person being tried for the first time for a negligent, minor, or less serious intentional offence, towards penalties not involving arrest or fixed-term imprisonment, and requires reasons to be given where imprisonment is imposed.
Nor is it sufficient to state in abstract terms that recidivists receive longer custodial sentences: according to the wording of Article 56 of the Criminal Code as provided, in the case of an ordinary recidivist convicted of an intentional offence, the court generally imposes imprisonment, but a term of imprisonment more severe than that provided for in the sanction is linked to dangerous recidivism.
On appeal, the prosecution’s strongest argument is not merely that the conduct occurred in a public place, but the totality of the facts showing a demonstrative contempt for others and a connection between the violence and the disturbance of public peace under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code. For the defence, the key practical task is to challenge the hooligan-motives element, because if that element is upheld, the classification under Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code remains, as does the sentencing range of up to five years. From a sentencing perspective, the custodial sentence imposed should not be confused with its actual service: Article 75 of the Criminal Code allows execution to be suspended, while Article 55 requires the court to explain why fixed-term imprisonment is being chosen at all.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether the acts of the convicted persons in November 2025 were properly classified as minor impairment of health committed for hooligan motives under Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, together with a breach of public order under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code. Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code applies where a person is slightly injured or made ill for hooligan motives, and such conduct is punishable by imprisonment for up to five years. Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code covers insolent acts, threats, mockery or acts of vandalism committed in a public place, whereby disrespect for others or the environment is demonstrated and public peace or order is disturbed. Accordingly, the substance of the appeals, insofar as the convicted persons denied hooligan motives, is directly linked to the basis for applying Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code and to the elements of Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code. The issue of punishment must be determined under Article 55 of the Criminal Code, since a person tried for the first time for a negligent offence or for a minor or less serious intentional offence is normally given a punishment not involving arrest or fixed-term imprisonment, and imprisonment must be reasoned. Issues concerning the serving or non-serving of the sentence additionally rest on Article 66 of the Criminal Code, concerning crediting time spent in temporary detention and pre-trial detention, and Article 75 of the Criminal Code, concerning suspension of the execution of a sentence
Legal assessment. According to the information provided, the conflict took place on Laisvės Avenue; therefore, for the purposes of Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, the essential circumstance is not violence alone, but its public nature and the disturbance of public peace or order. If the fight in a public place constituted insolent acts demonstrating disrespect for others, the breach of public order may be classified independently alongside the impairment of health. Such a relationship is consistent with the conclusion concerning draft amendment No. XIIIP-988(2) to Article 310 of the Criminal Code, which states that insolent acts or malicious mockery in a public place, where public peace or order is disturbed, are classified under Article 284 of the Criminal Code either independently or as a concurrence of criminal offences. The challenge to the existence of hooligan motives is significant because, in the absence of that element, the conduct could be assessed not under Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code, but under Article 138(1), where the sanction is imprisonment for up to three years. However, if the violence was directed not only at a specific victim but also expressed demonstrative disrespect for public order, the element of hooligan motives legally reinforces the application of Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code. The submitted conclusion concerning draft amendment No. XIIIP-988(2) to Article 310 of the Criminal Code also notes that filming a criminal offence or acting in the presence of children may, in case law, be regarded as indications of disturbance of public peace or of hooligan motives. The specific case is not identified in the sources, so this proposition may be used only as a general point of guidance drawn from the legislative source provided. Article 55 of the Criminal Code means that, when imposing actual or suspended fixed-term imprisonment for a minor or less serious intentional offence, the court must explain why more lenient punishments are insufficient. This obligation is particularly important because the submitted conclusion concerning draft amendments Nos. XIIIP-5147 and XIIIP-5148 to Article 346 of the Code of Administrative Offences and Article 310 of the Criminal Code states that, in practice, actual imprisonment for minor offences is applied in exceptional cases. Nevertheless, Article 138(2) of the Criminal Code permits imprisonment for up to five years, and Article 284(1) permits imprisonment for up to two years; therefore, the mere fact that sentences of 4 to 12 months were imposed does not in itself fall outside the limits of the applicable sanctions. Article 75(2) of the Criminal Code permits suspension of the execution of a custodial sentence where a person is sentenced to no more than four years for one or more minor or less serious intentional offences. Accordingly, the suspension for one year of the one-year custodial sentences imposed on L. Ščerbinskas and V. Zakarževskas falls within the range of possible judicial decisions contemplated by Article 75 of the Criminal Code. The obligation to participate in a behavioural correction programme is also consistent with the logic of Article 75 of the Criminal Code, while the conclusion concerning draft amendment No. XIP-1210 to Articles 42 and 67 of the Criminal Code links such programmes to the control of the convicted person’s conduct and social rehabilitation. Article 66(1) of the Criminal Code establishes not a right of the court, but a duty, to credit pre-trial detention and temporary detention against the sentence imposed. Under Article 66(2) of the Criminal Code, one day of pre-trial detention or temporary detention is equivalent to one day of imprisonment or arrest; therefore, treating a sentence as served by reason of time spent in detention and pre-trial detention is a direct consequence of applying that provision. From a procedural perspective, the appeals lodged by the convicted persons are based on the accused person’s right, set out in Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to appeal against a court judgment and rulings
Consequences. In practical terms, the most important issue for the further course of the proceedings is whether the higher court will uphold the classification based on hooligan motives under Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code. If that classification remains, the convicted persons’ prospects of obtaining a more lenient legal assessment will be narrower, because the qualified form of minor impairment of health and the independent breach of public order will remain in force. If the element of hooligan motives were removed, sentencing individualisation would have to be reconsidered under the less serious sanction in Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code, while separately assessing the elements of Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code. The prosecutor’s appeal means that the appellate stage may be important not only for the convicted persons’ attempt to mitigate liability, but also for a possible increase in sentences, insofar as permitted by the procedure and the charge brought. For the convicted persons whose sentence execution has been suspended, the obligations imposed under Article 75 of the Criminal Code are of practical significance: participation in a behavioural correction programme, employment, and not leaving their place of residence. For the convicted persons whose sentences were credited as served, the most important consequence arises from Article 66 of the Criminal Code: the actual time spent in pre-trial detention or temporary detention reduces or covers the imposed term of imprisonment. For the victims and the public, this case is important because public violence may be assessed not only as harm to health, but also as a breach of public order under Article 284 of the Criminal Code. For the courts, this situation gives rise to a duty to provide reasons under Article 55 of the Criminal Code: the further the sentence departs from more lenient punishments for minor or less serious offences, the more clearly it must be justified why imprisonment, or suspension of its execution subject to obligations, is necessary
The specific dispute is not about the content of the programme of the Twenty-First Government itself, but about whether its “submission to the Seimas” consists merely of registration, or only of presentation at a sitting of the Seimas and submission for debate before the Seimas approves the programme. The answer to that question determines whether the act of the Seimas approving the programme of Mindaugas Sinkevičius’s Government and, in effect, conferring powers on the Cabinet of Ministers may be held to have been adopted in breach of constitutional procedure.
Article 63 of the Law on the Constitutional Court allows the Constitutional Court to examine the compliance with the Constitution not only of laws, but also of “other acts of the Seimas”. The opposition’s route should therefore be directed at the specific act of the Seimas approving the Government programme, rather than at an abstract political question concerning the Government’s legitimacy. Under Article 66, an application must specify the exact title, number and date of adoption of the contested act, the specific grounds for examining the case and the legal reasoning.
A purely political argument that “the procedure was rushed” would therefore not be sufficient. Article 71 indicates that the Court’s decision would be binary: the act either is not contrary to the Constitution or is contrary to it, rather than merely recording a procedural inconvenience. The direct constitutional provision on the submission of the Government programme is not cited in the evidence provided, so the substantive argument would have to rest on how the applicants substantiate the content of the precise moment of “submission”.
In practice, the stronger argument for the opposition would be not to challenge the Government’s political mandate in general, but to frame the case precisely as a defect in the procedure for adopting an act of the Seimas under Articles 63 and 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. The most favourable argument for the Government would be a narrow interpretation of “submission”, under which the fact of registration is sufficient. However, the report indicates that the core of the dispute will be whether the Constitutional Court regards such a formal moment as sufficient.
The risk for the Government is that, under Article 71, an adverse decision would have to be formulated as a finding that a specific act of the Seimas is contrary to the Constitution; it would therefore not be merely a reputational error or a dispute over parliamentary technique. For lawyers preparing the referral, the key point is not to become mired in a political narrative about the extension of the spring session or holidays, but to document the precise chronology: when the programme was registered, when it was presented at a sitting, when the debates took place, and when the approval act was adopted.
Core issue. The legal issue is not a political assessment of the Government Programme, but whether the Seimas act approving the Programme of the Twenty-First Government was adopted in a manner consistent with the Constitution, and whether the Government’s mandate could therefore be challenged. This issue must be determined under Article 102 and Article 105(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, since the Constitutional Court reviews whether laws and other acts of the Seimas are contrary to the Constitution. The competence of the Constitutional Court is further defined by Article 1 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the Constitutional Court guarantees the supremacy of the Constitution and constitutional legality by deciding on the compliance of Seimas acts with the Constitution. In this case, the right to apply would arise from Article 106(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania: the Government, not less than one-fifth of all members of the Seimas, and the courts may apply in respect of the acts referred to in Article 105(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly, the opposition initiative mentioned in the report would be legally relevant only if it were signed by not less than one-fifth of all members of the Seimas and the petition complied with the requirements of Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. The object of the dispute would have to be the precisely identified act adopted by the Seimas concerning the Government Programme, because Article 66(6) of the Law on the Constitutional Court requires the title, number, date of adoption and other necessary details of the contested legal act to be specified
Legal assessment. If a group of members of the Seimas were to apply to the Constitutional Court, it would be required not merely to repeat public doubts concerning the procedure, but to provide legal reasoning with references to legislation, as required by Article 66(8) of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. The petition would also have to indicate the provisions of the Constitution and of the Law on the Constitutional Court conferring the right to apply, the specific grounds for examining the case, and a clearly formulated request to the Constitutional Court pursuant to Article 66(5), (7) and (9) of that Law. The petition of the group of members of the Seimas would have to be signed by all applying members of the Seimas, indicating their representative, and the signatures would have to be certified by the signature of the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the Seimas, as provided in Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. Under the final paragraph of Article 106 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court could refuse to accept the application if it were based on non-legal grounds. Thus, the opposition’s obligation would be to formulate the dispute as a normative issue concerning the procedure and the constitutionality of the Seimas act, rather than as political dissatisfaction with the formation of the new Government. In such a case, the Constitutional Court would not review the political expediency of the Programme; under Articles 102 and 105 of the Constitution, its competence concerns the conformity of legal acts with the Constitution. If the Seimas resolution concerning the Programme were challenged, it would constitute “another act adopted by the Seimas” within the meaning of Articles 102 and 105 of the Constitution. The sources provided indicate that this type of dispute is not foreign to constitutional review: by Resolution No. 1429 of 18 December 1997, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania requested an examination of whether the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 “On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania” was contrary to Article 92(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. Subsequently, by Resolution No. 1388 of 30 November 1998, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania requested an interpretation of the penultimate paragraph of item 3.3 of the reasoning part of the Constitutional Court ruling “On the Compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.” This is relevant insofar as it confirms that a Seimas act concerning the Government Programme may be the object of constitutional review. Nevertheless, under the provisions submitted, the automatic suspension of the validity of the contested act is linked not to a petition by a group of members of the Seimas, but to a submission by the President of the Republic or a resolution of the Seimas requesting an examination of the act’s compliance with the Constitution, as provided in Article 106 of the Constitution and Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court also provides that, upon receipt of such a Seimas resolution or submission by the President of the Republic, a preliminary examination of the materials is carried out within three days and a decision is taken on whether to accept the petition. The issue of continuity of Government activity is also linked to Article 94 of the Constitution, under which the Government administers the affairs of the country, implements laws and resolutions of the Seimas, coordinates the activities of ministries, prepares the draft budget and performs other duties entrusted to it by the Constitution and laws. Therefore, until there is a decision of the Constitutional Court, the provisions submitted do not, by themselves, eliminate the performance of the Government’s functions. The grounds for resignation of the Government are separately established in Article 101 of the Constitution, including where the Seimas twice in succession does not approve the Programme of a newly formed Government, where no confidence is expressed in the Government or the Prime Minister, where the Prime Minister resigns or dies, or after elections to the Seimas when a new Government is formed
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that a group of members of the Seimas collects the signatures of not less than one-fifth of all members of the Seimas, submits a petition complying with Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, and the Constitutional Court accepts and examines it as a case concerning the conformity of a Seimas act with the Constitution. The second scenario is that the application is rejected or not accepted if it fails to meet the requirements of form, content or legal reasoning established in Article 106 of the Constitution and Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. The third scenario is that the Constitutional Court recognises that the contested Seimas act, or part thereof, is contrary to the Constitution; in that event, under Article 107(1) of the Constitution, such act or part thereof could not be applied from the date of official publication of the Constitutional Court’s decision. The fourth scenario is that the Constitutional Court finds that the contested act is not contrary to the Constitution, in which case the legal basis for questioning the approval of the Programme under this application would disappear, since decisions of the Constitutional Court are final and not subject to appeal under Article 107 of the Constitution. The practical significance primarily concerns the Seimas, because it is the act adopted by the Seimas concerning the Programme that would be reviewed under Articles 102 and 105 of the Constitution. It is also directly significant for the Government, because approval of the Programme is linked to its political mandate, while Article 101 of the Constitution establishes separate circumstances in which the Government must resign. For the President, the matter is significant because, under Article 101 of the Constitution, the resignation of the Government or of a minister is accepted by the President of the Republic. For the Seimas opposition, the practical burden is procedural and argumentative: it is not sufficient to announce a doubt; a qualified application with a legal basis is required. More broadly, the case would be important for the review of constitutional legality, because Article 1 of the Law on the Constitutional Court defines the Constitutional Court as the institution ensuring the supremacy of the Constitution within the legal system
Should the episode of juvenile violence in Marijampolė, in respect of which a pre-trial investigation has been opened for disturbance of public order, be assessed legally only as an individual criminal case, or also as a question of the performance by the municipality and child rights protection authorities of their positive duties of prevention and assistance.
Article 20 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child establishes more than a declaratory prohibition of violence: state and municipal institutions must ensure the protection of the child from violence, and a child victim is entitled to assistance corresponding to the child’s needs and best interests. Article 29(3) is relevant to persons who observed and filmed the incident: any natural or legal person who has reasonable information about a child who has suffered from a criminal offence or violence must notify the police and/or the child rights protection authority. Article 52 assigns to the municipality not an abstract duty of care, but specific powers to organise and finance access to social, healthcare, education, mediation and other services, and to analyse the state of child welfare in the municipality.
Article 60 distributes prevention among several actors: the municipality, child rights protection authorities, police juvenile affairs officers, schools and other institutions.
The stronger legal argument here is not simply to “increase penalties”, because the evidence presented first allows assessment of the institutional duty to ensure that preventive and assistance measures operate effectively, while the accused person’s liability under the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure will depend on the legal classification adopted in the pre-trial investigation. In practice, a journalist or lawyer should ask not only whether the violent minor will be punished, but also who in Marijampolė municipality was responsible for the chain of measures relating to bullying, escalation of conflict on social networks, mediation and access to assistance. Article 29(3) is separately significant: if persons observed the incident, filmed it and disseminated the video, the legally relevant issue becomes not only the moral assessment of filming, but also compliance with the duty to report and to initiate assistance.
Accordingly, explanations by heads of institutions should be tested against the specific actions identified in Articles 20, 52 and 60, rather than against the general political phrase that “attention is being paid to prevention”.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not only whether the teenager’s violence gives rise to criminal liability, but also what duties the police, the child rights protection system, the municipality, schools, and other institutions responsible for the child have after violence against a child has occurred. This issue is to be assessed under Article 29(1), (3), (4) and (5), Article 52(1), Article 57(2) and (3), and Article 60(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child, Articles 140, 80, 82 and 93 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and Article 7 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Compensation for Damage Caused by Violent Crimes. Article 29(1) of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child establishes the protection of a child from criminal acts provided for in the Criminal Code, while Article 29(3) obliges any natural or legal person who becomes aware of a child victim of such an act and of a possible need for assistance to notify the police and/or the State Child Rights Protection and Adoption Service or its territorial division. Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code applies where, by beating or other violence, physical pain, minor bodily injury or short-term illness is caused to a person; the sanctions provided are community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Since the report concerns a possible minor perpetrator, the issue of liability must also be assessed under Article 80 of the Criminal Code, the purpose of which is to align punishment with age, social maturity, education, and the prevention of further offences
Legal assessment. The described infliction of several blows with hands, feet, and a telephone is, in legal terms, primarily associated with the causing of physical pain or minor impairment of health under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, provided this is confirmed by the case materials. The source provided in relation to Article 140 of the Criminal Code states that forensic medical experts make a finding of physical pain on the basis of case materials confirming the fact of beating or other violence, while minor impairment of health is associated with health impairment lasting no more than 10 days or a 5 percent loss of working capacity. The report states that the victim was taken to a medical institution after the incident; accordingly, healthcare records may be significant in determining whether physical pain, minor impairment of health, or other consequences within the meaning of the cited provisions are established. Since the victim’s relatives contacted law enforcement, this corresponds to the rule stated in the source that an act under Article 140 of the Criminal Code gives rise to criminal liability where there is a complaint by the victim, an application by the victim’s legal representative, or a prosecutor’s request. Article 29(4) of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child means that liability for a criminal act against a child is implemented in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the violent person is a minor, Article 80 of the Criminal Code points not to the automatic imposition of the strictest punishment, but to liability appropriate to the person’s age and social maturity, while limiting custodial sentences and expanding the possibilities for applying educational measures. Article 93(1) of the Criminal Code permits a court to release from criminal liability a minor who has committed, for the first time, a minor or less serious intentional crime, if the minor has apologised and fully or partially compensated the damage, has admitted guilt and shown remorse, or there are other grounds to believe that the minor will comply with the law. In such a case, under Article 93(2) of the Criminal Code, the court imposes the educational measures provided for in Article 82 of the Criminal Code. Article 82(1) of the Criminal Code lists, among such measures, a warning, compensation for or remedying of pecuniary damage, unpaid educational work, placement under the care and supervision of parents or other persons caring for children, behavioural restrictions, and placement in a special educational institution. Article 82(2) of the Criminal Code limits the number of such measures: the court may impose no more than three mutually compatible educational measures. The video recording and dissemination of the display of violence are legally relevant from the standpoint of child rights protection, because Article 29(2) of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child also protects a child from the demonstration of violence to a child and from other violations of the child’s rights. Persons who witnessed the incident or had justified information about the child victim and a possible need for assistance are subject to the duty under Article 29(3) of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child to notify the police and/or the child rights protection authority. The issue of liability of institutional heads arises not abstractly because of public reaction, but under Article 29(5) and Article 57(2) of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child, if educational, healthcare, or other institutions responsible for the child failed to perform their duties or performed them improperly. The municipality’s role derives from Article 52(1) of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child: it must organise and finance access to social, healthcare, educational, mediation, and other necessary services for the child and family, analyse the state of child welfare, and plan child rights protection measures. Under Article 60(1) of the same law, protection of children’s rights in municipalities is guaranteed by municipal councils, executive authorities, child rights protection authorities, police juvenile affairs officers, schools, and other institutions that prepare and implement measures for the prevention of violations of children’s rights. Therefore, from a legal perspective, the institutional discussion mentioned by the Prime Minister should be directed at whether those institutions in fact performed the prevention, service organisation, assistance, and cooperation functions established in Articles 52 and 60 of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is the continuation of the pre-trial investigation and refinement of the legal classification of the act according to the established consequences of the violence, particularly in light of the elements of Article 140 of the Criminal Code. The second scenario is the individualisation of the minor’s liability: even if a criminal act is established, the court may, under Articles 80, 93 and 82 of the Criminal Code, assess not only punishment but also educational measures. The third scenario concerns the victim: according to the interpretation of Article 29(6) of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child in the provided assessment of the draft legal act, the child and the child’s family members have the right to comprehensive assistance, including social, healthcare, educational, psychological, and other assistance. The fourth scenario concerns compensation and redress for damage: Article 7(2)(4) of the Law on Compensation for Damage Caused by Violent Crimes provides for a pecuniary damage limit of up to 40 BSB where a violent crime has caused minor impairment of a minor’s health or physical pain. The same Article 7 also provides limits for compensation for non-pecuniary damage, which is practically important for the victim and her family if the damage is established by a court. For institutions, the most important practical issue is not to declare the need for prevention, but to verify whether access to services, measures set out in assistance plans, and coordinated services for children who commit offences were ensured under Article 52 of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child. For schools and other institutions responsible for a child, this situation is important in light of Article 57(2) and (3) of the Law on Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child: they are responsible for the education of the children under their supervision and must immediately inform the competent authorities of known violations of children’s rights. Accordingly, the further legal course branches into three directions: the criminal-law assessment of the minor’s conduct, the mechanism of assistance and compensation for the victim, and the review of the preventive duties of the municipality, schools, and child rights protection authorities
The specific point in dispute is whether the Bank of Lithuania, having identified eight breaches of anti-money laundering requirements during a single inspection, was entitled to impose separate fines and aggregate them into a final sanction of EUR 370,000, or whether it was required to apply an absorption approach, under which the fine would have amounted to EUR 55,000.
Article 40(1) of the Law on Electronic Money and Electronic Money Institutions provides that the supervisory authority applies enforcement measures where at least one statutory ground exists, including the submission of incorrect, incomplete or inaccurate information, or failure to comply with other requirements of supervised legislation. The purpose of the same law is to ensure that the system of electronic money institutions is stable, reliable, effective and secure. Accordingly, a sanction under this regime is not merely compensatory or formal, but a supervisory risk-control measure.
The cited provisions do not disclose any general rule under which breaches identified during a single inspection would automatically be treated as one breach, or which would require only the highest fine to be applied. Paysera’s constitutional argument is therefore strongest not in asserting that separate fines are inherently impermissible, but in arguing that national law must state with sufficient clarity when aggregation applies, when absorption applies, and how proportionality is to be ensured.
The news report indicates that the Court of Justice of the European Union has already held that the Bank of Lithuania lawfully imposed separate fines on Paysera for breaches of anti-money laundering requirements. In March 2026, relying on this dispute, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania, by a final and unappealable ruling, reinstated the EUR 370,000 fine imposed by the Bank of Lithuania in 2020 and found that separate fines had properly been imposed for all eight breaches. This means that the current line of the administrative courts and the CJEU is more favourable to the supervisory authority’s discretion to classify several independent AML breaches separately, even where they are identified during a single inspection.
The practical conclusion for financial market participants is strict: a single Bank of Lithuania inspection does not mean a single sanction. AML control deficiencies must therefore be assessed not as one “systemic” error, but as potentially several independent breaches carrying cumulative financial consequences. Following the positions of the CJEU and the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania, the “absorption” argument is weaker in ordinary administrative litigation.
The stronger line of defence is now a constitutional test of legal certainty and proportionality in relation to the mechanism for combining sanctions. For professionals, it is important to cite not only the difference between EUR 370,000 and EUR 55,000, but also the fact that the court of first instance had reduced the fine to EUR 200,000, whereas the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania reinstated it in full. This shows that the risk arises not only from the finding of an infringement, but also from the sanctioning methodology: a dispute over the formula may result in a final fine several times higher.
Core issue. The legal issue is narrow: whether the Bank of Lithuania, having identified several breaches of anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing requirements during a single inspection, was entitled to treat each of them as a separate infringement and impose separate fines, rather than applying the principle of absorption of penalties. It is to be resolved primarily under Article 4(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, pursuant to which the Bank of Lithuania supervises the activities of electronic money institutions insofar as they relate to the implementation of preventive measures. The basis for the sanction is Article 39(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, which empowers the Bank of Lithuania and the Financial Crime Investigation Service to impose fines on a financial institution for breaches of that law. The framework of the Bank of Lithuania’s competence also follows from Article 42(1) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Bank of Lithuania, which identifies electronic money institutions as supervised financial market participants. Accordingly, the core of the dispute is not whether Paysera LT falls within the scope of supervision, but how the sanction must be individualised and aggregated where eight infringements have been established. The temporal issue concerning the applicable rules is linked to Article 21(2) of the Law Amending the Law on the Bank of Lithuania: infringements are subject to the provisions on the limitation period for adopting decisions to impose enforcement measures that were in force at the time the infringement was committed or, in the case of a continuing infringement, at the time it ended
Legal assessment. Under Article 4(1) of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, the Bank of Lithuania not only supervises electronic money institutions, but also approves instructions addressed to them and provides consultations on their implementation; therefore, the supervisory procedure encompasses both the setting of requirements and control over their compliance. Under Article 39(1)(1) of the same law, a financial institution may be fined between 0.5 and 5 per cent of its total annual income for breaches of the law. Where the infringements are systematic, repeated, or constitute a single serious infringement, Article 39(1)(2) permits the application of a stricter range: from 0.5 to 10 per cent of total annual income, and in certain cases from EUR 2,000 to EUR 5,100,000. This means that the number, nature, systematic character and recurrence of infringements are legally relevant not only to the amount of the fine, but also to the classification of the sanction. Paysera LT’s position, as reported, is based on the argument that infringements identified during a single inspection should have been absorbed into one fine of EUR 55,000. The position of the Bank of Lithuania, restored by the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania in March 2026, is the opposite: separate fines could be imposed for all eight identified infringements. The interpretation of the Court of Justice of the European Union referred to in this dispute between the Bank of Lithuania and Paysera LT confirmed that the Bank of Lithuania lawfully imposed separate fines for breaches of anti-money laundering requirements. This case law is important because it supports the logic of individualising infringements, rather than automatically absorbing them into a single infringement. Nevertheless, even where separate fines are imposed, the requirement of proportionality remains: the Government resolution concerning draft law No XIIIP-2092 states that sanctions and restrictive measures must be based on an individual assessment, the threat posed by the specific person, proportionality and necessity. The same source links such measures to the rights guaranteed by Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 1 of the First Protocol. Therefore, Paysera LT’s dispute concerning the EUR 370,000 fine does not, in practical terms, raise the issue of the Bank of Lithuania’s general competence, but rather the issue of plurality of sanctions and the limits of proportionality. In this context, Article 198 of the Code of Administrative Offences shows that breaches of anti-money laundering requirements may be differentiated according to the types of duties breached: identification of customers and beneficial owners, reporting of suspicious transactions, and other requirements. However, for Paysera LT as an electronic money institution, the most relevant sanctions regime presented is Article 39 of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, because it directly addresses fines imposed on a financial institution. Article 26(3) of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing additionally requires responsible authorities, including the Bank of Lithuania referred to in Article 4, to take into account the results of the national risk assessment when preparing instructions for financial institutions and other obliged entities. This reinforces the risk-based supervision model: a sanction cannot be detached from the objectives of the prevention system and the nature of the duties of the supervised entity
Consequences. If the Constitutional Court were to accept Paysera LT’s individual constitutional complaint and assess the challenged regulation, the practical significance would concern the clarity of rules on the aggregation of fines in financial market supervision. If the logic of imposing separate fines were upheld, the Bank of Lithuania’s practice concerning several separate anti-money laundering infringements would be strengthened, particularly in the electronic money and payment institutions sector. If an absorption principle or another limiting standard for aggregation were emphasised, this could be relevant not only to the assessment of the EUR 370,000 fine, but also to future sanctions imposed by the Bank of Lithuania under Article 39 of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. An application to the European Court of Human Rights would, in practical terms, focus on aspects of effective judicial protection, fairness of proceedings and protection of property, which the sources provided link to Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of the First Protocol. For financial institutions, this dispute is important because the results of a single inspection may lead not to one overall sanction, but to several separate financial consequences. For the Bank of Lithuania, it is important as a test of the limits of supervisory competence and the individualisation of sanctions. Paysera LT’s practical interest is clear: whether the final EUR 370,000 sanction remains in force, is amended, or gives rise to grounds for reconsideration will depend on how the model of imposing separate fines and its proportionality are assessed
The core dispute will not be only whether the 36 expense reports contained false information, but whether their submission to the municipal accounting department constitutes separate offences of fraud and document forgery, and whether the offence of abuse of office is supported by the element of “substantial harm”. The amount of EUR 2,200 strengthens the application of Article 182 of the Criminal Code through a scheme involving deception and the acquisition of another’s property, but under Article 228 the prosecution will need to substantiate broader harm to the municipality and the authority of the council, not merely a financial loss.
Article 300(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises the forgery of a genuine document and the use of a document known to be forged; accordingly, the expense reports of a council member are legally significant here as documents on which payment was based. Article 182(1) of the Criminal Code requires that another’s property be acquired by deception, so the prosecution will have to prove that the false information concerning fuel expenses was not an accounting error, but a means of misleading the municipality. Article 228(2) of the Criminal Code applies where a civil servant or equivalent person abuses their official position in pursuit of material or other personal gain and substantial harm is thereby caused.
It is this provision that makes the prosecution’s emphasis on systematic conduct during the 2019-2023 period, the 36 reports, and reputational harm to Varėna District Municipality and its council legally significant.
On the facts presented, the prosecution’s strongest argument is the combination of Articles 300 and 182 of the Criminal Code: if the reports were knowingly forged and municipal funds were obtained precisely on the basis of those reports, the document forgery becomes the mechanism of deception, rather than a collateral formality. The weaker and more contestable link is Article 228, because the financial amount of EUR 2,200 does not in itself necessarily answer the question of “substantial harm”; in practice, therefore, the decisive issue will be whether the court accepts the diminution of reputation and trust in local self-government as sufficiently particularised harm. For the defence, the most rational approach is to separate the individual reports, contest intent and the causal link between specific entries and payments, while the prosecution will need to show not an isolated inaccuracy but a repeated scheme of instrumentalising the right to reimbursement.
For lawyers, this case is important because in the “receipt” cases the real risk lies not only in the size of the amount, but in whether the prosecution can turn financial deception into a case about abuse of official status and harm to institutional trust.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the submission, in 2019-2023, of municipal council member expense reports containing information inconsistent with reality may constitute forgery of a document and use of a forged document under Article 300(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, fraud under Article 182(1) of the Criminal Code, and abuse of office under Article 228(1) or 228(2) of the Criminal Code. Under Article 300(1) of the Criminal Code, the relevant issue is whether a council member’s expense report is to be regarded as an authentic document that was forged, and whether it was used by being submitted to the municipality’s accounting department. Under Article 182(1) of the Criminal Code, the core of the case is the link between deception and the acquisition of another’s property: whether the submission of false reports resulted in the disbursement of approximately EUR 2,200 of municipal funds for the benefit of the accused. Under Article 228(1) of the Criminal Code, it is necessary to establish abuse of official position or excess of authority and substantial damage to the State or to a legal or natural person; under Article 228(2), the pursuit of pecuniary or other personal benefit is additionally relevant, provided there are no elements of bribery. Article 173 of the Criminal Code does not become the principal provision for this classification, because it concerns the falsification of election or referendum documents with the aim of influencing election or referendum results, whereas the report concerns expense reports relating to the activities of a council member. From a procedural perspective, since the case has already been referred to the Alytus District Court, the relevant provisions are Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the submission of objects and documents, Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the purpose and calculation of procedural time limits, and the rules reflected in Articles 118-120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning compensation for damage and the purpose and types of coercive measures
Legal assessment. The structure of the charge under Article 300(1) of the Criminal Code rests on two acts: first, 36 reports may have contained information inconsistent with reality concerning fuel acquisition expenses; second, those reports may have been used when applying for compensation. If the court were to find that the reports were authentic documents in which legally significant information had been altered, their submission to the municipality’s accounting department would satisfy not only the elements of document forgery but also the elements of disposal of a forged document in the form of use under Article 300(1) of the Criminal Code. Article 300(3) of the Criminal Code provides for stricter liability where the acts referred to in paragraph 1 of that article cause substantial damage; accordingly, the nature of the damage in this case may be relevant not only to Article 228 of the Criminal Code but also to the classification of the document forgery. As regards Article 182(1) of the Criminal Code, the court’s principal task will be to determine whether the disbursement of municipal funds was caused specifically by deception, namely the false declaration of expenses as being related to the council member’s activities. If deception was the means of obtaining compensation, and the funds received constituted another’s property, the acquisition of approximately EUR 2,200 for one’s own benefit falls within the model of conduct described in Article 182(1) of the Criminal Code. Article 182(5) of the Criminal Code provides that liability for the act set out in paragraph 1 of that article arises upon a complaint by the injured person, a statement by the injured person’s lawful representative, or a request by the prosecutor; since the case was referred to the court by the prosecutor’s office, the proceedings are to be assessed through the prism of a prosecution initiated by the prosecutor. In the abuse-of-office episode, Article 228(1) of the Criminal Code sets a higher threshold than a mere breach of internal rules: there must be abuse of official position or excess of authority and substantial damage to the State or to a legal or natural person. Article 228(2) of the Criminal Code makes the classification more serious where the same act is committed in pursuit of pecuniary or other personal benefit; therefore, the receipt of compensation for one’s own benefit, as indicated in the charge, is directly relevant to that paragraph. In the source concerning the description of the procedure for administering the Central Database of Prohibited Entities in Lithuania, Article 182 of the Criminal Code is classified as fraud, while Article 228 is classified as corruption; accordingly, the charges encompass not only a proprietary aspect but also the protection of public interests. In another source provided, concerning the draft amendment to Article 95 of the Criminal Code, Article 228 of the Criminal Code is expressly identified among criminal offences against the civil service and public interests, which reinforces the assessment that this case concerns not only the sum of EUR 2,200 but also the reliability of the functioning of a municipal institution. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants the accused, defence counsel, the injured party, the civil claimant, the civil defendant and other persons the right, on their own initiative, to submit objects and documents relevant to the examination of the criminal act; therefore, the submission of the reports, fuel acquisition documents and municipal accounting data may be of essential significance in court. Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that time limits in criminal proceedings define the commencement, performance or completion of procedural actions, while Article 100 details their calculation in hours, days and months, including the rule that where a time limit expires on a non-working day, the last day is deemed to be the first working day thereafter. If, in the court proceedings, it becomes necessary to decide on securing the accused’s participation, Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits coercive measures to be applied in order to ensure participation in the proceedings, the unhindered examination of the case and the enforcement of the judgment, while Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists measures such as bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register periodically with a police institution and a written undertaking not to leave. The sources provided contain no case law; therefore, the assessment must be based on the constituent elements of the provisions and on the factual elements of the charge indicated in the report
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the court finds that the reports were forged and used, and that municipal funds were acquired by deception; in that event, Article 300(1), Article 182(1) and, if the elements of official status and substantial damage are established, Article 228(1) or 228(2) of the Criminal Code could be applied. The second scenario is that the elements of document forgery and fraud are proved, but the classification as abuse of office depends on whether the court establishes the substantial damage required under Article 228 of the Criminal Code and the pursuit of pecuniary or other personal benefit. The third scenario is that individual episodes of the charge could be assessed differently, because the 36 reports referred to in the report form a chain of repeated acts, and the content of each report and its connection with the disbursement may have independent significance. The practical significance of the case for the municipality lies in the possibility of substantiating the issue of compensation for pecuniary damage within the criminal proceedings, while Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure additionally provides for the possibility of compensation for damage from State funds in the cases and according to the procedure provided by law where the accused, or the persons materially liable for the accused’s actions, lack the funds to compensate the damage. For the accused, it is significant that under Article 182(1), Article 300(1) and Article 228 of the Criminal Code, the possible sanctions include not only fines but also restriction of liberty, arrest or imprisonment, and the upper limit provided in Article 228(2) is up to seven years. For the administration of municipal council members’ expenses, the case is significant insofar as the court will assess whether compensation documents were used as a means of deception and whether such practice may be regarded as abuse in relation to the public interest. The further course of the case will depend on how the court assesses the content of the documents, the significance of their submission to the accounting department, the link between the funds disbursed and the declared expenses, and the element of damage required under Article 228 of the Criminal Code
Can the programme of the Twenty-First Government registered on 3 July be regarded as having been constitutionally submitted as the programme of a “Government formed and approved by the President”, where the presidential decree on the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers was signed only on 7 July, while the Seimas approved the programme and the ministers were sworn in on 14 July?
Under the constitutional rule referred to in the news report, the appointed Prime Minister must, within 15 days, present to the Seimas the Government he or she has formed and which has been approved by the President, and submit its programme for consideration. This means that the constitutionally material point is not merely the technical moment of registration of the programme, but also whether the programme submitted to the Seimas for consideration was one for which a Cabinet already approved by the President had assumed responsibility. Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court imposes a procedural threshold of precision on the opposition: the petition must indicate the exact legal act being challenged, the date of its adoption, the specific grounds for examination, and the legal reasoning.
A petition by a group of Members of the Seimas must be signed by all applying Members, and their signatures must be certified by the signature of the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker.
The opposition’s stronger argument is not simply that registration took place on 3 July, before the President’s decree of 7 July, but that such a sequence may undermine the programme’s character as a document of political responsibility of a specific Government approved by the President. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister’s statement that the programme was submitted to the Seimas only after the presidential decree weakens the formal illegality argument, because the constitutionally most important act may be precisely the submission to, and approval by, the Seimas, which occurred before the Government began its work on 14 July. In practice, it would be risky for the applicants to base their petition solely on a chronological registration error: under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, they will need to challenge a precisely identifiable act and explain why the date of registration had legal, rather than merely administrative, significance.
The governing majority’s reference to the 2020 analogy is politically useful, but legally it will be strong only insofar as it demonstrates an established institutional practice that advance registration is not treated as the constitutional submission of the programme.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the process of forming the Twenty-First Government and obtaining its powers complied with the constitutional sequence enshrined in Article 92(1), (2) and (5) and Article 93 of the Constitution. Under Article 92(1) of the Constitution, the Prime Minister is appointed by the President of the Republic with the approval of the Seimas; under Article 92(2), ministers are appointed and dismissed by the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the Prime Minister; and under Article 92(5), a new Government receives its powers to act when the Seimas approves its programme by a majority vote of the Seimas members participating in the sitting. Article 93 of the Constitution further provides that, upon taking office, the Prime Minister and ministers must swear an oath in the Seimas to be loyal to the Republic of Lithuania and to observe the Constitution and laws. The issue of standing must be assessed under Article 106 of the Constitution, since the source provided states that the Government, not less than one-fifth of the members of the Seimas, and courts may apply to the Constitutional Court regarding a law or another act adopted by the Seimas. The procedural form of the petition must be assessed under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania: the petition must specify the contested legal act, the grounds for examining the case, the applicant’s position on conformity with the Constitution, and the legal reasoning
Legal assessment. If the opposition relies on the fact that the Government programme was registered on 3 July 2026, while the decree of the President of the Republic on the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers was signed on 7 July 2026, the core of the dispute is not merely the technical date of registration, but whether the programme submitted for consideration by the Seimas was indeed the political document of a constitutionally formed and presidentially approved Government. Article 92(5) of the Constitution links the commencement of the Government’s authority to act with the Seimas’ approval of its programme; therefore, the Seimas decision on the programme becomes the central act subject to review if the applicants challenge the emergence of the Government’s powers. Article 92(1) and (2) of the Constitution mean that several distinct constitutional acts are required in the formation of the Government: the appointment of the Prime Minister, the appointment of ministers by presidential act, and the Seimas’ approval of the programme. Article 93 of the Constitution indicates that approval of the programme alone is not sufficient for the exercise of office, because the Prime Minister and ministers must swear an oath in the Seimas when taking office. The notice states that the Government began work on 14 July 2026, when the Seimas approved the programme and the members of the Cabinet took their oaths; accordingly, under the provisions provided, the legally significant issue is whether the acts referred to in Articles 92 and 93 of the Constitution had been performed by that point. In order for the Constitutional Court to examine the issue at all, the applicants should not request an abstract assessment of “legality”, but should, in accordance with Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, precisely identify the contested legal act, its date of adoption, number, publication details, and formulate the petition. Under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, a petition by a group of members of the Seimas must be signed by all members of the Seimas applying to the Constitutional Court, while also indicating the group’s representative or representatives, and the signatures must be certified by the signature of the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker. If the petition is submitted by electronic means, under the provisions amending Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, an electronic petition by a group of members of the Seimas must be certified by the qualified electronic signature of the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker of the Seimas. Upon receiving such a petition, the Constitutional Court would act independently: Article 17 of the Law on the Constitutional Court provides that the Court and its judges are independent of any state institution, person or organisation and are guided only by the Constitution. From the perspective of case preparation, Article 9 of the Law on the Constitutional Court is significant, because a judge may request documents and information from state institutions and officials, obtain explanations, summon witnesses and experts, and use specialist consultations
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that a group of members of the Seimas collects the signatures of not less than one-fifth of the members of the Seimas, properly formalises the petition under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, and the Constitutional Court proceeds to assess the conformity of the specified act of the Seimas with Articles 92 and 93 of the Constitution. The second scenario is that the petition is drafted too broadly or without a precisely identified contested act, in which case the procedural risk arises from the requirements of Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court concerning the content of the petition. The third scenario is that the dispute is in practice narrowed to whether the earlier registration of the programme had independent legal significance if the Seimas’ approval of the programme and the oaths took place on 14 July 2026. The fourth scenario is that the Constitutional Court, exercising the powers provided for in Article 9 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, requests documents and explanations concerning the preparation and registration of the programme, the adoption of the presidential decree, and the procedure of the Seimas sitting. The practical significance for the Government is direct, because Article 92(5) of the Constitution links the Government’s authority to act with the Seimas’ approval of its programme; therefore, the dispute concerns the very constitutional precondition for its functioning. The practical significance for the Seimas is that its decision on the programme may become an object of constitutional review, which is important when assessing the stability of subsequent political and legislative actions. The practical significance for the President and the Prime Minister arises from Article 92(1) and (2) of the Constitution, because the dispute would inevitably include an assessment of the roles of the President and the Prime Minister in the chain of forming the Government. The practical significance for the opposition is procedural: a political argument alone is insufficient, because the petition must be converted into a constitutional legal dispute that complies with Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court
The specific question is whether Alexei Navalny, as appearing in a video published by an opposition politician in 2023, may be classified as the display of a prohibited “extremist symbol” solely by reason of the image itself, where the sanction imposed was a fine of 1,000 roubles and, in theory, up to 15 days’ detention was possible.
The relevant Russian legal provision has not been produced in the evidence, so any conclusion can only be drawn by comparison with the Lithuanian regulation provided on prohibited symbols. Article 524 of the Lithuanian Code of Administrative Offences prohibits not every image of a politically undesirable person, but the dissemination or display of specifically enumerated Nazi, Soviet, or totalitarian and authoritarian regime symbols where they are used to promote aggression, crimes against humanity, or war crimes. Article 3 of the Law on the Prohibition of the Promotion of Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes likewise links the prohibition to promotion in public objects, rather than to neutral or critical reference.
These provisions indicate a narrower logic: the object of the prohibition must be a symbol or information that promotes a regime or its ideology, not merely a person whom state authorities have politically criminalised.
The stronger legal argument in such a situation is not the amount of the fine, since a sanction of USD 13 is formally minor, but the threshold for classification: the state penalises the appearance of an image in public communication without having to prove any promotional content. In practice, this changes the risk assessment for candidates and journalists in Russia: a reference to an opposition figure, or archival footage, may be treated as an administrative offence even where the meaning of the communication is not endorsement of “extremism”. By comparison with the Lithuanian provisions provided, the relevant criterion to cite is precisely the promotional function of the symbol: an image alone is insufficient unless it is shown to be used to promote a prohibited ideology or the crimes of a regime.
The less obvious risk therefore lies in the field of electoral rights: administrative proceedings against a politician who intended to stand as a candidate in the September parliamentary elections may operate as an instrument for restricting candidacy and campaigning, even where the sanction itself appears symbolic.
Core issue. In the context of the Lithuanian legal sources provided, the precise question would be whether a publicly released video showing a political figure may be regarded as prohibited public display of a symbol of a totalitarian or authoritarian regime. It would be assessed under Article 524(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 5(3) of the Law on Assemblies of the Republic of Lithuania, and Article 3(1)-(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Prohibition of the Promotion of Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes and Their Ideologies. Article 524(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences links liability not to any politically undesirable image, but to the dissemination, use at assemblies or in public places, or other public display of symbols of Nazi, communist, totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. Article 3 of the Law on the Prohibition of the Promotion of Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes and Their Ideologies prohibits the promotion of such regimes and their ideologies in public objects, including the depiction of symbols, persons, organisations, events or dates where such depictions promote those regimes, their aggression, occupation or repression. The amendment to Article 2(5) of that law defines a “public object” as including not only monuments or commemorative objects, but also public places, events, competitions and other public acts that meet the criteria set out in Article 3. Accordingly, the mere fact that a political opponent appears in a video is not, under the Lithuanian provisions provided, sufficient in itself; it would be necessary to assess whether the image is specifically a regime symbol referred to in the law or information promoting such a regime
Legal assessment. If an analogous situation were assessed under Article 524 of the Code of Administrative Offences, the basis for liability would not be the label of “extremism”, but the dissemination, use or other public display of symbols specifically identified by law. The sanction for an individual under Article 524(1) of the Code is a fine from EUR 300 to EUR 700, and, in the event of a repeated offence, from EUR 500 to EUR 900 under Article 524(2). This differs significantly from the fine of 1,000 roubles, approximately USD 13, mentioned in the report, because in the Lithuanian sources provided the minimum fine for such an administrative offence is EUR 300. Article 5(3) of the Law on Assemblies prohibits, during an assembly or a single-person action, the display of symbols of Nazi Germany, the USSR or the Lithuanian SSR, images of responsible repressive leaders, symbols of Nazi or communist organisations, and symbols of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes used to promote military aggression, crimes against humanity or war crimes. Thus, in the context of a candidate’s campaign or a public political action, the obligation would be to refrain from displaying such symbols, while the authorities should assess not the inconvenience of political speech to the government, but the connection between the symbol and propaganda as defined by law. Article 577(2) of the Code of Administrative Offences grants a person subject to administrative liability the rights to access the case file, participate in an oral hearing, provide explanations, submit documents and objects, make applications, use the assistance of a lawyer and appeal procedural decisions. Article 577(3) of the same Code establishes the obligation to comply with the procedural order and not to abuse procedural rights. From the perspective of institutional competence, the source concerning the draft amendment to Article 524 of the Code of Administrative Offences states that, under Article 589 of the Code, proceedings for these offences are initiated, investigations are conducted and protocols are drawn up by officers of the police and the State Border Guard Service. The same source proposed additionally empowering officers of the Customs of the Republic of Lithuania where goods or objects marked with such symbols are transported for the purpose of dissemination. Article 7 of the Law on the Prohibition of the Promotion of Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes and Their Ideologies assigns preventive activity to the Centre, non-governmental organisations, and research and higher education institutions, which implement projects, disseminate information, strengthen resilience to disinformation and conduct research. This preventive competence is not the same as the imposition of administrative liability; it is therefore relevant to the broader reduction of the dissemination of symbols and ideologies, but does not itself constitute a basis for imposing a fine. From the perspective of case law, the source concerning the draft Code of Administrative Offences refers to the European Court of Human Rights cases Platform “Ärzte für das Leben” v Austria, 21 June 1988, § 32, and Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria, 2 October 2001, §§ 86-107. Those cases emphasise that states must secure the right to peaceful forms of public expression of opinion, including demonstrations, even where the opinion annoys, shocks or offends persons who hold different views. Accordingly, the logic of the sources provided would require drawing a distinction between prohibited regime-propaganda symbolism and political opposition, criticism or commemorative imagery, where the image itself does not meet the elements set out in Article 524 of the Code of Administrative Offences and Article 5 of the Law on Assemblies
Consequences. A realistic first scenario would be that a public video is classified under Article 524 of the Code of Administrative Offences only where it is established that the video displays precisely a prohibited Nazi, communist, totalitarian or authoritarian-regime symbol used for the propaganda specified by law. In that event, the person would face the fine provided for in Article 524(1) of the Code, and, in the case of repeat offending, the stricter sanction under Article 524(2). A second scenario is that, if the image is the appearance of a political figure or a reference to a political context, but not the display of a regime symbol under the provisions provided, no basis for applying Article 524 of the Code would arise from these sources. A third scenario concerns public assemblies: if symbols referred to in the law were used at a campaign event taking place in September 2026, the assessment would additionally be based on Article 5(3) of the Law on Assemblies. In practice, this matters for politicians, campaign organisers, journalists and law enforcement authorities, because liability depends on a clear legal characteristic of the symbol, not on the political inconvenience of the speech. It also matters for the court, because under Article 577 of the Code of Administrative Offences a person subject to administrative liability must have a genuine opportunity to participate in the proceedings, make applications, use a lawyer and appeal the decision. The final practical criterion under the sources provided is narrow: what is prohibited is not opposition expression as such, but the public display or dissemination of such symbols where they promote totalitarian or authoritarian regimes, their military aggression, crimes against humanity or war crimes
The specific question is whether the three churches demolished by crane during the Jaranwala riots of 16 August 2023 are, in legal terms, more properly characterised as individually proven destruction of property and religious sites committed during riots, rather than merely as abstract collective violence against the Christian community. This distinction explains why I. Yousaf could have been sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment while another 12 individuals were acquitted for lack of evidence: liability in a riot case must be tied to the specific acts of the individual accused, not merely to presence in a crowd or to the broader context of a religious conflict.
Article 283(1) of the Lithuanian Criminal Code links riots not only to organising or inciting them, but also to a person’s use of violence, destruction of property, or other gross breach of public order during the riots; in this situation, the relevant alternative is precisely “destruction of property”. Article 171 of the Criminal Code would be too narrow, as it concerns the disruption of worship, rites or religious ceremonies by obscene language, threats or other indecent acts, whereas the report describes the demolition of churches by crane and arson. Article 106 protects religious objects as protected objects, but the provision cited is linked to destruction not justified by military necessity and causing extensive damage; on the facts provided, the stronger comparative basis is therefore the logic of riots and destruction of property, rather than the war-crimes provision.
Article 170 would assist only where public acts of mockery, contempt, incitement to hatred or discrimination on grounds of religion were proven; a recording showing physical demolition, on the excerpt provided, primarily proves participation in destruction, not a separate act of incitement.
In practice, the key message of this case is one of proof, not merely the severity of the sanction: according to the IMRF, the conviction turned on a video recorded by a local Christian woman, whose authenticity was confirmed by state-certified experts and which directly showed I. Yousaf using a crane to demolish a church and an adjacent house. The stronger argument in such mass-violence cases is therefore not the general context of religious hatred, although that may explain motive, but the individualised link between the act, the means and the object: who demolished what specific object, when, and with which crane.
A lawyer or journalist should avoid attributing liability to the entire crowd merely because of the scale of the riots, since the same judgment demonstrates the opposite limit: 12 accused were acquitted for insufficient evidence, and the judge criticised law enforcement for delayed reinforcement and improper evidence collection. The greatest continuing procedural risk is witness intimidation and social pressure on the Christian community, because such an environment weakens the stability of testimony and allows culpability to dissipate among as many as 150 suspects who remain unidentified.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not a review of the Pakistani judgment, but how, under the Lithuanian legal provisions provided, the public destruction of objects belonging to a religious community during riots would be assessed where the act is directed against the Christian community. The principal axis of qualification would be Article 283(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides for liability for a person who organised or provoked a gathering of people to commit public violence, destroy property, or grossly breach public order, as well as for a person who, during riots, committed violence or destroyed property. The religious target and the accusations that incited mob violence would also allow consideration of incitement to hatred, discrimination, or violence against a religious group of persons as described in Article 170(1)-(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. If the activity of accomplices, an organised group, or an organisation aimed at discriminating against or inciting against a religious group were established, the application of Article 170¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would be relevant. The destruction of churches as religious objects could also be assessed under Article 106 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania to the extent it were established that religious objects protected by domestic legislation or international treaties were destroyed and substantial damage was caused. Article 171 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would be relevant only if the destruction or threats disrupted the services, rites, or ceremonies of a religious community recognised by the State. The procedurally significant provisions would be Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the submission of objects and documents, Articles 99-100 concerning procedural time limits, Article 118 concerning compensation for damage, and Articles 119-120 concerning the purpose and types of remand measures
Legal assessment. The described use of a crane to demolish three churches during riots primarily corresponds to the destruction of property during a gathering of people under Article 283(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, because the act was carried out publicly, together with mass violence and a gross breach of public order. Under this provision, liability would attach not only to the organisers or provocateurs of the riots, but also to a person who personally destroyed property during the riots. The information provided contains no indications of the use of a firearm or explosives, or of resistance to the police; therefore, the stricter regime under Article 283(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania does not follow from the facts presented. The religious aspect is significant because the information refers to attacks against a Christian district, churches, and Christian homes, while Article 170 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania protects groups of persons and persons belonging to them, inter alia, on grounds of belief, religion, convictions, or views. If it were proved that a person publicly incited violence or physical reprisals against Christians as a religious group, Article 170(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides for imprisonment of up to three years, would apply. If only a public act of promoting hatred or contempt were proved, but not direct incitement to violence, Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would be relevant. If persons acted as accomplices or as an organised group whose aim was to discriminate against the Christian religious group or to incite against it, Article 170¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would cover participation in the activities of such a group, financing, or other material support. The application of Article 106 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would depend on whether the specific churches are to be regarded as protected religious objects and whether substantial damage was caused; the mere fact that they are houses of worship does not in itself exhaust all elements of that provision. Article 13 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations of the Republic of Lithuania confirms that religious communities, associations, and centres may own houses of worship and other property necessary for their activities, and therefore the destruction of such objects also infringes the exercise of their property rights under law. A video recording showing the demolition carried out by crane could be submitted under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania as an object or document relevant to the investigation and examination of the criminal act. The authenticity of the recording, confirmed by experts, is procedurally linked to an expert report, of which, according to the excerpt from Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provided, the prosecutor must notify the participants in the proceedings in writing and provide them with an opportunity to acquaint themselves with it. The acquittal of the other twelve persons due to insufficient evidence is consistent with the procedural logic expressed in Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, under which a pre-trial investigation is terminated where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt. The risk of witness intimidation would be relevant when selecting remand measures, because Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania permits them to be imposed in order to ensure an unhindered pre-trial investigation, the hearing of the case in court, and the prevention of new criminal acts. Under Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, possible measures would include detention, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register with a police authority, or a written undertaking not to leave. Procedural time limits would be calculated under Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, including the rule that the day on which the time limit begins is not counted, and that a time limit expiring on a non-working day is extended to the first following working day
Consequences. The realistic further course under the provisions provided would be the individualisation of the liability of separate riot participants: where direct participation in the destruction of property is established, the central provision would be Article 283(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and where incitement to religious hatred is established, Article 170 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would additionally apply. If the investigation revealed a coordinated group, the proceedings could expand to an assessment of the activity of a group or organisation under Article 170¹(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. If sufficient individual evidence of guilt were lacking, a possible outcome of the proceedings in respect of certain persons would be analogous to the logic of Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. For the affected religious communities, the punishment of the perpetrators would not be the only matter of practical importance; compensation for damage would also be important, because Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania provides for the possibility, in cases established by law, of compensating damage from State funds if the accused or materially liable persons lack funds. Article 13 of the Law on Religious Communities and Associations of the Republic of Lithuania is also important for religious communities, as it protects their ability to possess, use, and dispose of houses of worship and other property necessary for their activities. For witnesses and the local community, the most important procedural consequence would be the effective protection of the proceedings from pressure by applying the remand measures provided for in Articles 119-120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. For the institutions, this situation in practical terms entails a duty to investigate not only an isolated act of property destruction, but also possible organisation of riots, incitement to religious hatred, organised action, and the reliability of evidence, including video recordings and expert findings
Should violence by a pupil at school be treated as a private “children’s conflict”, or as a situation involving compensation for harm, in which liability depends on the perpetrator’s age, the moment of supervision, and the presumption of fault on the part of the parents or the school.
Article 6.275 of the Civil Code provides that parents or guardians are liable for harm caused by a child under the age of 14, unless they prove that the harm did not arise through their fault; where the harm was caused while the child was under the supervision of an educational institution, that institution is liable unless it proves the absence of fault. This means that, in the case of the incident at Marijampole “Suduva” Gymnasium on 28 April 2026, the mere fact that the actor was a minor does not, of itself, confine the issue of civil liability to the family sphere. Article 6.276 of the Civil Code allocates liability differently for minors aged 14 to 18: they are liable on general grounds, but if they have no property or earnings sufficient to compensate the harm, the relevant part must be compensated by the parents, caregiver, or supervising educational institution, unless they prove that the harm did not arise through their fault.
The less obvious conclusion is that the school’s exposure to liability does not depend solely on whether the pupil has already reached the age of delictual liability: the moment of supervision remains legally significant also in the 14 to 18 age group.
The article describes psychological violence by reference to an intentional, systematic violation of a child’s right to identity, but that formulation is too narrow. Under the wording set out in Article 3 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child, psychological violence also includes humiliation of a child, bullying, intimidation, interference with activities necessary for normal development, encouragement of antisocial behaviour, or other non-contact conduct. It would therefore be more accurate to say not that psychological violence consists solely of violations of identity, but that it is a broader category of systematic non-physical impact.
This clarification is important when assessing class chat groups, filmed assaults, or cyberbullying: the 128 reports of cyberbullying indicated by the Communications Regulatory Authority in the first half of 2026 may be legally relevant not only as “bullying” statistics, but also as an indication of possible psychological violence.
In practice, the stronger argument now is not “the children got into a fight themselves”, but “who had the duty of supervision at the time, and can they rebut the presumption of fault”. It is risky for a school to limit itself to a neutral record that “both were fighting”, because the logic of Articles 6.275 and 6.276 of the Civil Code requires an assessment of supervision, the initiation of aggression, imbalance of power, prior threats, and whether the institution responded in practice. For parents, the risk is likewise not eliminated merely because the incident took place at school: particularly in the case of children aged 14 to 18, their duty to compensate harm may arise if the child lacks sufficient property or earnings and the absence of fault is not proved.
For a professional handling such a case, the priority should be to gather evidence not of moral characterisations, but of supervision and response: reports to the school, the content of chat groups, records of previous incidents, duty or supervision arrangements, and actions taken after the first warning signs.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is who bears civil liability for damage caused by one pupil to another and how liability is allocated among the minor, the minor’s parents or guardians, and the educational institution. This issue is primarily determined under Article 6.275 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania where the damage is caused by a minor under the age of fourteen, and under Article 6.276 where the damage is caused by a minor between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. The substance of parental duties is assessed under Article 3.165 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which establishes the right and duty of parents to educate their children and to care for their health, spiritual development, and moral upbringing. If parental authority has been restricted, Article 6.277 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, as it links parental liability to the consequences of improper exercise of parental authority. The nature of a minor’s liability is also informed by juvenile justice provisions: paragraph 5 of the Juvenile Justice Programme for 2004-2008 and paragraph 5 of the Juvenile Justice Programme for 2009-2013 define juvenile justice as a system of administrative and criminal justice
Legal assessment. If the pupil who used violence is under the age of fourteen, Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code provides that the parents or guardians are liable for the damage caused by that pupil, unless they prove that the damage did not arise through their fault. If such a child caused damage while under the supervision of an educational institution, Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code transfers liability to that institution, unless it proves the absence of fault. This means that the school cannot be treated merely as the place where the incident occurred: if the damage was caused while the school had supervisory responsibility, it is legally relevant whether it properly discharged that duty of supervision. If the pupil who committed the violence is between fourteen and eighteen years old, Article 6.276(1) of the Civil Code provides that the pupil is personally liable for the damage on general grounds. However, under Article 6.276(2) of the Civil Code, where the pupil does not have sufficient property or earnings, the relevant part of the damage must be compensated by the parents, custodian, or the educational institution supervising the pupil at the time, unless they prove the absence of fault. Article 6.276(3) of the Civil Code provides that the duty of those persons to compensate the damage ceases when the person who caused the damage reaches the age of majority or, before reaching majority, acquires sufficient property or earnings. The assessment of parental liability cannot be confined to the formal assertion that the child acted independently, because Article 3.165(1) of the Civil Code imposes on parents responsibility for the upbringing and development of their children. Paragraph 174 of the report on the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child reiterates the same logic of liability: for children under the age of fourteen, damage is compensated by the parents, guardian, or supervising institution, while for children between fourteen and eighteen, the child is personally liable, with supplementary liability of the parents, guardian, or institution where the child’s property is insufficient. If parental authority has been restricted due to the parents’ fault, Article 6.277 of the Civil Code permits their liability to be based on the premise that the minor’s wrongful conduct is a consequence of improper exercise of parental authority. The provisions of the Juvenile Justice Programme for 2004-2008 make it possible to distinguish civil compensation for damage from mechanisms of administrative or criminal liability. The same programme’s definitions indicate that minimal supervision of minors consists of social, psychological, pedagogical, and other assistance aimed at positive behavioural change, without separating the minor from the family or guardians. Paragraph 5 of the Juvenile Justice Programme for 2009-2013 defines resocialisation as targeted social, pedagogical, psychological, educational, or other measures aimed at integrating a person into society. Accordingly, even where an incident bears indicia of violence, the cited sources link the legal response to a minor not only to sanction but also to behavioural change. Paragraph 538 of the report on the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child links the purpose of special rules on juvenile criminal liability to ensuring that liability corresponds to age and social maturity, limiting deprivation of liberty, and expanding the possibilities for applying educational measures. Paragraph 3.2.3 of the review of case law in criminal cases concerning domestic violence states that, when deciding on the application of Article 140(3) of the Criminal Code or Articles 72, 73, and 74 of the Code of Administrative Offences, it is necessary to assess the specific elements of the offences, the nature of the act, and its dangerousness. This rule is also relevant in the context of school violence to the extent that the cited sources show that a child’s age alone does not remove the need to classify the act according to its nature and consequences
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is a civil claim for compensation for damage: the injured child’s representatives may direct the claim against the parents, guardian, the minor personally, or the educational institution in accordance with the age and supervision rules laid down in Articles 6.275 and 6.276 of the Civil Code. The second scenario is a dispute concerning absence of fault: parents, guardians, or the educational institution may avoid liability only by proving that the damage did not arise through their fault. The third scenario is relevant to a pupil over the age of fourteen: the pupil becomes a direct subject of civil liability, but actual compensation may fall on the parents, custodian, or institution if the pupil’s property or earnings are insufficient. The fourth scenario is the application of juvenile justice measures, where the aim is not merely to establish that an infringement occurred, but also to provide social, psychological, pedagogical, or other assistance. This is practically important for the injured child and the child’s representatives, because the circle of liable persons depends on the age and property of the child who committed the violence, the time of the incident, and the circumstances of supervision. It is also important for the school, because Article 6.275(2) and Article 6.276(2) of the Civil Code link the school’s liability to the performance of its duty of supervision. For parents, the situation is important because the duty of upbringing enshrined in Article 3.165(1) of the Civil Code may have direct civil consequences where a child’s conduct causes damage to another child. The legally significant conclusion is narrow but concrete: a “children’s conflict” does not become non-legal merely because its participants are minors, since the cited sources establish clear rules on compensation for damage, supervision, and correction of minors’ behaviour
Can the mayor’s public statement that the Culture and Congress Palace will be operated by the tender-winning company Universali infrastruktūra, and that the municipality is open to proposals for naming rights to the palace, be regarded as a sufficient legal basis for the management and commercial naming of such a municipal facility?
Article 3 of the Law on Local Self-Government defines the mayor as an executive institution responsible for the direct implementation of laws, government resolutions and municipal council decisions, while also providing that the mayor may not assume, interfere with or exercise the exclusive competence of the municipal council. This means that the mayor’s communication regarding the operator or possible naming-rights proposals is legally strongest only as a statement of implementation or political position, not as an independent decision on the terms of use of municipal property. The principles of local self-government also require legality, openness and transparency of activity, informing residents about draft decisions and adopted decisions, and reconciling the interests of the municipal community and individual residents.
Accordingly, a management or naming-rights model affecting a 1,200-seat hall, other halls and a strategic cultural facility must be assessed not merely as a commercial transaction, but also as a local-government decision requiring a clear basis in competence, procedure and publicity.
In practice, the stronger argument is not that the mayor has led the municipality for 26 years or publicly declares openness to business proposals, but whether the specific selection of the operator and any potential naming rights are based on a proper council decision or a decision adopted under a procedure established by the council. For a lawyer or journalist, the document to examine here is not the interview, but the tender conditions, council decisions and the limits of the mayor’s authority in relation to the specific management model for the Culture and Congress Palace. The greatest risk would be to interpret a public political statement as an obligation already assumed by the municipality, since under the cited rules the mayor implements decisions but cannot replace the council’s competence where that competence is exclusive.
Core issue. The legal issue is not the political tone of the mayor’s interview, but the extent to which the mayor, in publicly presenting Druskininkai projects, the activities of municipal institutions, the use of the budget and assets, and relations with state institutions, acts within the limits of local self-government competence. It must be assessed under Article 2 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, which establishes the principles of self-government, in particular the coordination of municipal and state interests, accountability to residents, openness, legality, and respect for human rights. Article 4 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania is also applicable; it grounds local self-government in representative democracy, municipal autonomy, the mayor’s accountability to the council, responsibility to the community, legality, residents’ participation, openness, and transparency of activities. The content of the mayor’s role is directly defined by Article 27 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 27 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the mayor is accountable to the municipal council and the community, organizes budgetary matters, submits draft council decisions, administers resources, and supervises the activities of the heads of municipal institutions and enterprises. The substance of municipal activities must be assessed under Article 6 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 5 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, which distinguish between independent and state-delegated functions and provide that local government functions are performed by the municipal council and the mayor. Article 72 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant to relations with ministries and other state institutions; under that provision, municipalities are not subordinate to state institutions, but their relations are based on the Constitution and laws
Legal assessment. The Palace of Culture and Congresses, the bus station, municipal services, infrastructure adapted for persons with disabilities, public institutions, and the activities of municipal legal entities mentioned in the interview fall within an area in which the mayor has not an abstract political role, but statutory administrative and accountability powers. Under Article 27(2)(1)–(4) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the mayor prepares and submits the draft budget to the council, reports in writing to the council by 15 June of each current year, administers municipal budget appropriations, other monetary resources and assets, and prepares council agendas and draft decisions. Accordingly, a public statement about the construction or opening of facilities does not in itself alter legal procedures: issues concerning the budget, assets, institutions, and decisions must be formalized through council decisions and the mayor’s statutory functions. If “this autumn”, according to the date provided, means autumn 2026, the reference to that timeframe is legally significant only as a publicly communicated municipal activity plan, not as an independent administrative decision. The role of the municipal council remains essential because, under paragraph 2 set out in Article 1 of the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the approval of the rules of procedure falls within the council’s exclusive competence; those rules must provide for the main forms and methods of communication with residents, as well as the formation of committees, commissions, and other bodies required for municipal work. This means that the mayor’s communication with the community must be consistent with the regulated model for informing and involving residents, rather than replacing the council’s competence. Under Article 4(8) and (9) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the municipality must inform local residents about its activities, draft decisions, and adopted decisions, create conditions for residents to participate, and information about the activities of institutions and bodies is public. Therefore, the mayor’s report-style statements about Druskininkai indicators and projects are consistent with the direction of the principle of openness, but the principle of legality under Article 4(5) requires that actual actions be based on laws and other legal acts. Municipal autonomy is not unlimited: Article 5(1)(1) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania grants the municipality freedom of initiative, decision-making, and implementation in relation to independent functions, but at the same time establishes responsibility for performing those functions and compliance with statutory requirements. Article 6 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania shows that independent functions include the preparation and approval of the municipal budget, the establishment of local levies, the management of assets owned by the municipality, and the establishment and maintenance of municipal budgetary and public institutions; therefore, infrastructure and service-related matters must be assessed through these competences. Based on the sources provided, the mayor’s statements concerning operators or the management of municipal facilities may be linked only to his power to coordinate and control the work of entities providing public services and to exercise the rights and duties of a participant in municipal legal entities under Article 27(2)(9) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania. The mayor’s right to appoint and dismiss the heads of municipal budgetary and public institutions, where the municipality is the owner, is established in Article 27(2)(7) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 27(2)(7) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania. In relation to state institutions shaping tourism policy, it is important that, under Article 72(2) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, municipalities are not subordinate to state institutions. However, Article 72(4) and (8) provide for institutional dialogue: when considering matters related to municipal interests, state administrative entities must notify the mayor and the Association of Local Authorities in Lithuania, and draft legal acts related to municipal activities are discussed in accordance with the established procedure. The sources provided contain no case law; therefore, rules from similar cases do not apply to this situation
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is the ordinary course of local self-government: the mayor continues to present projects publicly, but their financing, asset administration, institutional activities, and draft decisions must proceed through the system of mayoral and council competences established in Article 27 of the Law on Local Self-Government and Article 27 of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government. The second scenario concerns accountability: the council and the community may assess whether the data presented by the mayor on projects, budget implementation, and municipal activities comply with his duty to report under Article 27(1) and Article 27(2)(2) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government. The third scenario is institutional coordination with the state, because the municipality may criticize national tourism policy directions and submit proposals, while state institutions, under Article 72(4), must examine them and provide a response where they are submitted in writing by the municipal council or by the governing bodies of the Association of Local Authorities in Lithuania. The fourth scenario is important for residents: under Article 4(8) and (9) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government, they must receive information about draft decisions and adopted decisions; therefore, matters concerning infrastructure, card programmes, public services, and adaptation for persons with disabilities must be visible not merely as a list of mayoral achievements, but as publicly verifiable municipal decisions. This is practically important for the Druskininkai community, the municipal council, the heads of municipal institutions, service operators, and state institutions, because the role of each is defined not by political loyalty, but by the competence, accountability, openness, and legality established in the Law on Local Self-Government
Can a Lithuanian employer, when submitting employee or candidate data in HR processes to a publicly available AI tool, treat this merely as a technological experiment, or does this already constitute personal data processing for which the controller is responsible?
Article 1(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Legal Protection of Personal Data provides that the law regulates relationships arising from the automated processing of personal data and establishes the duties and liability of legal and natural persons when processing personal data. Paragraph 3 of the same article links its application to the fact that personal data are processed in the course of the activities of a controller established and operating in the Republic of Lithuania. Therefore, in the HR context, the decisive point is not whether the AI tool is “public”, “auxiliary” or “experimental”, but that data concerning candidates, employees or internal documents are being transmitted for automated processing.
The cited Article 50 GDPR does not alter this conclusion: it concerns international cooperation between the Commission and supervisory authorities, not an independent basis for an organisation to transmit HR data to AI systems.
In practice, the stronger argument is not one based on “innovation” or “productivity”, but the argument based on controller responsibility: an organisation that allows employees to upload HR information into AI systems without clear rules effectively creates an uncontrolled channel for automated processing. For professionals, it is worth relying specifically on the logic of Article 1(2) and 1(3) of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data: where employee or candidate data are processed, the duties and responsibility remain with the organisation, even if the technical act is carried out by a specific employee through an external tool. The greatest mistake would be to draft an AI use policy as an IT recommendation; it must clearly specify which categories of HR data may not be submitted to public systems, who authorises use cases, and who is responsible for applying the outputs in recruitment, evaluation or remuneration processes.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not the content of the conference itself, but the boundaries of employment law that employers must observe when applying artificial intelligence tools in recruitment, employee management, and remuneration systems. This issue is assessed under Article 1(1)–(2) of the Labour Code of the Republic of Lithuania, as the Code regulates individual employment relations, pre-contractual relations, collective relations, disputes, and supervision. Article 8 of the Labour Code applies to employment relations carried out in the territory of Lithuania, while Article 13(1) of the Labour Code applies to information, consultation, and employee participation procedures. The substantive core is formed by the principles enshrined in Article 2(1) of the Labour Code: legal certainty, legitimate expectations, safe and healthy working conditions, fair remuneration, and equality of subjects of employment law. In the area of recruitment and candidate assessment, Article 41 of the Labour Code applies directly, in particular paragraph 1, concerning gender equality, non-discrimination, fairness, the provision of necessary information, and the preservation of confidential information. The discussion of pay transparency is legally connected with the principle of fair remuneration under Article 2(1) of the Labour Code and with Article 26(1) of the Labour Code concerning gender equality and non-discrimination
Legal assessment. Where an employer uses artificial intelligence tools in recruitment or employee assessment, it cannot shift responsibility solely to the technology, because Article 41(1) of the Labour Code imposes obligations on the parties to the employment contract in pre-contractual relations. The collection of a candidate’s or employee’s data must remain linked to health status, qualifications, or other circumstances connected with the direct performance of the job function, because other information may not be requested under Article 41(1) of the Labour Code. This means that a recruitment tool that encourages the collection or assessment of circumstances unrelated to professional qualities would create risk under Article 2(1) and Article 26(1) of the Labour Code. Article 26(1) of the Labour Code prohibits direct and indirect discrimination, harassment, sexual harassment, and instructions to discriminate on the grounds listed therein, as well as on the basis of circumstances unrelated to employees’ professional qualities. Accordingly, any remuneration, promotion, recruitment, or employee assessment system must be based on verifiable work-related criteria. Pay differences are not, in themselves, assessed as prohibited under the cited provisions, but they must be consistent with the principles of fair remuneration and equality under Article 2(1) of the Labour Code. If employees performing similar duties are paid differently on the basis of criteria unrelated to professional qualities, this may become an issue under Article 26(1) of the Labour Code. The need for clear internal rules mentioned at the conference is legally consistent with the principles of legal certainty and protection of legitimate expectations under Article 2(1) of the Labour Code. Where decisions concerning technologies affect employee participation or collective interests, the employee representation system under Article 19 of the Labour Code becomes relevant. If the employer’s average number of employees is fewer than twenty, employee representation rights may be exercised by an employee trustee under Article 177(1) of the Labour Code. Where competitions are organised for managerial or specialist positions, the regulation in Article 41(3) of the Labour Code applies. Under Article 41(3) of the Labour Code, the successful candidate has the right to require that an employment contract be concluded no later than within twenty working days, subject to statutory exceptions. This specific twenty-working-day limit is also important for technology-enabled recruitment, because automation of the procedure does not alter the successful candidate’s right to conclusion of the contract. If a position must be filled by way of competition, Article 41(4) of the Labour Code provides that a person may be employed under a fixed-term employment contract until an employee is recruited by competition, but for no longer than one year
Consequences. Ahead of the conference to be held on 10–11 September 2026, the most practically relevant scenario for organisations is the specification of internal rules on the use of artificial intelligence in recruitment, remuneration assessment, and employee data processing through the principles of employment law. Employers should define in advance what information is necessary for concluding or performing an employment contract, because Article 41(1) of the Labour Code prohibits requiring information unrelated to the job function. For employees and candidates, the practical significance is that, where pre-contractual obligations under Article 41(2) of the Labour Code are breached, they may apply to the body hearing labour disputes and seek compensation for damage or other remedies provided by the Code. Under Article 217(1) of the Labour Code, the body hearing a labour dispute may order the restoration of violated rights, award pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage, terminate or modify legal relations, and require the performance of other actions prescribed by legal norms. In cases of collective labour disputes concerning rights, Article 217(2) of the Labour Code allows for a fine of up to EUR 3,000, proportionate to the seriousness of the breach and deterrent against future infringements. Such disputes concerning rights are heard free of charge by the Labour Disputes Commission under Article 217(3) of the Labour Code, and litigation costs incurred by the parties to the dispute are not awarded. Under the provision on monitoring the implementation of the Labour Code, the State Labour Inspectorate assesses, among other matters, breaches of rules on remuneration, information, and consultation; therefore, the regulation of remuneration systems and employee participation procedures also has supervisory significance. The practical conclusion for employers is clear: technology-based HR decisions must be not only efficient, but also verifiable against the criteria of equality, non-discrimination, confidentiality, fairness, and fair remuneration
Whether Vilnius District Municipality, in refusing to include four Gegužinė streets in the list of maintained local roads, may rely on the cul-de-sac and turning-area criterion as a general ground for non-inclusion, while failing to provide a clear administrative decision on its competence and on the initiation of further road maintenance.
Article 14 of the Law on Public Administration gives a person the right to challenge not only an administrative decision of a public administration entity, but also an act, omission, or delay in carrying out actions falling within that entity’s competence. This means that the core of the dispute is not merely the abstract question of “who owns the roads”, but whether the municipality properly formalised and substantiated its position regarding the seven specific streets, of which only three were included in the lists. If residents have been receiving replies from institutions since 2022 but have not received a clear decision on the status of the remaining four roads and the entity responsible for their maintenance, the stronger argument becomes not one of ownership, but of administrative inaction or delay.
The municipality’s position presented in the article, namely that roads ending in a cul-de-sac without a turning area cannot be included in the lists of local roads and streets, is incomplete. The context of Article 6 of the Law on Gardeners’ Associations indicates a narrower rule: the requirement that a road must not end in a cul-de-sac, or must have a turning area of specified dimensions, is set out for the specific situation of registering ownership rights in the Real Property Register, using budgetary funds, in respect of roads located on land for common use of amateur garden associations. A more precise formulation would be as follows: this criterion may be relevant when deciding on the registration or takeover of roads of a former gardeners’ association under the specific mechanism provided by law, but the wording cited does not, in itself, establish a universal rule prohibiting any cul-de-sac without a turning area from being included in lists of local roads.
In practice, it would be more rational for residents to frame the dispute not as a general request to “fix the roads”, but as a demand for a clear administrative decision on each of the four streets that were not included, specifying the concrete legal basis on which they are treated as internal roads. The stronger argument at this stage is procedural: under Article 14 of the Law on Public Administration, the municipality’s inaction or delay may be challenged if the institution confines itself to vague explanations that the roads belong to “a natural or legal person”, without identifying that person and without resolving the question of competence. The risk for the municipality is that, even if the final substantive decision on the roads were favourable to it, a poorly reasoned refusal and an imprecise application of Article 6 of the Law on Gardeners’ Associations may be vulnerable as a matter of administrative procedure.
Core issue. The legal issue is not the abstract question of “who owns the problems”, but whether the administrative bodies of the Vilnius District Municipality are lawfully refusing to take action concerning the status of the roads of the former gardeners’ association, their inclusion in the list of local roads and streets, and the examination of residents’ requests. It is to be resolved under Article 11(1)–(3) of the Law on Public Administration of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 3(1) and (3) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 72(1), (2) and (7) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, and Article 3(1)–(2) and Article 17(1)(2), (3) and (8) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings of the Republic of Lithuania. The procedural issue must also be assessed under points 1 and 11.2 of the Rules for the Examination of Requests and Complaints from Persons by Public Administration Entities, because the residents submitted requests and complaints to public administration entities. If the dispute concerns the municipality’s refusal or delay, the competence model of the municipal public administrative disputes commission established in Article 5(1) of the Law on Administrative Disputes Commissions of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant
Legal assessment. Under Article 11(1) of the Law on Public Administration, the municipality and other public administration entities must examine residents’ requests in accordance with the rules approved by the Government; therefore, the formal “complexity” of the issue does not in itself release them from the duty to adopt an administrative decision or to take steps to determine competence. Article 11(2) of the same law confirms that a request may be submitted in various ways, including by electronic means, by post, or through a representative; therefore, repeated approaches by residents are not in themselves an improper procedural form. Article 11(3) of the Law on Public Administration permits a request or complaint not to be examined only on the specified grounds, for example where the applicant cannot be identified, where the content is insufficiently specific, where the same issue has already been answered and no new data have been provided, where the issue is being examined by a dispute-resolution body or a court, or where the time limit for lodging the complaint has expired. The information indicates that the residents are raising a specific issue concerning the status of four roads not included in the list, their users, and the institution that should initiate maintenance; therefore, a refusal limited to an undefined reference to a “natural or legal person” is legally weak if no clear administrative decision is adopted. Point 11.2 of the Rules is particularly important: if an institution lacks competence to resolve the matter, it must explain which institution should be approached and, where it has received a request other than orally, must take the steps specified in Article 11(4) of the Law on Public Administration. Accordingly, the municipality’s position that the ministries’ replies are merely opinions and are not binding on it does not answer the separate duty of the municipality itself to properly examine the residents’ request or to properly refer it according to competence. Article 3(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government means that the municipal council may not relinquish its exclusive competence or transfer it to the mayor, while Article 3(3) defines the mayor as the executive institution responsible for the direct implementation of laws, Government resolutions and council decisions. The question of including roads in the list must therefore be resolved through the competent municipal bodies and not left at the level of informal explanations. Article 72(2) of the Law Amending Law No. I-533 on Local Self-Government provides that municipalities are not subordinate to state institutions; therefore, ministerial interpretations do not in themselves replace a municipal decision. However, Article 72(7) allows a municipality to obtain consultations from state institutions; accordingly, the replies received from the ministries and the National Land Service may constitute relevant material for the decision, although the duty to adopt the decision remains with the competent entity. Article 3(2) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings defines the limits of any future judicial review: the court would not assess political or economic expediency, but would examine whether the law was breached, whether competence was exceeded, and whether inaction is contrary to the institution’s objectives and powers. Thus, a court dispute would not concern whether it is “convenient” for the municipality to maintain the roads, but whether its refusal, delay, or application of criteria complies with legal acts and the limits of competence. Under Article 17(1)(2) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings, administrative courts hear cases concerning acts, actions, inaction and delay by municipal administration entities, and under Article 17(1)(3), they also hear cases concerning compensation for damage caused by unlawful actions of public administration entities. Article 5(1) of the Law on Administrative Disputes Commissions likewise permits individual acts, actions, refusals or delays by municipal public administration entities in performing acts falling within their competence to be challenged before the municipal public administrative disputes commission. If the dispute were to develop into a conflict between non-subordinate public administration entities concerning competence, Article 17(1)(8) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings provides that administrative courts also have competence to resolve such disputes. Article 42 of the Law on Public Administration provides that a public administration entity that breaches the requirements of that law is liable in accordance with the procedure established by law, and that pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by unlawful acts is compensated in accordance with the Civil Code and other laws. Article 16(1) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings means that a final court judgment in such a dispute would be binding on the municipality, state institutions, officials and other persons throughout the territory of the Republic of Lithuania
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the municipality adopts a clear individual or other administrative decision concerning the non-inclusion of the four roads, specifying the particular criteria applied, and the residents challenge that decision before the commission or an administrative court. The second scenario is that the dispute is framed as the municipality’s delay or refusal to perform actions falling within its competence, because the residents’ issue concerns not only the financing of road repairs but also the determination of administrative status and the adoption of a decision. The third scenario is that the municipality, relying on consultations with state institutions, reassesses the roads’ compliance with the criteria applicable to its approved list and adopts a decision, through the council or another competent entity, on inclusion or reasoned non-inclusion. The fourth scenario is that, if unlawful public administration actions and resulting damage were established, the residents could raise the issue of compensation under Article 42 of the Law on Public Administration and Article 17(1)(3) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings. The practical significance of this situation for the residents is that, without a clear administrative decision, they remain caught between institutional explanations that cannot be effectively reviewed as a final refusal. For the municipality, the principal risk is not only the cost of road maintenance, but also that indefinite responses may be classified as inaction, delay, or improper examination of requests. For state institutions, this case is relevant insofar as their consultations help define the limits of competence; however, under the provisions cited, they do not in themselves replace the municipality’s mandatory administrative decision
Does advertising the paid iCloud+ feature “Hide My Email” as a service protecting private email become misleading advertising and a breach of a consumer contract if Apple had known of a vulnerability since June 2025 but, by 19 July 2026, had neither finally remedied it nor clearly warned users?
Article 6.301(1) of the Civil Code treats as misleading advertising commercial information which misleads, or is likely to mislead, its addressees and causes damage by reason of its misleading nature. Article 6.301(2)(1) is particularly problematic for Apple’s position: advertising claims are deemed incorrect if the advertiser cannot substantiate them at the time the advertisement is disseminated. The central issue in the dispute would therefore not merely be whether an actual attack occurred, but whether, at the time consumers were paying for iCloud+, Apple had a sufficient basis for claiming that Hide My Email reliably concealed the real email address.
Article 6.2282(4) of the Civil Code further prohibits a trader from engaging in unfair commercial practices towards consumers, while paragraph 1 would prevent contractual terms from eliminating consumer rights if a paid privacy feature essentially did not function as presented.
At present, the stronger argument for a claimant is not an abstract “data security incident”, but the disproportion between price and promise: the consumer paid for iCloud+ because of a specific privacy feature whose reliability Apple itself could no longer confidently rely on after researcher Tyler Murphy’s report in June 2025 and the subsequent acknowledgement that a final fix was still being prepared. For Apple’s defence, the key point will be to distinguish a marketing privacy promise from a guarantee that the feature would absolutely never disclose an address. That defence is weakened, however, by the reported fact that the vulnerability was reproduced for all tested addresses created through Hide My Email.
On compensation, claimants will need to prove not merely risk, but damage within the meaning of Article 6.301 of the Civil Code, for example the portion of the price paid or the premium attributable to the iCloud+ privacy features. The practical risk for technology service providers is that, once they have internal knowledge of a vulnerability, marketing claims are assessed not as general reputational slogans, but by reference to whether they had a reliable technical basis at the time the advertisement was disseminated.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether presenting “Hide My Email” as a service protecting a private email address, where Apple allegedly knew of a vulnerability, should be regarded as misleading advertising and a digital service of improper quality. This would be assessed under Article 6.301 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the concept of misleading advertising, Article 6.302 concerning persons liable, Article 6.2282 concerning the protection of consumer rights and the prohibition on restricting them, Article 6.22822 concerning consumer rights in cases of non-supply or improper quality of a digital service, and Article 6.153 concerning unfair terms in consumer contracts. Because the dispute is linked to the paid iCloud+ service, the consumer-rights issue arises not merely from an abstract privacy promise, but from a characteristic of a paid digital service that may have been material to the conclusion of the contract. Under Article 6.301(1) of the Civil Code, advertising would be misleading where commercial information misleads or is likely to mislead its addressees and damage has arisen due to its misleading nature. Under Article 6.301(2) of the Civil Code, three criteria are assessed: the accuracy, completeness, and manner of presentation of the advertising. If the service’s security claims were disseminated at a time when the advertiser could not substantiate their accuracy, the rule in Article 6.301(2)(1) of the Civil Code is relevant
Legal assessment. In this situation, the consumer would argue that they paid for iCloud+ and chose the service in reliance on the promise of privacy protection, meaning that the advertising claim concerning protection of the real email address was economically material. Apple, as the advertiser, would be liable for damage under Article 6.302(2) of the Civil Code unless it proved that the damage did not arise through its fault. If it were established that the company knew of the vulnerability and continued to disseminate security promises, this would strengthen the conclusion that the advertising was incomplete under Article 6.301(2)(2) of the Civil Code. The advertising could also be regarded as misleading under the manner-of-presentation criterion, because Article 6.301(2)(3) of the Civil Code also covers an implied misleading statement that consumers may perceive from the advertising as a whole. The practice discussed in Bulletin No. 15 of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania on administrative-law practice emphasizes that an advertiser may not shift to the consumer the obligation to verify information provided in advertising. That practice also states that the perspective of the average consumer is assessed, namely the perception of a reasonably well-informed, reasonably observant and circumspect consumer. This means that the consumer would not be required to use technical means to verify whether the privacy function in fact protects the real email address in the manner presented. Under Article 6.2282(1) of the Civil Code, consumers may not waive the rights established in the Code, and terms of a consumer contract that directly or indirectly abolish or restrict those rights are invalid. Accordingly, contractual provisions that would abolish or restrict the consumer’s rights in respect of an improperly functioning privacy feature would be assessed together with Article 6.153(2) of the Civil Code. Article 6.153(2)(2) of the Civil Code is particularly important if a term limits the consumer’s rights where the service provider wholly or partially fails to perform, or improperly performs, the obligations provided for in the contract. Because the matter concerns a digital service, Article 6.22822(1) of the Civil Code would allow the consumer first to require the trader to provide a proper digital service. If, following such a request, the service were not provided without delay or within an expressly agreed additional period, the consumer could unilaterally terminate the contract under the same provision. Article 6.22822(2) of the Civil Code would confer a right to terminate the contract immediately if it is clear from the circumstances that the trader will not provide the digital service, or if provision within the agreed time was of essential importance to the consumer. From an institutional perspective, Article 6.2282(2) of the Civil Code provides for the consumer’s right to apply to consumer-rights protection authorities or to a court for the defence of infringed rights. The strategy sources state that compliance with prohibitions and requirements concerning the use of advertising is supervised by the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority, the Competition Council, and institutions authorised by the Government, while the Competition Council examines infringements involving misleading advertising. The excerpt from the description of the procedure for investigating personal-data security breaches indicates that, when assessing a breach, it is material to determine whether it is a systemic error, what damage has been caused, and whether there is a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons
Consequences. The realistic first scenario would be a consumer request to remedy the digital service, because Article 6.22822(1) of the Civil Code first provides for a requirement that the service be supplied properly. The second scenario would be termination of the contract if the service were not remedied without delay or within an agreed additional period. The third scenario would be a claim for damages for misleading advertising under Articles 6.301 and 6.302 of the Civil Code, if the misleading nature, damage, and basis of liability were proven. The fourth scenario would be a challenge to the terms of the consumer contract under Article 6.153 and Article 6.2282(1) of the Civil Code, if the service terms restricted the consumer’s remedies for improper quality or misleading presentation. From the perspective of a collective dispute, the relevant strategy source provides that the group-action procedure must enable the defence not only of the public consumer interest, but also of groups of consumers. In practice, this is important for consumers who paid for iCloud+, because their interest would not be limited to technical correction of the error, but would also include protection of economic rights in relation to a service that may not have corresponded to the advertised level of privacy. This is also important for advertising and digital-service providers, because under the cited provisions security promises must be substantiated at the time they are made, and omission of material limitations may become an independent basis for finding misleading conduct
The specific point in dispute is whether the shots fired with a firearm in a public place in Šiauliai on 18 July 2026, which injured a man and damaged his car, may properly be classified as attempted murder by a method dangerous to the lives of other persons under Article 22(1) and Article 129(2)(7) of the Criminal Code, with Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code charged separately. The legally decisive issue is not that the victim, after receiving medical assistance, was released for outpatient treatment, but whether the nature, location and circumstances of the shots make it possible to prove intent to kill and a danger not only to the specific target, but also to other persons.
Article 129(2)(7) of the Criminal Code qualifies murder committed “by a method dangerous to the lives of other persons” and provides for imprisonment from eight to twenty years or life imprisonment. Since the person survived, the classification rests on the rule in Article 22 of the Criminal Code that liability for an attempt arises under Article 22(1) or 22(2) together with the article providing for the corresponding completed offence. Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code separately covers the unlawful manufacture, acquisition, possession, carrying, transportation or disposal of a firearm without authorisation; therefore, the fact of shooting does not in itself remove the need to prove the element of unauthorised possession or control.
It would be inaccurate to say that attempted murder is punishable solely under Article 22(1) of the Criminal Code, because the wording of Article 22 requires the simultaneous application of the article providing for the completed offence. The more precise formulation in this situation is: the pre-trial investigation is being conducted into attempted murder under Article 22(1) of the Criminal Code in conjunction with Article 129(2)(7). It is also incorrect to link unlawful possession or control of a firearm to Article 129(2)(7), because that provision regulates aggravated murder, whereas possession or control of a firearm is directly regulated by Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code.
For the prosecution, the strongest argument is not the severity of the injury itself, but the combination of a public place, a firearm and the circumstances of the shots, which may substantiate a method dangerous to the lives of other persons under Article 129(2)(7) of the Criminal Code. For the defence, the most practically important task is to challenge two elements: intent to kill and the actual danger to other persons, since outpatient treatment may be used only as an auxiliary, but not decisive, argument against the classification as an attempt. When deciding on detention, the seriousness of the legal classification is relevant, but it does not replace the need to justify individually the necessity of the remand measure in respect of the specific suspects.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether shooting in a public place, injuring a person and damaging a car, constitutes attempted murder by a method dangerous to the lives of other persons under Article 22(1) and (3) and Article 129(2)(7) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and whether unlawful possession of a firearm is also to be separately classified under Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code. Article 22(1) of the Criminal Code requires an intentional act by which the commission of a criminal offence is directly commenced, but is not completed due to circumstances beyond the offender’s control. Article 22(3) of the Criminal Code provides that liability for an attempt is imposed together with the application of the article prescribing the completed offence; therefore, the reference to Article 129(2)(7) of the Criminal Code is a necessary element of the legal classification here. As regards the weapon, Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code applies: manufacturing, acquiring, storing, carrying, transporting or selling a firearm without authorisation is punishable by arrest or imprisonment for up to five years; in the submitted amendment to Article 253, this disposition also covers sending and using the firearm. The question of the time of the offence is resolved under Article 3(1) of the Criminal Code: the criminality and punishability of an act are determined by the criminal law in force at the time the act was committed
Legal assessment. According to the information provided, the shots were fired in a public place, a person was injured, and a car was damaged; therefore, the core of the classification is not merely possession of the weapon, but the use of a firearm as the direct commencement of the commission of murder. If the investigation were to establish intent to take life, the victim’s survival and outpatient treatment would not in themselves negate an attempt, since Article 22(1) of the Criminal Code specifically covers an unfinished offence. The qualifying element under Article 129(2)(7) of the Criminal Code is linked to a method dangerous to the lives of other persons, so the public location and the nature of the shooting become significant in assessing not only the harm to the specific victim but also the danger to bystanders. The legal source provided in relation to Article 129(2) of the Criminal Code notes that all qualifying elements of murder are equivalent and equally dangerous, while the sanction under Article 129(2) also provides for the most severe penalty, life imprisonment. For the application of Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code, the relevant factor is not the extent of the injury, but the absence of authorisation and actual possession or control of the firearm in at least one of the forms identified by law. Article 255 of the Criminal Code is not the principal classification here, because it concerns breaches of the rules on storing, carrying or transporting a lawfully held weapon and only in cases of negligence. Article 258 of the Criminal Code is likewise inapplicable to this information, as it regulates non-firearms, whereas the report concerns a firearm. The logic of Article 145 of the Criminal Code assists in distinguishing a threat from an actual attempt: the source provided states that where a person attempts to kill or impair health, liability arises for preparation or attempt, not merely for making a threat. The pre-trial investigation is led by the Šiauliai Regional Prosecutor’s Office, the investigation is being conducted by police officers, and the prosecutor’s decision to apply to the court for detention is a procedural stage aimed at ensuring the suspects’ further participation in the proceedings. Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that a pre-trial investigation may be discontinued, among other grounds, where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt; therefore, detention does not yet amount to a finding of guilt
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is that the classification under Article 22 and Article 129(2)(7) of the Criminal Code, together with Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code, is maintained if the investigation confirms intent to kill, the dangerousness of the shooting method to other persons, and unlawful possession or use of the weapon. The second scenario would be a narrowing of the classification if the collected data did not confirm the intent required for attempted murder or the qualifying dangerous method, while the separate issue under Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code concerning the weapon remained. The third scenario is discontinuance of the pre-trial investigation under Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if insufficient data were collected to substantiate the guilt of a specific suspect. For the suspects, the most important point is that an attempt under Article 22 of the Criminal Code is assessed together with the provision on the completed offence; therefore, the legal risk depends on the classification under Article 129(2) of the Criminal Code, and not solely on the actual consequence of the injury. For the victim and the public, what matters is that the use of a firearm in a public place is legally assessed through the lens of an increased danger to multiple persons. For the prosecution service and the police, the decisive evidence will concern the circumstances of the shooting, the origin of the weapon, the existence or absence of authorisation, the direction and purpose of the suspects’ actions, and the reason why the offence was not completed
Could the use of generative AI in schools in Lithuania be restricted according to pupils’ age and stage of education through education-organisation documents approved by the Minister, without introducing a general statutory prohibition?
Article 30 of the Law on Education provides that schools operate in accordance with teaching plans and general curricula approved or endorsed by the Ministry, and that teaching content and methods must correspond to the objectives of the educational institution and the needs of society. This means that the issue of AI use in the educational process may primarily be addressed as a matter of teaching method and organisation of educational content, rather than necessarily as a standalone statutory prohibition. Article 38 is also relevant, because the assessment of learning outcomes must establish a pupil’s achievements against the curriculum, and the assessment procedure is regulated by the Minister; accordingly, restrictions on AI are strongest where they protect the reliability of assessment and the pupil’s independent demonstration of abilities.
Article 46 gives the pupil the right to good-quality education, learning according to abilities and needs, and impartial assessment; therefore, an absolute uniform prohibition for all groups would be legally weaker than a differentiated model distinguishing the formation of foundational skills, AI literacy in senior grades, and cases involving special educational needs under Article 14.
In practice, the stronger argument would not be that “AI is dangerous for children in general”, but that, at particular stages of education, AI changes the very object of determining learning outcomes: the school can no longer reliably assess whether the pupil is personally reading, writing, calculating and reasoning. For that reason, in Lithuania a Norway-type model would more rationally be grounded in education plans, general curricula and assessment procedures, providing for different regimes for pupils aged 6-13, 14-16 and 17-19, rather than in a single horizontal prohibition. The greatest regulatory risk would be to overlook the logic of Articles 14 and 46: for some pupils, an AI tool may be not a channel for cheating, but part of educational adaptation or educational support.
The rules should therefore clearly distinguish AI as an assistive access tool, AI as an object of learning, and AI as a prohibited substitute for the performance of assessed work.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether the Norwegian model is, as such, applicable in Lithuania, but whether restrictions on the use of generative AI in Lithuanian schools could be established as rules governing the educational process, assessment of learning outcomes, and internal school operations. It should be assessed under Article 56(1)(1), (4) and (5) of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania, which confer on the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport the functions of shaping education policy, responsibility for the quality of education, and submitting proposals to the Government regarding legal acts. Also relevant is the regulation of assessment of learning outcomes set out in Article 38(1)-(3) of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania, because the use of AI is directly connected with whether a pupil’s achievements reflect his or her own progress. At the internal school level, the issue rests on Article 43(3) and (4) of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania, because a school operates in accordance with its statutes and itself establishes standards of conduct for members of the school community. From the perspective of community participation and self-governance, Article 60(2)-(3) and Article 63(1)-(4) of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania are applicable. If AI tools were used for pupils with special educational needs, Article 14 of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania would additionally apply, especially paragraphs 1 and 3 concerning adaptation of education and the provision of educational assistance
Legal assessment. The body of sources provided indicates that a general national decision on the use of AI in schools would primarily fall within the sphere of education policy and regulation of the educational process, rather than solely within the discretion of individual schools. Article 56(1)(1) of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania assigns to the Ministry the function of shaping state education policy; accordingly, an age-based framework for the use of AI would be a matter within the Ministry’s competence. Article 56(1)(4) is important because the Ministry is responsible for the quality of education, while the risk discussed in the report is specifically linked to the development of basic skills. Under Article 56(1)(5), the Ministry may submit proposals and draft resolutions to the Government concerning the preparation and improvement of legal acts; therefore, stricter restrictions could be raised at the legislative or regulatory level. Article 38(1) of the Law on Education links assessment of learning outcomes to the verification of individual progress and the determination of achievements; accordingly, uncontrolled use of AI during assessment is legally significant for both the pupil and the teacher. Under Article 38(2), achievements are self-assessed by the pupil and assessed by the teacher and other education management entities; therefore, rules on the use of AI should be aligned with the chain of responsibility for assessment. Article 38(3) provides that the assessment of achievements of pupils participating in general education programmes and the use of results are regulated according to the procedure established by the Minister; therefore, internal school rules alone would not be sufficient to alter the national logic of assessment. At school level, Article 43(3) permits the establishment of standards of conduct for members of the community; therefore, a school could regulate when and how pupils use AI tools in lessons, assessments, or independent work. However, such standards would have to be consistent with the school’s statutes and higher-level education regulation, because Article 43(4) requires state and municipal schools to prepare their statutes in accordance with requirements approved by the Minister. The role of the school council would not be merely formal: under Article 60(2), self-governance bodies collegially consider matters relating to school operations, take decisions within their competence, and influence decisions of the head of the school. Under Article 60(3), the school council consists of representatives of pupils, teachers, parents, and the local community; therefore, internal rules restricting AI should be considered as a matter for the entire school community. Article 63(1)-(4) of the Law on Education supplements this logic, because members of the school community and their associations may participate in education governance, submit proposals, and receive informational, consultative, and methodological assistance. In the case of special educational needs, a categorical ban on AI would have to be reconciled with Article 14(1), under which the purpose of education is to help a pupil learn according to his or her abilities and to recognise and develop his or her capacities. Article 14(3) provides that the initial assessment is carried out by the school’s Child Welfare Commission, while the pedagogical psychological service assesses special educational needs and assigns assistance and educational adaptation. Therefore, where AI or another digital tool forms part of an educational adaptation for a pupil, the decision could not be assessed solely by reference to a general prohibition model. Point 1.2 of the Network Development Rules, which establishes an indicator for pupils’ access to computers, and point 2.3.5 concerning universal design principles show that digital infrastructure at school is regarded as part of the conditions for education. Point 3 of the same Rules, concerning electronic diaries, confirms that technology is already recognised as an element of the administration of the educational process and the school’s virtual environment; therefore, the AI issue is not merely a technical prohibition. From the copyright perspective, if the use of AI involved the use of database content for teaching purposes, Articles 32, 61 and 63 of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights of the Republic of Lithuania would be relevant. Article 32(4) permits a published or publicly disclosed database to be used as an example for teaching purposes where the source is indicated and the use is justified by a non-commercial purpose. Article 63(1)(5) permits educational institutions to reproduce or reuse a database for teaching illustrations only under the prescribed conditions, including indication of the source, responsibility of the educational institution, and use of a secure electronic network
Consequences. In practical terms, several legal routes are possible: a national procedure at ministerial or Government level, amendments to internal school rules on conduct and assessment, or a mixed model in which national guidelines are detailed in school statutes and self-governance decisions. If national regulation were chosen, the key institution under the provisions provided would be the Ministry of Education, Science and Sport, because it shapes policy, is responsible for quality, and may initiate improvements to legal acts. If an internal school model were chosen, practical responsibility would fall on the head of the school, teachers, the school council, and the community; however, their decisions would have to remain within the limits of Articles 38, 43, 60 and 63. For pupils and parents, this is important for the transparency of assessment: it must be clear when the use of AI is regarded as a permissible learning tool and when it distorts the determination of individual progress. For teachers, this is important because of assessment duties and the organisation of education, since under Article 38 they are among the principal actors responsible for assessing achievements. For schools, this is important because internal rules, statutes, self-governance, and special educational needs must be coordinated, since a general prohibition without exceptions may conflict with the mechanism for educational adaptation established in Article 14. Accordingly, on the basis of the sources provided, the most realistic legal direction would not be an absolute prohibition alone, but a clear framework for the use of AI according to the stage of education, the assessment situation, teacher supervision, participation of school self-governance, and assessment of special educational needs
Can an advocate who has entered into a legal services agreement with a client avoid disciplinary liability for breach of the duties of loyalty, honesty and protection of the client’s interests by arguing that part of the services was in fact provided by other advocates as subcontractors?
Article 5 of the Law on the Bar establishes loyalty to the client, avoidance of conflicts of interest, legality, non-disclosure of client secrets and impeccable conduct as principles of an advocate’s professional activity. These are therefore not merely contractual categories of service quality. Article 39(1) particularises this duty: an advocate must perform his or her duties honestly, comply with the Lithuanian Code of Ethics for Advocates, and act with integrity and civic responsibility.
From these provisions, the Supreme Court of Lithuania derived the rule that subcontracting services does not remove the professional centre of duty of the advocate who concluded the agreement: that advocate must remain loyal to the client, cooperate and ensure compliance with the standards of advocacy and professional ethics. Article 29 of the Law on the Bar is also relevant, as it provides that the agreement should generally identify the advocate who will perform it; this weakens the argument that performance of the services may be neutrally transferred to third parties without professional-liability consequences.
In its ruling of 17 July 2026 in civil case No e3K-3-109-421/2026, the Supreme Court of Lithuania upheld the reprimand imposed by the Court of Honour of Advocates and dismissed the advocate’s cassation appeal. The Court clearly did not recognise the use of subcontractors as an independent ground excluding liability. The practical ratio is strict: if the client entered into the agreement with a specific advocate, the disciplinary case will first assess that advocate’s performance of professional duties, not the internal allocation of work.
The ruling also indicates that a breach established in respect of even a single client may be sufficient for disciplinary liability, particularly where one of the mildest sanctions, a reprimand, is imposed.
The news statement that an advocate must ensure standards irrespective of whether the services are provided personally or through subcontractors should be refined by reference to Article 29 of the Law on the Bar. That provision states that a legal services agreement should generally identify the advocate who will perform the agreement, meaning that subcontracting is not merely a technical organisational decision. A more precise formulation would be: an advocate identified in the agreement, or acting as the advocate performing it, does not lose his or her duties of loyalty and honest performance of professional obligations towards the client by engaging other persons.
It is also inaccurate to describe the threshold for disciplinary liability merely as “mistakes”: Article 52 of the Law on the Bar refers to breaches of that law, of the requirements of the Code of Ethics and of advocates’ professional activity, so what is required is a qualified breach of professional duty, not any unfavourable or imperfect service outcome.
Following this ruling, the stronger argument in disciplinary cases is not “the subcontractor did it”, but “the advocate who concluded the agreement personally and effectively ensured client information, loyalty, control and compliance with ethical standards”. For advocates, the practical risk arises where the service model in substance operates as delegation, while the agreement and communications with the client leave the impression that a specific advocate is responsible. In disputes, it is worth citing Articles 5, 39, 29 and 52 of the Law on the Bar together with Supreme Court case No e3K-3-109-421/2026: taken together, they support the proposition that professional liability follows not only an individual act, but also the advocate’s organised control over the performance of the service.
The mistake to avoid is treating subcontracting as a transfer of liability; under this ruling, it instead increases the need to document the client’s consent, the allocation of work and the supervision exercised by the advocate performing the agreement.
Core issue. The precise issue is whether an advocate who has entered into a legal services agreement with a client may avoid disciplinary liability for breaches of loyalty, honesty, and professional standards solely because part of the services was in fact provided by other advocates acting as subcontractors. This issue is to be resolved primarily under Article 48(1) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania, because the client-advocate relationship arises upon the signing of a legal services agreement. The content of the services provided is defined in Article 2(1) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania: consultations, preparation of documents having legal significance, representation, defence, and representation in proceedings. The nature of an advocate’s activities is established in Article 4(3) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania, under which an advocate’s activity is the provision of legal services, not commercial economic activity. The standard of duties derives from Article 5(3), (5), and (6) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania, which enshrine the legality of activities, loyalty to the client, avoidance of conflicts of interest, and irreproachable conduct. The specific axis of disciplinary assessment is Article 39(1) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania, under which an advocate must perform his or her duties honestly, comply with the requirements of the Lithuanian Code of Ethics for Advocates, and act honourably and responsibly as a citizen. The institutional basis is formed by Article 59(2)(2) and (8) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the General Meeting of Advocates elects three members of the Court of Honour of Advocates and approves the Procedure for the Examination of Disciplinary Cases against Advocates
Legal assessment. Under Article 48(1) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania, the contractual relationship is formed between the client and the advocate, advocates, or professional partnership of advocates that signed the agreement; accordingly, that relationship is the starting point for assessing to whom professional duties attach. The engagement of subcontractors does not alter the fact that an advocate’s activity remains the provision of legal services within the meaning of Article 4(3) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania. Since Article 5(5) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania establishes loyalty to the client as a principle of an advocate’s activity, loyalty is not merely a duty of the person performing the technical work, but a standard governing the entire advocate-client relationship. Article 39(1) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania gives concrete expression to this standard: an advocate must perform his or her duties honestly and comply with the requirements of the Lithuanian Code of Ethics for Advocates. Therefore, in its ruling of 17 July 2026 in civil case No. e3K-3-109-421/2026, the Supreme Court of Lithuania rightly held that the engagement of third parties does not in itself preclude the possibility of disciplinary liability for the advocate who concluded the agreement. The practical rule arising from this case is narrow but significant: when organising the provision of services through other advocates, an advocate must continue to cooperate with the client, act in the client’s best interests, and ensure compliance with professional and ethical standards. The procedural background of the dispute is also consistent with Article 51(1) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania, because where a dispute arises between a client and an advocate concerning legal services, the client may apply to the Lithuanian Bar or to a court. Within the Lithuanian Bar, such disputes are examined, pursuant to Article 51(2) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania, by the Council of the Bar or a body established by it, and their decisions are recommendatory in nature. By contrast, the source of the disciplinary assessment procedure is Article 59(2)(8) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the General Meeting of Advocates approves the Procedure for the Examination of Disciplinary Cases against Advocates. The circumstance noted by the Supreme Court of Lithuania, namely that liability was also imposed on the advocate for breaches committed by the advocate personally, reinforces the conclusion: even if some arguments concerning subcontractors were rejected, the advocate’s independent acts could have constituted a sufficient basis for disciplinary liability. The Supreme Court of Lithuania also emphasised that, from the perspective of professional ethics, an error committed in respect of even one client is not less significant merely because there were no further errors or clients affected. This is directly linked to the principle of irreproachable conduct enshrined in Article 5(6) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania: disciplinary assessment protects the standard itself, and does not merely respond to widespread or repeated breaches
Consequences. The first practical consequence is that an advocate who has signed an agreement under Article 48(1) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania cannot convert his or her duties of loyalty and honesty into a matter solely of the subcontractor’s responsibility. The second consequence is that, for clients, it is important that the right to apply to the Lithuanian Bar or to a court under Article 51(1) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania remains directed at the quality of the services provided by the advocate and the performance of the advocate’s professional duties, even where other advocates participated in the chain of work. The third consequence is that, in practice, advocates must manage the work of subcontractors in such a way as to maintain the standards enshrined in Article 5 and Article 39(1) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania. The fourth consequence is that disciplinary liability may remain a real possibility even for an isolated breach in respect of a single client, because in case No. e3K-3-109-421/2026 the Supreme Court of Lithuania recognised such a breach as sufficiently significant for the maintenance of professional ethical standards. In future disputes of this kind, the assessment is likely to focus not only on who physically performed the specific task, but also on whether the advocate who concluded the agreement remained loyal and honest, cooperated with the client, and acted in the client’s interests. This is important for the self-governance of advocates, because disciplinary decisions of the Court of Honour of Advocates in such situations may be based not on the formal fact of subcontracting, but on the continuity of professional duties. The final ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania means that the reprimand imposed on the specific advocate remains in force, and the interpretation developed becomes significant for similar disputes concerning advocates’ disciplinary liability
May the court of the requested Member State refuse to execute a request from a court of another Member State to take evidence solely because that method of obtaining evidence is prohibited by its national substantive law?
The rule emerging from the CJEU’s clarification reported in the news item is strict: Regulation (EU) 2020/1783 governs the procedural mechanism for cross-border taking of evidence; it does not incorporate the substantive-law restrictions of the requested State into the grounds for refusing execution of a request. The grounds for refusal under that Regulation are exhaustive and must be interpreted narrowly. Accordingly, the French rule prohibiting post-mortem genetic identification for the purpose of establishing parentage without the express consent of the person while alive is not an autonomous ground for refusal.
Article 61 of Lithuania’s implementing law also reflects the procedural logic of the Regulation: requests by courts of other Member States to take evidence directly under Article 4(3) and Article 19 of Regulation 2020/1783 are decided by the Ministry of Justice, but that national rule on designation does not alter the grounds for refusal laid down in the EU Regulation.
In this case, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU preferred the argument based on mutual trust over the autonomy of the requested State’s substantive law. The Court distinguished between two functions: the Italian court determines whether the measure is necessary and whether it complies with the Charter, while the French court executes the request in accordance with its own procedural rules. As regards human dignity under the Charter, the CJEU stated that there was no evidence in the case that the Italian court had failed properly to balance the competing interests, nor was there any systemic risk of fundamental-rights violations in the Italian courts.
In practice, the stronger argument is now not “our substantive law would not permit such an expert examination”, but “whether there is a specific ground for refusal provided for in the Regulation”. The requested court or authority should focus on the procedural conditions for execution and on the clear grounds for refusal under Regulation 2020/1783, because recasting national fundamental legal principles as an ordre public-type objection will be a weak argument after this judgment. Conversely, the requesting court now bears a greater responsibility, in its order for the taking of evidence, to demonstrate clearly that it has balanced the rights protected by the Charter, since that assessment becomes the principal safeguard against any later dispute over the legality of the measure.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether a court of a Member State of the European Union, having received a request from a court of another Member State to take evidence in a civil case, may refuse to execute it on the basis of a prohibition under its own national substantive law. This issue is governed by Article 5(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Implementation of European Union and International Legal Acts Regulating Civil Procedure, under which all courts of the Republic of Lithuania have the right to take evidence in a Member State of the European Union in accordance with the procedure laid down by European Union legal acts. Article 5(2) of the same law is important for the guarantees afforded to participants in proceedings, as the parties and their representatives have the right to participate when a court of another Member State of the European Union takes evidence. In the national evidentiary regime, the key provision is Article 179(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, under which evidence is submitted by the parties and other persons participating in the case, while the court, where the evidence is insufficient, may propose that additional evidence be submitted and set a time limit for doing so. Article 179(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure defines the limits of the court’s initiative: the court may take evidence on its own initiative only in the cases provided for by the Code and other laws, or where required by the public interest. The limits of specific evidentiary measures are also apparent from Article 168(2) and Articles 190, 191 and 192 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which lay down prohibitions on witness examination, the content of a request to summon a witness, the duties of a witness, and the procedure for examination
Legal assessment. In the situation described, the Italian court is the requesting court, since it is hearing the parentage determination case and decides what evidence is required for the examination of the case. The French court is the requested court; therefore, according to the CJEU interpretation provided, its function is not to reassess the admissibility of the evidence under French substantive law, but to carry out the taking of evidence in accordance with its own procedural rules. From the perspective of Lithuanian law, this reasoning is consistent with Article 5(1) of the Implementation Law: the court is granted the right to act in a cross-border evidence-taking procedure specifically in accordance with the procedure laid down by European Union legal acts. This means that a Lithuanian court, acting as the requesting court, could apply to a court of another Member State for evidence where such evidence is necessary for the civil case before it and its taking corresponds to the purpose of the proceedings. In such a case, Article 179(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure would mean that the burden of proof lies first with the parties, but the court may manage the evidentiary process by proposing the submission of additional evidence and setting a time limit for its submission. Article 179(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure limits the court’s independent initiative, meaning that a cross-border request does not become a free-standing investigative tool for the court outside the scope of the case; it must be linked to an evidentiary act permitted by the Code or by law, or to a need arising from the public interest. If a Lithuanian court were the requested court, Article 5(2) of the Implementation Law would grant the parties and their representatives the right to participate in the taking of evidence, so the execution process would have to ensure not only cooperation between institutions but also the possibility for participants in the proceedings to take part. The interpretation given by the Grand Chamber of the CJEU in the case described establishes a clear boundary of competence: the necessity of the evidence and the reconciliation of fundamental rights are assessed by the requesting court, while the requested court may not refuse solely on the basis of a prohibition under its own national substantive law. This is particularly important in relation to post-mortem genetic testing, because, according to the CJEU’s position, the prohibition under French substantive law cannot in itself constitute a ground for refusing to execute the request. By comparison, sources of criminal procedure reveal a different structure: under Article 67(2) of the Law on the Mutual Recognition and Execution of Decisions in Criminal Matters by Member States of the European Union, when executing an order freezing property or evidence, the procedural rules requested by another State may be followed only if they do not infringe the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, laws, and the essential principles of criminal procedure. However, this criminal-law rule does not apply to the civil parentage determination situation at issue; it shows that, in different fields, mechanisms for taking evidence and mutual recognition have deliberately been constructed differently
Consequences. The practical consequence for civil cases is that the requested court may not expand the grounds for refusal by relying on assessments derived from its own substantive law, even if those assessments are associated with fundamental principles in its national system. The requesting court will have to substantiate more carefully why the specific evidence-taking measure is necessary for the case, because it is that court which bears the duty to assess its relationship with fundamental rights. This is important for the parties because, in a cross-border case, the possibility of obtaining evidence should not depend solely on whether the substantive law of the requested State would permit such a measure in its domestic disputes. For Lithuanian courts applying Article 5 of the Implementation Law and Article 179 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this message means a clearer allocation of roles: when a Lithuanian court requests evidence, it decides on its necessity in the case, and when it executes a request from another State, it primarily applies the execution procedure. A realistic subsequent scenario is that the requested court carries out the requested measure in accordance with its own procedural rules, ensuring the parties’ rights of participation where they apply under Article 5(2) of the Implementation Law. Another scenario is that the dispute shifts to the level of the requesting court, where participants in the proceedings may raise questions concerning the necessity and proportionality of the evidence and its significance for the final decision. This is of practical importance in parentage, family, succession and other civil cases where evidence needed to establish a fact is located in another Member State of the European Union
The specific question is whether luring a minor into a private space on the basis of a promise of employment, followed by sexual exploitation, should be assessed not only as an individual sexual offence, but also as a situation triggering the State’s duty to ensure assistance and protection for the child victim.
Article 43(2) of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child provides that administrative or criminal liability applies for involving children in criminal or other unlawful activity. Paragraph 3 of the same article specifically covers a child who has suffered from sexual exploitation, prostitution, pornography, the purchase or sale of a child, or another criminal offence, and establishes a duty to provide assistance, support and protection. Accordingly, the 2008 situation referred to in the news report, in which a teenage girl was lured by an offer of work as a masseuse and Epstein was convicted in connection with that conduct, would under the cited provision raise not only the issue of the perpetrator’s liability, but also an institutional duty to provide the victim with health, social and legal assistance.
The stronger legal argument here is not that “she could have left”, but that a deceptive job offer and the creation of dependency are relevant in assessing involvement in a situation of exploitation. In practice, the analysis should not be confined to evidence of physical restraint: control over finances, restriction of social contacts, promises of career advancement and psychological humiliation may all constitute factual elements of a mechanism of control. However, on the evidence provided, the clearest supported conclusion concerns the minor victim; this body of material does not identify a specific legal provision for classifying the experiences of adult women as trafficking in human beings or coercive control, so such a conclusion would require a separate basis in criminal law.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the described recruitment of women, fraudulent inducement, financial and psychological control, sexual exploitation, and possible placement in a position of dependency would meet the definition of trafficking in human beings under Article 147 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This issue is to be assessed primarily under Article 147(1) of the Criminal Code, which identifies the relevant acts: recruitment, transportation, holding in captivity, use of deception, abuse of dependency or vulnerability, and the purpose of exploitation. Since the described conduct occurred outside Lithuania and may have involved nationals of different states, Article 7(2) of the Criminal Code is also relevant, as it establishes liability for trafficking in human beings irrespective of citizenship, place of residence, place where the offence was committed, and whether the act is punishable under local law. The procedural and assistance rights of victims should be assessed under Articles 12(2), 12(3), and 21 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on State-Guaranteed Legal Aid. If the situation involved elements of sexual exploitation of a child, Articles 43(3), 43(4), and 57-1(1) of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child would also apply
Legal assessment. Under Article 147(1) of the Criminal Code, the essential issue is not formal physical captivity, but the totality of the acts, means, and purpose: recruiting or holding a person by using deception, dependency, or vulnerability for the purpose of sexual exploitation, forced labour, or other exploitation. The described promises of modelling work, connections in the fashion industry, and training in “real business” are legally significant as a possible mechanism of deception. Control over finances, housing, healthcare, movement, communications, and documents corresponds to indicators of exploitation of dependency and vulnerability, because the victim was encouraged to believe that she could not live independently without the perpetrator. The constant requirement to be available around the clock and to carry out instructions permits an assessment not only of sexual exploitation, but also of forced labour or services under Article 147(1) of the Criminal Code. Threats involving debts, surveillance, the use of private investigators, and possible consequences in the event of departure may be assessed as means of depriving the person of the ability to resist or maintaining dependency. The victim’s consent in such a model should not be decisive, because Article 147(1) of the Criminal Code expressly states that the purpose of exploitation is relevant “regardless of whether he consented.” If approximately a dozen women were exploited at the same time, Article 147(2) of the Criminal Code is relevant, as it provides for stricter liability where the act is committed against two or more victims. Under the same paragraph, a possible organised group is also relevant if several persons acting in a coordinated manner participated in recruitment, scheduling, travel arrangements, or the system for maintaining dependency. Article 7(2) of the Criminal Code means that qualification of trafficking in human beings under Lithuanian law is not, in itself, limited by the fact that the conduct is described as having occurred in Paris, Palm Beach, or Manhattan. Victims of trafficking in human beings have the right to secondary legal aid under Article 12(2) of the Law on State-Guaranteed Legal Aid irrespective of their assets and income. Under Article 12(3) of the same law, that right is also relevant in compensation claims, including cases where compensation is addressed within criminal proceedings. Article 21 of the Law on State-Guaranteed Legal Aid establishes the procedure for institutional action in criminal cases: where defence counsel or an authorised representative is necessary, the pre-trial investigation officer, prosecutor, or court notifies the service, which immediately appoints a lawyer. For a foreign national who is a current or former victim of offences related to trafficking in human beings, the Procedure Description on the Reflection Period may make relevant the rights to use psychological, translation, and interpretation services and to participate in assistance projects. During that period, such a person must submit available documents and truthful information about themselves and must not communicate with persons who may influence the decision to cooperate with a pre-trial investigation authority or a court. The sources provided also indicate that measures protecting victims and witnesses of trafficking in human beings from criminal influence may be applied, and that a victim or witness may request anonymity. If the victim were a child, Article 43(3) of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child would require the provision of healthcare, social, legal, and other assistance, support, and protection. Article 43(4) of the same law imposes a duty on a natural or legal person to notify the police and/or the child rights protection division of the municipal administration about a child who may have suffered from a criminal act. Article 57-1(1) of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child further creates restrictions on work with children for persons found guilty by a final judgment of sexual exploitation of a child or analogous acts under the criminal laws of other states
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario would be a criminal-law assessment under Article 147 of the Criminal Code, examining whether the elements of recruitment, deception, dependency, control, and sexual or labour exploitation are proven. The second scenario would be the application of a more serious qualification under Article 147(2) of the Criminal Code if the element of multiple victims or an organised group is confirmed. The third scenario concerns victim protection: legal aid, anonymity, protection from criminal influence, interpretation, psychological assistance, and participation in assistance projects become not ancillary measures but procedurally significant ones. For victims, this is important for the ability to give testimony safely, seek compensation, and receive secondary legal aid without an assessment of assets and income. For institutions, it is important because of the duty to assess not only physical confinement, but also less visible forms of dependency: debt, housing, documents, control of communications, psychological pressure, and the purpose of sexual exploitation. The legal significance of this situation is that “invisible chains” under Article 147 of the Criminal Code may be not a colloquial metaphor, but a description of indicators of trafficking in human beings
Should the EUR 1 billion acquisition of radars and helicopters, financed through the SAFE loan mechanism, be legally assessed under the defence and security procurement regime by reason of the subject matter itself, rather than by reference to the source of financing or industrial effect?
Article 2 of the Lithuanian Law on Defence and Security Procurement, as provided, links the regime to the subject matter of the procurement: the supply of military equipment, sensitive equipment, parts thereof, as well as directly related goods and services at any stage of the equipment life cycle. Under this rule, the 12 H225M Caracal helicopters and 12 Ground Master 200 MM/A air surveillance radars, intended to counter low-flying drones and protect NATO airspace, fall within the logic of defence procurement precisely because of their functional military purpose. Article 9 of the Law further indicates that oversight is not limited to the conclusion of the contract: the competence of the Public Procurement Office also covers provisions concerning the performance of procurement contracts and compliance with the obligation to apply the special law.
The stronger argument, therefore, is not that SAFE is a political or financial instrument, but that the financing does not alter the applicability of the special procurement regime where military or sensitive equipment is being purchased.
The practical risk in transactions of this type is an attempt to shift the main legal focus to the terms of the SAFE loan, job creation or an urgent security need, although in the event of a dispute the first issue examined will be the classification of the subject matter and the application of the special procurement regime. For a professional, it is important to record that delivery of the radars within 11 months and delivery of all equipment by 2030 are not merely commercial deadlines: under the logic of Article 9 as provided, contract performance also falls within the scope of oversight. The argument to cite would be the subject-matter criterion in Article 2: the helicopters, radars and related life-cycle services must be classified according to their purpose, not according to the fact that the transaction is financed by a concessional EU loan.
The greatest mistake would be to analyse these procurements as an ordinary state investment project, because the military-purpose subject matter strengthens the argument for the special regime and oversight of its performance.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the acquisition of radars and multi-role helicopters for defence needs, under the provisions provided, is to be regarded as a defence and security procurement subject to the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Public Procurement in the Field of Defence and Security. This issue must first be assessed under Article 1(1) and Article 2 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Public Procurement in the Field of Defence and Security. Article 1(1) of the Law covers public procurements whose subject matter consists of the works, supplies and services listed in Article 2, and also establishes the rights, obligations and liability of entities, as well as the procedures for control and dispute resolution. Under Article 2(1) of the same Law, the supply of military equipment falls within its scope where the equipment is included in the Common Military List or is attributable to the list of weapons, ammunition and war material approved by Council Decision 255/58 of 15 April 1958. Under Article 2(3), the scope also includes works, supplies and services directly related to such equipment at any stage of its life cycle
Legal assessment. The acquisition of H225M Caracal helicopters and Ground Master 200 MM/A airspace surveillance radars, according to the stated purpose, is connected with the modernisation of the armed forces, air defence and countering low-flying drones; therefore, under the provisions provided, such an object has the characteristics of a defence and security procurement. If an analogous procurement were conducted by a Lithuanian contracting authority, it would first have to assess whether the equipment falls within the category of military equipment referred to in Article 2(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Public Procurement in the Field of Defence and Security. The provisions of the Government resolution implementing this Law indicate that the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania is authorised to prepare and approve the Common Military List; accordingly, that list would be the relevant reference point for classification. If the subject matter of the procurement comprised not only the equipment itself but also its maintenance, supply, integration or other life-cycle services, those services would fall within Article 2(3) of the Law as being directly related to military or sensitive equipment. From the perspective of procurement control, Article 9 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Public Procurement in the Field of Defence and Security is important: the Public Procurement Office supervises compliance with the Law, including provisions concerning the performance of procurement contracts and the obligation to apply this Law. The same institution, under Article 9(1)(4), collects, stores and analyses information on procurements, contracts, their performance, disputes and infringements, except for classified and confidential information. The chain of responsibility is established in Article 69 of the amending law: the head of the contracting authority is responsible for procurements conducted by that contracting authority, while members of the commission and experts are liable in accordance with the procedure established by law. The question of non-application of the Law could arise only under specific exemptions: for example, under Article 3(1)(1) of this Law, where the procurement is carried out pursuant to an international agreement or treaty between EU Member States and third countries containing special procedural rules. Another possible exemption is Article 3(1)(3), where the procurement is carried out for the purposes of an international organisation under special procedural rules approved by that organisation. A further significant exemption is Article 3(1)(4), where application of the Law’s procedures would require the disclosure of information whose disclosure would be contrary to essential state security interests; the decision on this is taken by the Government after assessing the contracting authority’s justification. Article 12(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Public Procurement confirms, from a systematic perspective, that the general Law on Public Procurement applies to procurements involving defence and security aspects only where the special law on defence and security procurements does not apply, or where that special law is disapplied under Article 3 thereof. In terms of international financing, Article 14 of the Law on Public Procurement is relevant: paragraph 2 provides for non-application where the procurement is conducted under the procedural rules of an international organisation or international financial institution and is fully financed by such organisation or institution; where the majority of the financing is so provided, the procedures must be agreed. The SAFE lending initiative mentioned in the information provided constitutes a financing circumstance; however, under the provisions provided, the mere existence of a loan does not in itself remove the obligation to apply the defence and security procurement regime. If, after the contracts are concluded, it becomes necessary to amend the price, deadlines, quantity or subject matter, Article 53 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Public Procurement in the Field of Defence and Security would apply. Under Article 53(1)(1), a contract may be amended without a new procurement procedure only where the amendment was clearly, precisely and unequivocally provided for in advance in the procurement documents, specifying its scope, nature and circumstances, and where the overall nature of the contract is not thereby substantially altered
Consequences. In practical terms, the most important scenario is that the procurements would be conducted as special defence and security procurements, and their lawfulness would be assessed by reference to the classification of the subject matter as military or sensitive equipment, the choice of procedure, supervision of contract performance, and the compliance of any amendments with Article 53. If reliance were placed on the protection of essential state security interests, the legal consequences would depend on a Government decision under Article 1(5) or Article 3(1)(4) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Public Procurement in the Field of Defence and Security. If the procurement were recognised as falling within the scope of international rules, the applicable rules would be the specific procedural rules laid down in the international agreement or in the rules of the international organisation or international financial institution. As regards contractual deadlines, the information indicates two clear reference points: the first radar must be delivered within 11 months of the Friday press conference, that is, based on the date of 19 July 2026, around 17 June 2027, and all radars and helicopters must be delivered by 2030. Such a schedule is practically important for the contracting authority because subsequent amendments to deadlines, scope or price could be made without a new procurement only in compliance with the conditions set out in Article 53. For suppliers, this is important for competing for military equipment and related services, while for state institutions it is important because of the obligation to monitor whether the source of financing, the security need and contract performance alter the applicable procurement regime. In the case of an analogous Lithuanian procurement, the Public Procurement Office would have a supervisory and information-analysis function under Article 9, while the head of the contracting authority would bear responsibility for the lawfulness of the procurement under Article 69
Whether the repeated violence by a teenage girl against, according to the reader, a fourth-grade pupil, filmed in Šiauliai on 13 May, should be classified only as causing physical pain under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, or as an aggravated offence under Article 140(2) on the basis that the victim was a young child or that the conduct amounted to torture.
Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code criminalises beating or other violent conduct causing physical pain, minor bodily injury or short-term illness. Repeated blows to the face and head, together with the need for medical assistance, therefore point first to this provision, rather than to the general offence of breach of public order. However, Article 140(2) raises the penalty threshold to imprisonment for up to two years where the same act is committed against a young child or by torturing the victim.
Here, the stronger qualifying argument is not merely the number of blows, but their context: holding the victim by the hair, beating a crying child, forcing her to repeat an apology, and the perpetrator’s command “don’t cry” indicate a possible intentional intensification of humiliation and suffering. The degree of health impairment under Article 141 of the Criminal Code is determined according to rules approved by the Government or an authorised institution, so the medical report will be decisive for the line between physical pain and minor impairment of health, but it will not be the only circumstance relevant to assessing the elements of Article 140(2).
It is inaccurate to state that liability for the violence is provided for in Article 284 of the Criminal Code: that provision regulates breach of public order, where insolent conduct, threats, mockery or vandalism in a public place demonstrate disrespect towards others or the environment and disturb public peace or order. It would be more precise to say that the core of the physical violence in this situation is covered by Article 140 of the Criminal Code, while Article 284 could be considered only as a separate public-order aspect, if the elements of a public place and disturbance of public peace or order were proved. It is also incomplete to say that reclassification is possible only where more serious injuries are established: the cited source from the Code of Criminal Procedure shows the procedural possibility of changing the legal classification of the act specified in the charge.
The correct formulation should therefore not narrow the issue to more serious consequences, but link classification to the proven factual elements. In this case, those elements would include the victim’s age, the degree of health impairment, the manner of acting, and the possible contribution of other teenagers.
For a professional audience, the key point is not to repeat the breach-of-public-order framework as the principal one: the primary citation should be Article 140 of the Criminal Code, and the axis of the dispute should be whether the facts are sufficient for Article 140(2). For the defence, the strongest narrowing argument would be that the filmed situation shows physical pain or minor impairment, but does not prove the qualifying element of “torture”; for the prosecution, the stronger line is that the coercion was continuing, controlling and humiliating, and therefore was not limited to a spontaneous single blow. As regards the teenagers standing nearby and filming, Article 26 of the Criminal Code does not permit them automatically to be treated as accomplices: it must be proved that their intent covered the principal offender’s act and that their conduct was significant from the standpoint of complicity, rather than mere passive presence or a belated call to stop.
Since the girl who may have committed the violence is a minor, Articles 80 and 90 of the Criminal Code in practice shift the sanctions analysis away from rhetoric about maximum imprisonment and towards penalties adapted to age and social maturity, as well as the logic of educational measures.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the teenager’s actions, involving repeated public blows against another minor, holding her by the hair, and forcing her to apologise, should be classified as causing physical pain or minor impairment of health under Article 140(1) or 140(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, or as a breach of public order under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code. A related issue concerns the role of the persons present and filming, which must be assessed under Article 26 of the Criminal Code on liability of accomplices and, for sentencing purposes, under Article 58 of the Criminal Code. Since minors are said to have participated, the issue of liability must be determined under Article 80 of the Criminal Code on the purpose of juvenile criminal liability, Article 90 on penalties available for minors, Article 93 on possible release from criminal liability, and Article 87 on restrictions on conduct. From a procedural perspective, Article 189¹ of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania is important, because after the first interrogation of a minor suspect, the officer or prosecutor must immediately apply for an individual assessment. The dissemination of the public video recording must be assessed under Article 18 of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public of the Republic of Lithuania, protecting minors from public information harmful to their development, particularly information involving self-serving depictions of violence
Legal assessment. The described conduct directly falls within the core of Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code: beating or other violent conduct causing physical pain, minor injury, or short-term illness. If the violence were considered to have been committed by torturing the victim, Article 140(2) of the Criminal Code would apply, providing for imprisonment of up to two years. Article 141 of the Criminal Code states that the indicators of impairment of health are defined according to approved rules for determining the extent of health impairment; therefore, injuries established by medical professionals are legally relevant to classification under Article 140. The source provided in relation to Article 140 also states that a finding of physical pain is made on the basis of case materials confirming the fact of beating or other violent conduct, while minor impairment of health is associated with impairment lasting no longer than 10 days or a 5 percent loss of working capacity. Because the incident is described as having occurred in a public setting, with bystanders observing and filming it, legal classification under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code may be based on the fact that, in a public place, insolent actions or bullying demonstrated disrespect for others and disturbed public peace or order. This provision explains why, in the Marijampolė episode, the investigation was opened under Article 284 of the Criminal Code: violence against a minor in a public place may be assessed not only as violence against a specific person, but also as a breach of public order. The liability of the teenagers present cannot be based merely on their presence at the scene; under Article 26(1) of the Criminal Code, accomplices are liable only for those acts committed by the principal that were covered by their intent. If the role of an aider, instigator, or organiser were established, Article 26(4) of the Criminal Code provides for liability under the article establishing liability for the principal’s act, together with the relevant paragraph of Article 24 of the Criminal Code. In sentencing accomplices, Article 58 of the Criminal Code requires consideration of the type, form, role, and nature of participation; therefore, the position of the person filming, the person actively striking the victim, and the person merely observing would not be the same. In the case of minors, Article 80 of the Criminal Code alters the logic of liability: it must correspond to the minor’s age and social maturity, limit imprisonment, and increase the use of educational measures. Article 90 of the Criminal Code permits only community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or fixed-term imprisonment to be imposed on a minor, and a fine may be imposed only on a minor who is employed or owns property. Under Article 93(1) of the Criminal Code, a minor who has committed a criminal misdemeanour or a minor or less serious intentional crime for the first time may be released by the court from criminal liability if he or she has apologised and compensated the damage, admitted guilt and shown remorse, or if there are other grounds to believe that he or she will comply with the law. In such a case, Article 93(2) links release from liability to educational measures, while Article 87 permits restrictions on conduct for a period from 30 days to 12 months, requiring the minor to study, remain at home at specified times, participate in social education or rehabilitation measures, or prohibiting contact with persons exerting a negative influence. Article 189¹ of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides a procedural basis for assessing not only the fact of the act, but also the minor’s personality, maturity, and educational needs: the individual assessment must be submitted no later than 25 working days from the date of receipt of the request. Article 18(1) of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public requires minors to be protected from public information harmful to their physical, mental, and moral development, especially information involving self-serving depictions of violence; therefore, dissemination of a violent recording is not a neutral transmission of information. Paragraph 5 of the same article provides that dissemination of such information in breach of the established requirements entails liability in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is that the investigation continues under Article 284 of the Criminal Code if the focus remains on insolent violence, bullying, and disturbance of public peace or order in a public place. The second scenario is classification, or additional classification, under Article 140 of the Criminal Code if the investigation centres on the physical pain or minor impairment of health caused specifically to the victim. The third scenario is the separate identification of accomplice roles under Articles 26 and 58 of the Criminal Code if it is established that other persons did not merely observe, but encouraged, assisted, or otherwise intentionally contributed to the violence. The fourth scenario, in the case of minors, is that even if the act is established, the court may apply Article 93 of the Criminal Code and, instead of criminal liability, select educational measures, including the restriction on conduct provided for in Article 87. For the victim and her representatives, the issue of compensation is also important: Article 7 of the Law on Compensation for Damage Caused by Violent Crimes provides limits for compensation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, including cases where a minor has suffered minor impairment of health or physical pain as a result of a violent crime. For schools and parents, this situation is significant not as a reputational matter, but as a matter of procedures, assistance to the child, and the application of measures restricting minors’ conduct. For disseminators of public information and users of social networks, the most important consequence is the obligation not to disseminate self-serving images of violence against a minor, because Article 18 of the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public links such content to the protection of minors and liability for violations
Whether the 20-year custodial sentence in this case is legally grounded solely in the consequences of the fatal road traffic incident, or in an additional assessment of dangerousness: intoxication, a speed of 226 km/h, breach of an existing driving ban, flight from the scene, and prior recidivist conduct.
The exact wording of the Polish provision is not provided, so the conclusion rests on the legal change reported in the news item: following amendments to criminal law, the court could impose a sentence of up to 20 years for a fatal traffic offence of this kind, whereas the previous maximum was 12 years. The cited part of Article 281 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code shows an analogous structure: intoxication is not merely a moral assessment, but a qualifying element where driving under the influence causes a road traffic incident and harm. Article 2811 of the Criminal Code separately criminalises driving with a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more, even without a fatal consequence.
In this factual situation, therefore, the stronger argument is that alcohol, speed, and disregard of the driving ban accumulate independent layers of dangerousness. The excerpt from Articles 57-59 of the Criminal Code is also relevant to accomplices and mitigating circumstances: assisting the victim could mitigate liability, but the news item describes the opposite factual sequence: flight, concealment of evidence, and failure to provide assistance.
In practice, this case shows that, after the legislative amendment, the maximum sanction in fatal road traffic cases is applied not for the fact of death in isolation, but where the incident is reconstructed as the deliberate creation of an exceptionally high risk. From an appellate perspective, the weakest point for the defence is the characterisation of the case as an “ordinary” negligent accident, because the facts found by the court — 226 km/h in an 80 km/h zone, filming on a phone, intoxication, an active driving ban, and previous violations — support a conclusion of conscious disregard for the rules. The stronger appellate argument would most likely be not a denial of guilt, but proportionality of sentence: whether the court sufficiently individualised the application of the 20-year maximum, given that the judgment is not yet final.
For professionals, the key point is to cite not only the consequences, but the accumulation of risk before the incident and the conduct afterwards, because it is precisely that combination which explains why the court moved beyond the logic of the former 12-year sentencing ceiling.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether Lithuanian law can review the sentence imposed by the Warsaw court, but what significance analogous factual circumstances would have under the Lithuanian provisions provided: drunk driving, a gross breach of road traffic rules, harm to persons, fleeing the scene, and assistance in avoiding liability. The principal applicable provisions would be Article 281(1)-(4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, governing breaches of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules, as well as Article 281-1(1) of the Criminal Code concerning driving where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more is established. Since the act was committed in Poland, the double criminality principle in Article 8(1) of the Criminal Code is also relevant: liability under Lithuanian law for an act committed abroad arises only where the act is criminal both under the law of the state where it was committed and under Lithuanian criminal law. For individualisation of the sentence, based on the sources provided, Article 58 of the Criminal Code concerning the role of accomplices and Article 59(1) concerning mitigating circumstances are relevant. From a procedural perspective, Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the submission of objects and documents, Articles 99-100 on time limits, Article 118 on compensation for damage from state funds, and Articles 119-120 on the purpose and types of coercive measures are important
Legal assessment. Under Article 281(1) of the Criminal Code, criminal liability is linked to a breach of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules, a traffic accident, and at least minor impairment of another person’s health. If the driver was intoxicated by alcohol or other substances, the stricter Article 281(2) applies where the breach causes minor impairment of health or substantial property damage. If such a breach results in serious impairment of another person’s health, Article 281(3) applies, and where the act is committed by an intoxicated person, Article 281(4) provides for imprisonment for up to six years. Separately, Article 281-1(1) criminalises the very act of driving a motor vehicle where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more is established, as well as refusal to undergo testing or consumption of alcohol after a traffic accident before the circumstances are established, if such intoxication is found. In this situation, driving at 226 km/h in an 80 km/h zone, holding a phone while driving, and filming would be assessed as facts substantiating a conscious disregard of road traffic safety rules and the analysis of causation in relation to the consequences under Article 281 of the Criminal Code. Under the provisions provided, intoxication aggravates liability not merely as a matter of moral assessment, but as a qualifying element if it falls within the scope of Article 281(2) or (4), or as an independent offence under Article 281-1. Article 7 of the Law Amending Articles 47, 176, 220, 221, 272, 273, 281 and 284 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania states that, in cases under Article 281(2), (4) or (6), intoxication by alcohol means 0.41 per mille or more, refusal to undergo testing, or consumption of alcohol after a traffic accident before the circumstances are established. Fleeing the scene is directly prohibited under paragraph 48.6 of the provided Government Resolution amending the Road Traffic Rules where pedestrians are involved in a traffic accident, while the legislative assessments provided emphasise the broader duty not to leave a person without assistance. The assessment of Draft Law No. XIIP-1786 states that, under Article 144 of the Criminal Code, case law recognises criminal liability also for a vehicle driver who caused a traffic accident in which persons were or could have been injured and who fled the scene of the accident. At the same time, the assessment of Draft Law No. XP-1613 stresses that criminalising mere flight from the scene of a traffic accident was considered insufficiently substantiated, because leaving a person without assistance is already linked to Article 144 of the Criminal Code, while mere non-dangerous concealment of evidence was not, in itself, regarded as a sufficient basis for criminal liability. Accordingly, the legally significant distinction would be between simple flight from the scene, failure to provide assistance where life is in danger, and active obstruction of the investigation or concealment of evidence. The role of the five acquaintances should be assessed individually under Article 58 of the Criminal Code, taking into account the type, form, role and nature of each accomplice’s participation, rather than automatically equating them with the driver. If assistance in fleeing, concealment of evidence and failure to assist the victims were proved, this would be relevant both to their own liability and to the assessment of the principal offender’s conduct after the act. Points 1-3 of Article 59(1) of the Criminal Code show that assistance to the victim, confession and sincere remorse, or voluntary compensation for damage could constitute mitigating circumstances. The flight from the scene, avoidance of assistance and the lack of remorse established by the court, as described in the report, are plainly incompatible with such mitigating circumstances under the very logic of Article 59. Expert data on speed and other circumstances would, under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, constitute objects or documents of procedural significance that may be submitted by participants in the proceedings or other persons. The Review No. 30 of 24 March 2009 of the case law of the Supreme Court of Lithuania in criminal cases concerning breaches of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules, mentioned in the provided source, is relevant in that the issue of intoxication in road traffic cases may be linked not only to blood test results, but also to medical examination data and testimony from persons who interacted with the accused
Consequences. The first practical consequence is that a judgment which has not entered into force may still be varied by a higher court, and the time limits for such procedural steps under Articles 99-100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are calculated in hours, days or months, excluding the day on which the time limit begins. A second scenario would be that the sentence and civil obligations are left essentially unchanged if the appellate court agrees that intoxication, speed, prior prohibitions, flight from the scene and lack of remorse justify strict individualisation. A third scenario would be mitigation of the sentence if the higher court assesses differently the form of guilt, causation, the roles of accomplices or the absence of mitigating circumstances. For the victims’ family, the most practically important issue is enforcement of compensation for damage; under Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the accused or persons materially liable for his actions lack the funds to compensate the damage, in cases provided by law the damage may be compensated from state funds. Coercive measures are significant for the accused, because Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits their application in order to secure participation in the proceedings, unobstructed examination of the case, enforcement of the judgment, and prevention of new offences, while Article 120 lists detention among such measures. For accomplices, the practical significance is that their liability under Article 58 of the Criminal Code depends on their specific role; therefore, episodes involving assistance in fleeing, concealment of evidence and failure to assist the victims must be assessed separately in relation to each person. In the Lithuanian context, this case is important as an example for comparing the application of legal norms: the Lithuanian sources provided allow a strict assessment of intoxicated, extremely dangerous driving and post-accident conduct, but the level of punishment for an act committed abroad would, under Article 8 of the Criminal Code, be determined only through the limits of double criminality and Lithuanian criminal law
The specific issue is whether the court was entitled not to postpone the pronouncement of the judgment when the defendant was receiving medical assistance in the courtroom due to extremely high blood pressure, and when the decision resulted not only in a RUB 1,000 fine but also in his exclusion from this September’s parliamentary elections.
No direct provision of Russian law has been provided, so the assessment is based on the logic of the Lithuanian procedural rules supplied, rather than on any assertion as to the content of Russian law. Article 1622 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a case is adjourned where it cannot be heard at that sitting for important reasons, although illness is generally not, in itself, regarded as a sufficient reason. This means that the stronger argument is not simply “illness”, but whether the defendant’s actual medical condition objectively prevented him from participating meaningfully in the proceedings: relevant factors here include the extremely high blood pressure, the summoning of an ambulance, the cardiogram carried out in the courtroom, and the defence lawyers’ request for an adjournment.
Article 381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure further reflects the same procedural rule at cassation level: where the participation of a necessary participant is impossible due to illness or another important reason, the hearing is adjourned.
In practice, the stronger argument would not be the disproportionality of the RUB 1,000 fine, but the reality of procedural participation and the disproportionate consequences of the decision: a formally minor sanction immediately becomes a mechanism for restricting electoral rights. For that reason, the legal analysis should cite not only the allegation of displaying “extremist symbols”, but the entire procedural chain: the 2023 video containing a photograph of A. Navalny, the medical intervention during the hearing, the refusal to postpone the pronouncement, the finding of guilt, and the automatic barrier to standing in the September elections.
The greatest risk for a professional would be to assess the case by reference to the amount of the fine imposed; the real legal effect is the elimination of political rights through a finding of an administrative or similar offence.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the court could pronounce a conviction immediately after emergency medical care had been provided in the courtroom, where defence counsel requested that pronouncement be postponed on account of the accused’s state of health. This issue must be assessed under Article 6(1)-(3), Article 4301(1), Article 422(1)-(2), Article 346(1)-(3), and Article 352(1)-(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. The health-related aspect must be assessed in light of the submitted provision of the draft Law on Patients’ Rights and Compensation for Damage to Health concerning emergency medical care, the excerpt from Article 6(5)(3) of the Law on Health Insurance concerning emergency care, and the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 16 May 2013 in case No. 47/2009-131/2010. The standard of procedural fairness and equality of arms is supplemented by Article 5(1) and Article 6 of the Law on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania, as reproduced in the report under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
Legal assessment. Article 6(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that criminal cases are heard only by courts; accordingly, the issues of guilt and punishment formally fall within the competence of the court. However, Article 6(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure also requires that justice be administered in accordance with the equality of all persons before the law and the court, irrespective, inter alia, of political views and the type or nature of their activities. Article 6(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure prohibits restrictions based on a person’s characteristics or status; therefore, a procedural decision may not be based on the accused’s political profile or opposition activity. The standard set out in Article 5(1) of the Law on Courts requires an independent and impartial court, while Article 6 of that Law emphasises that human rights may not be restricted on the basis of convictions, views, or other circumstances. Article 4301(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure directly regulates cases of non-appearance: where the accused fails to appear for valid reasons, the judge sets another date for the hearing. Although, in the reported situation, the person was present in the courtroom, this provision reflects the procedural logic established in the submitted sources: a valid reason affecting the person’s ability to participate effectively in the proceedings entails an adjournment of the hearing, rather than a merely formal continuation of the process. Extremely high blood pressure, the calling of an ambulance, and the performance of a cardiogram are legally relevant insofar as they relate to the person’s ability to participate in the proceedings and defend his rights. The submitted provision on emergency medical care states that refusal to commence or discontinuation of such care is permissible only where the patient poses a threat to the health or life of other persons and only after the possibilities of eliminating that threat have been exhausted. It follows that, according to the submitted sources, emergency medical care takes precedence over the formal progression of the proceedings where there is no evidence of a threat to other participants in the process. In its ruling of 16 May 2013 in case No. 47/2009-131/2010, the Constitutional Court stated that the State is obliged to create the legal and organisational preconditions for the operation of a healthcare system ensuring quality healthcare accessible to all. This interpretation is important because judicial proceedings cannot be organised in such a way that emergency medical care becomes a merely formal episode having no effect on the decision whether to continue the proceedings. Conversely, the submitted constitutional requirement of prompt and effective proceedings permits the legislature and the court to prevent unjustified interruptions and abuse of procedural rights. Accordingly, the question of adjournment should not be resolved automatically, but by assessing whether the state of health in fact prevents the accused from participating, understanding the decision being pronounced, and benefiting from the assistance of counsel. If the case were concluded by a court penal order, Article 422(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would grant the accused the right, within fourteen days of service of the order, to submit a request to the court that issued the order and demand that the case be heard in court. Under Article 422(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, such a request would mean that the court penal order does not acquire legal force; if that right is not exercised, the order becomes final and is enforced in accordance with the procedure established by the Code of Criminal Procedure. If a final judgment or ruling has been adopted, Article 346(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes its binding force on all institutions and persons, while Article 346(3) entrusts the prosecutor with supervising the submission of the judgment for enforcement and its enforcement. Article 352(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the court, during enforcement, to resolve doubts arising from the judgment, but only provided that the substance of the judgment is not altered
Consequences. In practical terms, the most important scenario is that a final decision imposing a fine becomes enforceable and, under Article 346 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, binding on the institutions for which it produces legal consequences. The second scenario, if the court penal order procedure was applied, is a request by the accused within fourteen days for the case to be heard in court under Article 422(1)-(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The third scenario is the resolution, under Article 352 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, of ambiguities arising during enforcement; however, this mechanism cannot be used to alter the substance of guilt or punishment itself. If the case were reopened on the basis of newly discovered circumstances, then, under Article 450 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the pre-trial investigation, court hearing, and appeal against the subsequent judgment would proceed under the general procedure. If the issue raised concerned the manifestly improper application of the criminal law, Article 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for reopening where, on the basis of the circumstances stated in the judgment, there are grounds to believe that the criminal law was applied in a manifestly improper manner. This is of practical importance for the accused, his defence counsel, the authorities enforcing the judgment, and the institutions making decisions in the electoral process, because the legal operation of the reported prohibition on standing as a candidate depends precisely on the decision becoming final and on its enforcement
The specific dispute is not whether the programme had been prepared before approval of the cabinet of ministers, but whether the draft Government Programme registered in the Seimas on 3 July is to be regarded as the “submission for consideration” of the programme within the meaning of Article 6 of the Law on the Government, where the Presidential decree on the composition of the Twenty-First Government was signed only on 6 July. If registration is treated as the legally significant act, the opposition’s argument is strengthened, because at that time, under Article 91 of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Law on the Government, the Government was not yet fully constituted. If the significant act is instead the presentation of the programme at a sitting of the Seimas after the 6 July decree, M.
Sinkevičius’s argument that the procedural sequence was not breached becomes stronger.
Article 6 of the Law on the Government provides that the Prime Minister, “not later than within 15 days of his appointment, shall present to the Seimas the Government formed by him and approved by the President of the Republic, and shall submit its programme for consideration”. This wording links two acts into a single procedural moment: the Government presented to the Seimas must already have been approved by the President, and its programme must be submitted for consideration at the same time. Article 91 of the Constitution and Article 1 of the Law on the Government further establish that the Government is not merely the Prime Minister, as it consists of the Prime Minister and the ministers.
Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court is also procedurally important: an application to the Constitutional Court must specify the precise legal act being challenged, its date, number and legal grounds; therefore, an abstract request to assess the “formation process” would be too narrow unless the challenged act is clearly identified.
In practice, the stronger argument will depend on what the opposition chooses to challenge: the registration on 3 July as the essential submission of the programme, or a later act of the Seimas by which the programme was in fact considered or approved. The mere assertion that the draft was registered before 6 July is not yet sufficient if registration can be characterised as a preparatory movement of the document rather than the “submission for consideration” provided for in Article 6 of the Law on the Government. It is therefore critically important for the opposition, in any application to the Constitutional Court, to identify precisely, in accordance with Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the contested act of the Seimas or another institution, rather than merely the political chronology of the procedure.
For the Government, the practical risk is not the existence of the draft on 3 July itself, but the possibility that the Constitutional Court could equate registration with a procedurally significant submission for consideration before the formation of the Government approved by the President.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not the abstract “legality of the Government”, but whether a specific contested legal act relating to the submission or approval of the Government Programme may be reviewed by the Constitutional Court under Article 106 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 106 of the Constitution provides that the Government, not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas, and courts may apply in respect of the acts referred to in the first paragraph of Article 105, while not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas, courts, and the President of the Republic may apply in respect of the compliance of Government acts with the Constitution and laws. Accordingly, the collection of signatures mentioned by the opposition is legally relevant insofar as it forms a group of not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas within the meaning of Article 106 of the Constitution. The application itself must comply with Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court: it must state the exact title, number and date of adoption of the contested legal act, as well as the applicant’s position and its legal reasoning. The issue of representation is governed by Article 32 of the Law on the Constitutional Court: a group of Members of the Seimas is represented by the Member or Members of the Seimas indicated in its application, provided that the signatures of all applying Members of the Seimas are certified by the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker
Legal assessment. According to the information provided, the dispute centres on a procedural sequence: the draft Government Programme was registered in the Seimas on 3 July 2026, while the decree of the President of the Republic concerning the composition of the Twenty-First Government was signed on 6 July 2026. If the opposition were to apply to the Constitutional Court, it would have to formulate not a political question, but an application to examine the compliance of a specific legal act with the Constitution, because Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court requires identification of the contested act and the submission of legal reasoning. Earlier constitutional practice is also relevant in this situation: by Resolution No. 1429 of 18 December 1997, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania requested the Constitutional Court to examine whether the Seimas Resolution of 10 December 1996 “On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania” was contrary to Article 92(4) of the Constitution. The sources provided indicate that it is precisely a Seimas resolution concerning the Government Programme that may constitute an object of constitutional review, provided that the applicant relies on Article 106 of the Constitution and properly formalises the application. The Constitutional Court’s ruling of 10 January 1998, referred to in the source concerning the draft Law on the Government, emphasised that the Government is a collegial institution of general competence, composed of the Prime Minister and ministers. This is important when assessing the argument that the Programme was submitted before the Cabinet of Ministers had been approved: legally, that argument should be linked to the relationship between the formation of the Government as a collegial institution and the approval of its Programme. Nevertheless, under Article 106 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court may refuse to accept an application if it is based on non-legal grounds; therefore, it would not be sufficient for the application merely to indicate political disagreement with the procedure. If the application were submitted on behalf of a group of Members of the Seimas, Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court would require it to be signed by all applying Members of the Seimas, to identify their representative or representatives, and for the signatures to be certified by the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker. In the case of electronic submission, the rule established in the amendment to Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court applies, namely that an application by a group of Members of the Seimas in electronic form is certified by the secure electronic signature of the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the Seimas. If the application concerned an act of the Seimas and were submitted by a Seimas resolution, Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court provides for a preliminary examination of the materials within no later than three days and for the suspension of the contested act from the date of the official publication of the notice in the Register of Legal Acts, if the application is accepted for examination. However, Article 106 of the Constitution expressly provides that the validity of an act is suspended by a submission of the President of the Republic to the Constitutional Court or by a Seimas resolution requesting an examination of whether the act complies with the Constitution; the sources do not attribute such an automatic consequence to an application by a group of Members of the Seimas alone
Consequences. Realistically, the first scenario is that, upon collecting the required signatures by the end of July 2026, a group of Members of the Seimas would submit an application to be assessed under Article 106 of the Constitution and the formal requirements of Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. The second scenario is that the Constitutional Court would refuse to accept the application if it were based on non-legal grounds or if the contested act were not properly identified, as required by Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. The third scenario is that the application would be accepted and examined on the merits, in which case the practical significance of the dispute would concern the constitutional assessment of the procedure for submitting and approving the Government Programme. If the contested act were a Seimas resolution concerning the Government Programme, the earlier application initiated by Government Resolution No. 1429 of 18 December 1997 indicates that questions of this kind have already been raised before the Constitutional Court. If the Constitutional Court were subsequently to adopt a ruling, its official interpretation would be possible only under Article 61 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, that is, only the Constitutional Court itself may officially interpret its ruling and without altering its content. In practical terms, the case would be important for the group of Members of the Seimas, because it would have to select the contested act and legal basis precisely, and also for the Government, whose procedural approval of the Programme would be assessed through constitutional review. It would also be important for the Seimas, because the dispute may affect the constitutional stability of its act concerning the Government Programme. The legal significance here arises not from a public statement about “legality”, but from whether the application is converted into a procedural document that complies with Article 106 of the Constitution and Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court
Following VAATC’s termination of the MBA facility operation agreement, may Energesman continue accepting mixed municipal waste solely on the basis that the quantity stored on the site, according to Energesman, does not exceed the 24,000-tonne limit under the IPPC permit?
Article 4(1) of the Law on Waste Management provides that a waste holder must transfer waste to waste managers entitled to manage waste, and that municipal waste is to be managed in accordance with the procedure laid down in municipal waste management rules. This provision is important not because of the waste quantity limit as such, but because of the lawful organisation of the waste flow: waste must be directed to an entity which, on a specific legal basis, is entitled to manage that waste within the relevant system. Article 1 of the Law on Waste Management further indicates that the purpose of the regime is to prevent adverse effects on public health and the environment.
Accordingly, the relationship between 21,000 tonnes and 24,000 tonnes does not, in itself, resolve the question whether, after termination of the agreement, the operator still has a basis for accepting new waste.
At present, the stronger practical argument lies with VAATC and the municipalities, but not because a mayoral statement alone proves a breach by Energesman. The stronger construction is that, after termination of the operation agreement, the centre of the dispute shifts from the quantitative limit under the IPPC permit to the right to control the waste flow and the facility: the IPPC limit may serve as a defence to an allegation that the permitted quantity has been exceeded, but it does not answer the question whether the operator still has a contractual and systemic basis for accepting the region’s municipal waste. In practice, two evidential blocks must be distinguished: Energesman would need to prove not only the factual proposition that the quantity is 21,000 tonnes, but also the legal basis for continuing acceptance after termination; VAATC, for its part, should rely not on a general crisis narrative, but on the specific basis for termination of the agreement, the rule requiring transfer of waste to a lawful waste manager, and environmental risk.
It would be a mistake, whether publicly or in procedural documents, to narrow the dispute to the question “has the 24,000-tonne limit been exceeded?”, because that argument does not address the central issue: who, after termination of the agreement, lawfully controls the operation of the MBA facilities and the flow of the region’s mixed municipal waste.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not who is politically responsible for the waste crisis, but who, under the rules governing the public municipal waste management system, has competence to ensure the operation of MBT facilities and the organization of waste flows following the termination of VAATC’s contract with Energesman. It must be assessed under Article 30(1)–(3), Article 30¹(1)–(2), Article 30²(1), Article 30³, and Article 31(1)–(2) of the Law on Waste Management of the Republic of Lithuania. The regional aspect must be assessed under Article 27(4), (5), and (9) of the Law on Waste Management, as well as by reference to the provisions reflected in points 94, 95, 98.1, 223, and 224 of the Strategic Waste Management Plan approved by Government Resolution No. 519 of 12 April 2002. These provisions show that municipal waste management is not merely the economic activity of a private operator: it is a public service organized by municipalities, which may be administered through a regional waste management centre established or authorized by municipalities
Legal assessment. Article 30(1) of the Law on Waste Management allows several or all municipalities in a region, with a view to improving the efficiency of the system, to cooperate and jointly establish a legal person, namely an administrator of the municipal waste management system. Article 30(2) of the same law provides that the administrator’s duty to perform the assigned functions is established in its founding documents, in an agreement with the municipality, or in another administrative act. Accordingly, VAATC’s ability to take over the operation of MBT facilities legally depends on the functions assigned to it by the municipalities, and not merely on a political call by the mayor. Article 30(3)(2) and (3) of the Law on Waste Management allows the administrator, where so assigned by the municipality, to inspect and monitor contractual obligations between the administrator and the waste manager. This means that VAATC, as system administrator, has a statutory basis to supervise the performance of the private operator’s contractual obligations, and the situation involving termination of the contract legally falls within that control function. Article 30³(3) of the Law on Waste Management assigns regional waste management centres, upon municipal mandate, the function of operating regional municipal waste management facilities. Therefore, the principal condition for takeover is a municipal mandate for VAATC to operate the relevant regional facility. Article 30³(4) also allows a regional centre to organize the provision of waste management services at prices calculated in accordance with Article 30², where such services are assigned to it by the municipalities. Article 30²(1) requires pricing to be based on the principles of solidarity, proportionality, non-discrimination, cost recovery, transparency, and the “polluter pays” principle. Temporary decisions concerning waste flows or service organization therefore cannot be detached from those financial principles. The chain of obligations of waste holders also remains in place: under Article 30¹(2), owners of immovable property objects or authorized persons must pay the charge or, if no charge has been established, enter into a service agreement with the municipal legal person or the municipality. Thus, the obligation of residents and other waste holders to finance the system does not change merely because there is a dispute concerning the MBT operator. Under Article 31(1) of the Law on Waste Management, municipal councils must approve waste management rules regulating the organization of the system, provision of services, and compliance with environmental and public health safety requirements. Under Article 31(2), compliance with those rules is controlled by municipal institutions. Accordingly, the actions of mayors and municipal administrations must be based not only on crisis statements, but also on the control mechanisms provided in municipal rules. Joint action by the municipalities of the region is consistent with the logic of Article 27(4) and (5) of the Law on Waste Management, under which regional waste management plans are prepared and approved by regional development councils, and the plan is approved taking into account the boundaries of the municipal waste management region and municipal consent. Point 223 of the plan approved by Government Resolution No. 519 directly links the implementation of national municipal waste management tasks with systems organized by municipalities or municipal cooperation through regional systems. Point 94 of the plan allows municipalities to promote public-private cooperation, but the selection of waste managers must take place in accordance with applicable legislation and the principle of fair competition. A private operator may therefore operate within the system, but its status does not eliminate the public functions of municipalities and VAATC as the assigned administrator or regional centre. Point 95 of the plan establishes the benchmark that municipal waste generated within a municipality’s territory should be managed in the infrastructure facilities of that region. Accordingly, transporting waste to the Kazokiškės landfill as a regional facility is consistent with the regional management model to the extent that it is carried out pursuant to decisions of the competent institutions and municipal rules. Point 224 of the plan also indicates another direction: waste remaining after sorting that is no longer suitable for recycling but has energy value is intended to be used for energy recovery in incineration facilities. The restoration of MBT operations and supply to the Vilnius cogeneration plant is therefore legally significant as a matter of stability of the entire chain. Point 98.1 of the plan characterizes municipal waste management as a public service that must be universal, of good quality, accessible, and compliant with environmental protection and public health safety requirements. Issues of fire risk and waste accumulation therefore fall at the core of service quality and safety
Consequences. The most realistic first scenario is that the municipalities of the region coordinate mandates to VAATC so that, under Article 30³(3) and (4) of the Law on Waste Management, it takes over operation of the facility and organizes the provision of services. The second scenario is that, while the dispute over the operator’s obligations and performance of the contract continues, municipal institutions control compliance with their rules under Article 31(2), and waste flows are temporarily redirected through regional infrastructure facilities in accordance with point 95 of the plan. The third scenario is broader regional coordination, because under Article 27(5), approval of the regional plan and municipal consent are necessary where decisions affect the entire municipal waste management region. The practical significance for residents is that their obligation to pay the charge or enter into a service agreement under Article 30¹(2) remains, but municipalities must ensure actual accessibility and safety of the service. For municipalities, this situation matters as a test of competence: they must not only call for joint action, but also formally assign functions, monitor compliance with rules, and coordinate regional decisions. For VAATC, this matters because its right to take over operation is most strongly based not solely on the fact of contract termination, but on a municipal mandate to operate regional facilities. For Energesman, this matters because its conduct as a private operator is assessed in the context of the public municipal waste management system, in which the control functions of municipalities and the regional centre are clearly established by law
Whether Lithuania, having been ordered by an ECtHR judgment to pay EUR 30,000 and to approach the United States for an assurance that the death penalty will not be imposed on a Saudi national, may implement only the monetary part of the judgment while refusing the individual protective measure as alleged interference in the internal affairs of the United States.
The news item indicates that the ECtHR not only awarded compensation but also required the Lithuanian Government to approach the United States regarding an assurance against the death penalty. The subject matter of execution is therefore twofold: pecuniary redress and a specific diplomatic act. Article 67 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows that, under Lithuanian law, international cooperation in criminal matters is not treated as unlawful interference in itself: courts, prosecutors and pre-trial investigation authorities may execute requests from foreign states and international organisations, provided this is compatible with the Constitution, laws and fundamental principles of procedure.
Article 77 of the Code of Criminal Procedure shows even more clearly that the transfer or taking over of persons connected with deprivation of liberty may be linked to conditions agreed by the competent authority. The President’s argument about “interference” is therefore weak, not because the United States would be obliged to agree, but because requesting an assurance in the context of executing an international human rights judgment is not the same as directing a US court as to what sentence it should impose.
The news item states that this is already the third ECtHR judgment concerning the CIA prison in Lithuania, while in the broader context the ECtHR has also assessed analogous CIA detention facts in cases against Romania and Poland. An important practical detail is that, according to the text provided, no judge expressed doubt as to the facts established, and the cases examined the chain of the detainee’s transfer from Romania to Lithuania and his subsequent removal. This means that Lithuania’s public denial of the facts no longer appears to be a procedural position in litigation, but rather an issue of execution of judgments, which may be assessed by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
In practice, the stronger argument is not one of sovereignty or “non-interference”, but of full execution of the ECtHR judgment: payment of compensation alone does not remove the risk that led the Court to require Lithuania to approach the United States. For professionals, the point worth citing is precisely that the ECtHR identified a specific individual measure concerning an assurance against the death penalty, while the logic of Articles 67 and 77 of the Code of Criminal Procedure confirms that international requests and the negotiation of conditions in the context of criminal proceedings are standard legal techniques, not diplomatic violations. The greatest risk for Lithuania now is not the EUR 30,000 amount, but the possibility that public denial of the facts by state leaders may be used as evidence that the state is not executing the judgment in good faith and is not ensuring an effective further investigation.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether Lithuania may, as a political matter, agree with the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, but whether it may execute only the monetary part of that judgment while failing to implement another measure indicated therein. Payment of monetary compensation is governed by Article 2(1) and Article 2(2)(3) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Compensation for Damage Caused by Unlawful Acts of Public Authorities and Representation of the State and the Government of the Republic of Lithuania: appropriations for compensation of damage are provided in the state budget, and the Ministry of Justice executes judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Execution of the non-monetary part is determined under paragraphs 19, 20 and 10.5 of the Rules on Representation of the State before the European Court of Human Rights: judgments are executed by the competent institutions according to their respective fields of activity, those institutions must submit an implementation plan, and the Permanent Representative coordinates execution and submits execution reports to the supervisory authorities. The State is represented in proceedings before the ECtHR by the Representative of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania before the European Court of Human Rights, pursuant to Article 51(3), inserted by Article 6 of the Law Amending and Supplementing the Law on Compensation for Damage, and paragraph 5 of the Rules
Legal assessment. Under the provisions cited, payment of compensation is a separate component of execution, but it does not constitute execution of the judgment in full. Article 2(2)(3) of the Law on Compensation for Damage expressly assigns to the Ministry of Justice the execution of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights insofar as this concerns payment of compensation from the appropriations allocated for that purpose. Accordingly, the argument that Lithuania may pay EUR 30,000 and stop there is not supported by the execution framework provided: paragraph 19 of the Rules covers not only payment, but also the obligation of competent institutions to assess the judgment and seek to ensure that law and public administration practice comply with the Convention system. If the ECtHR judgment requires an approach to the United States for an assurance that the person will not be sentenced to death, paragraph 19 of the Rules requires identification of the institution whose field of activity covers that measure, and that institution must submit an implementation plan within one month from the date of receipt of the notification of the judgment. Paragraph 20 of the Rules means that the Government Representative, or the representative in cases, does not replace the competent institution, but coordinates the plan, progress, and communications with the Council of Europe. Paragraph 10.5 of the Rules further shows that execution is not a matter of domestic political discretion at the level of the President’s Office alone, because execution reports must be submitted to the authorities supervising execution of judgments. On the basis of these sources, the President’s statement concerning possible interference in another state’s internal affairs does not eliminate the obligation to execute the ECtHR judgment, since none of the provisions cited establishes such an exception. However, the sources provided also do not permit specification of the content, form, or addressee of a diplomatic note; therefore, the legally material issue is not the rhetoric, but whether the competent institution actually includes such an approach in the implementation plan and informs the coordinating representative of progress. Article 365 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not directly resolve this situation, because it concerns the execution in the Republic of Lithuania of judgments of foreign courts and decisions of the International Criminal Court. Article 67 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is relevant only insofar as requests by a foreign state authority or an international organisation to carry out procedural acts might arise: such requests are executed by courts, the prosecution service, or pre-trial investigation bodies through the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor General’s Office, or the National Member for Eurojust. Article 77 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regulates the temporary transfer or taking over of a person who is detained or serving a custodial sentence for the purpose of procedural acts, with the decision and conditions being coordinated by a prosecutor of the Prosecutor General’s Office; accordingly, that provision could be relevant only to procedural cooperation, not to payment of ECtHR compensation. Article 6.271 of the Civil Code defines state liability for unlawful acts of public authorities, including acts and omissions, while Article 6.272 defines liability for unlawful acts of pre-trial investigation officers, prosecutors, judges and courts; these provisions explain why damage is compensated from the state budget irrespective of the fault of a particular public servant under Article 6.271
Consequences. The most realistic lawful execution scenario has two tracks: the Ministry of Justice pays the awarded compensation under Article 2(2)(3) of the Law on Compensation for Damage, while the competent institution submits, under paragraph 19 of the Rules, a plan concerning an approach to the United States and other execution measures. A second scenario is that the money is paid, but the approach is postponed or not included in the implementation plan; in that case, under paragraphs 20 and 10.5 of the Rules, the problem would not disappear, because progress in execution would still have to be coordinated and reported to the supervisory authorities. A third scenario is that the institutions choose formally minimal execution, but the practical risk would then fall not on the applicant, but on the Lithuanian State: execution of the judgment would remain contested at the stage of international supervision. For domestic institutions, this matters because of the limits of competence: the political assessment of the President’s Office cannot replace the role of the Ministry of Justice as manager of appropriations, the coordinating function of the Government Representative, or the duty of competent institutions to submit an implementation plan. For the prosecution service and pre-trial investigation bodies, practical relevance would arise if requests to carry out procedural acts were received or sent under Article 67 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, or if issues of temporary transfer were addressed under Article 77 of that Code. Therefore, on the basis of the sources provided alone, Lithuania cannot reasonably claim that it has executed the ECtHR judgment merely by paying compensation if the same judgment requires it to take another specific execution measure