The specific point in dispute is whether the brawl on Laisvės Alėja amounted only to a breach of public order and minor bodily harm under the basic offence, or whether the minor bodily harm was inflicted for hooligan motives and should therefore be classified under Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code. The convicted persons’ appeals were aimed precisely at this qualifying element, since removing it would significantly lower the maximum penalty and weaken the argument for the necessity of imprisonment.
Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code provides, for minor bodily harm, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to three years; however, Article 138(2)(8), where injury is caused for hooligan motives, raises liability to imprisonment for up to five years. Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code separately criminalises contempt for others or the environment demonstrated in a public place through brazen conduct, where public peace or order is disturbed. The context of Laisvės Alėja as a public place is therefore not merely background, but an element of the offence.
Article 75(2) of the Criminal Code permits suspension of a custodial sentence of no more than four years for one or more minor or less serious intentional offences. Accordingly, even after classifying the conduct under Article 138(2)(8), the court formally had room to suspend the one-year sentences imposed on L. Ščerbinskas and V.
Zakarževskis.
The stronger practical argument in a case of this kind is not the abstract assertion that the conflict occurred in a public place, but that publicity, brazen conduct, and disturbance of public peace together support two distinct legal consequences: the offence under Article 284 and the classification under Article 138(2)(8). For the defence, merely denying hooligan motives is weak if the facts of the case show demonstrative violence in a public space, because in that situation the elements of breach of public order also reinforce the classification of motive. For the prosecution, the practical risk is the opposite: it must not duplicate the same “public place” fact twice, but must show why the violence was directed not only at the specific victim, but also demonstrated contempt for those nearby.
In terms of sentence, it is important that Article 75 of the Criminal Code does not remove the real risk of imprisonment: suspension is a matter of judicial discretion, so seeking mitigation on appeal may produce the opposite result if the qualifying element remains and the prosecution challenges the leniency of the sentence.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the violent acts committed on Laisvės Alėja were properly classified as minor impairment of health committed for hooligan motives under Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania and as a violation of public order under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code covers injury to, or illness caused to, a person where the victim suffered a prolonged illness or lost a minor part of his or her working capacity, but where the consequences amounting to serious impairment of health specified in Article 135(1) of the Criminal Code are absent. Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code qualifies this offence more severely where the minor injury or illness was caused for hooligan motives, and provides for imprisonment for a term of up to five years. The issue of violation of public order is assessed under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, which applies where, in a public place, a person demonstrates disrespect for others or for the environment by insolent acts, threats, mockery, or acts of vandalism, and thereby disturbs public peace or order. Article 55 of the Criminal Code is relevant to the individualisation of punishment: under that provision, a person tried for the first time for a negligent offence or for a minor or less serious intentional offence is normally sentenced to penalties not involving arrest or fixed-term imprisonment, and where arrest or fixed-term imprisonment is imposed, the court must state reasons for doing so
Legal assessment. On the basis of the information provided, the central issue in the appellate proceedings is not the fact of violence itself, but the qualifying element, namely hooligan motives, which all eight convicted persons denied in their appeals. The legal significance of this element is essential: without it, the offence would fall within the sanction of Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code, whereas, if it is present, the more severe constituent elements under Article 138(2)(8) apply. The cited regulatory source concerning Article 138 of the Criminal Code states that minor impairment of health means injury or illness causing a health impairment lasting more than 10 days or resulting in a loss of more than 5 percent but less than 30 percent of working capacity. This means that the extent of the impairment of health must be linked to specific consequences, and not merely to the public nature of the conflict or the number of participants. The public-place element is independently relevant to Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code: according to the description in the report, Laisvės Alėja is the setting in which disrespect for others may have been demonstrated and public peace or order disturbed. The cited source concerning the draft amendment to Article 310 of the Criminal Code also states that insolent acts or malicious mockery in a public place, where disrespect for others or for the environment is demonstrated and public peace or order is disturbed, correspond to the violation of public order provided for in Article 284 of the Criminal Code, classified either independently or as a concurrence of offences. Accordingly, impairment of health and violation of public order in this situation may be assessed as affecting two distinct legally protected interests: personal health under Article 138 of the Criminal Code, and public peace and order under Article 284. Article 135(1) of the Criminal Code is relevant as a threshold, because Article 138 applies only where the consequences of serious impairment of health are absent, such as loss of sight, hearing, speech, or fertility, severe mutilation, a life-threatening illness, or the loss of a substantial part of working capacity. The sentences referred to in the report, ranging from four months to one year of imprisonment, formally fall within the sanction ranges of Article 138(2)(8) and Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code. However, Article 55 of the Criminal Code requires additional reasoning where fixed-term imprisonment is imposed on persons tried for the first time for a minor or less serious intentional offence. Suspension of the execution of a sentence is assessed under Article 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: relying on Articles 75 or 92 of the Criminal Code, the court must specify in the judgment the duration of the suspension and the obligations or corrective measures imposed. The obligations mentioned in the report, namely participation in a behaviour correction programme, not leaving the place of residence, and working, are consistent with the logic of Article 339(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, since when suspending execution of a sentence the court must define the convicted person’s obligations in the judgment. Article 339(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is practically significant because the period of suspension of sentence is calculated from the date on which the judgment becomes final; therefore, the course of the appeal may determine when that period actually begins. Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the accused, defence counsel, the victim, and other participants in the proceedings to submit, on their own initiative, items and documents relevant to the case; therefore, at the appellate stage, when hooligan motives are contested, only data relating to the motive for the act, the circumstances of the public place, the nature of the conduct, and the consequences may be legally relevant. Articles 119 and 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure show that coercive measures, including detention on remand, are imposed in order to secure participation in the proceedings, ensure the unobstructed examination of the case, secure enforcement of the judgment, and prevent new criminal offences. This explains why the time spent in temporary detention and detention on remand, as mentioned in the report, has procedural significance, although the sources provided regulate in detail only the calculation of time limits and the purpose of coercive measures
Consequences. If the appellate court upholds the assessment of hooligan motives, the basis of the convicted persons’ liability remains Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code together with Article 284(1), and the practical consequence is a more severe classification and a broader sentencing range involving imprisonment. If hooligan motives were removed, the legal emphasis would shift to Article 138(1) and Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, because the violation of public order itself would continue to be assessed by reference to the elements of insolent acts committed in a public place and disturbance of public peace. The prosecution’s appeal is practically significant because it opens the way to the issue of increasing the sentences within the sanctions set out in the cited provisions of the Criminal Code. The convicted persons’ appeals are practically significant in the opposite direction: their purpose is to remove or weaken the qualifying element on which the application of Article 138(2)(8) of the Criminal Code depends. For those convicted persons whose sentences were suspended, the most important consequence arises from Article 339(2) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure: the obligations become part of the judgment, and the suspension period begins to run from the date on which the judgment becomes final. For those whose sentences were deemed served because of time spent in temporary detention and detention on remand, the rules in Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning the purpose and calculation of procedural time limits are practically important, especially the rule that periods of temporary detention and detention on remand are calculated from the actual moment at which the measure is applied. For the victims, this case is important in light of the purpose set out in Article 1(2) of the Criminal Code: the Code defines criminal offences, penalties, and the conditions of criminal liability, while also protecting human rights, freedoms, and public interests. For public order more broadly, the case is important because Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code allows insolent violent acts committed in a public place to be assessed not only as a conflict between individuals, but also as a disturbance of public peace or order. The final legal outcome will depend on how the appellate court assesses the element of hooligan motives, the reasoning required by Article 55 of the Criminal Code for imposing imprisonment, and the conditions for suspension of sentence provided for in Article 339 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Can the act of the Seimas approving the programme of the 21st Government led by Mindaugas Sinkevičius be declared unconstitutional on the ground that the programme itself was submitted to the Seimas in breach of the constitutional submission procedure?
Article 63 of the Law on the Constitutional Court permits the Constitutional Court to examine the compliance of “laws and other acts of the Seimas” with the Constitution; accordingly, the object of the dispute should not be an abstract political process, but the specific act of the Seimas approving the Government programme. Under Article 66, an application must state the exact title, number and date of adoption of the contested act, the specific grounds for hearing the case, and the legal reasoning with references to legislation. This means that it would not be sufficient for the opposition to rely on a public doubt as to the timing of the “submission”: it would have to translate that procedural defect into an argument as to why the Seimas approval act itself is incompatible with a specific provision of the Constitution.
Under Article 71, the Court may ultimately only declare that the act is either not contrary or contrary to the Constitution or to laws, identifying the specific provisions breached.
The stronger practical argument at this stage is not the political claim that the sitting was rushed because of holidays, but the formal constitutional argument that the procedural defect in the “submission” tainted the very act of the Seimas by which the Government programme was approved. The counterargument favourable to the Government should rest on a narrow understanding of “submission”, namely that registration or some other formal transmission to the Seimas was sufficient; however, the evidence presented does not disclose any rule that directly supports such an interpretation. For the opposition, the key point is not to shift the dispute into a general critique of political procedure: under Article 66, the application must be framed as a precise dispute concerning the constitutionality of an act, with the Seimas act identified and a specific constitutional basis pleaded.
The practical risk for the Government is that an adverse ruling of the Constitutional Court would, under Article 56, be final and not subject to appeal; as a result, a procedural error that could have been remedied by extending the session may become not merely a matter of political reputation, but a problem of constitutional legitimacy.
Core issue. The legal issue is not an assessment of political confidence, but whether the act adopted by the Seimas approving the Programme of the Twenty-First Government may be challenged before the Constitutional Court as “another act adopted by the Seimas” under Article 105 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 63 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. In such a case, the right to apply would belong to not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas under Article 106 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 65(1)(1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. The content of the application would have to comply with Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania: it must precisely identify the contested act of the Seimas, state the grounds for hearing the case, set out the applicant’s position, and provide legal reasoning. The substantive weight of the dispute arises from Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the Government implements the Government Programme and approves a plan for implementing its provisions. This issue is also linked to Article 94 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, which establishes the principal powers of the Government to administer the affairs of the country, execute laws and resolutions of the Seimas, coordinate the activities of ministries, and prepare the draft state budget
Legal assessment. If the opposition were to apply, the Constitutional Court would first have to assess not the public political dispute, but the specific act of the Seimas and its compliance with the Constitution under the first paragraph of Article 105 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Article 63(1)(1) of the Law on the Constitutional Court. Article 63 of the Law on the Constitutional Court permits review of the compliance of either an entire act or part of an act, so the dispute could focus on the Seimas resolution concerning the Programme itself or on its procedural component. The applicants would be required not merely to assert that the procedure was defective, but, pursuant to Article 66(8) of the Law on the Constitutional Court, to provide legal reasoning with references to laws. Under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, an application by a group of Members of the Seimas would have to be signed by all applying Members of the Seimas, while also indicating a representative or representatives, and the signatures would have to be certified by the signature of the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker. The requirement of a group of not less than one-fifth of all Members of the Seimas means that opposition dissatisfaction alone does not cross the procedural threshold unless the required number of signatures has been collected. Article 106 of the Constitution additionally provides that the Constitutional Court may refuse to accept a case for examination if the application is not based on legal reasoning. In practice, this requires the applicants to frame the dispute as a matter of constitutional procedure and the legality of the Seimas act, rather than as a lack of confidence in the Prime Minister or ministers. A precedent of a similar nature can be seen in Resolution No. 1429 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 18 December 1997, which requested an examination of whether the Seimas Resolution of 10 December 1996 “On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania” was contrary to Article 92(4) of the Constitution. The sources also refer to the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 10 January 1998 “On the Compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania,” which emphasized that the Government occupies a special place within the system of executive authorities and is a collegial institution of general competence. This case law shows that a Seimas resolution concerning the Government Programme is not merely a political document, since it may become an object of constitutional review. The Government’s position is complicated by the fact that, under Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government, the Programme is precisely the basis for implementing its activities. However, the mere filing of an application under the cited provisions does not automatically suspend the validity of the Seimas act, because Article 106 of the Constitution expressly provides that the validity of an act is suspended by a submission of the President of the Republic to the Constitutional Court or by a resolution of the Seimas requesting an examination of whether the act complies with the Constitution
Consequences. Realistically, the first scenario is formal: if not less than one-fifth of Members of the Seimas properly sign and substantiate the application, the Constitutional Court could initiate a case concerning the compliance of the Seimas act with the Constitution. The second scenario is procedural non-acceptance if the application is not sufficiently legally reasoned or does not meet the requirements of Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. The third scenario is a decision favorable to the Government, after which the Seimas resolution concerning the Programme would remain constitutionally unrefuted and the Government would continue to rely on Article 22(3) of the Law on the Government. The fourth scenario is a decision unfavorable to the Government, which would affect not only the fate of the contested Seimas act but also the practical stability of the Government Programme as the basis for governmental activity. This matters to the Seimas because the act it adopted would be an object of constitutional review under Article 105 of the Constitution. It matters to the Government because its day-to-day functions under Article 94 of the Constitution and Article 22 of the Law on the Government are performed on the basis of the political and legal foundation conferred by the Seimas. It matters to the opposition because its actions must be transformed into a precisely formulated constitutional application, not merely a public political statement. Finally, it matters to relations between state institutions because examination by the Constitutional Court in such a case would determine whether the specific procedure for approving the Government Programme complied with the balance of competences among the Seimas, the Government, and the Constitutional Court established in the Constitution
The specific question is when J. Valančiūnas’s move from a situation in which he still had a contract with the Denver Nuggets to Kaunas Žalgiris becomes a legally effective basis for professional sporting activity within a Lithuanian sports organisation, rather than merely a public announcement of a transfer. This question matters because the news item refers to lengthy negotiations, a date in the NBA contract concerning whether he would remain in Denver or be traded, and his eventual joining of Žalgiris.
Accordingly, the legal weight lies not in EuroLeague or media communications, but in the conditions governing the entry into force of the written contract and the alignment of prior obligations.
Article 35(1) of the Law on Sport of the Republic of Lithuania provides that a professional athlete, when carrying out sporting activity in a sports organisation, must conclude a sporting activity contract with that organisation, while Article 35(3) expressly states that only a written contract is valid. Article 35(2) of the same law requires the contract to specify the sports organisation, the athlete’s details, the rights and obligations of the parties, remuneration terms, health insurance, the procedure for compensation for damage, the right to rest, the term of validity, liability, and the conditions for entry into force and termination. Particularly relevant in this situation is Article 35(2)(4), because the athlete must undertake to comply with the rules of the sports organisation, the sports federation, and the international federations to which the organisation belongs.
A national contract therefore cannot be assessed in isolation from the rules of the EuroLeague and basketball structures. Article 10(1) of the Law on Sport further indicates that remuneration may be paid to an athlete under an employment contract or a sporting activity contract; however, where a sporting activity contract is chosen, Article 10(3) again requires written form and provisions on dispute resolution, validity, amendment, and termination.
The stronger argument in this case is not that Žalgiris or the EuroLeague publicly announced the return, but that the basis for a professional athlete’s activity in Lithuania must be a written contract with clear provisions on entry into force, termination, and liability. In practice, the greatest risk lies in the transitional period: if J. Valančiūnas’s NBA contract contained a date by which his status in Denver or another team had to be determined, the entry into force of the Žalgiris contract had to be structured so as not to create two incompatible sets of sporting obligations.
For a lawyer, the key point in this situation is to examine not the date of communication, but the contractual condition for entry into force, the mechanism for expiry or resolution of the prior contract, the remuneration structure, insurance, compensation for health-related harm, and the dispute resolution procedure. It would be a mistake to treat the transfer as merely a sporting or reputational event: under the provisions cited, it is a matter of a formal written contract and the coordination of several systems of sporting rules.
Core issue. The legal issue is not the public announcement of Jonas Valančiūnas’s return itself, but the legal basis on which a professional athlete may transfer from a foreign sports organisation to Kaunas “Žalgiris”, what contract must be concluded, and how income from his sporting activity is to be classified. This is determined under Article 35 of the Law on Sports of the Republic of Lithuania concerning a sports activity contract, Article 37 concerning the transfer of professional athletes to another sports organisation, Article 10 concerning remuneration under employment or sports activity contracts, Article 2(8) of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Personal Income Tax No. IX-1007 concerning the concept of sports activity, Article 5 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on State Social Insurance concerning social insurance for sports activity income, and Article 17 of the Lithuania-US Double Taxation Convention concerning the taxation of an athlete’s income. Article 35(1) of the Law on Sports provides that a professional athlete carrying out sporting activity in a sports organisation must conclude a sports activity contract with that organisation. Under Article 35(3) and (4) of the Law on Sports, only a written contract is valid, and the status of professional athlete is acquired upon signing it. Accordingly, what is legally material is not the emotional reaction of the EuroLeague or the media, but the content of the written sports activity contract, the transfer conditions, and the applicable social insurance and tax regime
Legal assessment. Under Article 35(2) of the Law on Sports, a contract with a sports organisation must specify the sports organisation itself, the identifying data of the professional athlete, the rights and obligations of the parties, the obligation to comply with the rules of the sports organisation, the relevant sports federation and international federations, remuneration, compulsory health insurance conditions, the procedure for compensation for harm to health, the right to rest, the term of validity, liability, and the conditions for entry into force and termination. This provision means that the relationship between Kaunas “Žalgiris” and the athlete must be not merely sporting or reputational, but formally defined by a contract allocating the principal risks in advance. Article 10(1) of the Law on Sports additionally permits remuneration to be paid to an athlete under employment or sports activity contracts; therefore, the form of remuneration must be linked to the chosen contractual basis. If a sports activity contract under Article 10(3) of the Law on Sports is applied, it must address the rights and obligations of the parties, preparation for and participation in sports competitions while representing the Republic of Lithuania, remuneration, liability, the term of validity, amendment and termination conditions, and the procedure for resolving disputes. Article 37 of the Law on Sports grants a professional athlete the right to transfer to compete from one sports organisation to another Lithuanian or foreign sports organisation, but that right is exercised subject to the conditions established in the sports activity contract or in agreements between sports organisations. The same provision of Article 37 also states that transfer conditions may be regulated by the rules of the relevant international federation; accordingly, the circumstance mentioned in the report concerning the previous contract with the Denver Nuggets is legally relevant only insofar as it affects the possible fulfilment of transfer conditions. Article 2(8) of the Law on Personal Income Tax defines sports activity as an athlete’s preparation for and participation in high-performance sports competitions; therefore, Valančiūnas’s remuneration for playing for the club falls within this sports activity framework if it is paid specifically for preparation for and participation in competitions. The Government’s position on draft amendment No. XIP-1422 to Article 2 of the Law on Personal Income Tax explains that sports activity income is primarily linked to the athlete’s performance, namely participation in competitions, rather than to whether the activity is carried out under an employment relationship or on the basis of individual activity. Article 17(1) of the Lithuania-US Double Taxation Convention provides that an athlete’s income from independent personal activities exercised in the other contracting state may be taxed in that other state, subject to the USD 20,000 or equivalent threshold. Article 17(2) of that Convention also permits income to be taxed in the state in which the athlete performs the activity where the income accrues not to the athlete himself but to another person, unless it is established that neither the athlete nor persons related to him participate in the profits of that other person. From the perspective of social insurance, Article 5(1) of the Law on State Social Insurance provides that permanent residents of Lithuania who receive income from sports activity from an insurer, namely a Lithuanian entity with which they are not connected by employment relations or relations corresponding in substance to employment relations, are covered by pension, sickness and maternity social insurance, except where such income is received from individual activity. The same provision states that the rules of this article also apply to persons to whom Lithuanian legislation in the field of social insurance applies under international treaties or European Union regulations on the coordination of social security systems. Article 1 of the Law Amending Articles 6 and 12 of the Law on State Social Insurance No. I-1336, which introduced Article 6(11), is relevant only to athletes who receive a state scholarship under the Law on Sports and who have no insured income or whose insured income is less than the amount of the minimum monthly wage. In the case of an athlete remunerated by a professional club, that scholarship scheme becomes relevant only if the conditions specified therein arise: a state scholarship and insufficient or non-existent insured income
Consequences. The first practical scenario is that a written sports activity contract, or another contract permitted under Article 10 of the Law on Sports, enters into force, setting out the conditions governing remuneration, health insurance, compensation for damage, rest, termination and dispute resolution, and the athlete carries out activity at Kaunas “Žalgiris”. The second scenario is that completion of the transfer depends on the previous contract, agreements between sports organisations or the rules of an international federation, because Article 37 of the Law on Sports assigns legal significance to precisely those documents in determining transfer conditions. The third scenario concerns income: if the athlete receives income for sports activity in Lithuania, its classification must be aligned with the concept of sports activity in Article 2(8) of the Law on Personal Income Tax and with the rule in Article 17 of the Lithuania-US Convention concerning the place where the athlete performs the activity. The fourth scenario concerns social insurance: if the athlete is a permanent resident of Lithuania and receives sports activity income from a Lithuanian entity otherwise than on the basis of an employment relationship, the pension, sickness and maternity social insurance specified in Article 5(1) of the Law on State Social Insurance applies. This is practically important for the athlete because the type and content of the contract determine the regime applicable to remuneration, rest, health protection, liability and dispute resolution. It is also important for the club because Article 35 of the Law on Sports requires a written contract that is comprehensive in terms of content, while Article 37 links the transfer to prior obligations and federation rules. For state authorities, the practical significance arises only through the application of social insurance and taxation rules, because the sources provided primarily link the sporting legality of the athlete’s transfer to contracts and the rules of sports organisations and federations
Did Alytus City Municipality, in organising the reconstruction of Lauko Street worth approximately EUR 615,000, properly comply with its duty under Article 37 of the Construction Law to ensure public participation in the consideration of the design proposals, if residents’ comments concerning the width of the carriageway were, in substance, left unassessed?
Article 37 of the Construction Law establishes not merely a formal duty on the part of the municipal mayor or an authorised municipal officer to publish information on the design of structures of public importance, but also a duty to inform the public about participation in the consideration of design proposals. The wording of the provision indicates that this duty also applies to the reconstruction of existing structures, save for expressly specified exceptions; accordingly, street reconstruction does not, in itself, fall outside the scope of the participation procedure. What matters is not the mere fact that a public presentation took place, but whether comments concerning an essential design solution, namely 2.75-metre traffic lanes and safe passing, were procedurally incorporated into the consideration of the design proposals.
Article 35 of the Construction Law separately addresses the issue of technical supervision: where works are carried out under a reconstruction design, technical supervision is mandatory, but it does not replace the adoption of design solutions or the public participation procedure.
At present, the stronger argument for residents is not the abstract assertion that the street is “too narrow”, since the evidence presented does not contain a specific technical width standard, but rather a procedural argument under Article 37 of the Construction Law: whether the municipality could adopt the design solution where comments raised during the public consideration concerning road safety and the passage of school buses were not genuinely assessed. In practice, residents should request not a general political explanation, but the materials from the consideration of the design proposals, the table of comments, the responses to those comments, and the document substantiating the choice of 2.75-metre lanes. The risk for the municipality arises where it bases its response on “expert opinions”, because, according to the news report itself, the experts’ role is presented as an assessment of documents rather than the selection of technical design solutions.
If the works are still ongoing and a breach of safety or functional requirements could be substantiated by documents, an additional practical course would be to apply to the state construction supervision authorities regarding the construction suspension mechanism referred to in the excerpt from Article 33 of the Construction Law.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not whether the design solutions are convenient for residents, but whether the reconstruction of Lauko Street was designed, publicised, and carried out in accordance with the rules governing construction, territorial planning, and the technical parameters of streets. It must be assessed under Article 20(1) and (2) of the Law on Territorial Planning of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 37(1) and (11) of the Law on Construction of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 24(1)(2), Article 35(1), and Article 4(1) and (2) of the Law Amending Law No. I-1240 on Construction of the Republic of Lithuania. For the legality of the technical solutions, Article 8(1) and (2) of the Law Amending the Law on Roads of the Republic of Lithuania, and paragraphs 1 and 33 of STR 2.06.04:2014, are relevant. The issue of public participation must be assessed under Article 37(1) of the Law on Construction and subparagraphs 61.7 and 61.8 of STR 1.04.04:2017. Since today is 18 July 2026, the applicable model is the one following the amendments that entered into force on 1 January 2024 and 2 January 2024, under which the duty to inform the public is linked to the municipal mayor or a civil servant of the municipal administration authorised by the mayor
Legal assessment. If Lauko Street is being reconstructed as an existing structure, Article 24(1)(2) of the Law Amending Law No. I-1240 on Construction provides that a reconstruction design must be prepared for the reconstruction of a special or non-special structure. Abstract political or administrative approval is insufficient for such a design, because Article 8(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Roads requires roads to be designed on the basis of approved territorial planning documents and Lithuanian road design regulatory documents. Article 8(2) of the same law further requires roads to be designed, reconstructed, and maintained in accordance with laws, other legal acts, and normative technical construction documents. Paragraph 1 of STR 2.06.04:2014 directly covers the technical design requirements for the construction, reconstruction, and repair of streets and local roads of all forms of ownership. Paragraph 33 of STR 2.06.04:2014 provides that the technical parameters of streets are determined in accordance with Table 10; therefore, the dispute concerning 2.75-metre traffic lanes must legally be resolved not by reference to residents’ impressions, but by reference to the street category and parameters to which the design was assigned. Article 4(1) of the Law Amending Law No. I-1240 on Construction requires that a structure be designed and built so that, according to its intended use, it satisfies the essential requirements for structures over an economically justified service life. Article 4(2) permits technical parameters to be detailed in legal acts adopted by institutions authorised by the Government; accordingly, the municipality and the designer are obliged to demonstrate the design’s compliance with the applicable technical requirements. As regards public participation, Article 37(1) of the Law on Construction establishes the duty of the municipal mayor or an authorised civil servant to inform the public about the intended design of structures of public importance and about participation in the consideration of design proposals. Subparagraph 61.7 of STR 1.04.04:2017 provides for information on the deadline and manner in which members of the public may submit proposals to the designer before the public meeting. Subparagraph 61.8 of STR 1.04.04:2017 requires an indication of where and when the public meeting will take place or the provision of a broadcast link. The visible part of paragraph 61 of STR 1.04.04:2017 also provides that the public must be given no less than 10 working days to familiarise itself with the design proposals from the date on which the notice is published on the municipality’s website. Therefore, the residents’ assertion that their comments were not taken into account during the public consideration is legally significant to the extent that it can be verified whether the procedure for submitting and considering proposals was in fact carried out in accordance with these rules. However, the cited rules do not in themselves grant residents a right of veto over a technical solution, because they establish a procedure for information and participation, not an obligation to accept every proposal. The axis of responsibility is divided here: the municipality organises and informs, the designer prepares the solutions, and technical supervision is mandatory under Article 35(1) of the Law Amending Law No. I-1240 on Construction where construction works are carried out under a reconstruction design. If construction is still ongoing, Article 33(1) of the Law on Construction gives the State Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate under the Ministry of Environment the right to suspend construction of the structure on its own initiative or where this is requested, among others, by the director of the municipal administration, the developer, the designer, or the technical construction supervisor. This competence is practically relevant only where the dispute concerns not merely dissatisfaction with the result, but a possible non-compliance of the design, technical parameters, permit, or execution with legal acts
Consequences. The first scenario is that the municipality substantiates that the reconstruction design complies with the territorial planning documents, the parameters applicable under STR 2.06.04:2014, and the public notice requirements under Article 37 of the Law on Construction; in that case, the residents’ comments would remain a matter of political and administrative dialogue. The second scenario is that a procedural deficiency is identified, for example that the public was not given a familiarisation period of at least 10 working days or that the procedure for submitting proposals and holding the public meeting was not properly indicated; in that event, the centre of gravity of the dispute would shift to the legality of publicising the design proposals. The third scenario is that the technical parameters of the street are found not to comply with the requirements applicable under paragraph 33 of STR 2.06.04:2014; in that event, revision of the design, actions by technical supervision, and the possible construction suspension mechanism under Article 33 of the Law on Construction would become significant. The fourth scenario is that the works have been completed, but practical use reveals obstacles for buses or for safe passing; in that case, the dispute would primarily be relevant to the municipality as the organiser of the construction and to the designer as the preparer of the technical solutions. For residents, the most practically important course is to request not a general explanation, but specific documents: the street category applied, the design parameters, public notice announcements, proposals received, and responses to those proposals. For the municipality, the most important point is to prove that the solutions were adopted in accordance with the reconstruction design, normative technical construction documents, and the procedure under Article 37 of the Law on Construction. The legal outcome of this situation will depend on a documentary comparison between the design, the public notice procedure, and the technical parameters applicable under STR 2.06.04:2014, rather than on the mere fact that, after reconstruction, the street appears too narrow to residents
The specific dispute is not an abstract issue of the “legality of the Government”, but whether the programme of the 21st Government registered on 3 July could have constituted a constitutionally significant part of the Government formation procedure before the President’s decree of 7 July on the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers. Procedurally, the opposition will have to frame this issue as a request concerning a specific legal act, not the political process in general.
Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court requires the request to specify the exact title, number, date of adoption and other identifying details of the contested legal act, as well as the applicant’s position and its legal reasoning. This means that a request concerning the “legality of the Government” will have to be constructed around identifiable acts, most likely the President’s decree, a Seimas resolution on the programme, or other formation-related acts, rather than merely around a political assertion that the programme was registered “too early”. The amended text of Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court additionally provides that a request by a group of members of the Seimas must be signed by all members applying to the Court, must identify their representative, and their signatures must be certified by the signature of the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the Seimas.
Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court links the mechanism for the automatic suspension of the validity of acts to a referral by the President concerning a Government act or to a resolution of the Seimas concerning a law, another act of the Seimas, or an act of the President or the Government. Accordingly, the cited provision does not disclose any basis for asserting that a referral by a group of members of the Seimas would, by itself, paralyse the validity of acts of the Sinkevičius Government.
The news report’s statement that the right to apply to the Constitutional Court belongs to “no fewer than 29” members of parliament is incomplete. The factual check provided states that Article 106 of the Constitution refers to “no fewer than one-fifth of all members of the Seimas”, not to the fixed number 29. A more precise formulation would be: no fewer than one-fifth of all members of the Seimas may apply; the specific number of signatures depends on the total number of members of the Seimas at the relevant time.
This correction matters because Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court requires the request to indicate the constitutional and statutory provision conferring the right to apply, meaning that the applicants’ standing must be justified by reference to the proportion, not merely to a number cited in the media.
The stronger argument for the opposition would not be that the programme “could not exist” on 3 July, but that the legally significant status of a programme submitted to the Seimas arises only when it is submitted by the Prime Minister of a Government that has already been formed and approved by the President. The governing majority’s response, based solely on the fact that in 2020 the programme was also registered several hours before the decree, is procedurally weak unless it establishes that the registration had no constitutional legal significance. In practice, the key point for the applicants is to distinguish precisely between the technical registration of the document and its constitutionally significant submission to the Seimas, because the Prime Minister relies specifically on the assertion that the programme was submitted to the Seimas after the decree of 7 July.
The risk for professionals is drawing a premature conclusion that a future referral would, by itself, call into question all Government acts adopted since 14 July: under Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court as cited, such automatic suspension does not follow from a referral by a group of members of the Seimas.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not the abstract “lawfulness of the Government”, but whether the process of forming the Government and submitting its programme complied with the constitutional model of the Government as a collegial executive authority under Articles 91 and 94 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, and whether the contested legal act may be reviewed by the Constitutional Court under Article 106 of the Constitution. From the perspective of Article 91 of the Constitution, it is material that the Government consists of the Prime Minister and ministers; therefore, the preparation of the programme and the question of political responsibility are linked to a specifically formed cabinet, rather than solely to the will of the political majority. Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court means that a group of members of the Seimas would have to challenge a precisely identified legal act: indicating its title, number, date of adoption, source of publication, the specific grounds for examining the case, and the legal reasoning supporting the position. The right to apply is linked to the subject specified in Article 106 of the Constitution, namely not less than one fifth of all members of the Seimas; accordingly, the threshold of 29 parliamentarians mentioned in the report is a condition for procedural access to the Constitutional Court
Legal assessment. If the opposition applies as a group of members of the Seimas, political uncertainty alone regarding the date of registration of the programme will not be sufficient: under Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the application will have to formulate a specific claim and provide legal, not political, reasoning. All members of the Seimas submitting the application will have to sign it, indicate their representative or representatives, and the signatures will have to be certified by the signature of the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker of the Seimas. If the application were submitted by electronic means of communication, under the amendments to Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, the application of the group of members of the Seimas would have to be certified by the qualified electronic signature of the Speaker of the Seimas or a Deputy Speaker. The essential substantive axis would be as follows: whether the programme registered on 3 July, when the Presidential decree on the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers was signed on 7 July, may be regarded as the programme of the Government for which responsibility is assumed by the Government defined in Article 91 of the Constitution. The importance of this issue is reinforced by the proposition set out in the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 10 January 1998 “On the compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania”, namely that the Government is a collegial institution of general competence composed of the Prime Minister and ministers. For that reason, the programme procedure cannot be assessed merely as the technical registration of a document: it is connected with the formation of a collegial institution, the assumption of political responsibility, and the Seimas’ decision on the programme. On the other hand, the sources provided allow assessment only of the aspect relating to the compliance of a legal act with the Constitution and laws; therefore, the Constitutional Court would decide not an issue of political confidence, but one of normative and procedural constitutionality. Article 9 of the Law on the Constitutional Court grants a judge the right to request documents and information, obtain explanations from officials, summon witnesses and experts, and use specialist consultations; therefore, the investigation of the case could encompass the documentary sequence of registration, submission, Presidential approval, and Seimas approval. Article 17 of the Law on the Constitutional Court also means that public statements by politicians regarding the desired outcome are not binding on the Court: the Constitutional Court and its judges are guided only by the Constitution and laws that do not conflict with it. If an act adopted by the Seimas or another act referred to in Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court were contested, upon receipt of the relevant resolution of the Seimas or another application provided for in that article, a preliminary examination of the material is carried out within three days and the question of accepting the application is decided at an administrative sitting. However, the mere submission of an application by a group of members of the Seimas, according to the visible provisions of Article 26, is not in itself equated with the Seimas resolution referred to therein for the purposes of the mechanism suspending the validity of an act
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that a group of members of the Seimas collects the required signatures, properly identifies the contested act, and the Constitutional Court accepts the application for examination; the centre of the dispute then shifts from political statements to the sequence of documents and constitutional competences. The second scenario is that the application does not meet the requirements of Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, for example because the contested act or the legal reasoning is not precisely formulated; in such a case, a procedural defect may be decisive even before any substantive assessment of the formation of the Government. The third scenario is that the Constitutional Court, relying on the concept of the Government as a collegial institution of general competence, assesses whether the programme approved by the Seimas was the programme of the Government of that composition, rather than an earlier or politically prepared text lacking a proper constitutional link to the appointed ministers. The fourth scenario is that, if the contested act is found not to conflict with the Constitution, Article 26 of the Law on the Constitutional Court provides that this is officially announced, and the political uncertainty surrounding the start of the cabinet’s work diminishes. The practical significance is greatest for the Seimas, the Government, and the President, because the dispute concerns the boundaries of their respective competences in forming the executive authority. It is also important for ministers, because the Government programme is a document with which the responsibility of the collegial institution is associated, as well as the further performance of the state governance function under Article 94 of the Constitution. For the opposition in the Seimas, this is an instrument of constitutional review, but its effectiveness will depend not on statements about “precision”, but on compliance with the formal and substantive requirements laid down in Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. For the governing majority, what is practically important is that constitutional clarity regarding the formation of the Government may reduce the risk of subsequent disputes concerning the basis of adopted legal acts; however, according to the sources provided, such risk must be tested through the compliance of the specific contested act with the Constitution and laws
Whether Aleksei Navalny’s appearance in a video published by a politician can, in itself, be treated as the display of an “extremist symbol” where the sanction is based not on the content of the act but on the legal status of the person depicted in the state.
The evidence provided does not identify the Russian legal provision under which B. Nadezhdin was fined 1,000 roubles, so it is not possible to assess directly the elements of the offence applied by the Russian court. The logic of Article 524 of the Lithuanian Code of Administrative Offences is narrower: liability is linked to the dissemination, use at assemblies or in public places, or other public display of specifically listed symbols of Nazi, communist, totalitarian or authoritarian regimes.
It follows from this provision that the prohibition is not aimed at any politically undesirable image, but at a symbol whose prohibited character derives from a category defined by law and from its use in a propaganda context. Accordingly, under the Lithuanian provision cited, the stronger defence argument would be that it is necessary to prove not only public display, but also that the object itself is a prohibited symbol, rather than merely the image of a political opponent.
The practical conclusion is that, in cases of this kind, the decisive issue is the legal characterisation of the “symbol”, not merely the fact of publication: if the authority does not show why the image of a particular person acquires the legal quality of a prohibited symbol, the sanction rests on an unduly expansive interpretation of the offence. The less obvious risk in this news item is not the USD 13 fine, but the precedential formula that would allow administrative liability to be imposed for mentioning or showing an opposition figure in archival video footage. For a professional audience, it is worth citing precisely the narrow construction of the provision: the prohibition must be tied to a symbol identifiable in law and to its public display, not to the political assessment of public authorities.
It should also be noted separately that the judge’s refusal to postpone delivery of the judgment, after an electrocardiogram had been performed in court because of extremely high blood pressure, reinforces the impression of instrumentalisation of the proceedings; however, the evidence provided does not identify a specific procedural rule by which that aspect could be legally classified.
Core issue. The legal issue under the Lithuanian legal sources provided is not whether the Russian court correctly applied its rule on “extremist symbols,” but whether an analogous public display of a video or image could satisfy the elements of an administrative offence under the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania. The principal provision would be Article 524(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, which establishes liability for the dissemination, use at assemblies or in public places, or other public display of symbols of Nazi, communist, totalitarian or authoritarian regimes. The limits of liability would also be determined by Article 1(2), Article 2(1), (3), (4) and (7), Article 4(1)–(3), and Article 5(1)–(2) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania. From the perspective of sanctions, it is relevant that Article 524(1) provides for a fine for natural persons ranging from EUR 300 to EUR 700, and, in the event of repeated conduct, Article 524(2) provides for a fine ranging from EUR 500 to EUR 900. Accordingly, the core of the analysis under Lithuanian law would concern public display, the specific prohibited symbol, fault, and territorial applicability
Legal assessment. Article 5(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania requires that the act be a dangerous act prohibited by the Code and that it correspond to the elements of a specific administrative offence. Therefore, the mere fact that a person published a video containing the image of a politician does not, under the provisions provided, in itself constitute a violation of Article 524 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania. It would be necessary to establish that the object displayed falls within the categories listed in Article 524(1): symbols of Nazi Germany, the USSR or the Lithuanian SSR; symbols or uniforms of Nazi or communist organisations; images of leaders responsible for repression; or symbols of totalitarian or authoritarian regimes used to promote aggression or crimes. The term “extremist symbols” mentioned in the report is not the wording used in Article 524 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, and therefore, from the standpoint of Lithuanian law, qualification could not be based solely on that label. Article 2(4) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania establishes the requirement that the elements of the offence be met, while Article 2(3) establishes the requirement of fault. This means that the authority would have to prove not only public display or dissemination, but also that the person was at fault specifically in relation to such prohibited conduct. Under Article 2(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, the law in force at the time the act was committed is also relevant. From a territorial perspective, Article 4(1) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania links liability to an act committed in the territory of Lithuania or on a Lithuanian vessel or aircraft. Article 4(2) permits liability for an act committed abroad only where the consequences provided for in the Special Part arose in the territory of Lithuania or where this is provided for by an international treaty or a European Union legal act. Article 4(3) links the place of commission to the place where the act was performed or the place where the consequences provided for in the Special Part arose. Accordingly, under the provisions provided, the mere fact of a court decision rendered in Russia does not in itself create administrative liability in the Republic of Lithuania. Procedurally, the rule of Article 589 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, as cited in the source, is relevant to Article 524: proceedings under Article 524 are initiated, investigations are carried out, and protocols are drawn up by officers of the police and the State Border Guard Service. The source concerning Draft Law No. XIVP-3646 additionally notes that, if liability were to be introduced for transporting such symbols with the intent to disseminate them, it would be necessary to amend Article 589(40) and empower customs officers. The judicial action described in the report, namely the refusal to postpone the judgment on health grounds, cannot be assessed as an independent procedural rule under the Lithuanian sources provided, because the provisions supplied do not regulate the grounds for such postponement. Article 35(1)(9) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania mentions, as a mitigating circumstance, a person who has reached the age of 65 or a person with an established level of capacity for work or special needs; however, according to the text provided, that specific age threshold would not apply to the 63-year-old person mentioned in the report. Article 88 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania would be relevant only to violations of the procedure for collecting citizens’ signatures established for a Lithuanian referendum, a citizens’ legislative initiative, or under the Election Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and therefore the fact of a campaign taking place in Russia would not be classifiable under that provision
Consequences. The first practical scenario under the sources provided would be that a video publicly posted in Lithuania would not be punishable under Article 524 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania if it did not contain the symbols or images identified in paragraph 1 of that Article. The second scenario is that, if a symbol specifically prohibited by Article 524(1) and public display were established, a natural person would face a fine of EUR 300 to EUR 700, and, in the event of repeated conduct, a fine of EUR 500 to EUR 900 under Article 524(2). The third scenario concerns jurisdiction: if the act was committed outside the territory of Lithuania, the issue of liability under the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania could arise only under the conditions set out in Article 4(2). The fourth scenario is procedural: according to the description of Article 589 provided, an investigation under Article 524 would be conducted by the police or the State Border Guard Service, while the expansion of customs officers’ competence is discussed only in the context of a legislative proposal. The practical significance for the media and political actors is that, under Lithuanian law, what matters is not the political status of the person in another state, but the specific symbol publicly displayed and whether it satisfies the elements of Article 524 of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania. The practical significance for institutions is that liability cannot be based on an abstract label of “extremism” when Lithuanian administrative law is being applied
The specific question is whether the Bank of Lithuania, having identified eight breaches of anti-money laundering requirements at an electronic money institution in a single supervisory episode, was entitled to impose separate fines and aggregate them to EUR 370,000, or whether the constitutional principle of proportionality required the fines to be absorbed up to EUR 55,000. The dispute over the Constitutional Court’s interpretation is therefore not merely about the amount of the sanction, but about whether, in financial market supervision, multiple breaches may serve as the basis for separate sanctions.
Article 40(1) of the Law on Electronic Money and Electronic Money Institutions provides that the supervisory authority applies enforcement measures “where at least one” of the listed grounds exists, including the submission of incorrect, incomplete or inaccurate information and failure to comply with mandatory instructions. This wording strengthens the Bank of Lithuania’s position at the level of competence: enforcement measures are linked to each established supervisory ground, rather than to an abstract single inspection or single procedure. However, the provision itself does not lay down a clear rule on the aggregation or absorption of fines, meaning that Paysera’s constitutional argument must in reality be directed not at the Bank of Lithuania’s power to impose fines as such, but at the proportionality and legal certainty of cumulative sanctions.
The facts provided indicate that the practical direction is already favourable to the Bank of Lithuania: in March 2026, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania, by a final and non-appealable ruling, reinstated the EUR 370,000 fine and held that separate fines had been properly imposed for all eight breaches. The Court of Justice of the European Union also clarified in 2025 that the Bank of Lithuania had lawfully imposed separate fines on Paysera for breaches of anti-money laundering requirements. This means that, at the level of ordinary administrative and EU law interpretation, the separate-fines model has already been confirmed in this case.
At present, the stronger procedural and substantive argument lies with the Bank of Lithuania: if the breaches are classified as separate, the mere fact that they were identified in the same supervisory dispute does not in itself transform them into a single sanction. Paysera is left with a narrower route: to prove not that separate fines are generally impermissible, but that this specific cumulative amount of EUR 370,000, compared with the EUR 55,000 outcome under absorption, exceeds the constitutional standard of proportionality or clarity. In practice, the risk for financial institutions is clear: in disputes over supervisory sanctions, it is dangerous to assume that several breaches will be “absorbed” into a single fine; the defence must separately challenge the autonomy of each breach or the individual proportionality of each fine.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the EUR 370,000 sanction imposed by the Bank of Lithuania for eight infringements may be based on the imposition and aggregation of separate fines, or whether it is constrained by the requirements of proportionality and individualisation. This issue falls to be assessed under Article 42(1) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Bank of Lithuania, which defines the financial market participants supervised by the Bank of Lithuania, including electronic money institutions and payment institutions. Article 47⁷(4) of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania provides that the Bank of Lithuania shall apply one or more enforcement measures to the same person who has committed infringements, while paragraph 6 of that Article permits the imposition on a legal person of a fine of up to 10 per cent of gross annual income. The logic of Article 47(3)(3) of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania is also relevant, as it demonstrates the competence of the Bank of Lithuania in the field of payment services and other relationships regulated by the Law on Payments. The issue of individualising the fine is subject to proportionality standards expressed in Article 83(1) and Article 83(2) of GDPR 2016/679, as well as in Article 50(2) and (3) of the Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data Processed in the Context of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, insofar as those sources provide a general model for the effectiveness, proportionality and deterrent effect of administrative fines. From a procedural perspective, Article 34 of the Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data is important: the supervisory authority must submit a proposal to impose a fine, grant a period of not less than 10 working days for explanations, and generally examine the case by written procedure
Legal assessment. In the situation presented, the Bank of Lithuania acted as the financial market supervisory authority, and the essence of the dispute is not the fact of supervision itself, but the method by which the fine was constructed. The wording of Article 47⁷(4) of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania, “one or more enforcement measures”, provides a normative basis for applying separate enforcement measures to the same person where several independent infringements have been established. Accordingly, the conclusion of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania that separate fines were properly imposed for all eight established infringements is consistent with the text of Article 47⁷(4) of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania as presented. However, the lawfulness of imposing separate fines does not in itself resolve the proportionality of the final amount: under Article 47⁷(6) of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania, a fine imposed on a legal person may not exceed the statutory threshold of up to 10 per cent of gross annual income. The proportionality requirement is formulated more broadly in the sources provided: Article 83(1) of the GDPR requires administrative fines in each individual case to be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Recital 150 of the GDPR adds that the amount of a fine must be determined having regard to the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement, its consequences, and the measures taken to prevent or mitigate the consequences of the infringement. Article 50(3) of the Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data Processed in the Context of Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters also sets out criteria: the nature, gravity and duration of the infringement, intent or negligence, actions taken to mitigate damage, previous infringements, and cooperation with the supervisory authority. These sources point to a model of individualised assessment, rather than automatic aggregation. Nevertheless, the information provided states that the Court of Justice of the European Union has already clarified that the Bank of Lithuania lawfully imposed separate fines on Paysera for breaches of anti-money laundering requirements. Following such clarification, the focus of the national dispute narrows to constitutional proportionality and the limits of aggregating sanctions. The direction of the Constitutional Court’s case law is reflected in the source concerning the draft Law on Environmental Protection: the constitutional principles of justice and the rule of law require enforcement measures to be proportionate to the infringement, consistent with legitimate aims, and not to restrict a person manifestly more than necessary. The same source emphasises that a fair balance must exist between the objective pursued and the measures used, as well as between infringements and penalties. The importance of individualising administrative sanctions is reinforced by the source concerning amendments to the Code of Administrative Offences, which criticises a strictly fixed fine because it limits the right of the institution and the court properly to individualise the penalty in accordance with the principle of proportionality. In terms of procedural guarantees, Article 34(1) of the Law on the Legal Protection of Personal Data establishes a minimum period of 10 working days for explanations, while Article 34(2) and (3) permit the written procedure to be replaced by an oral procedure where it is necessary to hear the person or where, due to the complexity of the case, it is better examined orally. The source concerning the Concept for the Application of Enforcement Measures to Economic Operators notes that the absence of an opportunity to submit explanations within an adequate period and the failure to suspend enforcement of a fine when a court is seised should be regarded as defective regulation. The same source relies on the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in UAB “Rikoma” v Lithuania, application no. 9668/06, judgment of 18 January 2011, and links the administrative liability of legal persons with the safeguarding of essential procedural guarantees. Therefore, on the basis of the sources provided, the practical legal significance of Paysera’s application to the European Court of Human Rights would relate not to the expediency of financial supervision, but to whether the procedural guarantees necessary for a legal person were ensured when the fine was imposed and reviewed
Consequences. If Constitutional Court proceedings were initiated and it were recognised that the model of aggregating all fines without sufficient individualisation infringes the principle of proportionality, the practical consequence would be a review of the methodology for imposing enforcement measures. In that event, the key issue would not be solely the specific amount of EUR 370,000, but the rule by which the supervisory authority calculates the final sanction for several infringements. If the Constitutional Court did not find such regulation contrary to the Constitution, the significance of the final and unappealable ruling of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania would remain: separate fines for eight infringements would remain a legally justified model. For financial market participants, this is practically important because the supervised entities referred to in Article 42(1) of the Law on the Bank of Lithuania must assess each infringement as capable of giving rise to an independent sanction. For the Bank of Lithuania, this is important as a question of supervisory competence and the limits of applying enforcement measures: under Article 47⁷(4), it may apply one or more measures, but under the proportionality standard it must justify the adequacy of the final burden. For Paysera, the further course of the matter is practically significant because of the EUR 370,000 fine and the difference between the aggregation model and the EUR 55,000 outcome it identifies. The direction of the European Court of Human Rights, based on the sources provided and the case of UAB “Rikoma” v Lithuania, is most closely connected with procedural guarantees for a legal person in an administrative sanctions case. The final impact of the dispute may extend beyond a single company, as it would affect the calculation of financial market supervisory sanctions, their individualisation, and the intensity of judicial review of proportionality
Does the registration of the draft Government Programme in the Seimas on 3 July 2026, where the Presidential decree on the composition of the XXI Government was signed only on 6 July 2026, amount to submitting the Government Programme for consideration before there existed a “Government approved by the President of the Republic”?
Article 6 of the Law on the Government establishes the sequence: the Prime Minister, “not later than within 15 days of his appointment, presents to the Seimas the Government formed by him and approved by the President of the Republic, and submits its programme for consideration”. This wording gives rise to the rule that the constitutionally significant submission of the programme for consideration is linked not to the abstract preparation of the programme text, but to the presentation to the Seimas of a Government that has already been formed and approved by the President. The decisive point in dispute is therefore not merely the date on which the text appeared in the Seimas document system, but whether the registration on 3 July constituted a procedural “submission for consideration”, or only a preparatory registration of the document prior to a later formal presentation after the decree of 6 July.
Article 22 of the Law on the Government further indicates that the programme is not a technical annex: the Government implements it, and ministers, under the proposed wording of the amendment to Article 26, are directly responsible for its implementation in the areas assigned to them.
At present, the stronger argument is the one that precisely distinguishes registration from the moment of “presentation to the Seimas” and “submission for consideration” referred to in Article 6 of the Law. If M. Sinkevičius’s position is factually correct and the programme was presented at a sitting of the Seimas only after the Presidential decree of 6 July 2026, the mere registration of the draft on 3 July should not necessarily entail the unlawfulness of the formation of the Government.
For the opposition, it is practically important not merely to cite the date of registration, but to prove that the Seimas consideration procedure in fact began on 3 July, although under Article 6 it could begin only after the President had approved the Government’s composition. The risk for the governing majority is not the automatic invalidity of every future law, but rather that, if the Constitutional Court were to find a procedural defect in the submission of the programme, it would create a basis for challenging the Government’s political mandate and the foundation for implementing its programme.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the sequence of submitting the Government Programme and obtaining the Government’s mandate complied with Article 6 and Article 24(2)(1) and (7) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Government. Under Article 6 of the Law on the Government, the Prime Minister, “no later than within 15 days of his appointment,” presents to the Seimas the Government formed by him and approved by the President of the Republic, and submits its programme for consideration. The same provision establishes the essential legal consequence: a new Government receives authority to act only when the Seimas, by a majority vote of the members participating in the sitting, approves its programme. The role of the Prime Minister is further specified in Article 24(2)(1) of the Law on the Government, under which he forms the Government and submits its composition to the President of the Republic for approval, and in Article 24(2)(7), under which he submits the Government Programme to the Seimas for consideration. The question of the Constitutional Court’s competence would be determined under Article 106 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Articles 1 and 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. If a resolution of the Seimas concerning the programme were challenged, Article 106 of the Constitution permits an application by no fewer than one fifth of all members of the Seimas, by the Government, or by courts in respect of the acts specified in the first paragraph of Article 105 of the Constitution
Legal assessment. The facts presented indicate two significant dates: the draft Government Programme was registered in the Seimas on 3 July 2026, while the decree of the President of the Republic on the composition of the Twenty-First Government was signed on 6 July 2026. Article 6 of the Law on the Government refers not merely to the text of the programme, but to the Prime Minister’s duty to present to the Seimas “the Government formed by him and approved by the President of the Republic” and to submit its programme for consideration. The legal dispute would therefore focus on whether the mere registration of the draft programme before the presidential decree may be regarded as submission of the programme for consideration within the meaning of that article, or whether the legally relevant act is the presentation of the programme at a sitting of the Seimas after approval of the Government’s composition. The Prime Minister’s right to submit the programme under Article 24(2)(7) of the Law on the Government must be read together with Article 24(2)(1), because the programme is submitted by the person who forms the Government and submits its composition to the President of the Republic for approval. Under Article 6 of the Law on the Government, even before approval of the programme, the new ministers may obtain from ministries and other state institutions the material necessary for preparing the programme; accordingly, the preparation of the programme need not begin only after final approval by the Seimas. However, the moment at which authority to act arises is linked not to registration of the draft, but to the Seimas’ approval of the programme. This issue is reinforced by Article 96 of the Constitution, under which the Government is collectively accountable to the Seimas for the general activities of the Government, while ministers are accountable to the Seimas and the President of the Republic and are subordinate to the Prime Minister. Thus, the procedure for submitting the programme must ensure that the Seimas assesses not an abstract political document, but the programme of a specific Government approved by the President. In its ruling of 10 January 1998, “On the Compliance of the Resolution of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 10 December 1996 ‘On the Programme of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania’ with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania,” the Constitutional Court stated that the Government occupies a special place in the system of executive institutions, is a collegial institution of general competence, and consists of the Prime Minister and ministers. This jurisprudence is important because, procedurally, the Government Programme is linked to the formation of a collegial institution, rather than merely to the political intention of the Prime Minister. The content of an application should comply with Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court: it must identify the specific legal act being challenged, the date of its adoption, the applicant’s position, the legal reasoning, the grounds for examining the case, and the request formulated for the Constitutional Court. If the application were submitted by a group of members of the Seimas, under the same Article 66 it would have to be signed by all applying members of the Seimas, identify a representative, and the signatures would have to be certified by the signature of the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the Seimas. Article 106 of the Constitution also provides that the Constitutional Court may refuse to accept a case if the application is based on non-legal grounds
Consequences. The most realistic procedural route is not a general request to assess the “legality of the Government,” but an application to examine the compliance of a specific legal act, first and foremost the act of the Seimas concerning the Government Programme, with the Constitution or laws under Article 106 of the Constitution and Article 66 of the Law on the Constitutional Court. If, by the end of July 2026, signatures of no fewer than one fifth of all members of the Seimas were collected, the opposition would have the constitutional right to initiate such review. If the application were framed as a political assessment without a specific contested act and legal reasoning, there would be a risk of refusal to accept the application under Article 106 of the Constitution. If the Constitutional Court accepted the application, the substantive assessment would turn on whether the procedural difference in timing between registration and presentation of the programme breached the sequence established in Article 6 of the Law on the Government. If it were found that the Seimas approved the programme in compliance with the requirement that the Government presented was one approved by the President, the basis for the Government’s authority to act under Article 6 of the Law on the Government would remain unrebutted. If a procedural breach were found, the practical significance would lie in the assessment of the Seimas resolution on the programme and of the Government’s authority arising from it. This is directly relevant to the Seimas, because the Government’s political mandate derives from the Seimas’ approval of the programme, and to the Prime Minister, because under Article 24 of the Law on the Government it is he who forms the Government and submits the programme. It is also relevant to the ministers approved by the President of the Republic, because under Article 96 of the Constitution they participate in a Government collectively accountable to the Seimas. Finally, for individuals, Article 106 of the Constitution provides for the possibility of an individual application only where a decision adopted on the basis of a specific act has violated their constitutional rights or freedoms and all legal remedies have been exhausted
Should the demolition of religious minority churches with a crane during anti-Christian riots be legally assessed merely as destruction of another person’s property, or as an aggravated offence by reason of the nature of the property, the dangerous method used, and the religious motive?
Article 187(2) of the Lithuanian Criminal Code increases liability not only because property has been destroyed, but also by reference to the method and the object: imprisonment for up to five years is possible where property is destroyed by a generally dangerous method or where assets of major scientific, historical, or cultural significance are destroyed. Accordingly, the fact that I. Yousaf demolished three churches and a nearby house with a crane on 16 August 2023 would, under the Lithuanian provision cited, move the classification from ordinary property damage to an aggravated offence: the use of a crane in the context of mob riots indicates heightened dangerousness, and churches are not neutral commercial property.
Article 170 of the Criminal Code is relevant only to the extent that public incitement to hatred or violence against a religious group could be proved; the video recording of the demolition, as described in the news report, directly proves an act against property, but not yet a separate act of incitement. The direction of Article 169 of the Criminal Code would be stronger if the proceedings concerned the systematic exclusion of Christians from social, employment, or economic activity, but the reported facts concerning witness intimidation point more to interference with the process and the community than to a discrete discrimination offence by I. Yousaf himself.
The strongest legal argument in this situation is not an abstract characterisation as a “hate crime”, but aggravated destruction of property based on the specific method of operation, the object targeted, and the individual identification of the perpetrator confirmed by video evidence. That is precisely why the acquittal of 12 other persons for lack of sufficient evidence is not paradoxical: in mass-riot cases, the religious context explains the motive, but does not replace proof of individual participation. In practice, the distinction between I.
Yousaf’s case and that of the acquitted persons is worth citing: a video recording, verified by state-certified experts, showing the specific operation of the crane is a far stronger basis for conviction than mere presence in a crowd or membership of an anti-Christian group. From a jurisdictional perspective, Article 7 of the Criminal Code would be an obstacle to any attempt automatically to transpose such an episode committed abroad into Lithuanian criminal law: destruction of property, discrimination, and incitement to hatred are not listed as universal jurisdiction offences, and the evidence presented for a terrorism classification does not contain the elements of the offence under Article 2521 of the Criminal Code.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether the Pakistani court correctly applied its own law, but what criminal-law classifications would arise under the Lithuanian provisions provided if such a factual situation were assessed under the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. First, Article 170 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania would apply in respect of incitement against a religious group of persons, particularly Article 170(3), which provides for liability for public incitement to violence or physical reprisals against a group of persons on grounds of belief, religion, convictions, or views. If the acts were connected with the creation of a group of accomplices or an organised group, participation in the activities of such a group, financing, or material support, Article 170^1 of the Criminal Code would be relevant. False accusations against two Christians in respect of a non-existent offence would be assessed under Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code, and, if evidence were also falsified in order to initiate criminal prosecution, under Article 236(2). Attacks on churches, as places of religious rites, may also raise an issue under Article 171 of the Criminal Code if it were established that services, rites, or ceremonies of a state-recognised religious community were disrupted by obscene language, brazen conduct, threats, mockery, or other indecent acts. From the perspective of jurisdiction, the essential provisions are Article 4(1)–(3) of the Criminal Code concerning acts committed within the territory of Lithuania and Article 7 of the Criminal Code, which, irrespective of citizenship, place of residence, and the place where the act was committed, applies only to the offences listed therein that are punishable on the basis of international treaties
Legal assessment. According to the circumstances described, the violence was directed not at random individuals or property, but at the Christian religious community: 26 devastated churches and approximately 90 Christian homes are mentioned. Accordingly, the protected legal interest under Article 170 of the Criminal Code would be the rights, security, and equality of members of a religious group. Article 170(1) of the Criminal Code would cover the production, possession, or distribution, for the purpose of distribution, of items in which a religious group is mocked or demeaned, hatred is incited, or violence is instigated against it. Article 170(2) of the Criminal Code would cover public mockery, denigration, incitement of hatred, or incitement to discriminate against a Christian group on grounds of belief or religion. Under the structure of Article 170 as provided, public incitement to violence or physical reprisals would be assessed most severely, since Article 170(3) of the Criminal Code provides for a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to three years. The use of a crane in demolishing churches is not directly identified in the disposition of Article 170 of the Criminal Code as destruction of property, but it is significant as the factual context of an attack on, and violence against, a religious group. If it were proven that the persons acted as a group of accomplices or an organised group with the aim of discriminating against a religious group or inciting against it, Article 170^1(1) of the Criminal Code would allow assessment not only of the direct perpetrators, but also of participants, financiers, or persons who otherwise provided material support. Article 171 of the Criminal Code would be narrower: it protects not the property of a religious community as such, but the conduct of services, rites, or ceremonies, and would therefore apply only insofar as specific religious rites or ceremonies were disrupted during the attack. A false accusation of blasphemy against two Christian brothers would be criminal under Article 236(1) of the Criminal Code where an innocent person is falsely reported to an institution or official entitled to initiate criminal prosecution, and that person is thereby subjected to prosecution. If evidence were additionally falsified for the purposes of the false report, Article 236(2) of the Criminal Code would provide for stricter liability: a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to five years. A video recording showing the demolition of a church could, under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, be submitted as an object or document relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal act. Procedurally, it is also important that Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits such relevant objects and documents to be submitted on their own initiative not only by participants in the proceedings, but also by any natural or legal person. Expert confirmation of the authenticity of the video recording would relate to the cited provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure under which, upon receiving an expert report, the prosecutor must notify the participants in the proceedings in writing and indicate where and when the report may be accessed. If, in the investigation, there were insufficient data to substantiate the guilt of some persons, Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for termination of the pre-trial investigation on that basis. Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are relevant to time limits: they define the purpose of time limits and establish that time limits are calculated in hours, days, and months, excluding the day or hour on which the time limit begins. Remand measures could be imposed on suspects or accused persons under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in order to ensure participation in the proceedings, an unobstructed investigation, examination of the case, enforcement of the judgment, and prevention of new criminal acts. Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists such measures as detention, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register with a police institution, and a written undertaking not to leave
Consequences. The first practical consequence would be the allocation of liability by role: the initiators of the false report would be assessed under Article 236 of the Criminal Code, persons who publicly incited or promoted hatred under Article 170 of the Criminal Code, and participants in organised activity directed against a religious group under Article 170^1 of the Criminal Code. Secondly, the video recording and its expert confirmation could become central evidence, since Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the submission of objects and documents relevant to the investigation, and receipt of an expert report creates a duty to inform participants in the proceedings about access to it. Thirdly, acquittal of persons or termination of the investigation in respect of some suspects would be a realistic scenario if, under Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sufficient data to substantiate guilt were not collected. Fourthly, Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is of practical importance for injured members of the religious community and for communities, as it provides that, where the accused or the persons materially liable for the accused’s acts lack funds to compensate the damage, the damage may, in cases provided by law, be compensated from state funds. Fifthly, Lithuanian jurisdiction over such an act committed in Pakistan would not arise under Article 4 of the Criminal Code solely because the act occurred abroad, since that provision links liability to the territory of Lithuania and to Lithuanian ships or aircraft. Article 7 of the Criminal Code could be relevant only where the act fell within the categories listed therein, for example terrorist offences and offences related to terrorist activities under Article 252^1(1) and (2), but the sources provided do not allow this aspect to be classified more broadly. Therefore, under the Lithuanian provisions provided, the greatest practical significance lies not in reviewing the Pakistani judgment, but in classifying an analogous situation: incitement of religious hatred, false reporting, collection of evidence, application of remand measures, and possible compensation for damage
Does harm caused by a 13-year-old through violence in a public place, where criminal liability is precluded by age, pass in civil law to her parents under Article 6.275 of the Civil Code, and what presumption of fault would they have to rebut?
Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code establishes a special rule: parents or guardians are liable for harm caused by a minor under the age of fourteen unless they prove that the harm did not arise through their fault. This does not amount to an automatic “punishment” of the parents, but rather a civil liability model based on a presumption of parental fault: the victim would have to prove the harm, the unlawful acts and the causal link, while the parents would bear the burden of rebutting their fault in relation to supervision or upbringing. Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code would be relevant only if the violence had occurred while the child was under the supervision of an educational, upbringing, healthcare or care institution; according to the report, the incident took place in Poetry Park, so the facts presented do not disclose a basis for civil liability of an institution.
Article 6.277 of the Civil Code would be relevant only in a narrower situation, where parental authority had been restricted due to the parents’ fault and the child’s actions were a consequence of improper exercise of parental authority; the report mentions that the families are known to child rights specialists, but provides no information about any restriction of parental authority.
The statement that criminal liability “begins at the age of 14” is incomplete. Under Article 13 of the Criminal Code, the general age threshold for criminal liability is sixteen, while liability from the age of fourteen is possible only in the cases provided for in Article 13(2) of the Criminal Code. It is therefore more accurate to put it as follows: a girl born in 2013, if she was 13 at the time of the incident, cannot be held criminally liable because she has not even reached the exceptional threshold of fourteen.
However, that conclusion does not eliminate possible civil liability for the harm, because Article 6.275 of the Civil Code specifically regulates harm caused by minors under the age of fourteen.
The practical emphasis here should not be the abstract slogan “this is entirely the parents’ responsibility”, but the shift in the burden of proof under Article 6.275 of the Civil Code. For the victim’s representatives, the stronger argument is a civil one: the 13-year-old’s criminal non-liability by reason of age does not prevent a claim for compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage from the parents, who will have to prove that the harm did not arise through their fault. On the parents’ side, it should not be sufficient merely to state that the conflict began on social media or that the violence occurred outside the home; they would need to show specific facts concerning supervision, upbringing and responses to earlier risks, especially where the report states that the families were already known to child rights specialists.
In public communication, it is risky to conflate the age thresholds for criminal liability with the civil liability regime: the former determines whether the child can be punished under criminal law, while the latter determines who compensates the victim for the harm suffered.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not abstract “parental responsibility”, but rather who bears civil liability for the damage caused to the victim by a 13-year-old child and what measures of influence applicable to minors may be imposed. Since the suspected perpetrator, according to the information available, was born in 2013 and, as of 2026-07-18, may not yet have reached the age of fourteen, the principal provision is Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. It provides that damage caused by a minor under fourteen years of age is compensated by his or her parents or guardians, unless they prove that the damage did not arise due to their fault. If the damage was caused while the child was under the supervision of an educational, upbringing, healthcare or care institution, Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania would apply. If it transpired that, at the time the damage was caused, the violent child was already between fourteen and eighteen years of age, the liability model would change under Article 6.276 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 6.277 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania is additionally relevant, but only where parental authority has been restricted due to the parents’ fault and the child’s actions are a consequence of improper exercise of parental authority
Legal assessment. Under Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, civil liability for a 13-year-old child is directed not at the child herself, but at her parents or guardians. This provision is framed as a presumption of fault on the part of the parents or guardians: they are liable unless they prove that the damage did not arise due to their fault. Therefore, the injuries suffered by the victim, treatment costs, other pecuniary consequences and non-pecuniary damage would, in a civil dispute, primarily be linked to the liability of the parents or guardians of the minor who committed the violence. If it were established that, at the time of the incident, the child was supposed to be supervised by an educational, upbringing, healthcare or care institution, the centre of liability could shift to that institution under Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The mere fact that the family was known to child-rights specialists or had previously received social services does not, under the provisions cited, in itself change the subject of civil liability. However, it is practically significant when assessing whether the parents could rebut their fault, since Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania allows them to defend themselves by proving the absence of fault. If parental authority had been restricted due to the parents’ fault, Article 6.277 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania would allow parental liability to be linked to whether the child’s actions were a consequence of improper exercise of parental authority. If the perpetrator had already reached the age of fourteen at the time the damage was caused, she herself would be liable on general grounds under Article 6.276(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. In that case, under Article 6.276(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, the parents or custodian would compensate the relevant part of the damage only where the minor lacked property or earnings sufficient to compensate the damage and they failed to prove that the damage did not arise due to their fault. Article 6.276(3) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania further provides that such parental obligation would end when the child reaches majority or, earlier, acquires sufficient property or earnings to compensate the damage. Paragraph 174 of the cited report on the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child repeats the same distinction: for children under 14, parents, guardians or the supervising institution are liable for damage, while from 14 to 18 the child is liable personally, with parents or the institution additionally involved where the child’s property is insufficient. From the perspective of the aims of juvenile liability, paragraph 538 of the same report is important: liability must correspond to age and social maturity, limit deprivation of liberty and increase the application of educational measures. Paragraph 542 of the report identifies possible educational measures: a warning, compensation or elimination of pecuniary damage, unpaid educational work, placement with parents or other persons for upbringing and supervision, restrictions on conduct, or placement in a special educational institution. Under the same paragraph 542, the court may impose no more than three mutually compatible educational measures. Paragraph 2.4 of the Concept of the Law on Minimal and Medium Supervision of Minors covers minors whose conduct causes harm and poses a threat to others, where the efforts of parents, guardians and the local community are insufficient to achieve positive behavioural change. Paragraph 4 of that Concept defines minimal supervision as social, psychological, pedagogical and other assistance provided to minors who are not separated from their families, with the aim of achieving positive behavioural change
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is a civil claim for damages against the parents or guardians of the violent 13-year-old under Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The second scenario would arise only if institutional supervision at the time of the incident were established: in that case, liability could be asserted against that institution under Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The third scenario depends on the age threshold: if, at the legally relevant time, the minor had already reached the age of fourteen, Article 6.276 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania would apply, under which she herself would be liable on general grounds, while the parents would be subsidiarily liable where her property or earnings were insufficient. The fourth scenario is the application of educational and supervision measures, since the cited sources orient juvenile liability toward behavioural change, assistance and prevention of further offences. As regards dissemination of the video recording, a relevant provision of the Juvenile Justice Programme for 2009-2013 states that, in order to protect a minor from the negative effects of disseminating information about an offence, publication of data concerning minor offenders and victims should be prohibited. This is practically important for the victim, because civil liability may be the most realistic route to compensation, and for the parents of the violent girl, because their liability under Article 6.275 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania is presumed. It is also important for child-rights and social assistance institutions, because the cited sources allow the situation to be assessed not only as a single act of violence, but also as a basis for considering minimal supervision, psychological, pedagogical and social assistance measures
The specific point in dispute is not whether the pupils’ conduct should be described as a “conflict” or as “bullying”, but who bears the civil obligation to compensate damage where a minor injures other pupils at school. In the context of the incident at Marijampolė “Sūduva” Gymnasium on 28 April 2026, the decisive facts would be the age of the child who caused the damage, whether at the time of the incident the child was under the supervision of an educational institution, and whether the parents or the school can rebut the presumption of fault.
Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code provides that parents or guardians are liable for damage caused by a minor under the age of fourteen, unless they prove that the damage did not arise through their fault. Paragraph 2 of the same article specifically addresses the school context: where such a child causes damage while under the supervision of an educational institution, that institution is liable unless it proves the absence of fault. If the pupil who caused the damage is between fourteen and eighteen years old, Article 6.276(1) of the Civil Code primarily directs liability to the minor personally; however, paragraph 2 provides for the obligation of the parents, curator, or supervising institution to compensate the shortfall in damages if the minor lacks sufficient assets or earnings and those persons do not prove that the damage did not arise through their fault.
The statement in the article that psychological violence is an “intentional and systematic violation of a child’s right to identity” is too narrow. According to the cited wording of Article 3 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child, psychological violence also includes humiliation of a child, bullying, intimidation, disruption of activities necessary for normal development, encouragement of antisocial behaviour, or other non-physical conduct. It would be more accurate to say that violation of the right to identity is only one feature of psychological violence, and that digital humiliation in a class chat group may fall within the broader category of non-physical impact if it meets the criteria of intentional and systematic conduct.
In practice, the stronger argument is not the abstract proposition that “the school must ensure safety”, but the specific regime under Article 6.275 or Article 6.276 of the Civil Code, depending on the child’s age and the moment of supervision. The injured child’s representatives should collect evidence not only of the punch, kick, or digital humiliation itself, but also of the school’s knowledge, prior warning signs, supervision arrangements, and response procedures, because these matters will determine whether the educational institution can rebut the presumption of fault. It is risky for a school to document an incident using the neutral formula “both were fighting”, because from the perspective of civil liability it is important to establish the beginning of the aggression, any self-defence, group pressure, and prior threats.
Core issue. The precise legal question is who, in terms of civil liability, child rights protection, and the responsibility of an educational institution, is required to respond and compensate damage where a minor allegedly injures other pupils at school. It is primarily resolved under Article 6.275 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania where the damage is caused by a minor under fourteen years of age, and under Article 6.276 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania where the damage is caused by a minor between fourteen and eighteen years of age. If parental authority has been restricted due to the parents’ fault, Article 6.277 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, linking parental liability to the consequences of improper exercise of parental authority. For the procedural dimension of protecting the child’s interests, Article 3.178 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania is important, as it establishes the mandatory participation of the state child rights protection authority in disputes concerning children. The duty to notify arises from Article 3.250(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, as quoted in the source provided, and from Article 43(4) of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the police and the child rights protection division must be notified of a child who may have suffered from a criminal offence and may require assistance
Legal assessment. If the pupil who caused the damage was under fourteen years of age, Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that his or her parents or guardians are liable for the damage, unless they prove that the damage did not arise through their fault. If such a child caused the damage while under the supervision of an educational or upbringing institution, Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania permits liability to be directed against the institution if it fails to prove that proper supervision was provided. If the violent pupil was between fourteen and eighteen years of age, Article 6.276(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that he or she is personally liable on general grounds. However, paragraph 2 of the same article provides for supplementary liability of the parents, custodian, or the educational institution supervising the child at the relevant time where the minor has no property or earnings from which to compensate the damage and those persons fail to prove the absence of fault. Article 6.276(3) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania defines the end of this supplementary obligation: it ends when the child reaches the age of majority or earlier acquires sufficient property or earnings. These rules mean that the school environment is not a legal vacuum: an institution with a duty of supervision may become a subject of civil liability if the damage arose during its supervision and it does not rebut its fault. Parental liability is likewise not an automatic penalty for the child’s conduct, because the cited provisions allow parents to defend themselves by proving that the damage did not arise through their fault. If parental authority has been restricted, Article 6.277 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania links liability to whether the minor’s actions were a consequence of improper exercise of parental authority. The interpretation of Article 59(5) of the Law on Education set out in the source provided indicates that the liability of the head of the school is determined by reference to his or her failure to perform, or improper performance of, duties as the head of the institution, and not merely by the fact of the incident itself. The description of Article 47 of the Law on Education states that parents have a duty to inform the head of the school of a known case of violence in an educational institution and, where their child is committing or experiencing violence, to attend a psychologist’s consultation together with the child at the specified time. Article 5 of the Law on the Police of the Republic of Lithuania, as quoted in the source provided, defines the tasks of the police as the prevention, detection, and investigation of criminal offences and administrative offences. Therefore, where conduct between pupils bears signs of a possible criminal offence, the school’s internal response does not replace the obligation to notify the police and the child rights protection authority
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is that a civil claim for compensation is directed against the parents or guardians if the damage was caused by a child under fourteen years of age and they do not rebut their fault under Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The second scenario is that liability is asserted against the educational institution if the damage was caused during its supervision and it does not prove that it properly performed its duty of supervision under Article 6.275(2) or Article 6.276(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The third scenario is that a pupil aged fourteen to eighteen is personally liable, while his or her parents, custodians, or the educational institution cover only the portion that the pupil cannot compensate, if they fail to prove the absence of their own fault. The fourth scenario is that the child rights protection authority is joined in the dispute concerning children and submits an opinion to the court under Article 3.178 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. The fifth scenario is that the police investigate a possible legal offence within the competence specified in Article 5 of the Law on the Police of the Republic of Lithuania, in parallel with the civil issue of compensation for damage. This is practically important for the injured child’s family, because the liable person is identified by reference to the child’s age, the circumstances of supervision, fault, and causal link with the damage. It is also important for the family of the violent child, because the child’s age changes the form of liability but does not eliminate legal consequences. For the school, the key point is that the liability of its head and of the institution itself will be assessed by reference to the performance of specific duties, and not on the basis of an abstract assertion that the incident occurred between children
When publicly presenting Druskininkai Municipality projects - the selection of an operator for the Culture and Congress Palace, the possible naming of the palace after sponsors, the bus station complex, and the “Druskininkai Resident Card” - is the mayor acting merely as a political communicator, or as a personally responsible municipal actor for the implementation of those decisions within the limits of his competence?
Article 25(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government provides that the mayor is “directly and personally responsible” for the implementation, within the municipal territory, of laws, Government decisions, municipal council decisions and his own decisions on matters falling within his competence. This means that the mayor’s interview is not merely reputational advertising for the municipality: where the discussion concerns a specific operator, the tender-winning company “Universali infrastruktūra”, a 1,200-seat hall, the planned autumn opening of the bus station complex, or benefits granted to residents, the legally material issue becomes the chain of competence and decision-making. Article 21(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government further establishes the mayor’s accountability to the council and the community for municipal activity, while Article 21(2) assigns to him the formation of council agendas, the submission of draft decisions, and representation of the municipality.
The stronger conclusion from these provisions is that the mayor cannot distance himself solely on the ground that the projects are formally carried out by the administration or operators, where the initiation of decisions, representation, or supervision of implementation falls within his competence.
In practice, the key point is not the mayor’s 26-year tenure in itself, since the cited statutory text links the mayor to the term of office of the municipal council and to new elections where powers terminate early, but rather that long-term projects must be assessed through the legality and accountability of specific municipal decisions. If a dispute arises over the tender for the palace operator, the granting of naming rights to a commercial entity, or the benefits under the “Druskininkai Resident Card”, the stronger argument will be to rely not on the mayor’s political promises, but on the personal responsibility formula in Article 25(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government, together with the principles in Article 2: transparency, responsiveness to residents’ views, legality, social justice, and respect for human rights. For a professional, the risk lies in failing to draw the line between city marketing and municipal decision-making: once public property, a service operator, or benefits for residents become a concrete administrative practice, a purely communicative explanation is no longer sufficient.
It is necessary to verify which municipal body adopted the decision, whether the mayor submitted the draft decision or represented the municipality, and whether the chosen model withstands scrutiny under the principles of transparency and legality enshrined in Article 2.
Core issue. The legal issue is not the merits of the political assessment of the mayor, but the public administration, accountability, and transparency duties implied by the mayor’s public statements concerning municipal projects, tourism priorities, the selection of an operator, and measures intended for local residents. It must be resolved under Article 3(3) of the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. I-533, which defines the mayor as the executive institution of the municipality and the head of the municipality, vested with municipal authority and public administration powers. Also applicable is the requirement of Article 25(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania that the mayor is directly and personally responsible for the implementation, within the territory of the municipality, of laws, Government decisions, municipal council decisions, and the mayor’s own decisions in matters assigned to the mayor’s competence. The legal boundary of public statements concerning municipal activity must also be assessed under Article 4 of the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania No. I-533: representative democracy, municipal autonomy, the mayor’s accountability to the council, responsibility to the community, legality, coordination of state and municipal interests, residents’ participation, and openness and transparency of activities. The mayor’s public criticism of state tourism institutions is additionally connected with the principle of coordinating municipal and state interests enshrined in Article 4(6). His statements concerning Druskininkai infrastructure, the Culture and Congress Palace, the bus station, and local programmes are not merely political communication, because under Article 25(4)(2) of the Law on Local Self-Government the mayor ensures the preparation of draft long-term social, cultural, economic, investment, and other programmes and the control of their implementation
Legal assessment. Under the cited provisions, the mayor is not merely a representative speaker: Article 3(3) of the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government No. I-533 grants him the status of an executive institution, and therefore statements concerning the construction of facilities, an operator, openings in autumn 2026, and the municipal strategy must be linked to the implementation of decisions falling within his competence. Article 25(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government means that the mayor is directly and personally responsible for implementing, within the municipal territory, decisions assigned to his competence; accordingly, publicly presented projects must legally be assessed through the lens of implementation, not merely promises. Where the issue concerns the operator of the Culture and Congress Palace or the multifunctional bus station complex, the sources provided allow assessment only of the mayor’s duty to ensure the preparation and control of programmes under Article 25(4)(2) of the Law on Local Self-Government, but not the legality conditions of specific tenders or contracts. The statement that the palace will be managed by the company that won the tender falls, in practical terms, within the sphere of openness of municipal activity, because Article 4(9) of the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government No. I-533 provides that information concerning the activities of municipal institutions and bodies, draft decisions, and adopted decisions is public. The description of the “Druskininkai Resident Card” is linked to Article 4(7): decisions adopted in the interests of the municipal community must not infringe the rights of individual residents guaranteed by law. Since the card is described as a measure for persons who have declared their place of residence in Druskininkai Municipality and as granting discounts, the normative question would not be the political attractiveness of the idea itself, but whether municipal decisions concerning such a measure reconcile the interests of the community and of individual residents under Article 4(7). From the perspective of resident involvement, Article 4(8) is relevant; it provides that municipalities inform local residents about their activities, draft decisions, and adopted decisions, and create conditions for direct participation in the planning and implementation of decisions. Therefore, a public interview by the mayor may be one form of information provision, but the legally significant duty is broader: to inform residents about activities and decisions in a manner enabling them to participate in the management of municipal affairs. The mayor’s criticism of the Ministry of Economy and Innovation or “Travel Lithuania” does not eliminate the duty to coordinate municipal and state interests under Article 4(6); on the contrary, the municipality’s tourism direction must be articulated as compatible with municipal competence and the sphere of state interests. Article 25(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government protects the mayor from persecution for opinions expressed at meetings of the municipal council, committees, commissions, or the municipal board, but an interview with a newspaper does not fall within that enumerated meeting context. The same Article 25(3) provides that, for insulting a person, defamation, or disseminating information that is degrading to honour and dignity and inconsistent with reality, the mayor is liable in accordance with the procedure established by law; public communication therefore has a clear boundary of liability. From the perspective of institutional tenure, Article 19(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government provides that the mayor is directly elected for the term of office of the municipal council, while Article 14(1) of the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government No. I-533 defines the beginning and end of the council’s powers. The mayor’s powers begin not from a political statement or the announcement of election results as such, but, under Article 25(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government, after taking the oath. Organisational duties are also subject to time limits: under Article 25(2), within three months from the day on which the directly elected mayor takes the oath, the mayor appoints the director of the municipal administration and a vice-mayor, and, upon termination of their powers, new persons are appointed within two months. The Government’s position provided in respect of Draft Law No. XIIP-3989(2) emphasised the balance of powers between the municipal council, as a representative institution, and the mayor, as the directly elected head of the municipality; accordingly, long-standing political confidence does not alter the institutional balance of competences. The same position stated that the procedure for nominating candidates should be regulated in the rules of procedure of the municipal council, which indicates that the mayor’s personnel proposals and the role of the council must be procedurally defined. The Government resolution concerning Draft Law No. XIP-2469 noted that the nature of the activities of the mayor and deputy mayor is linked to the confidence of the majority of council members, but that provision was based on the regulation then in force concerning a mayor elected by the council. The sources provided do not include case law; therefore, rules from analogous cases do not apply to this situation
Consequences. In practical terms, the most important scenario is the continued implementation of municipal projects through the mayor’s executive responsibility under Article 25(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government and programme control under Article 25(4)(2). If the opening or management of facilities announced for autumn 2026 were based on municipal decisions, their publicity and the informing of residents would have to be ensured under Article 4(8) and (9) of the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government No. I-533. If the mayor’s public formulations concerning state institutions exceeded the limits of opinion and were assessed as insulting a person, defamation, or the dissemination of information that is untrue and degrading to honour and dignity, the second rule of Article 25(3) of the Law on Local Self-Government, concerning liability in accordance with the procedure established by law, would become relevant. If the mayor’s powers were to terminate before the end of the term, new mayoral elections would be held under Article 19(1) of the Law on Local Self-Government. If the mayor were temporarily unable to perform his duties and no deputy mayor had been appointed, then, under the same Article 19(1), the mayor’s duties would be temporarily performed by a council member elected by a majority vote of the council members participating in a municipal council meeting, but for no longer than 120 calendar days on the stated ground of temporary inability. This is practically important for the residents of Druskininkai, because their rights to participation and information arise directly from Article 4(8) and (9) of the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government No. I-533. It is also important for the municipal council, because the mayor’s accountability to the council is enshrined in Article 4(3), and the mayor may not take over the council’s exclusive competence under Article 3(1). For businesses and project operators, the important point is that the mayor’s public statements do not replace competences and procedures: the activities of municipal institutions must be based on the Constitution, laws, and other legal acts under Article 4(5)
The specific question is whether a speed of 226 km/h, intoxication, filming with a phone, an existing driving ban, and fleeing after a fatal accident allow the court to treat the incident not as a typical negligent breach of road traffic rules, but as conduct of such dangerousness that the maximum custodial sentence is justified. In this case, the decisive factor is not merely the fact of the victim’s death, but the totality of the circumstances before and after the incident: the deliberate choice of speed, prior bans, the element of recidivism, and the context of failure to provide assistance and concealment of evidence.
Article 281(2) of the Lithuanian Criminal Code shows that intoxication itself, combined with a breach of road traffic rules and actual consequences, qualitatively changes the level of liability: even for minor impairment of health or substantial property damage, imprisonment of up to three years is available. Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code separately criminalises driving with a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more, even in the absence of a traffic accident. Intoxication is therefore not merely a detail relevant to individualising the sentence, but an independent indicator of dangerousness.
Article 59(1)(1) of the Criminal Code treats the provision of assistance to the victim or active efforts to prevent more serious consequences as a mitigating circumstance; the opposite practical conclusion follows for this situation, namely that fleeing, concealing evidence and failing to provide assistance leave no room for that mitigating line of argument. According to the news report itself, the severity of the Polish sentence resulted from the post-amendment possibility of imposing up to 20 years for an offence of this kind, rather than the previous 12-year limit.
The stronger argument on appeal is likely to be not the abstract severity of the sentence, but whether the first-instance court sufficiently individualised why precisely the maximum sentence of 20 years was necessary, given that the judgment is not yet final. Nevertheless, on the facts presented, the prosecution position appears stronger because of the cumulative dangerousness: driving at 226 km/h in an 80 km/h zone, intoxication, phone use, the driving ban in force as of 21 December 2023, prior offences, and flight from Poland. In practice, this case should be cited not as a simple precedent for “harsher penalties for accidents”, but as an example of a court assessing a fatal traffic incident through the prism of deliberate risk creation and disregard of previous bans.
It would be a mistake for the defence to narrow the dispute to the proposition that “a traffic accident is still negligent”, because the weight of the sentence here rests not only on the form of guilt, but also on the fact that previous sanctions had already proved ineffective.
Core issue. The precise legal question is how, under the cited provisions of Lithuanian law, driving while intoxicated, in gross breach of road traffic safety rules, would be assessed where it results in a traffic accident, injuries to persons, the death of an individual, the driver leaving the scene, and assistance being provided to conceal the circumstances of the incident. The principal provisions are Article 281(1)–(4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania concerning violations of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules, Article 281¹(1) of the Criminal Code concerning driving a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more, and Article 1(2) of the Criminal Code concerning the function of the Criminal Code to define criminal offences and penalties. Also relevant to the aspect of leaving the scene is the rule in Article 144 of the Criminal Code cited in the legislative materials: liability arises for a person who, having created a danger or having a duty to care for the victim, fails to provide assistance when there is a threat to human life, despite having the opportunity to do so
Legal assessment. Under Article 281(1)–(4) of the Criminal Code, the core of liability is not merely speeding, but a violation of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules that is causally linked to the consequences specified by law. If such a violation causes a minor impairment of another person’s health, Article 281(1) of the Criminal Code applies; if the person drove while intoxicated or under the influence and minor impairment of health or significant property damage also resulted, Article 281(2) applies. If the consequence is serious impairment of another person’s health, the classification would be based on Article 281(3), and if the act was committed while intoxicated or under the influence, on Article 281(4), which provides for imprisonment for up to six years. Separately, Article 281¹(1) criminalises the act of driving a motor vehicle where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more is established, as well as evading testing where signs of intoxication are present or consuming alcohol after the incident before the circumstances have been established, where such intoxication is established. The intoxication referred to in the report would be legally relevant only to the extent that it is proven under the applicable procedure and meets the thresholds laid down in the relevant provisions. Article 7 of the Law Amending Article 281 of the Criminal Code states that an act provided for in Article 281(2), (4), or (6) is deemed to have been committed under the influence of alcohol where the blood alcohol concentration is 0.41 per mille or more, or where the person evades intoxication testing or consumed alcohol after the traffic accident before its circumstances were established. As appears from the cited excerpt, the Review No. 30 of the case law of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 24 March 2009 in criminal cases concerning violations of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules also treats the testimony of persons who directly interacted with the offender before the traffic accident as relevant to establishing intoxication. From a procedural standpoint, Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the suspect, accused, defence counsel, victim, civil claimant, and other persons to submit, on their own initiative, objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of the criminal offence. The significance of expert examination is also apparent from the cited excerpt of the Code of Criminal Procedure: upon receiving the expert report, the prosecutor notifies the participants in the proceedings in writing and indicates where and when they may review it. According to the legislative materials provided, leaving the scene of the incident is not in itself equivalent to new criminal liability for fleeing as such, because the assessment of the draft legislation states that a non-dangerous attempt merely to conceal evidence of a legal violation is not, in itself, a basis for criminal liability. However, the same materials clearly emphasise that, in case law, a driver who caused a traffic accident in which people were or could have been injured and who left the scene may incur liability under Article 144 of the Criminal Code for leaving a person without assistance where there is a threat to human life. At the same time, Article 58 of the Criminal Code is relevant to assessing the liability of the convicted acquaintances: accomplices are sentenced having regard to the type, form, role, and nature of their participation, and members of an organised group are generally given a more severe sentence than members of a group of accomplices. Article 59 of the Criminal Code is important for the individualisation of punishment: according to the cited excerpt, mitigating circumstances include providing assistance to the victim, confession and sincere remorse, assistance in clarifying the offence, or voluntary compensation for damage. Accordingly, the account’s references to failure to provide assistance, flight, and lack of remorse would be relevant under the cited provisions not morally, but in terms of legal classification and individualisation of punishment. As regards pre-trial restraint measures, Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits them to be imposed in order to secure participation in the proceedings, an unobstructed investigation, the hearing of the case, enforcement of the judgment, and prevention of new criminal offences, while Article 120 lists among them detention, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, and a written undertaking not to leave. Procedural time limits under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are calculated in hours, days, and months, and periods of detention are calculated from the moment the measure is actually applied
Consequences. Since the report states that the judgment has not yet become final and that the defence intends to appeal it, the most important immediate practical scenario is review by a higher court of the legal classification, the sentence, compensation, and the liability of accomplices. For the family of the victim and the injured persons, compensation for damage is of essential practical importance; under Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if the accused or the persons materially liable for his actions lack the funds to compensate the damage, in the cases and according to the procedure provided by law, the damage may be compensated from state funds allocated for that purpose. For the accused, the legally significant issue is whether the appellate court will uphold the finding that his conduct was not momentary inattention, but a dangerous violation of the rules connected with intoxication, speed, disregard of previous prohibitions, and conduct after the incident. For the persons convicted together with him, the decisive issue would be their specific role after the traffic accident, because Article 58 of the Criminal Code requires an individual assessment of the nature of each accomplice’s participation. For the authorities, this case is practically significant in terms of proof: speed, telephone use, intoxication, leaving the scene, and failure to provide assistance must be substantiated by procedurally proper evidence, including expert reports, objects, documents, and witness testimony. The broader significance is that the cited Lithuanian provisions make it possible to distinguish clearly between three legal layers: the dangerous driving itself and its consequences under Article 281 of the Criminal Code, intoxicated driving under Article 281¹, and post-incident conduct under the application of Article 144 discussed in the legislative materials
Can an employer’s cash-flow difficulties and an employee’s tacit agreement to “bear with it” exclude the employer’s liability for late payment of wages? The crux of the dispute is not whether small businesses experience liquidity problems, but whether the agreed payment date remains binding even where wages are delayed by several days, weeks, or longer.
Article 147(1) of the Labour Code provides that, where the employment relationship has not ended and wages or other employment-related payments are paid late due to the employer’s fault, default interest must be paid together with those sums. This means that a delay is not merely an “internal arrangement” or a reputational issue: the legal consequence arises from the very fact of late payment, provided it is attributable to the employer’s fault. Article 219 of the Labour Code further strengthens the employee’s position, as the body hearing the labour dispute awards all such sums in respect of delayed wages, subject only to the limitations laid down in the Code and to limitation periods.
Article 18 of the Labour Code supports recourse to the State Labour Inspectorate, while Article 19 sets out the role of employee representatives, including trade unions and works councils, in defending such rights.
The article does not fully state that wages must be paid at least twice per month unless otherwise agreed in the employment contract. A more precise formulation under Article 146 of the Labour Code would be as follows: wages are paid at least twice per month, but, at the employee’s request, they may be paid once per month. It is also inaccurate to state that a delay of more than one month may in itself constitute grounds for unilaterally terminating the employment contract and claiming compensation.
Under the cited wording of Article 56 of the Labour Code, the relevant condition is that the employee has not been paid the full wages due to them for two consecutive months or more; therefore, a delay of only one month or one and a half months is insufficient for this specific ground of termination.
In practice, the stronger argument is not the employer’s explanation of “temporary difficulties”, but the employee’s documented claim for the specific unpaid amount and default interest under Article 147 of the Labour Code. The key point for the employee is to record not a general promise by the employer to settle the debt, but the payment deadline set out in the employment contract or another document, the actual date of receipt, payslips, bank statements, and correspondence. The employer’s greatest risk is assuming that delays of several weeks “do not create a case”, because Article 219 allows the body hearing the labour dispute to award all delayed sums.
Nevertheless, an employee’s decision to terminate the contract must be grounded carefully: under Article 56 of the Labour Code, the safer position arises where the full wages due have not been paid for two consecutive months or more, rather than from general irregularity in payments alone.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether an employer’s delay in paying wages gives the employee an independent right to additional monetary payments and through what institutional procedure such a breach is supervised. It must be assessed under Article 147 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Labour Code, which regulates late payment of wages and other employment-related payments. Article 145 of the same law is also applicable, as it provides that, in the cases specified in the Labour Code, payments due to an employee are calculated on the basis of average wages. The avenues for protecting labour rights arise from Article 18 of that law on administrative supervision and Article 19 on the participation of employee representatives. The competence of the supervisory authority must be assessed under Articles 4, 6, 8 and 9 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the State Labour Inspectorate
Legal assessment. Under Article 147(1) of the Law on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Labour Code, where the employment relationship has not ended and wages are paid late through the employer’s fault, default interest must be paid to the employee together with those wages. This provision means that the employer’s cash-flow difficulties do not in themselves eliminate the obligation to settle amounts due, nor do they eliminate the obligation to pay default interest where the delay is attributable to the employer’s fault. Under the same Article 147(1), the rate of default interest is approved each year by 1 February by the Minister of Social Security and Labour of the Republic of Lithuania, taking into account the consumer price index published by the State Data Agency. If bankruptcy proceedings are opened against the employer or out-of-court bankruptcy proceedings are commenced, the calculation of default interest is discontinued from the point specified in Article 147(1). Where the employment relationship has ended, the consequences are more stringent: under Article 147(2), if the employer delays final settlement for reasons not attributable to the employee, the employer must pay a penalty. The amount of that penalty is the employee’s average monthly wage multiplied by the number of months of delay, but not exceeding six months. In such a case, the average wage is calculated on the basis of Article 145 of the Law on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Labour Code and the calculation procedure approved by the Government. At the administrative level, Article 18 of the Law on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Labour Code provides that compliance with the Labour Code and other labour law rules is supervised by the State Labour Inspectorate and other institutions within their respective competence. Article 4 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the State Labour Inspectorate particularises that competence: the State Labour Inspectorate carries out prevention of breaches of normative labour legislation and supervises compliance with the Labour Code and legislation governing employment relationships in undertakings, irrespective of their form of ownership, type or nature of activity. Under Article 9(1)(1) of that law, inspectors, upon presenting their official certificate and the decision to conduct an inspection, may inspect workplaces without prior notice, and under Article 9(1)(2) they may obtain data, documents and other evidence from the employer. This is practically important because, in a case of delayed wages, wage accounting, payment and settlement documents become material. The employee may also act through representatives, since Article 19 of the Law on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Labour Code provides that employees’ rights and interests are protected by trade unions, works councils and employee trustees. As regards the lawfulness of the internal actions of the State Labour Inspectorate, Article 8 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the State Labour Inspectorate is relevant; under that provision, the Chief State Labour Inspector examines requests and complaints concerning the lawfulness of inspectors’ actions and decisions. The sources provided contain no case law; accordingly, the assessment is based on statutory regulation and the rules defining institutional competence
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is the continuation of the employment relationship: the employer pays the delayed wages and, at the same time, must pay default interest under Article 147(1) of the Law on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Labour Code. The second scenario is the termination of the employment relationship and delayed final settlement, where under Article 147(2) the employee may acquire a right to a penalty calculated on the basis of average wages, but for no more than six months. The third scenario is the involvement of the supervisory authority: under Articles 4 and 9 of the Law on the State Labour Inspectorate, the State Labour Inspectorate may inspect the employer and require documents necessary to supervise compliance with labour law rules. The fourth scenario is a collective or representative pressure mechanism through a trade union, works council or employee trustee under Article 19 of the Law on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Labour Code. The practical significance for the employee is monetary: delay is not merely a failure to honour a promise, because the law links it to default interest or, after the employment relationship has ended, to a penalty. The practical significance for the employer is that delayed payment of wages becomes not only an internal financial management issue, but also a matter of labour law supervision. This is particularly important for smaller undertakings, because Article 4 of the Law on the State Labour Inspectorate does not make competence dependent on the employer’s size or type of activity. Therefore, the further legal course of such a situation will depend on whether the employment relationship is continuing or has ended, the length of the delay in settlement, and what documents the State Labour Inspectorate or employee representatives are able to assess within their competence
Can a municipality, having received residents’ request concerning roads not taken over after the liquidation of the garden association “Gegužinė”, effectively leave the exclusion of four roads from the list of maintained roads without a clear administrative decision on their legal status, ownership, and maintenance obligation?
Article 11 of the Law on Public Administration obliges public administration entities to examine persons’ requests and complaints in accordance with rules approved by the Government, while refusal to examine them is permitted only on narrowly defined grounds, for example where the applicant cannot be identified or the request is non-specific and incomprehensible. The news report indicates the opposite situation: since 2022, residents have specifically requested that the ownership or affiliation of the former garden association’s roads be determined and that seven Gegužinė streets be included in the list of local roads and streets. The stronger legal emphasis here is therefore not merely the roads’ technical parameters, but the duty to resolve the status issue through an administrative procedure, since the response “we do not know who the users are” is not equivalent to a reasoned decision.
The article is imprecise in stating that roads which do not meet the criteria for local roads are, for that reason, classified as internal roads whose maintenance must be ensured by users. Under the wording of Article 3 of the Law on Roads, internal roads are not “non-local” roads: local roads are divided into public roads and internal roads. It would be more accurate to say that the dispute is not whether the road falls outside the local road system altogether, but whether the specific Gegužinė roads should be regarded as public roads, internal roads, ownerless property, or municipal/state property.
It is also incomplete simply to state that, upon liquidation of a garden association, property must be transferred to a successor: Article 27 of the Law on Garden Associations provides that, where no successors to the property appear, roads and infrastructure objects are accepted, safeguarded, entered into accounting records, recognised as ownerless, and transferred into municipal or state ownership.
In practice, the stronger argument for residents and their representatives is not an abstract demand to “repair the roads”, but a demand that a reasoned administrative decision be adopted on the status of each of the four excluded roads, based on Article 3 of the Law on Roads and Article 27 of the Law on Garden Associations. It is risky for the municipality to rely solely on the criterion of a dead-end road or turning area if it does not also resolve who is legally required to account for the road, safeguard it, initiate the ownerless-property procedure, or lawfully establish the users’ obligation. In professionally drafting a complaint, it is worth challenging not only the refusal to include the four streets in the list, but also the administrative inaction in determining the status of the property.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not the abstract “ownership” of the roads, but whether Vilnius District Municipality and other public administration entities are lawfully examining residents’ requests, adopting administrative decisions, or avoiding delay in actions falling within their competence. This issue is to be assessed under Articles 11, 14 and 42 of the Law on Public Administration of the Republic of Lithuania, Articles 3, 17, 28, 93 and 132 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings of the Republic of Lithuania, and paragraphs 1, 24, 33 and 34 of the Rules on the Examination of Requests and Complaints by Public Administration Entities. Article 11(1) of the Law on Public Administration provides that requests and complaints from persons are examined in accordance with rules approved by the Government, while Article 11(2) permits them to be submitted by electronic means, by post, in person or through a representative. Article 14 of the Law on Public Administration gives a person the right to appeal an administrative decision, act, omission or delay to the same entity, a superior entity, a pre-litigation dispute resolution body or an administrative court. Article 17(1)(2) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings directly assigns to administrative courts cases concerning acts, actions, omissions and delays of municipal administration entities
Legal assessment. The residents’ request to include Gegužinės Streets 1-7 in the list of local roads and streets must, on the basis of the sources provided, be regarded as a request or complaint submitted to a public administration entity, and is therefore subject to paragraph 1 of the Rules and Article 11 of the Law on Public Administration. The municipality cannot confine itself to informal explanations or oral deliberations where the submission is a request for the adoption of an administrative decision; it must be accepted, examined and concluded by a response or decision under paragraph 24 of the Rules. If the institution lacks data, paragraph 34 of the Rules requires it to contact the person in writing within 5 working days to request the necessary information and documents, rather than shifting the burden of uncertainty onto the residents. If the residents’ submission were merely a notification about a situation or deficiencies in the institution’s activities, paragraph 33 of the Rules would allow it only to be registered and assessed; however, the request described in the notice, seeking the inclusion of specific streets in the list, is clearly directed at an administrative decision. The municipality’s decision to grant the request in part, by including three streets and excluding four, is a contestable administrative decision within the meaning of Article 14 of the Law on Public Administration. The same applies to inaction if the municipality fails to provide a clear response as to who, within its competence, must initiate actions concerning the roads not included. Article 3(2) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings means that, in such a dispute, the court would not review the expediency of a political or economic decision, but would assess whether the law has been breached, whether competence has been exceeded, and whether the inaction is inconsistent with the purposes of the institution’s powers. Accordingly, the axis of the dispute would not be whether it is “convenient” for the municipality to take over or maintain the roads, but whether it lawfully examined the request, substantiated its refusal and performed the actions falling within its competence. Differences in position between the National Land Service, the ministries and the municipality do not, under the rules provided, remove the obligation of each public administration entity to act within the limits of its competence. Article 14 of the Law on Public Administration specifically provides a remedy for a situation in which a person is confronted with a chain of decisions, inaction and delay. If the alleged infringement by a public administration entity is challenged, Article 11(3)(5) of the Law on Public Administration permits a complaint not to be examined where more than one month has elapsed since the infringements became apparent; it is therefore practically important for the residents to challenge specific recent decisions or instances of inaction. If the dispute were first examined by an administrative disputes commission, Article 28(1) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings allows the commission’s decision to be appealed to an administrative court within one month from the date of receipt of the decision. If the commission fails to examine the complaint in time, Article 28(2) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings permits an application to the court within two months from the date by which the decision should have been adopted. The sources provided contain no case law concerning the “Žara” gardeners’ association, and therefore its outcome may be significant factually, but cannot be used as a legal precedent in this assessment
Consequences. The most realistic first course is to challenge the municipality’s refusal concerning the four streets or its inaction under Article 14 of the Law on Public Administration. If the dispute reached an administrative court, the court could, under Article 17(1)(2) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings, assess the lawfulness of the municipality’s administrative decision, inaction or delay. The possible outcome would not be a court decision itself “to repair the roads”, but an order requiring the public administration entity to perform an action falling within its competence or to re-examine the matter properly. If the municipal public administrative disputes commission had previously adopted a decision favourable to the residents, Article 93 of the Law on Administrative Proceedings provides for the possibility of applying to the court to secure enforcement of that decision. If the judgment of the court of first instance were unfavourable to one of the parties, Article 132(1) of the Law on Administrative Proceedings would allow it to be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania within one month from its pronouncement. If the residents suffered damage as a result of an unlawful administrative decision, inaction or delay, Article 42 of the Law on Public Administration also allows the issue of compensation for damage to be raised in accordance with the procedure established by law. The practical significance of this situation for the residents is that their course of action should be framed not as a request for “someone to assume responsibility”, but as a specific demand to adopt, amend or annul an administrative decision, or to terminate delay. For the municipality, this case is important because ambiguous explanations and inter-institutional correspondence do not in themselves replace the obligation to adopt a decision capable of legal review. For the National Land Service and the ministries, the situation is relevant insofar as their responses may disclose the limits of competence; however, under the rules provided, the dispute concerning the lawfulness of the municipality’s actions would ultimately be resolved by an administrative dispute resolution body or an administrative court
Whether advertising the paid iCloud+ feature “Hide My Email” as a private email protection tool, while knowing of an unremedied vulnerability since June 2025, may be regarded as misleading advertising and improper performance of contractual privacy obligations.
Article 6.302 of the Civil Code provides that “the advertiser shall be liable for damage caused by misleading advertising”, and that the advertiser is liable unless it proves that the damage was not caused through its fault. This is significant here because the claimant’s theory rests not only on a technical defect, but on the point at which knowledge arose: Apple is alleged to have received researcher Tyler Murphy’s report, confirmed that it was investigating, later acknowledged that a final fix was still being prepared, yet continued to sell iCloud+ with a privacy promise. Article 28 of the Law on Advertising permits claims not only for damages, but also for cessation of the advertising and for statements of specific content refuting the misleading advertising.
Accordingly, a request to require Apple to fix the flaw or clearly inform users is normatively consistent with the proposed remedial model. Article 6.153 of the Civil Code is also relevant if Apple were to rely on standard terms limiting liability for the feature’s failure: non-individually negotiated terms restricting consumer rights where a service is improperly performed may be deemed unfair.
The stronger argument for the claimant is not that an actual attack occurred, since the report itself states that there are no confirmed cases of that kind, but that the paid feature may have systematically failed to conform to a specific sales promise: concealing the real email address. If the tests did indeed show that the vulnerability was reproducible for all tested addresses created through Hide My Email, the consumer’s theory of loss may be based on the portion of the iCloud+ price paid for privacy functionality that was not received, rather than on individual harm from data disclosure. In practice, Apple’s weakest point would be the period after notification of the vulnerability: from June 2025 until at least the end of May 2026, the dispute shifts from a “software bug” to “whether there was a duty to change the marketing or clearly warn users”.
For practitioners, it is worth citing Article 6.302 of the Civil Code on the presumption of the advertiser’s fault and Article 28 of the Law on Advertising on corrective statements, because these grounds better support injunctive and information-based relief than a merely abstract breach of a privacy promise.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the paid “iCloud+” digital service, advertised as protecting the user’s real email address, was of inadequate quality and whether the promotional privacy claims could have misled the consumer. This issue should primarily be assessed under Article 6.22822 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which regulates consumer rights in cases of non-supply or inadequate quality of digital content or a digital service. If the dispute were to raise issues concerning contractual terms restricting consumer rights, Article 6.153 of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania on unfair terms in consumer contracts would apply. The advertising aspect should be assessed under the concept of misleading advertising set out in Article 2(4) of the Law on Advertising of the Republic of Lithuania, as referred to in Bulletin No. 08 of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania’s administrative law practice. The personal data security aspect is linked to Article 24 of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data of the Republic of Lithuania, under which the controller and processor must implement appropriate organisational and technical measures against unlawful disclosure
Legal assessment. On the stated facts, the consumer paid for “iCloud+”, one feature of which was the concealment of the real email address; accordingly, “Hide My Email” should legally be treated as part of the digital service. If, due to a vulnerability, the service could disclose the very data it was intended to conceal, the consumer’s claim would not concern an abstract security promise, but the improper functioning of a feature presented in the contract and in advertising. Article 6.22822(1) of the Civil Code first provides for the consumer’s right to require the trader to supply the digital content or digital service, and if, following such a demand, it is not supplied without delay or within an expressly agreed additional period, the consumer may unilaterally terminate the contract. In this situation, that would mean requiring the elimination of the possibility of disclosing the email address or ensuring that the feature actually operates in accordance with its intended purpose. Article 6.22822(2) of the Civil Code would allow immediate termination of the contract only where the trader states, or it is clear from the circumstances, that the service will not be supplied, or where the agreed time limit was of essential importance to the consumer and was not observed. According to the information provided, “Apple” informed the researcher of a fix and later acknowledged that it was continuing work on the final fix; therefore, the key point of dispute would be not merely the existence of the error, but whether consumers were receiving the service for which they paid. Article 6.153(1) of the Civil Code gives the consumer the right to seek a court declaration that consumer contract terms contrary to the requirements of fairness are invalid. If the service terms contained a provision excluding or limiting the consumer’s rights where the service provider fully or partially performs its obligations improperly, it would fall within the scope of Article 6.153(2)(2) of the Civil Code. For the purposes of Article 2(4) of the Law on Advertising, misleading advertising is advertising which in any way misleads or is likely to mislead persons and, by reason of its misleading nature, is likely to affect their economic behaviour. Bulletin No. 08 of the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania’s administrative law practice emphasises that the purpose of the Law on Advertising is to improve consumer information about goods and services, protect consumer interests, and safeguard freedom of fair competition. Accordingly, what would be legally significant is not only whether there was actual exploitation of the vulnerability, but also whether the security claims could have affected the consumer’s decision to pay for the service. Article 24 of the Law on Legal Protection of Personal Data requires technical and organisational measures appropriate to the nature of the personal data to be protected and the risks of processing. Since the real email address forms part of private information, and the function itself is intended to prevent its disclosure, the risk assessment should be strict precisely because of the declared purpose of the service. From an institutional perspective, the cited sources connect consumer rights protection with the right to accurate, clear and comprehensive information, control of unfair contract terms, and supervision of compliance with advertising requirements within the relevant competence. With regard to personal data protection in the electronic communications sector, the sources refer to the supervisory function of the State Data Protection Inspectorate under Article 12(5)(1) of the Law on Electronic Communications in respect of Articles 62, 68 and other articles of Chapter Nine of that Law
Consequences. The first practical scenario is that the service provider eliminates the vulnerability and clearly aligns the information provided to consumers with the actual operation of the feature. The second scenario is that consumers bring claims concerning an inadequate digital service on the basis of Article 6.22822 of the Civil Code, including the right to terminate the contract if the statutory conditions are met. The third scenario is that the dispute moves into the area of unfair terms if the service provider relies on terms limiting liability or consumer rights in respect of improper performance of the service. The fourth scenario is that promotional privacy claims are assessed as potentially misleading if they could have affected consumers’ economic behaviour in purchasing or continuing an “iCloud+” subscription. From the perspective of the collective interest, it is important that the sources refer to the protection of the public interest of consumers in court and to the logic of actions concerning infringements that cause or may cause harm to the collective interests of consumers. In practical terms, the case is important for paying consumers because the value of the dispute arises not only from a single technical defect, but from the difference between the promised privacy protection and the quality of the digital service actually provided
Following termination of the VAATC contract with Energesman, can the takeover of management of the waste sorting plant and the redirection of waste flows be based solely on a decision of Vilnius City, or is regional action by the municipalities required under the municipal waste management system?
Article 30(1) of the Law on Waste Management indicates that municipal waste management is not a simple private relationship between an operator and a resident: in the organisation of the service, the conclusion of a contract, or the payment of a municipal levy, waste holders are represented by the owner of the immovable property or by authorised entities. This reinforces the argument that the dispute with Energesman concerning the operation of the MBA facilities is primarily a matter of system administration and continuity of service, rather than merely a bilateral commercial dispute. The amending provision to Article 27(5) of the Law on Waste Management provides that the municipal waste management regional plan is approved at regional level and, where the region does not coincide with administrative boundaries, with the approval of the municipalities located in that region.
The stronger conclusion from this rule is that the Vilnius Mayor’s call for all eight municipalities to act has a clearer legal basis than a unilateral attempt by Vilnius City alone to rearrange the region’s waste flows.
In practical terms, the stronger argument for VAATC and the municipalities is not merely Energesman’s breach of contract, but the fact that the accumulation of 21,000 tonnes of waste, approaching the 24,000-tonne limit specified in the IPPC permit, creates a systemic problem of continuity of regional service and environmental risk. Decisions should therefore record not only the grounds for termination of the contract, but also the link between the regional waste management plan, municipal approval, and the emergency regime. Elektrėnai’s position on refusing access to the Kazokiškės landfill is not merely a political disagreement: if the redirection of waste flows is based only on an administrative decision of Vilnius City, the weak point will be the lack of competence and regional approval.
The declaration of a state-level emergency in this factual situation would be legally significant because it would shift the basis for decision-making from inter-municipal coordination to a special crisis regime, allowing the burden of waste sorting to be distributed more broadly.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not merely the termination of the contract with Energesman, but which entity, under the rules governing the public municipal waste management system, must ensure the continuity of mixed municipal waste management in the Vilnius region and the management of regional facilities. It is to be assessed under Article 2(58^2), Article 30(1)–(3), Article 30^3(1), (3), (4) and (8), Article 30^5(1)–(3), and Article 31(1)–(2) of the Law on Waste Management of the Republic of Lithuania. Also relevant are points 25, 94, 95, 98.1, 223 and 224 of the Waste Management Plan approved by Resolution No. 519 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 12 April 2002. These provisions make it possible to assess whether VAATC, as the Vilnius regional waste management centre, is an appropriate entity to take over management of the regional facility if the municipalities have entrusted it with such functions. Article 2(58^2) of the Law on Waste Management defines a regional waste management centre as a legal person established by all municipalities forming part of the region, which manages regional municipal waste management facilities and performs functions assigned by the municipalities. Accordingly, the legal axis of the mayor’s appeal is the relationship between municipal mandates, management of the regional facility, and continuity of the public municipal waste management service
Legal assessment. Article 30(1) of the Law on Waste Management allows several or all municipalities of a region to cooperate and establish an administrator of the municipal waste management system, while Article 30(2) provides that such administrator’s duty to perform functions must be set out in founding documents, an agreement with the municipality, or an administrative act. This means that VAATC’s competence is not merely a matter of political agreement: it must be based on municipal mandates and the relevant documents. Article 30^3(3) of the Law on Waste Management expressly provides that regional waste management centres, upon assignment by municipalities, manage regional municipal waste management facilities. Point 4 of the same article allows them to organise the provision of waste management services where such services are assigned by municipalities, while point 8 obliges them to provide state and municipal institutions with the information necessary for the performance of their duties. Therefore, if the municipalities of the Vilnius region have assigned the relevant functions to VAATC, VAATC is an entity provided for in legal sources that may organise the management of the regional facility and the restoration of the service. The involvement of a private operator is not in itself contrary to this system, since point 94 of the Plan provides that, when organising municipal waste management, municipalities promote public-private cooperation, and waste managers are selected in accordance with legal acts and the principle of fair competition. However, Article 30(3)(2) and (3) of the Law on Waste Management grant the administrator, where assigned by the municipality, functions relating to verification, supervision and control of the performance of contractual obligations. Consequently, the reason for termination of the contract referred to in the notice, namely material breaches, should, on the basis of the sources provided, be assessed not as an independently established fact, but as a situation falling within the administrator’s sphere of supervision and control. Article 31(1) of the Law on Waste Management obliges municipal councils to approve waste management rules regulating the organisation of the system, the provision of services, and compliance with environmental protection and public health safety requirements. Under Article 31(2), compliance with those rules is controlled by municipal institutions; therefore, municipalities cannot confine themselves to public statements where waste acceptance, accumulation or diversion creates problems for the functioning of the system. Article 30^1(2) of the Law on Waste Management also reflects the obligations of residents: owners of immovable property or authorised persons must pay a charge or conclude a service provision contract if no charge has been established. This reinforces the municipalities’ duty to ensure that a service is actually organised in return for the charge or contractual payment. Article 30^5(1) of the Law on Waste Management links the administration of municipal waste management funds to the signing of contracts, the collection of charges or payments, disbursement of funds to service providers, accounting, and public provision of information, where such functions are assigned by the municipality. If these functions have not been assigned to an administrator, Article 30^5(3) provides that they are performed by the municipality itself in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Point 25 of the Plan confirms that municipalities may assign the organisation of municipal waste management systems to an administrator, and in the case of Vilnius a county waste management centre operates. Point 223 of the Plan further states that, in 2021–2027, the functions of system organisation and service administration remain assigned to municipalities and are performed through municipal systems or through cooperation via regional systems. The mayor’s call for all municipalities of the region to act jointly is therefore consistent with the logic of the cited provisions: the regional system is based not only on the City of Vilnius, but on the mandates and coordination of all municipalities in the region. Point 95 of the Plan is important for the dispute concerning waste diversion, as it establishes the direction that municipal waste generated within a municipality’s territory should be managed at the regional infrastructure facilities of that waste management region. At the same time, point 224 of the Plan provides that, after sorting, waste unsuitable for recycling but having energy value is used for energy recovery in waste incineration facilities; accordingly, restoration of the sorting and incineration chain mentioned in the notice is linked to the waste management model established in planning documents. Point 98.1 of the Plan describes municipal waste management as a public service that must be universal, of good quality, accessible, and compliant with environmental protection and public health safety requirements
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the municipalities of the region, relying on Article 30(1)–(2) and Article 30^3(3) of the Law on Waste Management, coordinate their mandates so that VAATC in practice manages the regional facility and organises the service. The second scenario is that, while management of the facility is being stabilised, municipal institutions control compliance with waste management rules under Article 31(2), and the entity administering funds ensures continuity of payments, accounting and information provision under Article 30^5. The third scenario is that part of the waste is temporarily diverted to another regional infrastructure facility, but such a decision must be coordinated with the regional management direction established in point 95 of the Plan and the environmental and public health safety requirements referred to in point 98.1. The practical significance for residents is that their obligation to pay a charge or have a service contract under Article 30^1(2) of the Law on Waste Management remains linked to the municipalities’ duty to ensure an operational public service. For municipalities, this situation is important because, according to the sources provided, they remain the principal entities responsible for organising the system, even where functions have been transferred to VAATC or another administrator. For VAATC, this is a matter of competence and responsibility: it may act to the extent that functions have been assigned to it under Articles 30 and 30^3 of the Law on Waste Management. As regards Energesman, the sources provided allow only the assessment that the activities of a private waste manager must be controlled through mechanisms for supervising contractual obligations and compliance with waste management rules, rather than independently resolving the legality of the contract termination
Can the Commission, by delegated act, narrow the practical scope of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 so that smart glasses, watches, activity trackers and certain electric toys are not subject to the requirement that the battery be readily removable and replaceable by the consumer, where opening the product creates a safety risk or access to the battery is constrained by technical circumstances. The core of the dispute is not merely Meta’s interest, but the boundary between a technical exemption and a substantive weakening of the consumer-protection standard.
The evidence provided does not directly quote the article of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 concerning battery removability, so the substantive rule can be grounded only in the requirement referred to in the news report and in the general principle of EU law that a delegated act may elaborate or specify the application of a regulation only within the limits of the powers conferred. The evidence clearly shows that Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 is identified as the EU regulation in force on batteries and waste batteries, and the news report links the Commission’s proposal specifically to its requirement for consumer-replaceable batteries. The delegated-acts model is illustrated by Article 284 of Regulation (EU) No 952/2013: the Parliament or the Council may revoke the powers conferred on the Commission to adopt delegated acts, and once the Commission adopts such an act it must notify the Parliament and the Council.
Accordingly, the strongest legal question will not be whether the exemption is economically beneficial, but whether it remains a technical implementation adjustment that does not alter the essential legislative choice concerning repairability and consumer control.
For manufacturers, the stronger argument at this stage is one based on safety and technical infeasibility: if access to the battery in smart glasses or watches genuinely increases risk to the consumer or undermines the product’s structural function, the exemption is easier to defend as a proportionate clarification of the regulation’s logic. For consumer organisations, the strongest challenge would not be the assertion that any exemption is prohibited, but the argument that a categorical exemption may become a circumvention of an essential obligation if it is not narrowly linked to a specific safety risk and technical inaccessibility of the battery. In practice, companies planning European market launches should not rely on product category alone: their documentation will need to substantiate why opening the particular model, or replacing its battery by the consumer, creates a risk or is not realistically feasible from a technical standpoint.
While the Parliament and the Member States may still object to the delegated act, the regulatory risk remains procedural: product timelines may be accelerated, but contractual supply and distribution plans should account for the scenario in which the exemption does not enter into force or is narrowed.
Core issue. The legal issue is not merely the technical removal of a battery, but whether smart glasses, watches and similar connected products fall within the system of obligations under Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 concerning batteries and waste batteries, and how those obligations would be supervised in Lithuania. This issue is assessed under Regulation (EU) 2023/1542, which is expressly identified in Lithuanian law in item 118-1 of the Annex to the Code of Administrative Offences, as well as under the Government Resolution “On the Implementation of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542”, which assigns functions to national authorities under Article 22(1) and (2), Article 24, Article 54(1), (3) and (4), Article 69(2), Article 76(1), Article 79(6), Article 80(2), and Article 81(1) and (3) of the Regulation. In Lithuania’s internal market, Article 34^15 of the Law on Waste Management is also relevant, as it establishes obligations for producers and importers of batteries and accumulators to register, organise the collection, treatment and recycling of waste, and inform the public. Where obligations are fulfilled collectively, Article 34^16 of the Law on Waste Management applies, permitting producers and importers to entrust the management of waste batteries and accumulators to an organisation
Legal assessment. The exception proposed by the Commission, as described in the notice, would alter the design requirement applicable to the product, but would not remove batteries as a regulated object from the system of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542. Accordingly, a producer or importer placing such products on the Lithuanian market would remain subject to the obligation to register in accordance with the procedure established by the Minister of Environment, as set out in Article 34^15(1)(1) of the Law on Waste Management. The obligations set out in Article 34^15(1)(2) and (3) to organise a system for the collection, treatment and recycling of waste batteries and accumulators, and to ensure that collected waste is managed in accordance with environmental protection, public health safety and waste management requirements, would also remain in force. If the producer or importer chose a collective model, Article 34^16(1) of the Law on Waste Management would allow the obligations to be entrusted to an organisation, while Article 34^16(2) would require a bank guarantee or surety insurance contract to cover the financing of waste management for waste that may arise over a three-month period. Under the Government Resolution “On the Implementation of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542”, the Environmental Protection Agency is assigned functions relating to producer registration under Article 55 of the Regulation, authorisation to fulfil extended producer responsibility obligations for batteries under Article 58 of the Regulation, data collection under Article 75 of the Regulation, and public disclosure of data and submission of reports to the Commission under Article 76 of the Regulation. Under the same resolution, the Environmental Protection Department supervises the fulfilment of extended producer responsibility obligations for batteries under Article 57 of the Regulation. The State Consumer Rights Protection Authority performs market surveillance functions for batteries, except batteries for electric vehicles, under Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 and carries out the actions specified in Chapter X of the Regulation concerning risk assessment, recall or withdrawal from the market. This means that even if simple battery removal by the consumer were no longer mandatorily required for a specific category of connected devices, supervisory authorities would still assess battery conformity and potential risk within the scope of the competences assigned to them. Paragraph 13 of the Rules on the Management of Waste Batteries and Accumulators further establishes that producers and importers of portable batteries and accumulators must ensure separate waste collection, free acceptance from consumers, and convenient collection points. Paragraph 4 of those Rules provides for special exclusions only for security, military-purpose and space equipment; therefore, based on the text provided, ordinary smart glasses or watches do not fall within those exceptions under the national waste management rules
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario would be that the delegated amendment enters into force and producers may place compact connected devices on the market without a design solution enabling the consumer to remove the battery easily. In that case, the legal burden would shift from consumer-performed battery replacement to the obligations of the producer, importer and waste management system under Articles 34^15 and 34^16 of the Law on Waste Management. The second scenario would be more intensive market surveillance: the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority could assess whether a specific battery poses a risk and apply measures to ensure that non-compliant or hazardous batteries are recalled or withdrawn from the market. The third scenario is relevant to importers and distributors: before placing products on the Lithuanian market, they would need to address registration, data submission, financing of waste collection, and the choice between a collective organisation and an individual system. For the consumer, this change would in practice mean not a guarantee of independent battery replacement, but dependence on the producer’s repair, replacement or waste acceptance arrangements, while preserving the principle of free acceptance of waste batteries under subparagraph 13.2 of the Rules on the Management of Waste Batteries and Accumulators. For Lithuanian authorities, this is significant because the implementation of Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 has already been allocated among the Environmental Protection Agency, the Environmental Protection Department and the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority; therefore, the new exception would not alter the supervisory architecture itself, but only the specific content of conformity assessment within the category of connected devices
Whether shots fired in a public place, where the victim was injured but discharged after treatment for outpatient care, are properly classified as attempted murder by a method dangerous to the lives of other persons, rather than merely as bodily harm or unlawful use of a weapon.
Article 22(1) of the Criminal Code requires not the gravity of the consequence, but intentional conduct by which the commission of an offence is directly commenced, where the offence is not completed due to circumstances beyond the perpetrator’s control. Accordingly, the fact that a man wounded by gunfire in Šiauliai was discharged from a medical institution for outpatient treatment does not, in itself, weaken the classification as attempted murder, provided that the direction of fire, distance, number of shots and surrounding circumstances indicate a direct attack on life. Article 22(3) of the Criminal Code means that liability arises together with the provision governing the completed offence; therefore, Article 129(2)(7) of the Criminal Code, cited by the prosecution, operates here as the basis for classifying a completed murder, while Article 22 explains why death is not required for liability.
Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code separately criminalises the manufacture, acquisition, possession, carrying, transport or transfer of a firearm without authorisation; consequently, the investigation will need to prove not only the fact of shooting, but also the absence of authorisation and the specific form of possession or control.
The wording of the article, stating that the prosecutor decides whether to apply “to the court” for imposition of the strictest remand measure, is incomplete if understood as a general statement of competence in the pre-trial investigation. Under the wording of the cited law amending Articles 120 and 121 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, such remand measures “may be imposed only by an order of a pre-trial investigation judge or a court”. It would be more precise to say that, at the pre-trial investigation stage, the prosecutor applies for detention under the procedural control of a judge, rather than saying abstractly that detention is imposed solely by “the court” without distinguishing that stage.
At this stage, the prosecution’s stronger argument is not the resulting injury, but the chosen method of conduct: shooting in a public place allows dangerousness to be constructed not only in relation to the specific victim, but also in relation to other persons, which is directly connected with the cited classification under Article 129(2)(7) of the Criminal Code through Article 22. For the defence, the key practical task is to challenge the elements of intent to kill and of a “method dangerous to the lives of other persons”, rather than relying solely on the fact that the victim was discharged for outpatient treatment. As regards Article 253 of the Criminal Code, the risk for the prosecution lies in the autonomy of proof: unlawful possession or control of a firearm is not an automatic consequence of shooting, so clear proof of the absence of authorisation and of factual possession or control will be required.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether shots fired with a firearm in a public place, injuring a person and damaging a car, constitute attempted murder under Article 22(1) and (3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, in conjunction with Article 129(2)(7) of the Criminal Code, as well as unlawful possession of a firearm under Article 253(1) of the Criminal Code. Article 22(1) requires establishing intentional conduct by which the commission of a criminal offence is directly commenced, but not completed due to circumstances beyond the perpetrator’s control. Article 22(3) provides that liability for an attempt arises under Article 22 and the article of the Criminal Code establishing the corresponding completed offence. As regards the legal significance of the weapon, the issue under Article 253(1) is whether the persons, without authorisation, manufactured, acquired, stored, carried, transported or transferred a firearm, ammunition, explosives or explosive materials. Article 3 of the Criminal Code is also relevant, because the criminality of an act and the punishability of a person are determined under the criminal law in force at the time the act was committed
Legal assessment. According to the information provided, the investigation was opened not merely in relation to a threat, but in relation to shots actually fired; therefore, the offence of threatening under Article 145(1) of the Criminal Code is not the principal axis of qualification here. This distinction is also confirmed by the cited source concerning Article 145: where a person not only threatens, but begins preparing for or attempts to kill or impair health, liability is linked to preparation for, or an attempt to commit, the relevant offence. The fact of injury and the shooting in a public place are circumstances which, under Article 22(1), may be assessed as the direct commencement of the commission of the offence, rather than preparatory or merely verbal acts. The fact that the victim, after receiving assistance at a medical institution, was discharged for outpatient treatment does not in itself preclude the attempted-offence model, because Article 22 focuses on why the act was not completed and the extent to which the intent was implemented. If the case were to reach court, sentencing would be governed by Article 57 of the Criminal Code: for an attempt, punishment is imposed under the general procedure, taking into account the dangerousness of the acts, the degree to which the intent was implemented, and the reasons why the offence was not completed. Article 57(2) provides for the possibility of imposing a more lenient sentence on the basis of Article 62, but that is a sentencing issue, not an issue of initial legal qualification. As regards the weapon, it will be necessary separately to establish the absence of authorisation and the specific mode of possession or control, because Article 253(1) lists independent acts: manufacture, acquisition, storage, carrying, transportation or transfer. The cited source concerning amendments to Article 253 shows a broader formulation, including sending and use, as well as alternatives of a fine and restriction of liberty; therefore, under Article 3 it would be important to apply precisely the criminal law in force at the time the act was committed or, where relevant, the criminal law that mitigates the person’s position. Article 255 would concern a different type of situation, because it regulates negligent breaches of the rules on storing, carrying or transporting a lawfully held firearm; in the information provided, the investigation is linked to unlawful possession or control and shooting, so the visible part of that article does not replace the analysis under Article 253. Article 258 is likewise not an appropriate principal provision, because it concerns a non-firearm weapon, whereas the information refers to a firearm. Procedurally, it is significant that the investigation is led by a prosecutor and the actions are carried out by police officers; according to the information provided, the prosecutor is deciding whether to apply to the court for detention on remand. The cited provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure make it possible to identify the procedural position of witnesses: under Article 78, any person may be summoned as a witness if there is information that he or she knows circumstances relevant to the case. However, under Article 80(1), a person who may give testimony about a criminal offence committed by himself or herself may not be questioned as a witness; accordingly, the questioning of suspects cannot be replaced by witness status in respect of the same acts. The cited excerpts from Article 59(2) and Article 63(5)-(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure regulate aspects of international surrender and the European Arrest Warrant; on the facts reported, they do not directly determine the legal qualification of this investigation opened in Šiauliai
Consequences. The nearest practical stage is the prosecutor’s decision on whether to apply to the court for detention on remand, because the information expressly states that the strictest coercive measure is being considered. The further direction of the investigation will depend on whether the elements of Article 22(1) are substantiated: intent, direct commencement of the commission of the offence, and non-completion of the act due to circumstances beyond the perpetrator’s control. The elements of Article 253(1) will have to be examined separately, because the mere fact of shooting still requires establishing the mode of unlawful possession or control of the firearm and the absence of authorisation. For the victim, it is practically important that the case is being assessed not merely as a threat under Article 145, but as an attempt on life and a breach of the rules governing firearms circulation, because this creates substantially more serious criminal exposure for the suspects. For the suspects, the key issues will be legal qualification, intent, the status of the weapon and the lawfulness of possession or control, as well as whether detention on remand will be imposed. If the investigation confirms only unlawful possession or transportation of the weapon, but not the elements of attempted murder, the scope of liability would narrow to Article 253 and any other provisions applicable on the facts. If it is substantiated that the shots directly commenced a killing by a method dangerous to the lives of other persons, the case will remain qualified under Article 22 in conjunction with Article 129(2)(7). If the case reaches the sentencing stage, Article 57 will require the court to assess not only the consequence, but also the nature of the shooting, the extent of the danger, the degree to which the intent was implemented, and the reasons why the person remained alive
The specific point in dispute is not the fact of violence itself, but whether several dozen blows inflicted on a minor with hands, feet and a telephone will, in light of the medically established consequences, remain at the level of physical pain or minor impairment of health, or whether the conduct will have to be reclassified as causing a non-serious impairment of health.
Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code covers cases where a person, “by beating or otherwise using violence”, causes physical pain or slightly injures or briefly causes illness to another person; therefore, the sheer number of blows and the fact that they were filmed do not, in themselves, move the act into a more serious legal classification. Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code requires a different threshold of consequences: the victim must have lost a small part of his or her capacity for work or have been ill for a prolonged period. Since the prosecution states that there is currently no evidence of serious injuries, and the victim was discharged home after receiving assistance, the more cautious argument, on the information available, is stronger under Article 140 rather than under Article 138 of the Criminal Code.
Article 80 of the Criminal Code is also relevant because the juvenile liability system is intended to restrict deprivation of liberty and increase the use of educational measures; therefore, even once the act is established, the analysis of sanctions cannot be mechanically transferred from the adult model.
In practice, the key document will not be the video recording as such, but the assessment of the degree of impairment of health, because that is what will distinguish an Article 140 situation from reclassification under Article 138 of the Criminal Code. At this stage, it would be a weaker public claim to say that the case must inevitably become “more serious” solely because of several dozen blows or blows with a telephone. The stronger argument is that legal classification must be determined by the medical consequences, not by the emotional intensity of the video.
The victim’s representatives should document not only the initial injuries, but also subsequent treatment, any incapacity for work, or signs of prolonged illness, because these are precisely the factors that may alter the boundaries of legal classification and compensation for damage. If the impairment of health remains minor, or if only physical pain is established, Article 7 of the Law on Compensation for Damage Caused by Violent Crimes provides a separate limit of 40 BSI for pecuniary damage suffered by a minor, while in respect of damage caused to a minor by other violent crimes, the 80 BSI limit may be relevant.
Core issue. The legal issue is not merely “what consequences may follow”, but which elements of a criminal offence correspond to the established consequences: Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 140(3) as set out in Article 1 of the Law Amending Article 140, or Article 138 of the Criminal Code. If the evidence established only that physical pain, a minor injury, or a short-term illness was caused by beating or other violent conduct, the legal basis would be Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code. If a longer illness or the loss of a small part of professional or general working capacity were established, the axis of legal classification would shift to Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code. If the act were committed against a young child or by torturing the victim, Article 140(3), as set out in Article 1 of the Law Amending Article 140 of the Criminal Code, would become relevant. The procedural issue is determined under Article 167(1) and (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as under Article 409 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, insofar as it regulates the prosecutor’s transition to public prosecution. Article 80 of the Criminal Code applies to the assessment of the minor’s potential liability, as it provides that criminal liability of minors must correspond to their age and social maturity
Legal assessment. The several dozen blows with hands, feet, and a telephone described in the report primarily permit an assessment of the elements of causing physical pain or minor impairment of health under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code. The sources state the rule that minor impairment of health is established where an injury or illness impairs health for no longer than 10 days or results in a 5 percent loss of professional or general working capacity. Accordingly, medical data in this case are not ancillary, but a body of evidence decisive for legal classification. If the victim were to suffer a prolonged illness or lose a small part of her working capacity, the act could be assessed under Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code, which provides for restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to three years. If the elements of Article 138(2) of the Criminal Code were established, for example torture or other particularly cruel conduct, the penalty under that paragraph would be imprisonment for up to five years. Under Article 141 of the Criminal Code, the characteristics of impairments of health provided for in Articles 135, 138, and 140 of the Criminal Code are described by the approved rules for determining the degree of health impairment. Thus, the possibility of reclassification mentioned by the prosecutor’s office depends legally not on the emotional impact of the video recording, but on the established degree of health impairment and the other elements of the offence. With respect to Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires a complaint by the victim or a statement by her legal representative, and the report indicates that the minor’s relatives contacted law enforcement. Article 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure additionally permits the commencement of a pre-trial investigation at the prosecutor’s request if the act is of public significance or if harm was caused to a person who, for important reasons, is unable to defend his or her interests. Article 409(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure essentially confirms the same duty of the prosecutor in cases where a matter falling within private prosecution becomes subject to public prosecution due to public significance or the victim’s inability to defend herself. The organisation of the pre-trial investigation described in the report is consistent with the procedural model under which the prosecutor directs and controls the investigation, while police officers carry out investigative actions. Temporary detention, if applied, is permissible under Article 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure where a person is caught in the act of committing a criminal offence or immediately thereafter, and its maximum duration may not exceed 48 hours. The position of the minor suspect cannot be assessed solely by reference to the general sanction, because Article 80 of the Criminal Code requires liability to be aligned with age, social maturity, and the possibility of applying educational measures. The purpose of juvenile liability set out in the sources clearly limits the application of imprisonment and emphasises addressing the causes of the behaviour. The legal sources provided do not regulate the issue of administrative liability of persons who filmed or disseminated the video recording; accordingly, on the basis of those sources, only aspects of criminal procedure and the classification of the violent act can be assessed
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the classification remains under Article 140 of the Criminal Code if the medical data confirm only physical pain, minor impairment of health, or short-term illness. The second scenario is reclassification under Article 138 of the Criminal Code if a longer illness or the loss of a small part of working capacity is established. The third scenario concerns the suspect’s age and social maturity: under the logic of Article 80 of the Criminal Code, even if the act is established, it must be determined whether criminal liability is applicable and what measures would correspond to the purpose of juvenile liability. For the victim and her legal representatives, it is practically important that their statement is significant for the purposes of Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while the prosecutor’s request may ensure the continuation of the process where the conditions of Article 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are met. In terms of compensation for damage, Article 7 of the Law on Compensation for Damage Caused by Violent Crimes is important, as it provides for compensation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in the amount determined by the court, without exceeding the statutory limits. If a violent crime caused physical pain to a minor or minor impairment of health, Article 7(2)(4) of that Law provides for a pecuniary damage limit of up to 40 BSI. If another violent crime causing damage to a minor were established, Article 7(2)(2) provides for a pecuniary damage limit of up to 80 BSI, while Article 7(3)(2) provides for a non-pecuniary damage limit of up to 100 BSI. Therefore, the further course of the matter will in practice depend on three decisions: the forensic medical conclusion, the classification chosen by the prosecutor, and the possibility of holding the minor liable under the special rules governing juvenile criminal liability
Do Lithuanian schools already have a mandatory obligation to restrict the use of generative AI by reference to pupils’ age, or is the legally stronger position for the time being that this is a matter of national education policy rather than direct regulation under the EU AI Act?
Article 2 of the proposed amendment to the Law on Information Society Services provides that the terms used in that law are to be understood as defined, inter alia, in Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, i.e. the AI Act. Article 4 of the same amendment adds the AI Act itself to the annex to the law, while Article 5 provides for entry into force on 1 April 2025. These provisions indicate not a prohibition on the use of AI in schools, but the creation within the Lithuanian legal system of a terminological and institutional link to the AI Act.
The article notes that some provisions of the AI Act will apply from 2 August 2026, but the Act itself does not directly prescribe how AI must be used in schools; rather, it establishes an obligation of AI literacy and leaves choices on education regulation to the Member States.
In practice, the stronger argument at present is not that “EU law requires AI to be banned in schools”, but that “the State may, through national education regulation, choose a model of restrictions, provided it also implements the AI literacy objective”. For Lithuanian schools, municipalities and the ministry, this means that the Norwegian model cannot be presented as an automatically transferable EU obligation: a separate national decision would be required, clearly distinguishing between control of pupils’ use, teachers’ use in lessons, and the development of AI literacy in higher grades. The greatest risk would be adopting a general ban without an implementation mechanism, since the article rightly raises the problem of the effectiveness of restrictions outside school.
For professional purposes, the point to cite is precisely that the AI Act has already been incorporated into Lithuania’s regulatory framework for information society services as of 1 April 2025, but the evidence presented does not show any rule that would, of itself, require Lithuanian schools to follow Norway’s age-restriction model.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether the Norwegian decision automatically binds Lithuanian schools, but whether, under the cited Lithuanian and European Union legal sources, there would be a legal basis in Lithuania for restricting the use of generative artificial intelligence in the education of pupils. This question must first be assessed under Article 38 of the Law on Education of the Republic of Lithuania, which regulates the assessment of learning achievements and the entities involved in assessing a pupil’s progress. Also relevant is the annex to the Law on Information Society Services of the Republic of Lithuania, supplemented by a reference to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024, namely the Artificial Intelligence Act. The issue of institutional competence is linked to the document “On Draft Law No. XVP-925 Amending Articles 3, 9-1 and 9-2 of Law No. VIII-1234 of the Republic of Lithuania on Public Administration”, which states that a separate law under preparation will establish the competence of Lithuanian state institutions implementing the Artificial Intelligence Act, as well as the rights and obligations of other entities. The technological environment of schools should be assessed under points 1.2, 2.3.5 and 3 of the Rules for the Development of the Network of Schools Implementing Formal Education Programmes. The copyright aspect, if the use of artificial intelligence were to involve the use of databases for teaching purposes, must be assessed under Articles 32, 61 and 63 of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights of the Republic of Lithuania
Legal assessment. Under Article 38(1) of the Law on Education, the purpose of assessing learning achievements is to help a pupil review individual progress, determine the pupil’s achievements and compare them with the achievement levels established in general curricula. This means that the use of generative artificial intelligence in school is legally relevant insofar as it may affect the determination of the pupil’s own achievements and the reliability of assessment results. Article 38(2) of the Law on Education defines the assessment actors broadly: the pupil performs self-assessment, while assessment is also carried out by the teacher, the education provider, the institution exercising the rights and obligations of the school owner, the municipal executive institution or its authorised person, the owner or meeting of participants, and an institution authorised by the Minister of Education, Science and Sport. Accordingly, practical rules on the use of artificial intelligence in assessment tasks could not be left solely to the pupil’s discretion: they would directly concern assessment carried out by the teacher, the school and the founder. Article 38(3) of the Law on Education provides that the assessment of achievements of pupils participating in general education programmes and the use of results are regulated in accordance with the procedure established by the Minister of Education and Science. That procedure would therefore be the natural instrument for determining when assistance from artificial intelligence is permitted, when it must be disclosed, and when it is incompatible with the purpose of assessment. Point 1.2 of the Rules for the Development of the School Network shows that, in the formal education environment, digital access is a normal part of infrastructure, since there must be no more than four pupils per one network-connected computer used in the education process. Point 3 of the same rules provides for registers compiled on the basis of electronic diaries and for the school’s virtual environment, meaning that the law cannot be interpreted as generally rejecting digital tools in schools. Nevertheless, that infrastructure obligation does not in itself confer on a pupil the right to use generative artificial intelligence at any time, because it must be reconciled with the purpose of assessment enshrined in Article 38 of the Law on Education. In the cited sources, the Artificial Intelligence Act is incorporated into Lithuanian law through point 4 of the annex to the Law on Information Society Services, but the cited provision does not lay down a specific rule on how generative artificial intelligence must be permitted or prohibited in schools. The document concerning Draft Law No. XVP-925 amending the Law on Public Administration states that a separate law will establish the competence of institutions implementing the Artificial Intelligence Act and the rights and obligations of other entities. Therefore, as of 18 July 2026, what is significant is that the national implementation architecture is still linked to a separate legislative decision. Article 32(4) of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights permits the use of a publicly disclosed database as an example for teaching or scientific research purposes, provided that the source is indicated and the use is justified by a non-commercial purpose. Article 63(1)(5) of the same law permits educational institutions to reproduce or reuse a database for teaching illustration where a digital copy is used under the responsibility of the educational institution, on its premises or in other places, or through a secure electronic network accessible only to teachers, lecturers and learners. However, Article 61(1) of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights protects the right of the maker of a database to prohibit the extraction and making available to the public of the whole database or a substantial part of it. The teaching exception therefore cannot be interpreted as a general authorisation to use any databases without restriction for artificial intelligence tools. Article 30 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of the Rights of the Child is relevant in this situation only in a narrower sense: it regulates restrictions applicable to persons working or carrying out activities with children in relation to certain criminal offences, but not the use of artificial intelligence itself in the education process. No case law is included among the cited sources, so the assessment is based solely on the indicated statutory and subordinate legislation provisions
Consequences. The most realistic legal development in Lithuania would not be the automatic adoption of the Norwegian prohibition, but the refinement of national rules through the procedure for assessing learning achievements under Article 38(3) of the Law on Education. In that case, the practical burden would fall on teachers and education providers, because under Article 38(2) of the Law on Education they are direct actors in the assessment of pupils’ achievements. For pupils, this would mean a clearer boundary between permitted assistance in learning and the impermissible presentation of achievements as independent work. For schools, the key task would be to reconcile the digital infrastructure provided for in points 1.2 and 3 of the Rules for the Development of the School Network with the reliability of assessment and supervision obligations. If teaching data or databases are used for artificial intelligence tools, educational institutions would have to assess separately the conditions set out in Articles 32, 61 and 63 of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights, in particular source attribution, the non-commercial purpose and the requirement of a secure electronic network. For state institutions, the forthcoming allocation of competences is practically important, because the materials relating to Draft Law No. XVP-925 provide that the competence of institutions implementing the Artificial Intelligence Act and the rights and obligations of entities will be established by a separate law. The nearest legal tension in Lithuania would therefore arise between the desire to restrict generative artificial intelligence in the assessment of younger pupils and the already existing obligation to ensure a digital educational environment. In the context of the cited sources, the Norwegian example would be a political and regulatory point of reference, but not a legal rule directly applicable to Lithuanian schools
Can the criminal misdemeanour under Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code for a small quantity of cannabis, although it does not give rise to a criminal record, become an independent bar to professions subject to an impeccable reputation requirement?
Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code classifies the production, acquisition, possession, transportation or sending of a small quantity of narcotic or psychotropic substances without intent to distribute not as an administrative offence, but as a criminal misdemeanour, punishable by community service, restriction of liberty, a fine or arrest. This means that the decisive practical threshold is not merely “having a criminal record”, because the conduct itself already falls within the sphere of criminal liability. According to the factual categorisation presented in the news item, in the case of cannabis, up to 5 grams is usually associated with Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code, whereas more than 5 grams but not more than 60 grams is already associated with the offence under Article 259(1) of the Criminal Code and the risk of a criminal record.
Article 259(3) of the Criminal Code provides for release from criminal liability where a person voluntarily seeks medical assistance or approaches a state authority in order to surrender the substances; however, that rule does not cover a situation in which the substances are simply found on the person at the initiative of the employer or law enforcement.
The stronger argument now available to employers and professional self-governing bodies is not that “the person has a criminal record”, but that “the person committed an intentional criminal misdemeanour or there is a registry entry to that effect”. Therefore, in the context of checks by the Bar, the civil service or similar reputation-based screening procedures, release from criminal liability on the basis of surety or on other grounds may reduce the consequences of a criminal record, but it does not necessarily eliminate the reputational fact, because the news item clearly states that the entry in the Register of Suspects, Accused and Convicted Persons remains. A practical mistake would be to assess a candidate’s risk solely by reference to a certificate of criminal record: for a professional, the more important question is whether the relevant special rule prohibits not only a criminal record, but also an intentional criminal misdemeanour.
In a dispute concerning proportionality, the candidate’s strongest argument would remain the minor nature of the conduct and the absence of a criminal record; however, for positions with an expressly established standard of impeccable reputation, that argument will be weaker than the specific reputational restriction.
Core issue. The legal issue is not whether “one joint” in itself destroys a career, but how the specific conduct is classified under Articles 259, 260, 260-1, 261, 268 and 269 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and what procedural course it may entail under Articles 98, 99, 119, 120 and 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 2(1), (3) and (4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, liability is possible only for an act that was prohibited by criminal law at the time it was committed, where the person is culpable and the act corresponds to the elements of a crime or criminal misdemeanour. If a person unlawfully acquired, possessed, transported or sent a small quantity of narcotic or psychotropic substances without the purpose of selling or otherwise distributing them, the criminal misdemeanour provided for in Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies. If the quantity is not small, but no purpose of distribution is established, the assessment moves to Article 259(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides liability for unlawful possession or handling of narcotic or psychotropic substances without the purpose of distribution. If it is proven that the substances were possessed for sale or other distribution, or were sold or otherwise distributed, Article 260 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies; paragraph 1 of that Article provides for imprisonment from two to eight years. The significance of the quantity is determined not by a lay assessment, but under Article 269(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, because small, large and very large quantities are established on the basis of recommendations approved by the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Lithuania
Legal assessment. In a case of simple possession, the most important dividing line is between the criminal misdemeanour under Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania and the crime under Article 259(1), because both provisions cover similar conduct but differ in the quantity element and in the severity of sanctions. Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania permits the imposition of community service, restriction of liberty, a fine or arrest; therefore, even a case involving a small quantity is not an administrative matter under the current text of the provision provided. This is also confirmed by the legislative material submitted concerning draft laws No. XIVP-95 and XIVP-96: it states that it was proposed to decriminalise the criminal misdemeanour established in Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania and to introduce administrative liability for such acts, but the very nature of the proposal shows that, in the legal position presented, this conduct is treated as criminal. If a person voluntarily applies to a healthcare institution for medical assistance or to a state institution in order to surrender substances unlawfully produced, acquired or possessed without the purpose of distribution, Article 259(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides for release from criminal liability for the production, acquisition and possession of the substances used or surrendered. Intoxication is not, in itself, a defence: under Article 19(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, a person who committed a criminal act while intoxicated by narcotic or psychotropic substances is not released from criminal liability. The position may differ only in the narrow situation under Article 19(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, where the person was intoxicated against their will and, as a result, was not fully capable of understanding the nature of the act or controlling their actions. The distribution aspect represents a material escalation of career risk: Article 260(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania makes no exception for a small quantity if the purpose of sale or other distribution, or the act of distribution itself, is established. If distribution is to minors, the special provision in Article 261 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania applies, providing for imprisonment from three to twelve years. If the situation involves transportation or sending across the state border of the Republic of Lithuania without presentation to customs control, by avoiding such control, or without authorisation, Article 260-1 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania must be assessed, as it separately criminalises the smuggling of narcotic or psychotropic substances. Workplace risk is directly apparent in the sources provided through the criterion of impeccable reputation in the legislative material on civil service: it discusses that a person abusing narcotic, toxic or psychotropic substances would be deemed to have lost impeccable reputation and could not be admitted to civil service positions. The same material emphasises that what matters is not only an abstract reputational formulation, but also the procedure by which the fact of abuse is established and the documents substantiating it. Procedurally relevant objects and documents may be submitted by the suspect, their defence counsel, the victim or other persons under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Time limits in criminal proceedings are calculated under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania: they determine the time for the commencement, performance or completion of procedural acts, and a time limit calculated in days generally expires at twenty-four hundred hours on the final day. Where it is necessary to ensure the participation of the suspect, accused or convicted person in the proceedings, the unhindered conduct of the investigation, the hearing of the case or the enforcement of the judgment, remand measures may be imposed under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania lists measures such as detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to report periodically to a police institution, and a written undertaking not to leave. A pre-trial investigation may be terminated on the grounds provided for in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, including where insufficient data are collected, where the act is recognised as minor under Article 37 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, or where the suspect is released on surety in the cases provided for in Article 40 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is classification under Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, if only a small quantity is established and there is no purpose of distribution; this means a criminal misdemeanour and the selection of sanctions from among the penalties specified in that paragraph. The second scenario is classification under Article 259(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, where the quantity does not fall within the small-quantity category but there is no purpose of distribution; in that case, the upper limit of the sanction includes imprisonment for up to two years. The third scenario is the application of Article 260 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, if the purpose of sale or other distribution, or the act of distribution itself, is established; from a career perspective, this is a qualitatively more serious situation, because the provision prescribes only custodial penalties. The fourth scenario may arise where the person themselves seeks medical assistance or surrenders the substances to a state institution: in that case, release from criminal liability may apply under Article 259(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania to the extent specified there. The fifth scenario is procedural termination of the case under Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, if a ground for termination specified in that Article arises. The practical significance for a job candidate is that the legal assessment depends on three facts: the quantity of the substance, the purpose or act of distribution, and any special reputational requirements applicable to the position. For an employer or state institution, what matters in practice is not to use the general label “punished for a joint”, but to distinguish precisely whether the matter concerns a criminal misdemeanour under Article 259(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, a crime under Article 259(1), distribution under Article 260, smuggling under Article 260-1, or distribution to minors under Article 261. It is precisely this classification that determines whether the situation remains a case of possession of a small quantity without distribution, or becomes a much more serious criminal-law risk which, in professions requiring impeccable reputation, may become a decisive criterion for selection and fitness to hold office
Whether several dozen blows inflicted on a minor in a public park, while a group of young people watched and filmed, may at the initial stage reasonably be classified under Article 284 of the Criminal Code as a breach of public order, rather than solely as individual violence against the victim. The stronger initial argument lies with the prosecution: the facts indicate not only violence against a person, but also a demonstrative act of disrespect towards others in a public place, causing a disturbance of public peace.
Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code covers conduct where, in a public place, a person demonstrates disrespect for others or the environment through brazen acts, threats, mockery or acts of vandalism, and thereby disturbs public peace or order; the sanction extends to imprisonment for up to two years. What matters for this provision is not merely the extent of bodily injury, but the combination of publicity, demonstrativeness and disturbance of public peace: Poezijos Park, the group’s observation, the filming, the several dozen blows and the dissemination of the recording all strengthen the elements of Article 284. Article 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that certain acts of individual violence, including Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, are generally linked to a complaint by the victim or the victim’s lawful representative; however, in the present case the relatives contacted law enforcement, and in respect of acts of public significance an investigation may also be initiated by the prosecutor.
Article 80 of the Criminal Code further means that, if the suspect is a minor, the purpose of liability is not purely repressive: age, social maturity and the possibility of educational measures must be assessed.
A practical mistake would be to treat the public-order classification automatically as a “downgrading”: on the facts presented, Article 284 of the Criminal Code may be the more accurate initial procedural basis, because it captures the public nature of the assault, not only the physical violence suffered by the victim. For a professional audience, the key point is not the article number itself, but whether the investigation separately assesses three matters: the extent of the victim’s health impairment, the active encouragement or participation of other persons, and the limits of procedural protections for minors when recordings are publicised. Article 140 of the Code of Criminal Procedure also weakens the public argument that law enforcement was required to “detain everyone immediately” solely because of public outrage: where a person is not caught in the act or immediately afterwards, temporary detention is possible only in exceptional cases and subject to additional conditions.
The practical risk for journalists and commentators is therefore to confuse legitimate public scrutiny with the disclosure of minors’ identities or calls for retaliation; such communication may harm the proceedings and the victim, even though the case concerning public violence plainly contains a core public-interest element.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not whether public outrage is justified, but whether the acts described in the Marijampolė park, on the basis of the initial information, are reasonably being investigated as a breach of public order under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and what procedural duties arise for law enforcement authorities. Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code applies to a person who, in a public place, by insolent acts, threats, taunting, or acts of vandalism, demonstrated disrespect for others or for the environment and disturbed public peace or order. Since the report mentions a minor victim, the purpose of Article 80 of the Criminal Code is also relevant: liability of minors must correspond to their age and social maturity, and deprivation of liberty must be limited by expanding the possibilities for educational measures. From a procedural perspective, Article 2, Article 98, Article 140, Article 167, Article 409, and the visible provisions of Articles 118-120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure must be assessed. If an episode of violence of the type covered by Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code is also being considered, Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 140(4) of the Criminal Code, as set out in Article 1 of the law amending Article 140 of the Criminal Code, indicate that for proceedings concerning such an act, the complaint of the victim, an application by the legal representative, or a prosecutor’s request is procedurally significant
Legal assessment. The described incident took place in a park, in the presence of a group of persons, while the violence was being filmed and the recording was later disseminated; therefore, the elements of a public place, insolent acts, taunting, and disturbance of public peace or order are directly linked to Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code. Under the cited provisions, this qualification is not merely an “administrative” or disciplinary response: Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code provides for a fine, community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to two years. The source concerning the draft amendment to Article 310 of the Criminal Code further states that, in case law, filming a criminal act in the presence of the victim is recognised as an element indicating disturbance of public peace and order, or as an element showing hooligan motives or a particularly cruel or torturous character. In this situation, this is important because filming and collective observation are not merely incidental circumstances, but may strengthen the assessment of the elements of a breach of public order. Article 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure obliges the prosecutor and pre-trial investigation authorities, once indications of a criminal act become apparent, to take all measures provided by law so that the investigation is carried out within the shortest possible time and the act is disclosed. According to the cited source concerning Articles 166 and 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a pre-trial investigation is commenced upon receipt of a complaint, application, or report, or where officials themselves identify indications of a criminal act, while the prosecutor may conduct the investigation personally or must supervise the investigation conducted by officials. The report states that relatives of the minor victim contacted the authorities; therefore, the procedural precondition for action under the logic of private-public prosecution, if relevant to Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, is also apparent. Even without such a complaint, Article 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits and requires the commencement of an investigation at the prosecutor’s request where the act is of public significance or where harm has been caused to a person who, for important reasons, is unable to defend their interests. Article 409(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure similarly establishes the prosecutor’s duty to commence criminal proceedings in private prosecution cases where they are of public significance or where the victim, for important reasons, is unable to defend their interests. The victim’s status as a minor is also procedurally significant because of the rule referred to in the source concerning Article 176(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, namely that pre-trial investigations into criminal acts committed against minors must be given priority. Video recordings and data stored on phones may be significant for the investigation, because Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows any natural or legal person, on their own initiative, to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal act. Temporary detention under Article 140(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is possible where a person is caught in the act of committing a criminal offence or immediately thereafter; in other cases, under Article 140(2), it is possible only exceptionally, where grounds for remand in custody exist, there is a need immediately to restrict liberty, and it is not possible to apply to a court with particular urgency. Article 140(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that temporary detention may not last longer than necessary to establish identity and carry out the necessary procedural actions, and that the maximum period is forty-eight hours. Measures of restraint under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are intended to ensure participation in the proceedings, an unhindered investigation, the hearing of the case, enforcement of the judgment, and the prevention of new offences; Article 120 also identifies among such measures the placement of a minor under the supervision of parents, guardians, or other persons
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is the continuation of the investigation under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, collecting video recordings, questioning the victim, suspects, and witnesses, establishing the role of each participant, and determining whether public peace or order was disturbed. The second scenario is a broader procedural assessment, in which the conditions for initiating proceedings under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, pursuant to Article 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 140(4) of the Criminal Code, also become relevant; however, the cited provisions allow discussion only of the mechanism for commencing proceedings, not of the final legal classification. The third scenario is termination of the pre-trial investigation only on the grounds set out in Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for example where insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt, or where other grounds listed in that article apply. If the suspect or other participants in the proceedings are minors, the possible consequences must be assessed through the prism of Article 80 of the Criminal Code: liability is aligned with age, social maturity, education, and the prevention of further offences. For the victim and her relatives, the practical significance is that, according to the cited sources, an investigation concerning an act committed against a minor must be given priority, while in relation to compensation for harm, Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the possibility, in cases established by law, of compensating harm from state funds if the accused or the persons materially liable lack the necessary funds. For persons who possess recordings, the practical point is not to publicise minors’ identities on social networks, but to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation under the procedure laid down in Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For the public, this case is significant not because of any possibility to “punish” independently through publicity, but because, under the cited provisions, public violence, filming, and taunting may precisely constitute a matter for criminal proceedings, investigated by the police, supervised by the prosecutor, and ultimately assessed by the court
The specific question is whether the assault of a minor in Marijampolė Poetry Park should be classified solely as a breach of public order under Article 284 of the Criminal Code, or should also be assessed as causing physical pain or a minor impairment of health under Article 140 of the Criminal Code. The stronger initial basis for classification is not merely the fact that the incident occurred in a “public place”, but the demonstrative nature of the violence: several dozen blows, the presence of bystanders, filming, and the circulation of the recording on social media indicate a possible display of disrespect towards others and a disturbance of public peace. However, Article 284 alone does not exhaust the harm caused to the victim, as the report refers to direct acts of physical violence and the need for medical attention.
Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code penalises a person who, in a public place, by insolent conduct, threats, mockery or acts of vandalism, demonstrates disrespect towards others or the environment and disturbs public peace or order. What matters under this provision is not only violence against a particular person, but its public and demonstrative character and its impact on public order; therefore, the park setting, bystanders, filming, and the public dissemination of the video are legally relevant facts for classification. Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code separately covers battery or other violence causing physical pain, minor injury or short-term illness; several dozen blows with hands, feet and a phone, together with the victim’s admission to a medical facility, provide a factual basis for examining this offence as well.
Article 141 of the Criminal Code provides that the elements of the health impairments referred to in Article 140 are determined in accordance with the rules on assessing the degree of health impairment, so the final classification will depend on medical assessment, not merely on the number of blows or the emotional impact of the recording.
In practice, the key task for prosecutors and defence counsel is to distinguish between two protected legal interests: Article 284 protects public order, while Article 140 protects personal health and physical integrity. Accordingly, the stronger procedural emphasis for the victim’s representatives would be to insist that the case not be confined to a public-order classification and to ensure that the extent of the injuries is medically recorded, since that will determine whether there is an independent basis for Article 140. If it emerged that the victim was under the age of fourteen, she would be regarded as a young child under Article 141(3) of the Criminal Code, which would make Article 140(2) relevant, as it provides for more severe liability for an offence committed against a young child.
Since the report refers only to a “minor”, this classification cannot yet be stated as fact, but age becomes one of the first circumstances to be verified.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the beating of a minor in a public place, while other persons watched and filmed, should be classified as a disturbance of public order under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, or additionally or alternatively as causing physical pain or minor impairment of health under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code. Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code applies where, in a public place, disrespect for others or the environment is demonstrated by insolent acts, threats, taunting, or acts of vandalism, and public peace or order is disturbed. Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code covers beating or other violent conduct by which physical pain is caused to a person or by which the person is slightly injured or made briefly ill. The indicators of impairment of health under Article 141 of the Criminal Code are defined by the rules for determining the extent of impairment of health approved by the Government or an institution authorised by it. From a procedural perspective, Articles 167(1)–(2) and 409(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are also relevant, because an act under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code is generally linked to a complaint by the victim, a statement by the legal representative, or a prosecutor’s request where there is public significance or where the person is unable, for important reasons, to defend his or her interests
Legal assessment. The report states that the incident took place in Poetry Park in Marijampolė; therefore, on the facts provided, the element of a “public place”, required for Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, is a key basis for qualification. A dozen or several dozen blows with hands, feet, and a telephone may be assessed as insolent acts, and their demonstrative commission in the presence of other persons is connected with the element of disrespect for others or the environment under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code. Since persons nearby watched and filmed the incident, and the violent recording spread on social networks that same evening, the element of disturbance of public peace or order becomes particularly significant. The source provided regarding the amendment of Article 310 of the Criminal Code states that, in case law, filming or photographing a criminal act in the victim’s presence is recognised as conduct disturbing public peace and order, or as indicators showing hooligan motives or an especially cruel or tormenting character. Although the specific court case number is not provided in the sources, this position directly strengthens the logic for applying Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, because the violence was not confined to a private conflict and acquired a public, demonstrative character. At the same time, the blows inflicted on the victim and her admission to a medical institution may be relevant to Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, because that provision covers causing physical pain, minor injury, or brief illness. According to the excerpt from the CEDAW implementation report provided, a finding of causing physical pain is based on evidence in the case file confirming the fact of beating or other violent conduct, while minor impairment of health is associated with impairment of health lasting no longer than 10 days or a 5 percent loss of working capacity. Accordingly, data from the medical institution and other medical documents would be important not for the fact of disturbance of public order itself, but for the possible application of Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code or concurrence of offences. Article 140(2) of the Criminal Code cannot currently be applied directly solely because the victim is a minor, since the qualifying element in the provision provided is linked to a young child or to torture. If the violence was carried out by several persons, or if other persons did not merely film but knowingly assisted, encouraged, or organised the act, Article 26 of the Criminal Code is relevant: accomplices are liable only for the criminal acts committed by the perpetrator that were covered by their intent. Under Article 58(1) of the Criminal Code, punishment for accomplices would be imposed taking into account the type, form, role, and nature of participation; therefore, mere identical presence at the scene does not in itself entail identical liability. If the suspects were minors, Article 80 of the Criminal Code would require that liability correspond to their age and social maturity, and would also orient the response toward limiting deprivation of liberty and increasing the possibilities for educational measures. The opening of a pre-trial investigation under Article 284 of the Criminal Code is not procedurally linked to the complaint requirement set out in Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because Article 284 of the Criminal Code is not listed there. Nevertheless, if Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code were also assessed in the investigation, it would be relevant that the relatives of the minor victim contacted law enforcement, while Article 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure refers to the victim’s complaint or a statement by his or her legal representative. Video recordings, telephones, medical documents, and other data may be submitted under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because any natural or legal person may, on his or her own initiative, submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of a criminal act. If temporary detention of a person were required, Article 140(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows detention of a person caught in the act of committing a criminal offence or immediately thereafter, while under paragraph 4 the maximum period of temporary detention is 48 hours. Under Article 100(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that period is calculated from the moment of actual detention. Coercive measures, if required, are intended under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to ensure participation in the proceedings, an unhindered investigation, examination of the case, and enforcement of the judgment, as well as to prevent new criminal acts
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is the continuation of the investigation under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code, if it is substantiated that violent and demonstrative acts committed in a public place disturbed public peace or order. The second scenario is an additional or amended qualification under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, if medical and other data confirm the causing of physical pain, minor injury, or brief illness. The third scenario concerns the procedural assessment of other persons present at the scene: they may remain witnesses, but the issue of their liability under Article 26 of the Criminal Code would arise only if an intentional contribution to the perpetrator’s act were established. The fourth scenario is termination of the pre-trial investigation under Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for example if insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt. For the victim and her representatives, the most practically important materials are medical data, video recordings, and other relevant objects and documents referred to in Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because they will determine both the qualification of the act and issues of damage. If the accused or persons materially liable for his or her actions lack the funds to compensate the damage, Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the possibility, in the cases and according to the procedure established by law, of compensating damage from state funds. Institutionally, this case is important for the prosecutor’s office and the police, because according to the report the investigation is directed by a prosecutor of the Marijampolė District Prosecutor’s Office and conducted by officers of the Marijampolė Police Commissariat. More broadly, the practical significance also lies in the assessment of publicly filmed violence: according to the sources provided, such a context of filming and public display may be not an incidental fact, but a circumstance strengthening the elements of disturbance of public order
Can the operator of an official secondary ticketing market, charging a 15% fee to both the buyer and the seller, defer disclosure of the seller’s identity, the seat location in the stadium and the final price until the last stage of the purchase, when the consumer is subject to a six-minute decision-making pressure and the most expensive seats are selected automatically?
Article 3(2) of the Lithuanian Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices links unfairness not only to formal falsehoods, but also to a lack of professional diligence and the capacity materially to distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer in relation to the product offered. Accordingly, the strongest legal argument in this dispute is not the high level of resale ticket prices in itself, but the information architecture: showing a lower price at the outset, deferring the final price, uncertainty as to the seller’s identity and the seats, and time pressure may together alter the consumer’s decision to purchase. Article 12¹ of the same law shows that the consequence is not limited to a sanction imposed by the supervisory authority: affected consumers may claim damages, a price reduction or termination of the contract, depending on the seriousness and nature of the infringement and the harm suffered.
Article 6.228² of the Civil Code further precludes contractual terms by which attempts are made to limit the consumer’s rights to challenge such practices.
The news report indicates that the Frankfurt Regional Court, in the case brought by Ticombo against FIFA, adopted precisely the logic of upfront transparency: the seller’s identity and address must be disclosed before the transaction is confirmed. This is important because the court did not confine itself to ex post dispute resolution after the purchase, but used interim relief to alter the design of the sales process itself. It is not possible to establish consistency of practice from the information provided, as only one interim decision in Germany is cited, together with planned action in Switzerland.
In practice, the stronger argument at present is distortion of the consumer’s decision through control of information and interface design, rather than an abstract criticism that tickets are resold at high prices or that FIFA earns substantial revenue. Platforms are exposed to risk where commissions, the seller’s status, the seat location in the stadium and the final price are not clear before the consumer assumes a payment obligation, especially where a short decision-making period is used at the same time. For a professional dealing with this situation, it is worth citing the “likely materially to distort” criterion in Article 3(2), because it allows a challenge not only to the final contractual term, but to the entire purchasing process.
If a competition-law version of the argument were advanced, Article 7 of the Law on Competition would be useful only if FIFA’s dominance in the relevant market were established; on the facts provided, the consumer-law argument is more direct and, from an evidential perspective, less dependent on market definition.
Core issue. The legal issue is whether a ticket sales and official secondary market model under which the identity and address of the commercial seller, the final price, and the essential characteristics of the seats in the stadium are not disclosed before confirmation of the transaction would be regarded as an unfair commercial practice towards consumers under Articles 3, 4 and 6 of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices. This issue must also be assessed under Article 6.2286(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which requires that, before the conclusion of a consumer contract, necessary, accurate, comprehensive and non-misleading information be provided clearly and intelligibly, including information about the trader, the main characteristics of the service and the total price. The consequences for consumer redress must be assessed under Article 6.2282(1), (2) and (4) of the Civil Code and Article 12¹ of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices. The institutional procedure arises from Article 14 of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices, under which the Authority examines cases falling within its competence and imposes fines or issues warnings
Legal assessment. Article 1(2) of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices covers conduct before, during and after the conclusion of a transaction; accordingly, the stages of ticket selection, price display, seller disclosure and payment fall within the core of the regulatory framework. Article 1(3) of the same law excludes only conduct that infringes solely the interests of competing operators; therefore, the mere fact that the dispute was initiated by a ticket resale platform does not preclude a consumer protection issue where the challenged practices affect purchasers’ transactional decisions. Under Article 3(2), a practice would be unfair if it is contrary to the requirements of professional diligence and is likely materially to distort the economic behaviour of the average consumer. A sudden price increase at checkout, disclosure of the final price only at the last stage, and the automatic selection of the most expensive seats are directly connected with the decision to enter into the transaction. Such circumstances must therefore be assessed in light of the requirement in Article 3(5) to take account of all features of the specific situation. Under Article 4, misleading commercial practices include misleading omissions. Under Article 6(1), a misleading omission consists of failing to provide, concealing, or providing in an unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely manner material information where, as a result, the average consumer may take a transactional decision that he or she would not otherwise have taken. The seller’s identity and address fall within Article 6.2286(1)(2) of the Civil Code, while the stadium seat location and the nature of the match ticket constitute the main characteristics of the service referred to in Article 6.2286(1)(1). The final ticket price and commission fall within Article 6.2286(1)(3) of the Civil Code, since the consumer must be provided with the total price of the goods or services, inclusive of taxes, or the method for calculating that price. The six-minute purchase time limit is not, in itself, a separate presumed infringement under the provisions cited, but it is relevant in assessing whether the information was provided in good time and whether the consumer was genuinely able to make an informed decision. Article 6.2282(1) of the Civil Code would not permit contractual terms to eliminate or restrict consumer rights; accordingly, the rules of the platform or organiser could not legitimise the concealment of material information. Article 6.2282(4) of the Civil Code directly prohibits a trader from engaging in unfair commercial practices towards consumers. If an infringement is established, under Article 12¹(1) of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices the consumer may claim damages, a price reduction or termination of the contract, having regard to the gravity and nature of the infringement, the damage suffered and other relevant circumstances. Under Article 12¹(2), such a claim is submitted in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Law on Consumer Rights Protection, while Article 12¹(3) preserves the rights provided for in the Civil Code. At the level of the Authority’s competence, Article 14 permits the examination of cases of unfair commercial practices and the imposition of a warning or a fine; consequently, the dispute may have not only an individual transactional dimension but also a supervisory procedural dimension
Consequences. If an analogous practice were assessed under the Lithuanian provisions cited, the principal consequence would be an obligation to disclose clearly, before confirmation of the purchase, the identity of the commercial seller, the registered office address, the characteristics of the ticket and the total price. For the trader, this would in practice mean the need to redesign the purchase flow so that the consumer sees the material information before making the decision, and not only in the final checkout window. This is important for the consumer because Article 12¹ confers not merely an abstract right to complain, but specific civil remedies: damages, a price reduction or termination of the contract. For the organiser or platform, the risk would be twofold: individual consumer claims and enforcement measures imposed by the Authority under Article 14. The interim injunction of the Frankfurt court, as described in the report, is directly connected with the same disclosure issue: who is selling the ticket, on what terms and at what final price. Realistically, the further course may involve changes to the practice before future championships, the transfer of the dispute to another jurisdiction, or an increase in consumer claims concerning specific transactions. What is legally significant is not whether resale is profitable in itself, but whether, before the transaction, the consumer receives the information required by Article 6.2286 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Law on the Prohibition of Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices
Does the article correctly classify two separate criminal-law risks: causing physical pain under Article 140 of the Criminal Code and driving while intoxicated at 3.15 per mille under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code, particularly as regards the applicable penalties and confiscation of the vehicle?
Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code provides for liability for a person who, by beating or otherwise using violence, causes another person physical pain or minor injury or short-term illness; the penalties provided for this offence are community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Therefore, the conduct of the 53-year-old woman, if it is proved that physical pain or minor impairment of health was caused to the 34-year-old victim during the conflict in the yard of a detached house, falls precisely within this provision, and intoxication of 3.03 per mille does not in itself alter the structure of the sanction under Article 140 of the Criminal Code. Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code separately criminalises driving a motor vehicle where intoxication of 1.51 per mille or more is established; the 3.15 per mille recorded for the 39-year-old BMW driver clearly exceeds that threshold.
This provision provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year, and not administrative liability under the range in Article 427 of the Code of Administrative Offences, which in the excerpt provided is linked to intoxication up to 1.5 per mille.
The article inaccurately states that a fine may be imposed for causing physical pain or minor impairment of health. There is no fine in the sanction under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code: it lists community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. It would be more accurate to write that no fine is imposed for the offence provided for in Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, unless the legal classification were based on another provision not identified in the article.
The article also formulates the statement about confiscation of the BMW too broadly: Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year, but the provision cited does not itself identify vehicle confiscation as a sanction. Confiscation should therefore be framed not as an automatic part of the sanction under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code, but as a separate possible legal consequence whose basis must be identified independently.
In practice, the stronger argument is not that “severe intoxication entails a more serious offence”, but that Article 2811 of the Criminal Code requires only the fact of intoxication at 1.51 per mille or more: the 3.15 per mille is relevant here primarily to individualisation of the penalty, not to the threshold for legal classification. When writing about the violence episode, it is essential not to cite a fine as a sanction under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, because that is misleading as to possible procedural expectations and bargaining position. In the driving episode, the penalties under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code must be distinguished from the issue of vehicle confiscation: the basis for confiscation must be substantiated separately, and not inferred solely from the text of Article 2811.
For a professional audience, the riskiest error here is to conflate the administrative-law logic applicable to drink-driving up to 1.5 per mille with criminal liability from 1.51 per mille, thereby inaccurately describing both the sanction and the possible taking of property.
Core issue. The legal issue is twofold: whether the actions of the 53-year-old woman in the yard of a detached house constitute causing physical pain or a minor health impairment under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and whether the 39-year-old BMW driver’s driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 3.15 per mille constitutes a criminal offence under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code. Under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, liability arises for a person who, by beating or otherwise using violence, causes physical pain to another person or slightly injures that person or causes a short-term illness. Pursuant to Article 141 of the Criminal Code, the characteristics of health impairments are defined by the rules for determining the extent of health impairment approved by the Government or an institution authorised by it. The source provided further states that minor health impairment is associated with a health impairment lasting no more than 10 days or with a 5 percent loss of professional or general capacity for work. In the driver’s case, the applicable provision is not the general offence under Article 281 of the Criminal Code concerning the consequences of a traffic accident, but the special provision in Article 2811(1), because the report refers to the act of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more. The threshold for administrative liability under the provided text amending Article 427 of the Code of Administrative Offences covers intoxication up to 1.5 per mille; therefore, 3.15 per mille falls within the scope of criminal, and not merely administrative, liability
Legal assessment. Regarding the violence episode, the key task in the investigation is to establish whether there was beating or other violence and whether it caused physical pain, minor injury, or short-term illness, since these are precisely the elements forming the basis for applying Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code. The fact that the suspect was found to have a blood alcohol concentration of 3.03 per mille does not, in itself, alter the constituent elements of Article 140(1) under the provisions provided, but it may be relevant in assessing the factual circumstances of the conflict. The victim’s application to law enforcement authorities corresponds to the procedural logic indicated in the source provided, because an offence under Article 140 of the Criminal Code gives rise to criminal liability upon the victim’s complaint, a statement by the victim’s lawful representative, or a prosecutor’s request. Article 34 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines a private prosecutor as the victim or the victim’s representative in private prosecution cases, who supports the charge, submits evidence, participates in its examination, and makes submissions on the application of the criminal law, sentencing, and compensation for damage. If the investigation were to establish not only physical pain or minor impairment, but also signs of non-severe health impairment, the classification could be based on Article 138 of the Criminal Code, under which liability is linked to the loss of a small part of capacity for work or prolonged illness. However, given the circumstances stated in the report, which directly refer to an investigation opened in relation to violence, the most accurate analytical basis is Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code. The sanction under that paragraph is community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year; a fine is not provided for in the text of Article 140(1) as presented. In the BMW driver’s case, the legally decisive fact is the established blood alcohol concentration of 3.15 per mille, because Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code links criminal liability to the threshold of 1.51 per mille or more. This offence does not require that a traffic accident occurred or that consequences arose for a person’s health; therefore, in the absence of any accident mentioned in the report, it is sufficient to assess the act of driving itself at such an alcohol concentration. Article 281 of the Criminal Code would be relevant where, while driving, road traffic safety rules or rules on the operation of a vehicle are breached and this results in a traffic accident causing non-severe or severe health impairment or substantial property damage. Since the situation described involves stopped driving without the specified consequences, Article 2811 of the Criminal Code operates as an independent basis for liability. The offence under Article 2811(1) is punishable by a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Article 2811(2) further provides that liability also arises where the acts specified in paragraph 1 of that Article are committed through negligence. The provided texts amending Article 427 of the Code of Administrative Offences show that administrative liability for repeated drink-driving is regulated within the range above 0.4 or from 0.41 to 1.5 per mille, which confirms the significance of the threshold in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code for criminal-law assessment
Consequences. In the violence episode, the practical course of the case will depend on whether the elements of Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code are substantiated in the pre-trial investigation: beating or other violence and the resulting physical pain, minor injury, or short-term illness. If these elements are confirmed, the 53-year-old woman may be subject to one of the penalties provided for in Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code: community service, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. For the victim, the practical significance is that Article 34 of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants a procedural role in a private prosecution case to support the charge, submit evidence, and state a position on compensation for damage. In the driver’s episode, the likely procedural direction is the issue of criminal liability under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code, because 3.15 per mille is more than twice the criminal-liability threshold of 1.51 per mille. If it were established that the driving caused a traffic accident and the consequences specified in Article 281 of the Criminal Code, the legal assessment could shift into the regulatory scope of Article 281; however, according to the report provided, no such consequential episode is described. This situation is practically significant for the police and prosecution as a matter of legal classification, for the victim as a possible basis for the charge and compensation process, and for the driver as a risk of criminal liability, a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year
Whether a public Facebook post which, in the context of a possible Russian military campaign, attaches a list of 66 Lithuanian citizens and refers to their “removal from Lithuania” for payment contains sufficient indicia of offences under Articles 122 and 118 of the Criminal Code to open a pre-trial investigation without complaints from the alleged victims.
Article 166(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits a pre-trial investigation to be opened not only upon receipt of a complaint or report, but also where a prosecutor or pre-trial investigation officer independently identifies indicia of a criminal offence. This means that, at this stage, the prosecution is not required to prove all elements of offences under Articles 122 or 118 of the Criminal Code in full; an initial assessment of indicia is sufficient. Here, that assessment is linked to a public text, content in Lithuanian and Russian, the context of Russian military targets, and the naming of 66 specific individuals.
Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists offences for which an investigation is generally opened only upon a victim’s complaint, but Articles 122 and 118 of the Criminal Code are not included in that list. The stronger procedural argument, therefore, is that the investigation was opened as a case involving a public-interest and national-security dimension, rather than as a purely private matter dependent solely on complaints by the individuals named in the list.
In practice, the key issue is not whether the post already proves guilt, but that the prosecution has chosen a qualification that allows the investigation to proceed ex officio and shifts the centre of the dispute from insult or threats against individual persons to conduct directed against Lithuania’s sovereignty and a possible element of assistance to a foreign state. The strongest line for the defence will be to challenge not the lawfulness of opening the investigation, but the link between a hyperbolic or provocative social-media text and the specific elements of Articles 122 and 118 of the Criminal Code, since the Article 166 threshold for opening an investigation is low. For the prosecution, the risk lies in Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure: if the investigation does not produce sufficient evidence substantiating the suspect’s guilt in respect of these specific criminal offences, the investigation will have to be discontinued.
Practical attention should therefore focus on additional evidence: the identity of the account operator, the purpose of publishing the post, its connection with the context of Russia’s actions, the audience, and whether the “bounty” wording can be assessed as a genuine call to action or offer of assistance, rather than merely political rhetoric.
Core issue. The precise legal question is not the ultimate culpability of the account administrator, but whether the text publicly posted on 1 July 2026, together with the accompanying list of 66 persons, provides a sufficient basis to open a pre-trial investigation and collect data concerning indications of a possible criminal offence. This question is primarily assessed under Article 166(1)(1) and (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, which permits the opening of a pre-trial investigation upon receipt of a report of a criminal offence or where a prosecutor or pre-trial investigation officer identifies indications of a criminal offence on their own initiative. Since Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not list Article 122 of the Criminal Code, “Public Calls to Violently Violate the Sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania”, or Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code, “Assisting Another State to Act Against the Republic of Lithuania”, the opening of such an investigation under the cited provisions is not conditional on a complaint by the victim. The procedural assessment is also based on Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, under which a pre-trial investigation is terminated where, during the investigation, insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt in committing a criminal offence. If the investigation were to establish harm to specific persons, Articles 109 and 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning civil claims and the rights of civil claimants in criminal proceedings would be relevant
Legal assessment. At the initial stage, it is sufficient for the prosecutor’s office to identify indications of a criminal offence, rather than prove all elements of the charge. Accordingly, a publicly posted text referring to the “removal from Lithuania” of persons and remuneration “for each head” may reasonably become the subject of Article 166 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Procedurally, it is significant that the post was public, published on a social network, and linked to a video concerning Russian actions against the Baltic States, since these circumstances explain why the prosecutor’s office is assessing a possible connection with Article 122 and Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code. Article 166(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires every instance of opening a pre-trial investigation to be registered in accordance with the procedure established by the Prosecutor General; therefore, an opened investigation must be formalised and may not be conducted as an informal review of a public post. Under Article 166(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the person who submitted the complaint, application, or report is notified of the opening of the pre-trial investigation if the investigation was opened on that basis. Article 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is relevant to this situation not because it imposes an additional requirement, but because such a requirement is absent: that provision lists categories of offences for which an investigation is opened only upon a victim’s complaint or a prosecutor’s request, but the offences under Articles 122 and 118 of the Criminal Code referred to in the report do not fall within that list. This means that individual complaints by the 66 persons named in the list are not a prerequisite for opening the investigation, although their questioning or explanations may become significant data. Under Article 78 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, any person may be summoned as a witness where there are data indicating that the person knows circumstances relevant to resolving the case; accordingly, persons who saw the publication of the post, persons named in the list, and persons connected with the administration of the account may all be questioned. At the same time, Article 80(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure restricts questioning a person as a witness where that person may testify about a criminal offence committed by themselves. If the investigation required the seizure of devices, account administration data, documents, or other objects relevant to the investigation, Article 149(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits only the seizure of items and documents that may be relevant to the investigation. During a search or seizure, under Article 149(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the officer must announce the ruling or order and provide a copy to the person in whose premises or possession the action is being carried out, while Article 149(5) prohibits searches or seizures at night except in urgent cases. Article 149(7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires seized items and documents to be shown to the participating persons, listed in the record or inventory, and, where possible, packaged and sealed. If a restriction of personal liberty were being considered, Article 140(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits temporary detention of a person caught committing a criminal offence or immediately after its commission, while Article 140(2) sets stricter conditions for detention where the person is not caught at the scene. Article 140(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes a maximum 48-hour period of temporary detention, and where, in certain cases, the person had previously been questioned as a suspect, the initial period may not exceed 24 hours, subject to extension by prosecutor’s order up to the maximum period. Coercive measures under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be imposed to ensure the participation of the suspect, accused, or convicted person in the proceedings, the unhindered conduct of the investigation, the hearing of the case, and the enforcement of the judgment, as well as to prevent new criminal offences. Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure lists coercive measures such as detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to register periodically with a police authority, and a written undertaking not to leave. If the persons named in the list claimed to have suffered pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage, they could bring a civil claim in the criminal proceedings under Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and would be recognised as civil claimants by prosecutor’s order or court ruling under Article 110(1). The provided case-law sources do not contain specific cases concerning Article 122 or Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code; therefore, procedural criteria, rather than criteria based on precedential interpretation, are more significant here
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is the continuation of the investigation by collecting data on the author of the post, control of the account, the circumstances of publication, the purpose of the text, its connection with the publicised video, and the situation of the persons named in the list. The second scenario is the application of procedural coercive measures if the objectives set out in Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are established, for example the need to ensure participation in the proceedings or the unhindered conduct of the pre-trial investigation. The third scenario is termination of the investigation under Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the collected data do not sufficiently substantiate the suspect’s guilt in committing a criminal offence. The fourth scenario is completion of the pre-trial investigation by an indictment: under Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, an indictment is a document adopted by the prosecutor by which the pre-trial investigation is completed, the criminal offence is described, and the data substantiating the charge and the criminal law are specified. The practical significance for the prosecutor’s office and the police is that they must act within the limits established by the Code of Criminal Procedure for registration, data collection, questioning, seizures, and possible coercive measures. For the persons named in the list, the practical relevance lies in the possibilities provided under Articles 109 and 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to bring a civil claim, submit evidence and requests, and challenge actions or decisions insofar as they relate to the civil claim. For the account administrator or another possible suspect, the essential point is that the process may move from an assessment of a public post to specific procedural actions; however, at the charging stage, that person’s rights would be linked to the rights of the accused set out in Article 16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and to the indictment defined in Article 23. For the public, the practical significance of this case is not a political assessment, but the boundary between the publication of public content and indications of a criminal offence sufficient to open criminal proceedings under Article 166 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Whether a blood alcohol level of 3.23 per mille while driving a Renault Megane Scenic, with no reported traffic accident, should be classified under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code as a separate criminal offence, rather than under Article 281, which is linked to a traffic accident and its consequences.
Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code directly criminalises driving a motor vehicle where a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more is established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Since the reported 3.23 per mille significantly exceeds the 1.51 per mille threshold, the threshold for criminal liability under this provision is crossed by the act of driving alone. On the facts as presented, Article 281 of the Criminal Code applies where a breach of road traffic rules causes a traffic accident and specific consequences; it is therefore not the strongest basis for legal classification on the facts reported.
The article inaccurately refers to Article 281 of the Criminal Code: on the facts provided, the more precise reference is Article 2811(1), because the issue is driving with a blood alcohol level of 1.51 per mille or more, not a traffic accident resulting in bodily injury or substantial property damage. The statement regarding a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year is accurate as the specific sanction under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code; however, in the broader context of criminal liability, Article 42 of the Criminal Code provides for a wider catalogue of penalties, and it should therefore not be conflated with the sanction for the specific offence. The formulation on deprivation of the right to drive “from 1 to 5 years” is also too broad in light of the excerpt from Article 426 of the Code of Administrative Offences provided: it distinguishes between periods of “from one to three years” and “from three to five years”, depending on the specific paragraph.
In practice, the stronger argument is classification under Article 2811 of the Criminal Code, because a blood alcohol level of 3.23 per mille in itself satisfies the quantitative element of that provision, whereas the reported facts lack the necessary consequential element required for Article 281. A professional should cite not “severe intoxication” as a journalistic category, but the threshold in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code, namely “1.51 per mille or more”, because that is what separates administrative from criminal risk. The main error would be to transfer administrative sanction ranges automatically into a criminal case: additional measures must be assessed under the specifically applicable regime, rather than framed in a general “from 1 to 5 years” formula.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the driving by a 60-year-old person of a Renault Megane Scenic, where a blood alcohol concentration of 3.23 per mille was established, constitutes a criminal offence under Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. This provision applies to a person who drove a motor vehicle while intoxicated, where a blood alcohol concentration of 1.51 per mille or more was established, and provides for a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. The basis for liability must also be assessed under Article 2(1), (3), and (4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania: the act must be prohibited by the criminal law in force, the person must be culpable, and the person’s conduct must correspond to the statutory elements of the offence. Article 1(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania is relevant insofar as it defines the function of the Code itself, namely to establish criminal offences, penalties, and the conditions for criminal liability. According to the text provided, Article 281 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania regulates violations of road traffic safety or vehicle operation rules where they result in a traffic accident and cause bodily harm or substantial property damage; therefore, in the situation described, the central provision is specifically Article 2811 of the Criminal Code
Legal assessment. A blood alcohol concentration of 3.23 per mille exceeds by more than twice the threshold of 1.51 per mille established in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code; accordingly, on the facts provided, the legal classification is based not merely on generally dangerous driving, but on a specific statutory definition of a criminal offence. The protected legal interest is road traffic safety, and the objective element consists of driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated to the degree specified by law. Article 2811(2) of the Criminal Code further provides that a person is also liable where the act referred to in paragraph 1 is committed through negligence; therefore, the form of guilt does not exclude criminal liability merely because the person might claim that he failed to assess his condition. The provisions of the rules approved by Government resolution are relevant to the procedure for establishing intoxication: according to point 1 provided, they apply to the determination of intoxication of vehicle drivers, and under subpoint 2.3, intoxication testing consists of actions by the police and other specified entities, carried out using metrologically verified special technical devices by reference to the ethyl alcohol concentration in exhaled air. Thus, under the regulation provided, patrolling police officers fall within the category of entities whose actions establish the intoxication of a vehicle driver. If additional data are relevant to the investigation, Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania permits the suspect, defence counsel, victim, and other persons, on their own initiative, to submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation and examination of the criminal offence. Procedural time limits are calculated under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: they define the time of commencement, performance, or completion of procedural acts, and time limits calculated in hours, days, and months must be assessed in accordance with the rules set out in Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 100(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is particularly significant, because detention time limits are calculated from the actual moment when that measure is applied. Following detention, the process may move to the question of remand measures: under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, such measures are imposed to ensure the participation of the suspect, accused, or convicted person in the proceedings, the unobstructed conduct of the investigation, the hearing of the case, and the enforcement of the judgment, as well as to prevent new criminal offences. Under Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, possible remand measures include detention, intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, an obligation to report periodically to a police authority, and a written undertaking not to leave. The issue of the vehicle is determined under Article 72 of the Criminal Code: confiscation of property is the compulsory uncompensated taking of confiscable property into state ownership, and confiscable property is deemed to include the instrument, means, or proceeds of a prohibited act. If the vehicle belongs to the offender and is recognised as the means by which the criminal offence was committed, Article 72(3) of the Criminal Code provides for mandatory confiscation of such property. If the vehicle belongs to another natural or legal person, Article 72(4) of the Criminal Code permits confiscation only under the conditions specified therein, for example where the owner knew, or ought to have and could have known, that the property would be used to commit a prohibited act. The texts amending Article 427 of the Code of Administrative Offences and Article 423(3) are relevant for drawing the boundary: they refer to intoxication of more than 0.4 per mille or from 0.41 per mille up to not more than 1.5 per mille, and therefore a case involving 3.23 per mille falls outside that administrative range. No case law has been provided; accordingly, the assessment is based solely on the specified provisions of statutes and subordinate legislation
Consequences. Realistically, the principal scenario is a pre-trial investigation into the act provided for in Article 2811(1) of the Criminal Code and a decision on a fine, arrest, or imprisonment for up to one year. Another practical issue will be the status of the vehicle: if it is regarded as the means of committing the prohibited act and belongs to the offender, confiscation is mandatory under Article 72(3) of the Criminal Code. If the vehicle belongs to another person, the issue of confiscation will depend on the conditions set out in Article 72(4) of the Criminal Code. Procedurally, it is important for the suspect that he and his defence counsel may submit objects and documents relevant to the investigation under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while any coercive or remand measures applied must be assessed under Articles 100, 119, and 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The alternatives for concluding the pre-trial investigation under the text of Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided include termination where the specified circumstances are established, where insufficient data are collected to substantiate guilt, and where the grounds referred to in Articles 36, 37, 38, 40, or 39(1) of the Criminal Code apply. The practical significance of this case for the driver is the risk of criminal liability, possible forms of deprivation or restriction of liberty, and confiscation of property. For the police and the prosecutor, the most important matters are to properly record the fact of driving, the degree of intoxication, and the moments at which procedural measures were applied, because these elements constitute the basis for applying Article 2811 of the Criminal Code. For society and road users, this situation is significant not as an administrative road traffic violation, but as a road traffic safety case protected by criminal law, in which the decisive threshold is 1.51 per mille
Does the employment of T. Metelionis’s father at UAB Kauno švara from 1 March 2024 and of his stepmother in the municipal Tax Administration Subdivision in itself constitute an unlawful conflict of interest, or would it be necessary to prove the administration director’s specific involvement in personnel, control, supervision or other decision-making concerning these persons or the company?
Article 60 of the Law on Civil Service allocates municipal personnel management among several actors: the council, the mayor and the municipal administrator. Accordingly, the mayor’s sole exercise of shareholder rights in UAB Kauno švara does not eliminate the question of the administration director’s possible administrative or personnel-management functions within the municipality. However, that provision also does not permit an automatic inference of a breach from the mere fact of kinship, because it is necessary to establish what specific decision or channel of influence the administration director had in relation to B.
Metelionienė’s position, A. Metelionis’s employment, or the company’s activities. Article 161 of the Law on Civil Service directly regulates other employment by a civil servant, but its wording indicates an important legal threshold: the risk arises where the work gives rise to a conflict of interest, creates conditions for using public office for private interests, or is connected with an undertaking over which the civil servant has authoritative powers, controls or supervises it, or takes other decisions concerning it.
Therefore, the stronger legal argument is not “relatives are employed”, but rather “whether there were authoritative, control or decision-making functions connected with their positions or employer”.
In practice, the legal vulnerability of a publication lies where it moves from verifiable facts to implied influence: B. Metelionienė’s employment since 2010, A. Metelionis’s employment at UAB Kauno švara from 1 March 2024, T.
Metelionis’s position as administration director from 14 April 2023, and his earlier board membership until April 2023 are facts, but a conclusion that there was a conflict of interest requires a chain of decisions. At present, the stronger defensive position would be that the mayor exercises shareholder rights and that the family relationship itself, absent a specific decision, does not prove a breach; the stronger investigative position would be to request documents concerning recruitment, approval of posts, remuneration, reporting lines, working groups and municipal decision-making processes relating to Kauno švara. For a lawyer or journalist, the key point is not to present a breach as an established fact until there is evidence of a decision or of a breach of a duty to recuse; the more precise formulation is that this is a conflict-of-interest risk worth examining, linked to the specific functions of the administration director.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not merely whether T. Metelionis’s relatives work for the municipality or for a municipally controlled company, but whether the director of administration, as a declaring person, adopted, prepared, considered, or implemented official decisions connected with his private interests. This issue is primarily to be assessed under Article 1, Article 2(1)-(4), Article 3(1)-(2), and Article 4(1)-(2) of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests. Under Article 1 of that Law, the purpose of the regulation is to disclose private interests, ensure the primacy of public interests, and prevent conflicts of interest and corruption. Under Article 2(2) of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests, a conflict of interest arises where a declaring person, in performing official duties or an assignment, must adopt or participate in adopting a decision that is also connected with his private interests. Under Article 2(3) of the same Law, private interests include the interest of the declaring person or a person close to him in obtaining pecuniary or non-pecuniary benefit, a moral debt, a moral obligation, or an interest of a similar nature. Under Article 2(1) of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests, T. Metelionis’s father falls within the concept of persons close to him, and therefore official decisions connected with him may be subject to assessment from the perspective of private interests. Under Article 3(1)(1)-(4) of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests, a declaring person must perform his duties impartially, honestly, and properly, avoid conflicts of interest and act in a manner that does not give rise to doubts as to such a conflict, refrain from using his position for personal benefit, and adopt decisions in accordance with the law and the principle of equality of persons
Legal assessment. The mere fact of kinship and employment within the municipality or a municipally controlled company is not, under the cited provisions, in itself identified as a prohibition, because Article 2(2) of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests links a conflict to a specific decision, participation in its adoption, or performance of an assignment. It is therefore legally relevant whether T. Metelionis had an official function in relation to B. Metelionienė’s employment in the municipality, her position, evaluation, working conditions, remuneration, assignments, or other decisions directly relevant to her. Equally relevant is whether he had a function in relation to decisions of UAB “Kauno švara” that could have concerned A. Metelionis’s employment, position, remuneration, work organisation, or company operating processes affecting his private interest. Article 4(1) of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests obliges a person working in the civil service to declare private interests, while Article 3(2) establishes a general obligation to declare in accordance with the procedure laid down by that Law. Under paragraph 2.5 of the Description of the Procedure for Selecting Candidates to the Board of a State Enterprise or Municipal Enterprise, a municipally controlled company is a private limited liability company in which shares carrying more than half of the voting rights are owned by the municipality; therefore, the classification of UAB “Kauno švara” as a municipally controlled company is relevant for assessing the risk of a conflict of interest. Article 4(2) of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests also applies the declaration regime to heads and deputy heads of public limited liability companies and private limited liability companies in which the state or a municipality holds more than 50 per cent of the authorised capital or shares; however, in the situation presented, A. Metelionis is described as an adviser, not as a head or deputy head. Paragraph 16 of the Government resolution amending the regulation on the exercise of pecuniary and non-pecuniary rights in public institutions provides that, where circumstances giving rise to a conflict of interest of an authorised representative arise or become apparent, the provisions of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests apply, and where an employee is not included in the relevant list, he must immediately inform the head of the authorising state institution or the municipal mayor. Paragraph 7 of the same regulation similarly provides that, in the event of a conflict of interest involving a curator or a member of a supervising working group, the provisions of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests apply, or the head of the state institution or the municipal mayor must be informed immediately. The Government’s opinion on draft law No. XIIP-886 notes that the declaration of private interests must enable prior written recommendations to be prepared as to the decisions from which a person must recuse himself, as well as the adoption of a reasoned written decision to remove a person from the preparation, consideration, or adoption of a specific decision. In administrative case A11-222-2003, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania held that a circumstance relevant to a conflict of interest is linked to a person’s influence over decisions giving rise to the conflict. In ruling A-442-705-08, the Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania emphasised the purpose of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests, namely to ensure the impartiality of decisions and the supremacy of public interests, while a conflict of interest is linked to the duty to adopt a decision, participate in its adoption, or perform an assignment connected with private interests
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario would be a review of declarations and actual functions: whether T. Metelionis’s declaration disclosed the relevant private interests and whether his official functions intersected with decisions concerning persons close to him or UAB “Kauno švara”. The second scenario would be preventive management of interests: prior written recommendations, recusal, or removal from the preparation, consideration, or adoption of specific decisions where the decision is connected with a private interest. The third scenario is relevant to the supervision of municipally controlled entities: if the municipal mayor, an authorised representative, a curator, or a member of a working group encounters the possibility of a conflict of interest, the notification, revocation of authorisation, or withdrawal mechanisms must operate under paragraphs 7 and 16 of the cited Government resolutions. The fourth scenario would be risk monitoring by the Chief Official Ethics Commission, because Article 21(1)-(4) of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests provides for the Conflict of Interest Risk Management Information System, administered by the Chief Official Ethics Commission, to which institutions and legal persons must provide the necessary data. The legal significance for T. Metelionis is the obligation to demonstrate not only formal declaration, but also actual non-participation in decisions which, under Article 2(2)-(3) of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests, could be connected with his private interests. For the municipality, this is important for internal conflict-of-interest management, because it is not sufficient to know the family relationships: they must be linked to duties, assignments, the decision-making chain, and recusal practice. For UAB “Kauno švara”, this is important both as a municipally controlled company and as an entity whose heads and deputy heads are subject to the declaration regime under Article 4(2) of the Law on the Adjustment of Public and Private Interests. For the public and the media, the practical significance of this situation is that the law assesses not the impression of nepotism, but verifiable links between a private interest and a specific official decision
Can an advocate who has entered into a legal services agreement with a client avoid disciplinary liability for breach of the duties of loyalty and honest provision of services by arguing that some of the services were in fact provided by other advocates as subcontractors? A secondary but practically important question is whether a single breach in relation to one client may be a sufficient basis for imposing a disciplinary sanction, where one of the mildest forms of liability, a reprimand, has been imposed.
Article 4(2) of the Law on the Bar establishes the client’s right to choose an advocate to advise, represent or defend his or her interests, meaning that the contractual relationship is not merely a technique for allocating services among lawyers. Article 4(3) of the same law provides that an advocate’s activity consists of the provision of legal services and is not commercial economic activity; accordingly, the subcontracting argument cannot be mechanically transposed from the ordinary commercial services model. Points 5 and 6 of Article 5 of the Law on the Bar identify loyalty to the client, avoidance of conflicts of interest and irreproachable conduct as principles of an advocate’s activity, while Article 39(1) requires an advocate to perform his or her duties honestly and comply with the Lithuanian Code of Ethics for Advocates.
The stronger rule arising from these provisions is that the professional duty follows the advocate who accepted the client’s mandate and does not disappear when the work is factually transferred to third parties.
In its ruling of 17 July 2026 in civil case No e3K-3-109-421/2026, the Supreme Court of Lithuania upheld the position of the lower courts and the Court of Honour of Advocates that engaging subcontractors does not in itself preclude disciplinary liability for the advocate who concluded the agreement. The Court emphasised that such an advocate must continue to remain loyal to the client, cooperate, act in the client’s best interests and ensure compliance with the standards governing advocates’ professional activity and ethics. The Supreme Court also expressly underlined that breaches committed by the advocate personally are sufficient for disciplinary liability, even if part of the services were provided through other persons.
The signal from the case law is clear: in defending against disciplinary liability, subcontracting may operate, at most, as an argument distinguishing factual acts, but not as a circumstance eliminating liability.
In practice, the stronger argument is now not “the service was performed by another advocate”, but whether the advocate who concluded the agreement actually ensured that the client was informed, that cooperation took place, that the client’s interests were protected and that ethical standards were monitored. For law firms and advocates practising individually, any subcontracting model must be documented so that it is clear who is responsible to the client for the progress of the mandate, communication and quality control, because in disciplinary proceedings the centre of liability will remain with the advocate chosen by the client and party to the agreement. It is also significant that the Supreme Court does not treat an error made in relation to a single client as insignificant merely because it was isolated, particularly where a mild sanction, a reprimand, is imposed.
Therefore, in disputes concerning disciplinary liability, it would be a mistake to rely solely on the number of breaches or on the involvement of subcontractors; the essential assessment will be whether, in the specific mandate, the professional standard of loyalty and honest conduct was breached.
Core issue. The precise question is whether an advocate who has entered into a legal services agreement with a client may avoid disciplinary liability for a breach of loyalty and the diligent performance of duties solely because some of the services were in fact provided by other advocates as subcontractors. This question is assessed under Article 2(1) and (2), Article 4(2) and (3), Article 5(3), (5) and (6), Article 39(1) and (2), and Article 51(1) and (2) of the Law on the Bar of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 2(1) of the Law on the Bar defines legal services as consultations, the preparation of documents having legal significance, representation, defence, and representation in proceedings, while paragraph 2 provides that such services are provided by advocates, assistant advocates, or a professional partnership of advocates. Under Article 4(2) of the Law on the Bar, a person has the right to choose an advocate to advise, represent, or defend his or her interests; therefore, the legal relationship is primarily linked to the advocate chosen by the client and who entered into the agreement. Article 5(5) of the Law on the Bar establishes loyalty to the client and the avoidance of conflicts of interest, Article 5(6) establishes impeccable conduct, and Article 39(1) obliges an advocate to perform his or her duties honestly and comply with the requirements of the Lithuanian Code of Ethics for Advocates
Legal assessment. Under the cited provisions, the use of a subcontractor does not alter the nature of the advocate’s primary duty to the client: the advocate’s activity remains the provision of legal services under Article 4(3) of the Law on the Bar, and loyalty to the client is one of the principles of an advocate’s activity under Article 5(5). What is legally significant for the client is not only who technically prepared a document or performed an act, but that the advocate chosen by the client under Article 4(2) ensures the honest, lawful, and loyal organisation of the service. Accordingly, when an advocate delegates part of the tasks to other advocates, he or she does not cease to have a duty to cooperate with the client, act in the client’s interests, and ensure compliance with professional standards. Article 39(1) of the Law on the Bar is framed as a personal duty of the advocate and therefore cannot be narrowed to a duty only in respect of acts physically performed by the advocate personally, where that advocate undertook to provide the service to the client. Article 5(3) of the Law on the Bar also requires lawfulness; therefore, organising services through other persons cannot become a means of circumventing the standards governing advocates’ activity and ethics. According to the ruling of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 17 July 2026 in civil case No. e3K-3-109-421/2026, as referred to in the notice, the fact that third parties were engaged to provide legal services does not in itself preclude disciplinary liability being imposed on the advocate who entered into the agreement. In the same case, the Supreme Court of Lithuania emphasised that an advocate must remain loyal to the client, cooperate with the client, perform duties honestly, and act in the client’s best interests even when subcontractors are engaged. It is also significant that disciplinary liability was imposed not only for acts related to subcontractors, but also for breaches committed by the advocate personally. In the Supreme Court’s assessment, even a mistake made in relation to a single client may be sufficiently significant from the perspective of the standards applicable to advocates’ activity and professional ethics. Procedurally, Article 51 of the Law on the Bar applies to a dispute between a client and an advocate concerning legal services: under Article 51(1), the client may apply to the Lithuanian Bar or to a court. Under Article 51(2), such disputes before the Lithuanian Bar are examined by the Council of the Lithuanian Bar or by a body formed by it, which may adopt recommendatory decisions. In this situation, the disciplinary sanction, a reprimand, was imposed by the Court of Honour of Advocates, and the courts did not annul it; this shows that the focus of the disciplinary assessment was not compensation for civil damage, but a breach of professional duties. Article 20(1) to (3) of the Law on the Bar regulates compulsory professional civil liability insurance for damage, but that provision does not replace disciplinary liability for breaches of the standards of loyalty, honesty, and impeccable conduct
Consequences. In practical terms, this case means that an advocate who accepts a client and enters into a legal services agreement must control the quality of the service and the protection of the client’s interests even when other advocates are engaged to perform the work. For clients, this is important because the protection of their rights is not weakened merely because of an internal allocation of the service among advocates or other entities providing legal services. For advocates, this entails a heightened duty to organise subcontractors’ work clearly, maintain communication with the client, and ensure that the client’s interest is not lost among several service providers. If a client considers that legal services were provided improperly, under Article 51(1) of the Law on the Bar the client may choose to apply to the Lithuanian Bar or to a court. If the dispute is examined by the Lithuanian Bar, under Article 51(2) it is examined by the Council of Advocates or a body formed by it, and the question of disciplinary liability may result in a professional sanction. The further course of such a case for the advocate concerned may entail harm to his or her disciplinary reputation, although the reprimand referred to in the notice is described as one of the mildest forms of disciplinary liability. The issue of compensation for civil damage, if raised, would be separate from the disciplinary assessment and would be linked to the professional civil liability insurance mechanism established in Article 20 of the Law on the Bar. The broader practical weight of the precedent is that subcontracting does not extinguish the advocate’s duty of loyalty, and an isolated breach in relation to a single client may constitute a sufficient basis for disciplinary liability under the principles and duties governing an advocate’s activity
Is it sufficient, for attaching an external air-conditioning unit to the facade of an apartment building, to establish that a construction permit document is not required, or is a decision of the owners of the apartments and other premises on the use of a common-use object nevertheless necessary?
Article 27(5) of the Law on Construction indicates that where a construction permit document is required, obtaining it is linked to a formal chain of documentation: an application, the relevant construction design documentation, and other documents specified by law. Accordingly, the distinction described in the news item between cases where an air-conditioning unit is regarded as a material alteration of the appearance of a building and cases where it is not determines the need for a construction permitting procedure, not the right to use the facade itself. Article 4.85 of the Civil Code separately provides that decisions concerning the management and use of common-use objects are adopted by a majority vote of the owners of apartments and other premises, unless otherwise provided by law.
It follows that the absence of a requirement for a construction permit does not remove the civil-law requirement to obtain a majority decision concerning the facade as a common-use object.
The article’s statement that, in an apartment building, it is necessary to obtain the consent of a majority of the owners, “recorded in minutes”, is incomplete. On the wording of Article 4.85 of the Civil Code cited, the essential requirement is not minutes as the sole form, but a decision by a majority vote of the owners of apartments and other premises concerning the management and use of a common-use object. A more precise formulation would be: attaching an external air-conditioning unit to the facade of an apartment building requires the majority decision of the owners of apartments and other premises provided for in Article 4.85 of the Civil Code, duly documented in accordance with the decision-making procedure permitted by the Civil Code, and not necessarily only by minutes of a meeting.
In practice, the stronger argument is to distinguish between two separate constraints: the construction-law regime and the co-owners’ decision on the use of the facade. If the building does not fall within the areas referred to in the article, is not a cultural heritage building or a building forming part of a cultural object of national significance, and the equipment is not regarded as a material alteration of appearance, a construction permit document may be unnecessary. That does not, however, mean there is a right to use the facade unilaterally.
For a lawyer or building administrator, the key point is not to repeat the mistake that “no permit is required” means “no consent is required”: in a dispute, Article 4.85 of the Civil Code should be cited for the requirement of a majority decision, and Article 27(5) of the Law on Construction only for the permitting procedure where that procedure applies at all.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether affixing the outdoor unit of an air conditioner to the façade of a residential building is to be regarded as such ordinary repair works as require a building design, a construction permitting document, notification of commencement of construction, and a decision of the owners of the apartment building. This question is assessed under Article 24(1)(5) and (9), Article 27(5), and Article 27²(1)–(3) of the Law on Construction of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as Articles 4.83(1)–(3) and 4.85(1)–(2) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania. In terms of technical requirements, clause 1 of STR 2.09.02:2005 and clause 229 of STR 2.02.02:2004 are applicable. The essential distinction is not only between cases where a construction permitting document is or is not required, but also between requirements of public construction law and requirements arising from common partial ownership
Legal assessment. If installation of the outdoor unit of an air conditioner is classified as ordinary repair of a structure, the form of the design documentation is determined under Article 24(1) of the Law on Construction of the Republic of Lithuania: for ordinary repair of a cultural heritage structure, an ordinary repair design is prepared under Article 24(1)(5), whereas for ordinary repair of other structures, an ordinary repair description is prepared under Article 24(1)(9). Where a construction permitting document is required, Article 27(5)(1) and (2) of the Law on Construction of the Republic of Lithuania require submission of an application and the relevant building design or design proposals in the prescribed manner. Under Article 27(5)(3) of the same law, an opinion of an immovable cultural heritage assessment council or a recommendation or opinion of a regional architectural council may be submitted where applicable under the specified provisions. If the application is submitted by a person other than the developer, Article 27(5)(5) of the Law on Construction of the Republic of Lithuania requires the developer’s written authorisation. Where Article 27² of the Law on Construction of the Republic of Lithuania applies, possession of a construction permitting document alone is not sufficient to commence works: under paragraph 1 of that article, the developer must notify the State Territorial Planning and Construction Inspectorate of the commencement of construction where a construction permitting document is mandatory or where the cases specified in Article 27(11) apply. Under Article 27²(2), construction works may commence once the documents submitted with the notification have been registered in the “Infostatyba” information system. Under Article 27²(3), in certain cases where design proposals are reviewed by entities authorised by the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Health, or the Ministry of Transport and Communications, works may commence no earlier than 10 working days after registration of the notification in “Infostatyba”. The public is informed of an issued construction permitting document through TPS “Vartai”, by publishing in “Infostatyba” the data concerning the document, the design proposals, and the structure, in accordance with Article 27(15¹) of the Law on Construction of the Republic of Lithuania. In the case of an apartment building, the façade is assessed under the regime governing common-use objects: Article 4.83(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania permits an owner to use common-use objects only in accordance with their functional purpose and without infringing the rights and legitimate interests of other owners. Accordingly, even where no construction permitting document is required for a specific installation under construction law, a separate obligation remains at the level of co-owners’ relations to comply with Article 4.85(1) of the Civil Code: decisions concerning the management and use of common-use objects are adopted by a majority vote of the owners of apartments and other premises, unless otherwise provided by law. Each owner of an apartment or other premises has one vote, and where an apartment or premises are owned by several persons, they are represented by one person under Article 4.85(1) of the Civil Code. If the required number of owners does not attend the first meeting, a repeated meeting is convened under Article 4.85(2) of the Civil Code no earlier than two weeks later, and decisions at that meeting are adopted by a majority of the votes of those participating, but by not less than one quarter of all owners’ votes, except in the cases listed in that provision itself. Article 4.83(2)(2) of the Civil Code grants an owner the right to require that the management and use of common-use objects comply with the general rights and legitimate interests of the owners. Article 4.83(3) of the Civil Code also establishes the duty to manage, properly maintain, repair, or otherwise administer common-use objects. Clause 1 of STR 2.09.02:2005 applies to the installation of air conditioning equipment, since that regulation applies to the design and installation of heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning systems in building premises, and, in the case of repair works, its requirements are mandatory for the parts or premises being repaired. Clause 229 of STR 2.02.02:2004 additionally requires that the structure, its envelope, and air-conditioning systems be designed and constructed so that energy consumption during use is as low as possible, having regard to the climatic conditions of the locality and the needs of the users of the structure
Consequences. In practical terms, the first scenario is simpler: if, under construction law requirements, a construction permitting document and notification of commencement of construction are not applicable, a resident of an apartment building nevertheless needs a majority decision of the owners concerning use of the façade, adopted in accordance with Article 4.85 of the Civil Code. The second scenario is a formal construction process: where a construction permitting document is mandatory, the developer must prepare the design or description required under Article 24(1) of the Law on Construction of the Republic of Lithuania, submit the documents specified in Article 27(5), and complete the notification procedure for commencement of construction provided for in Article 27². The third scenario is relevant to a cultural heritage structure: in that case, under Article 24(1)(5) of the Law on Construction of the Republic of Lithuania, the ordinary repair design for a cultural heritage structure is specifically material to ordinary repair works, and under Article 27(5)(3) there may be a need to submit heritage protection or architectural assessment documents. In the event of disagreements between owners, the practical focus of the dispute would not be an abstract right to have an air conditioner, but whether the use of the façade as a common-use object has been approved in accordance with Article 4.85 of the Civil Code and whether the legitimate interests of other owners are not infringed under Article 4.83 of the Civil Code. This is important for apartment owners, administrators, and associations, because the absence of a requirement for a construction permitting document does not in itself alter the voting rules applicable to a common-use object. It is also important for contractors and designers, because the technical installation solution must comply with clause 1 of STR 2.09.02:2005 and clause 229 of STR 2.02.02:2004, and cannot be limited merely to the physical attachment of the outdoor unit
Whether the departure of Mindaugas Balčiūnas, head of the association “Lietuvos krepšinis”, from office is determined by a political or reputational condition publicly identified by him, or solely by the decision-making procedure of the competent body laid down in the association’s articles of association.
Article 7 of the Law on Associations provides that an association exercises civil rights and assumes civil obligations through its bodies, and that an association must have either a general meeting of members, or another body vested with its rights, as well as a management body. Article 12(1) of the same law defines the articles of association as the founding document by which the association is governed in its activities, while Article 12(2)(8) requires the articles of association to determine the competence of the general meeting of members, and the procedure for convening it and adopting decisions. Accordingly, the strongest inference from these provisions is not a rule based on the personal declarations of the head of the association, but rather an internal rule on the competence of the association’s bodies: if, under the articles of association, the issue of removing the head, formalising a resignation, or forming a new body is assigned to a specific body, the legal effect is created by a procedurally proper decision of that body.
In practice, the key issue is not what condition Mindaugas Balčiūnas publicly identifies for his departure, but what the articles of association of “Lietuvos krepšinis” provide regarding the appointment and removal of the head, acceptance of a resignation, and the competent body. For a professional audience, the stronger argument would be to cite Articles 7 and 12 of the Law on Associations: the governance of an association is not a personalised question of confidence; it operates through the bodies and procedures defined in the articles of association. The risk for journalists and lawyers is to conflate reputational considerations, or pressure from the sporting community, with the legal mechanism for departure.
Without the text of the articles of association, it is not possible to state with certainty who precisely may remove the head, but it is possible to state with precision that a public statement, by itself, is not a sufficient substitute for a decision of an association body.
Core issue. The legal issue is not “what should happen politically”, but which body of the association has competence under the articles of association to terminate the powers of the head of the association “Lietuvos krepšinis” or to formalise his resignation. This is determined under Article 1(1), Article 7(1), (5), (7) and (9), Article 8(1)(2), and Article 12(1) and (2)(8)-(9) of the Law on Associations of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 7(5) of the Law on Associations requires an association to have a management body, either single-member or collegial. Under Article 8(1)(2) of the Law on Associations, the general meeting of members appoints, elects and removes members of management bodies, unless the articles of association provide otherwise. Accordingly, the precise answer depends on whether Mindaugas Balčiūnas is a member or the head of the association’s management body, and on the specific removal and decision-making procedure established in the association’s articles of association
Legal assessment. Article 12(1) of the Law on Associations provides that the articles of association are the founding document by which the association is guided in its activities. This means that the mechanism for the head’s departure must be sought first in the association’s articles of association, not in public statements. Article 12(2)(8) of the Law on Associations requires the articles of association to specify the competence of the general meeting of members, the procedure for convening it, and the procedure for adopting decisions. If another body is formed instead of the general meeting of members, for example a conference, convention, congress or assembly, its competence and decision-making procedure must be established pursuant to Article 12(2)(9) of the Law on Associations. Article 7(2) of the Law on Associations permits such a body to have all or some of the rights of the general meeting of members. Under Article 7(3) of the Law on Associations, a body having all the rights of the general meeting of members is subject to the statutory provisions applicable to the general meeting of members. If such a body has only some of the rights of the general meeting of members, Article 7(4) of the Law on Associations provides that the general meeting of members nevertheless remains mandatory. The practical conclusion is that Balčiūnas may be removed only by a decision of the competent body of the association, adopted in accordance with the convening, participation, representation and voting procedure established in the articles of association. If the articles of association do not establish another model, Article 8(1)(2) of the Law on Associations applies, under which a member of a management body is removed by the general meeting of members. Article 7(9) of the Law on Associations additionally requires that general meetings of members and meetings of collegial bodies be recorded in minutes; therefore, a public statement or political pressure alone is insufficient to formalise a departure legally. If the matter concerns a voluntary resignation, the provisions applicable to associations indicate the general principle that the structure, competence and decision-making of bodies are determined in the articles of association pursuant to Article 7(7) of the Law on Associations. The council regulations cited also establish a model under which a member’s powers end upon written resignation or upon removal by the delegating institution, association or non-governmental organisation: points 9.1-9.3 of Resolution No. 1426 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 23 December 2005 and points 9.1-9.3 of the Regulations of the Council for the Welfare of Persons with Disabilities. These provisions directly regulate the status of councils, not the head of an association, but within the limits of the sources provided they demonstrate a formalised logic of departure and removal: a term of office, written resignation, or removal by a competent entity. Article 8(1)(6) of the Law on Associations distinguishes removal of the head from the termination of the association itself, because a decision on the transformation, reorganisation or liquidation of an association is a separate matter for the general meeting of members. Article 2.106 of the Civil Code provides the grounds for liquidation of a legal person, but the departure of the head is not, in itself, equivalent to liquidation of the association. Article 17(1) of the Law on Associations provides that associations are transformed and terminate in accordance with the procedure established by the Civil Code; therefore, procedures for terminating the organisation would not be the ordinary answer to the question of removing the head
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that Mindaugas Balčiūnas submits his resignation, and the body specified in the association’s articles of association formalises it in accordance with the established procedure. The second scenario is that the competent body of the association removes him, if it has that right under Article 8(1)(2) of the Law on Associations or under the articles of association. The third scenario is that the matter is raised at the general meeting of members or in another body provided for in the articles of association that has the relevant rights of the general meeting of members under Article 7(2)-(4) of the Law on Associations. The fourth scenario concerns not the head, but the association itself: if the termination of the association were at issue, Article 8(1)(6) and Article 17 of the Law on Associations, and Article 2.106 of the Civil Code, would apply. This is practically important for the members of the association because it is their participation and voting in the competent body that determines whether the head’s powers continue or come to an end. It is also important for the head himself, because his departure must be formalised in accordance with the articles of association and recorded in minutes, not merely declared publicly. It is important for third parties because, under Article 7(1) of the Law on Associations, an association acquires civil rights and performs obligations through its management bodies, and the head’s status therefore determines clarity of representation. The legally decisive act is not an answer to the media, but a decision adopted by the competent body of the association in accordance with the procedure established in the articles of association, or a properly formalised resignation
Whether, following the conviction of 16 July 2026, the strongest appellate issue in this case concerns a breach of the defendants’ procedural rights through delay or restrictions on the defence, or the specific legal classification of the offences under Articles 199-2, 260 and 260-1 of the Criminal Code and the resulting sentence.
Article 199-2 of the Criminal Code links the sentencing range not only to the unlawfulness of excisable goods, but also to their value: thresholds exceeding 150 MGL, 400 MGL or 900 MGL give rise, respectively, to imprisonment of up to 4, up to 6 or up to 8 years. Under Article 260 of the Criminal Code, the essential threshold is the quantity of narcotic or psychotropic substances and the intent to distribute: a large quantity with intent to distribute carries 8 to 10 years’ imprisonment, while a very large quantity carries 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment. Article 260-1 of the Criminal Code separately criminalises the transport of narcotic or psychotropic substances across the state border of the Republic of Lithuania without presenting them for customs control, while intent to distribute increases the penalty to 2 to 10 years.
Article 16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the accused’s rights to receive a copy of the indictment, submit applications and seek recusals; therefore, the mere fact that the brothers challenged the indictment, the prosecutor and the judge does not in itself constitute a procedural violation.
From a practical standpoint, the stronger route on appeal is likely not an abstract argument that the case dragged on from the arrests in autumn 2022 until the verdict of 16 July 2026, but a precise challenge to the qualifying elements: the MGL value threshold for excisable goods, the quantity of narcotic substances, and the intent to distribute. If the conviction is based on Article 260(2) or 260(3) of the Criminal Code, it is critical for the defence to attack the proof of a “large” or “very large” quantity and of intent to distribute, because this determines not a marginal adjustment but a sentencing increase measured in years. For the prosecution and the court, the most vulnerable point would not be the length of the proceedings as such, but an insufficiently clear distinction between which conduct is punished as possession or handling of excisable goods under Article 199-2, which as possession or handling of narcotic substances under Article 260, and which as border-crossing smuggling under Article 260-1.
The procedural-rights argument concerning recusals will be strong only if the appeal shows not merely that the applications were dismissed, but that their examination in fact restricted the right of defence guaranteed by Article 16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is whether the brothers’ actions were properly classified as unlawful possession or handling of excise goods under Article 199(2) or Article 1992 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, smuggling of narcotic or psychotropic substances under Article 2601 of the Criminal Code, and unlawful possession or handling of narcotic or psychotropic substances under Article 260 of the Criminal Code. In the excise-goods episode, the decisive factor is the value of the goods: Article 199(2)(1) of the Criminal Code provides for liability where the value exceeds 250 MGL, while Article 1992(1)–(3) differentiates liability where the value exceeds 150, 400, or 900 MGL. In the case of drug smuggling, the legally material question is whether the substances were transported or sent across the state border of the Republic of Lithuania without presenting them for customs control, otherwise evading such control, or without authorisation, as this is the core of the disposition of Article 2601 of the Criminal Code. In the case of unlawful possession or handling of narcotic or psychotropic substances under Article 260 of the Criminal Code, it is important to establish the form of possession or handling, the quantity, and the intent to distribute, because paragraph 1 is linked to the intent to sell or otherwise distribute, paragraph 2 to a large quantity and intent to distribute, and paragraph 3 to a very large quantity. The procedural issue also includes whether the defendants’ exercise of their rights to file applications and motions for recusal complied with the rights of the accused enshrined in Article 21(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Articles 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, concerning the purpose of coercive measures, Article 120, concerning the types of coercive measures, and Articles 99–100, concerning the purpose and calculation of procedural time limits in criminal proceedings, are also relevant to the assessment of the course of the case
Legal assessment. On the facts presented, the excise-goods episode could be punishable only if it was established that the goods were acquired, stored, transported, sent, used, or disposed of in breach of the prescribed procedure and that their value reached the MGL thresholds specified in Articles 199(2) or 1992 of the Criminal Code. Under Article 1992 of the Criminal Code, the sanction increases according to value: imprisonment for up to four years where the value exceeds 150 MGL but does not exceed 400 MGL; up to six years where it exceeds 400 MGL but does not exceed 900 MGL; and up to eight years where it exceeds 900 MGL. This shows that, in relation to the excise goods, the court is concerned not only with the form of unlawful possession or handling, but also with the economic scale. As regards smuggling of narcotic substances, liability under Article 2601 of the Criminal Code depends on quantity and intent to distribute: transporting or sending a large quantity across the border under paragraph 4 is punishable by imprisonment for a term of four to twelve years. If the narcotic or psychotropic substances were not only transported across the border but also unlawfully acquired, stored, transported, or sent with intent to distribute, Article 260 of the Criminal Code is independently relevant. Article 260(2) of the Criminal Code provides for imprisonment for a term of eight to ten years for a large quantity and intent to distribute, while paragraph 3 provides for imprisonment for a term of ten to fifteen years for a very large quantity. Accordingly, the “long years in prison” in this case are legally explained primarily by the quantity of narcotic substances, the possible intent to distribute, and the sentencing ranges under Articles 260 and 2601 of the Criminal Code. The defendants’ complaints concerning the indictment fall within the regulatory scope of Articles 21(3) and 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: the accused has the right to know the charge against him, to receive a copy of the indictment, and the indictment is the prosecutor’s document by which the pre-trial investigation is completed and the criminal act is described. The filing of motions for recusal is also a procedural right of the accused under Article 21(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure; therefore, the mere filing of such motions cannot be equated with unlawful conduct. On the other hand, if procedural actions were to exceed the limits of exercising the right of defence and in any way obstruct a judge or prosecutor in the performance of their duties, such conduct is defined as a separate criminal act by Article 231(1) of the Criminal Code. Detention from autumn 2022 until release on 23 January 2024 and 1 February 2024 must be assessed through the purpose of coercive measures: under Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, they are imposed to ensure participation in the proceedings, the unobstructed examination of the case and enforcement of the judgment, and also to prevent new criminal acts. Article 120(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure identifies detention as one of the coercive measures, alongside intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, periodic registration with the police, and a written undertaking not to leave. The fact that the persons were later released pending judgment is, in itself, consistent with the system of coercive measures, since the law provides not only for detention but also for more lenient measures ensuring participation in the proceedings. The protraction of the case is procedurally linked to the purpose of time limits established in Article 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because time limits in criminal proceedings define the commencement, performance, or completion of acts having procedural significance. Article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sets out the rules for calculating time limits, and paragraph 5 separately states that detention periods are calculated from the moment when that measure is actually applied
Consequences. Following the verdict announced by Kaunas Regional Court on 16 July 2026, the defendants, if a conviction was entered, become convicted persons under Article 21(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The most important practical consequence is the enforcement of the sentence within the sanction ranges under Articles 199(2), 1992, 2601, or 260 of the Criminal Code as determined in the judgment. At the same time, convicted persons retain the right specified in Article 21(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to appeal court judgments and rulings. If the proceedings were to reach the cassation stage, under Article 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the cassation instance would be the Supreme Court of Lithuania, which examines appeals against final judgments or rulings. Article 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines a cassation appeal as an appeal lodged in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law against a final judgment or ruling, while Article 26 treats the person who lodged such an appeal as the cassation appellant. If objects or documents were material in the case, Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows the accused, defence counsel, the victim, civil parties to the proceedings, and other persons to submit them on their own initiative. As regards civil damage, Article 118 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that where the accused or persons materially liable for his actions lack funds to compensate the damage, in the cases and according to the procedure provided by law the damage may be compensated from state funds. This case is of practical importance to the defendants because of the length of imprisonment and appeal options, to the prosecution because of the substantiation of the indictment and evidence, and to the court because of case management where the defence actively exercises the right to file applications and motions for recusal. It is also important for the classification of cases involving the circulation of excise goods and narcotic substances, because the cited provisions of the Criminal Code link the severity of punishment to value, quantity, border crossing, and intent to distribute
Whether, in civil law, liability for the harm caused to the victim in Marijampolė by a twelve-year-old lies with the minor herself or with her parents, where criminal liability is likely precluded by her age.
Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code applies directly to this age group: parents or guardians are liable for harm caused by a minor under the age of fourteen unless they prove that the harm did not arise through their fault. This does not mean automatic criminal or administrative liability of the parents for the violence, but rather a presumption of civil liability for compensation of damage. Since the news report states that the perpetrators are twelve years old, the model under Article 6.276 of the Civil Code, whereby a minor aged 14 to 18 is primarily liable personally, is not the main rule applicable to this situation.
If the harm had been caused while the child was under the supervision of an educational, upbringing, healthcare or care institution, Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code would shift the centre of liability to that institution; however, the facts provided indicate only Poetry Park, not institutional supervision.
In practice, the stronger argument is not that “the child cannot be punished”, but that the victim’s civil claim should be directed against the parents under Article 6.275 of the Civil Code, because the law specifically places on them the burden of rebutting their fault. The lawyer’s statement that criminal or administrative liability does not automatically apply to the parents does not negate the prospects of a civil claim; it merely distinguishes punitive liability from compensation for harm. For the victim’s side, the key points are to document the impairment of health, non-pecuniary damage, the impact of filming and publication, and the causal link with the specific acts, because in civil proceedings the issue will be compensation, not punishment.
The parents’ defence would centre on proving that the harm did not arise through their fault, but a mere reference to the fact that the incident occurred in a public place and that the child is young does not, under the logic of Article 6.275 of the Civil Code, in itself release them from liability.
Core issue. The precise legal issue in this situation is not merely whether a twelve-year-old may be sanctioned, but who, under the cited rules, is liable for damage caused by a minor under the age of fourteen and whether the parents may face independent legal consequences for failure to exercise parental authority. This issue must be assessed primarily under Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, which provides that damage caused by a minor under the age of fourteen is compensated by his or her parents or guardians, unless they prove that the damage did not arise through their fault. If the damage was caused while the child was under the supervision of an educational, upbringing, healthcare or guardianship institution, Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code applies, under which that institution is liable unless it proves the absence of fault. The issue of the parents’ administrative liability must be assessed under Article 73(1)–(3) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, concerning failure to exercise parental authority or exercising it contrary to the interests of the child. The purpose of administrative liability for minors must be evaluated under Article 42(1)–(3) of the Code of Administrative Offences: liability must correspond to the minor’s age and social maturity, help change behaviour, and deter further violations
Legal assessment. Since the report states that the violent adolescent is twelve years old, under Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code the burden of civil compensation is primarily shifted to her parents or guardians, unless they prove that the damage did not arise through their fault. This means that compensation for damage caused to the victim’s health, property or other civil interests may be directed not at the child herself as an independently liable tortfeasor, but at her statutory representatives. If it were established that, at the time of the incident, the child was under the supervision of an institution, Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code would provide a basis for raising the issue of that institution’s civil liability as well. Paragraph 174 of the report on implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child repeats the same rule: parents or a guardian are liable for damage caused by a minor under 14 unless they prove the absence of fault, and during supervision the relevant institution is liable. Parental liability is not automatic criminal or administrative liability for the violent act itself, but Article 73 of the Code of Administrative Offences allows for an independent assessment of whether parental authority was not exercised or was exercised contrary to the child’s interests. Under paragraph 1 of that article, a warning is imposed; under paragraph 2, in the event of repetition, a fine from ten to one hundred euros; and under paragraph 3, an obligation may be imposed to participate in prevention, early intervention, resocialisation, improvement of communication with children, violent behaviour change or other programmes. Paragraph 173 of the report also states that administrative liability is provided for failure to exercise parental authority or exercising it contrary to the child’s interests, namely a warning or a fine. If more serious family circumstances were established, paragraph 171 of the report links avoidance of parental duties, abuse of parental authority, harmful influence or failure to care for children with the temporary or indefinite restriction of parental authority provided for in Article 3.180 of the Civil Code. Where a decision is made to restrict parental authority, under paragraph 172 of the report the court, by the same decision, appoints guardianship or curatorship for the child and determines the child’s place of residence. If the violent person were between fourteen and eighteen years old, a different rule would apply: Article 6.276(1) of the Civil Code provides that such a minor is liable for damage caused by him or her on general grounds. However, Article 6.276(2) of the Civil Code provides for an additional duty of the parents, curator or supervising institution to compensate the relevant part of the damage where the minor does not have sufficient property or earnings. The review of the application, in criminal cases, of legal rules governing compensation for damage caused by a criminal act explains this structure as meaning that minors aged fourteen to eighteen are independent subjects of liability for compensation, while parents, curators or institutions are joined as co-defendants where the minor’s property is insufficient. The same review also indicates possible partial civil liability where the damage is the result of improper parental upbringing and improper institutional supervision. Article 6.276(3) of the Civil Code limits the duration of such persons’ supplementary duty: it ends when the minor reaches majority or earlier acquires sufficient property or earnings. Article 6.277 of the Civil Code further distinguishes parents whose authority has been restricted due to their fault: they are liable on general grounds for damage caused by their minor children if the child’s actions are a consequence of improper exercise of parental authority, except where a guardian or curator has been appointed
Consequences. In practical terms, under the cited rules the most important avenue for the victim’s family would be a claim for compensation directed against the twelve-year-old’s parents or guardians under Article 6.275(1) of the Civil Code. For the parents or guardians, the essential line of defence would be to prove that the damage did not arise through their fault, since that is the exception expressly established in Article 6.275 of the Civil Code. If the circumstances of the incident indicated that the child should at that time have been supervised by a relevant institution, the victims could also raise the issue of that institution’s liability under Article 6.275(2) of the Civil Code. Separately, the authorities may assess failure to exercise parental authority under Article 73 of the Code of Administrative Offences; the consequences here would not be compensation for damage, but a warning, a small fine in the event of repetition, and a possible obligation to participate in behavioural or parenting skills programmes. A stricter family-law protective response would arise only where there were grounds to apply the restriction of parental authority described in Article 3.180 of the Civil Code, as referred to in paragraph 171 of the report. As regards the minors who were present and filming, the rules directly applicable under the cited sources would primarily be relevant insofar as their own conduct caused damage or insofar as, due to their age and actions, the preconditions for civil liability under Articles 6.275 or 6.276 of the Civil Code arose. Accordingly, the realistic response of the legal system in this situation would not be a single measure, but several parallel layers: compensation to the victim, review of the exercise of parental authority and, where necessary, administrative or family-law measures
Can the unjustified prescribing of reimbursed medical devices be qualified under Article 229 of the Criminal Code where damage has been caused to the CHIF budget, but the NHIF can in practice recover it by civil-law means from the healthcare institution with which it has a contractual relationship.
Article 229 of the Criminal Code links criminal liability not merely to improper performance of duties, but to an additional consequence: the state, a legal person or a natural person must have suffered substantial damage. Accordingly, issuing prescriptions without assessing the patient’s condition or in the absence of medical need is not, in itself, sufficient for qualification under Article 229 of the Criminal Code unless significant damage and causation are proved. Article 30 of the Criminal Code further narrows the threshold: the performance of professional duties does not give rise to criminal liability if the person did not exceed the powers established by law, but liability may arise where the limits of professional activity are exceeded.
Article 69 of the Criminal Code shows that compensation for damage in criminal proceedings is an independent penal measure, but the damage must be compensated or remedied within a time limit set by the court, not exceeding three years.
The article’s reasoning on discontinuing proceedings on the basis of suretyship is incomplete if understood as meaning that compensation for damage, or an agreement on compensation, admission of guilt and remorse are sufficient. According to the stated factual assessment under Article 40 of the Criminal Code, an additional prognostic condition is also required: there must be grounds to believe that the person will fully compensate the damage, comply with the law and not commit new criminal offences. A more precise formulation would be that suretyship is not available automatically because damage has been compensated and remorse expressed, but only where the totality of admission of guilt, full compensation for damage or a realistic prospect of such compensation, and future lawful conduct is assessed together.
This correction matters because partial compensation for damage, or a civil settlement alone, does not in itself remove the basis for criminal liability.
The stronger argument in this situation is not that “there is no damage because it can be recovered in court”, but that in a case under Article 229 of the Criminal Code the prosecution must prove substantial damage as an element of criminal liability, not merely the existence of a compensation mechanism. The refusal to open investigations in respect of 24 medical practitioners, and the discontinuance of two further proceedings, indicate a practical boundary: if the NHIF has an effective civil-law route against the contracted healthcare institution and there is no evidence that recovery is impossible or impeded, criminal proceedings for an individual doctor’s negligence become weaker. The defence should emphasise the reality of civil recovery, the limits of professional powers under Article 30 of the Criminal Code, and whether the specific doctor’s actions in fact created the substantial damage required by Article 229 of the Criminal Code.
For the prosecution, by contrast, the critical evidential issue is not merely the EUR 330,000 amount of loss to the CHIF, but why the specific individual’s conduct exceeded the limits of professional duties and why civil contractual liability is not a sufficient route for managing the damage.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether criminal liability must be applied in respect of medical aid devices unjustifiably paid for from the PSDF budget, or whether civil recovery of damages from the healthcare institution, natural persons, or economic operators is sufficient. This question is to be resolved primarily under paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Rules on the Formation and Execution of the Compulsory Health Insurance Fund Budget, which require the National Health Insurance Fund and the territorial health insurance funds to demand the return of unlawfully used PSDF funds and, if they are not reimbursed voluntarily, to recover them in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, the principle of criminal liability as a measure of last resort applies, as identified in the context of subparagraph 8.2.6 of the Implementation Plan for the Government Programme and in the rulings of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 24 May 2011 in criminal case No. 2K-262/2011 and of 5 March 2025 in criminal case No. 2K-47-648/2025. From the perspective of compensation for damage in criminal proceedings, Article 109 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cited in the judgment of Klaipėda Regional Court of 5 December 2012 in case No. 1-133-557, is relevant because it permits a person who has suffered damage as a result of a criminal offence to bring a civil claim in criminal proceedings
Legal assessment. The prosecution’s argument that there is no evidence that civil recovery would be impossible or impeded directly corresponds to the stated ultima ratio rationale: criminal liability should not replace an operative civil mechanism for recovering damages. Paragraph 21 of the Rules establishes a duty of the institutions, not a discretionary option: once unlawful use of PSDF funds is established, the National Health Insurance Fund and the territorial health insurance funds must demand their return under the Civil Code. Paragraph 22 of the Rules further broadens the circle of persons subject to liability, since damage caused by unjustified payments must also be compensated by natural persons and economic operators where the damage arose through their fault. Accordingly, the contractual relationships between the National Health Insurance Fund and the healthcare institution, emphasised in procedural decisions, are legally significant: they indicate a real addressee for a civil claim and a possible route for compulsory enforcement. If the damage is not compensated voluntarily, paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Rules direct the matter to compulsory recovery under the Code of Civil Procedure, meaning that criminal proceedings are not the only means of securing compensation for the damage in this respect. The overview of the case law of the Supreme Court of Lithuania concerning Chapter XXXI of the Criminal Code states that where the principal legal regulation falls within civil law, the application of criminal liability must be justified by the greater dangerousness of the conduct and the insufficiency of civil remedies to achieve the aims of justice; the cases cited include, among others, Nos. 2K-7-181-895/2015, 2K-321-489/2015, 2K-149-303/2019, 2K-151-495/2023, and 2K-157-788/2023. This case law explains why the mere fact of damage to the PSDF budget is not, in itself, a sufficient basis for criminal prosecution if civil compensation is realistic and effective. Conversely, in the cases of the six doctors, it was stated that they admitted the criminal offences, expressed remorse, and that the damage had been compensated or an agreement had been reached regarding compensation; therefore, termination of the proceedings under suretyship is consistent with the case law noted in the overview, according to which a judgment releasing a person from criminal liability and terminating the case is a procedural document adopted after the case has been examined on the merits under Article 29, Article 254(5), and Article 303(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Klaipėda Regional Court case No. 1-133-557, the civil claim of the National Health Insurance Fund was upheld because its expenses arose from the unlawful actions of the accused; that case therefore confirms that the NHIF may be the claimant in respect of direct pecuniary damage in criminal proceedings. From the perspective of limiting civil liability, Article 6.253 of the Civil Code would permit assessment of grounds for exemption from civil liability, but the circumstances presented do not indicate any such grounds, such as force majeure, acts of the state, acts of a third party, or acts of the injured party. Articles 6.272 and 6.273 of the Civil Code are relevant only to potential state liability for unlawful acts of pre-trial investigation officers, the prosecutor, or the court, whereas the issue emphasised here is not state liability but the recovery of damage caused to the PSDF budget and the limits of criminal liability
Consequences. In practical terms, this means that the refusal to commence pre-trial investigations in respect of the 24 medical professionals does not prevent the National Health Insurance Fund from seeking compensation for damage by civil means under paragraphs 21 and 22 of the Rules. For a healthcare institution that has contractual relations with the National Health Insurance Fund, the principal risk is the obligation to return unlawfully used PSDF funds and, if they are not reimbursed voluntarily, compulsory enforcement. Natural persons and economic operators may also be addressees of claims for damages if their fault in relation to unjustified payments is established. Criminal liability realistically remains reserved for cases involving a higher degree of dangerousness of the conduct: this is illustrated by doctors’ admissions regarding failure to perform official duties, episodes of bribery, the release under suretyship of patients who gave bribes, and the fine imposed on an employee of a company that distributed medical devices. For the National Health Insurance Fund, this situation is important as a precedentially clear dividing line between recovery of damage and criminal prosecution: damage must be compensated, but, according to the sources presented, criminal proceedings are justified only where civil remedies are insufficient or where the dangerousness of the conduct exceeds the boundaries of a civil dispute. For doctors and healthcare institutions, the practical consequence is twofold: even in the absence of a pre-trial investigation, civil financial liability remains, while in cases involving a bribe, bribery, or plainly improper performance of official duties, the outcome of criminal proceedings may include a fine, penal sanctions, and a restriction on the right to work
Should the episode in Marijampolė Poetry Park involving a dozen or so blows with hands, feet and a telephone continue to be classified under Article 284 of the Criminal Code as a breach of public order, or should the focus of the investigation shift to Article 140 or Article 138, depending on the established extent of the victim’s impairment of health?
Article 284 of the Criminal Code requires not merely violence in a public place, but insolent conduct, mockery or threats demonstrating disrespect for those present or for the surrounding environment and disturbing public peace or order. Relevant to this classification is the fact that the incident took place in a public park, that a larger group of young people was nearby, that they watched and filmed the incident, and that the violent video spread on social media that same evening. Article 140 of the Criminal Code covers beating or other violence causing physical pain, minor injury or short-term illness; therefore, if the medical evidence does not exceed the threshold of minor impairment, the health-related aspect will rest on this provision.
Article 138 of the Criminal Code will become materially relevant only if a non-minor impairment of health is established, for example prolonged illness or a minor loss of working capacity; the possibility of reclassification mentioned by the prosecutor is logically linked precisely to this threshold of health consequences. Article 80 of the Criminal Code additionally changes the logic of the response: the liability of minors must correspond to their age and social maturity, limit the use of imprisonment, and increase the scope for applying educational measures.
At present, the stronger prosecutorial argument under Article 284 of the Criminal Code is not the assault itself, but its public, demonstrative character and its continuation on social media: the park setting, the group of observers, the filming and the dissemination of the video make it possible to contest the claim that this was merely a private conflict between two acquaintances. For the defence, the key practical point will be to narrow the disturbance of public order to a personal conflict over comments, but that line is weakened by the dozen or so blows and the circumstances of the involvement of other young people. For the victim’s side, the most important task is to collect not only video recordings but also medical evidence, because the extent of the impairment of health will determine whether the case remains at the level of Articles 284/140 of the Criminal Code or whether there is a basis for classification under Article 138.
Since the girl who used violence was born in 2012, the issue of liability cannot be assessed solely by reference to the severity of the sanction; in practice, it is necessary to establish her exact age on the date of the incident and to assess the educational measures applicable to minors, including the restriction of conduct provided for in Article 87 of the Criminal Code.
Core issue. The precise legal issue is not what caused the conflict on a social network, but how to classify the violence used against a minor in a public place: under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania as a breach of public order, under Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code as causing physical pain or minor impairment of health, or, if more serious consequences are established, under Article 138 of the Criminal Code as a non-severe impairment of health. Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code applies where, in a public place, insolent conduct, threats, taunting, or acts of vandalism demonstrate disrespect for others or the environment and disturb public peace or order. Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code covers beating or other violent conduct that causes a person physical pain, minor injury, or short-term illness. Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code becomes relevant only where it is established that the victim was ill for a prolonged period or lost a small part of her professional or general capacity for work, while Article 138(2) of the Criminal Code provides for qualifying circumstances, including injury to a young child, torture or other particularly cruel treatment, and hooligan motives. Since it is stated that the girl who used violence was born in 2012, on 18 July 2026 she is 13 or 14 years old; therefore, in assessing her liability, the purpose of the special rules on criminal liability of minors set out in Article 80 of the Criminal Code must be applied
Legal assessment. According to the description of the situation, Poetry Park is a public place. Therefore, punches, kicks, and blows with a telephone, while other persons were watching and filming, first require examination of the elements of Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code: insolent conduct, demonstration of disrespect for others, and disturbance of public peace or order. The social media comments are the cause of the conflict here, but under the cited provisions they do not in themselves alter the legal classification, so long as the violence is assessed under Articles 284, 140, or 138 of the Criminal Code. If medical evidence confirmed only physical pain, minor injury, or short-term illness, Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code would also be legally relevant. According to the interpretation provided in relation to Article 140 of the Criminal Code, minor impairment of health is associated with impairment lasting no longer than 10 days or a 5 percent loss of professional or general capacity for work, while a finding that physical pain was caused is made on the basis of case materials concerning beating or other violent conduct. If the investigation established a longer period of illness or the loss of a small part of capacity for work, the focus of classification would shift to Article 138(1) of the Criminal Code, and the maximum penalty would increase to imprisonment for up to three years. If one of the circumstances listed in Article 138(2) of the Criminal Code were established, for example an act against a young child or involving torture, the penalty under the cited provision would be imprisonment for up to five years. The current investigation under Article 284 of the Criminal Code allows the proceedings to be conducted under the general procedure, because Article 284 of the Criminal Code is not listed in Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure among the acts for which a victim’s complaint or a statement by a lawful representative is required to initiate proceedings. Nevertheless, the application by the victim’s relatives is important because, in the case of Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code, Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a pre-trial investigation may be initiated only upon the victim’s complaint or a statement by a lawful representative, while Article 1 of the law amending Article 140 of the Criminal Code also refers to the basis of a prosecutor’s request. Article 409(1) and (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure additionally indicates that, in certain cases, proceedings concerning such acts move into the logic of public prosecution, especially where there is public significance or indications of domestic violence. In this situation, the investigation organisation and supervision model indicated by the prosecutor corresponds to the procedural direction: the investigation is carried out by police investigators, while the prosecutor organises and supervises the pre-trial investigation. If the minor were questioned as a suspect, Article 1891(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure would require the pre-trial investigation officer or prosecutor to immediately apply to the state child rights protection authority for an individual assessment. Under the same provision, data from the pedagogical psychological service must be submitted no later than within 10 working days, and the summary of the minor’s individual assessment no later than within 25 working days from the date of receipt of the request. If temporary detention were applied, under Article 140(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure it could not last longer than necessary to establish identity and carry out the necessary procedural actions, with a maximum term of 48 hours. In cases involving minors, Article 80 of the Criminal Code requires liability to be aligned with age and social maturity, to restrict the use of imprisonment, and to increase the possibility of educational measures. One realistic such measure is the behavioural restriction provided for in Article 87 of the Criminal Code for a period from 30 days to 12 months, including an obligation to study, participate in social education or rehabilitation measures, be at home at specified times, or a prohibition on visiting certain places or communicating with persons exerting a negative influence. The procedural rights of a suspect or, later, an accused person cannot be bypassed: under Article 16(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused has the right to know the accusation, have defence counsel, submit evidence, make applications, and appeal a court judgment or rulings. At the end of the pre-trial investigation, if the case reached court, under Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the indictment would be the prosecutor’s document describing the criminal act, indicating the evidence supporting the accusation and the applicable criminal law
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the investigation remains under Article 284(1) of the Criminal Code if it is substantiated that violence and taunting in a public place disturbed public peace or order; in that case, the possible range of sanctions would include community service, a fine, restriction of liberty, arrest, or imprisonment for up to two years. The second scenario is that the classification is supplemented by or changed to Article 140(1) of the Criminal Code if medical evidence shows physical pain or minor impairment of health, in which case the victim’s or her lawful representative’s statement under Article 167(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is procedurally significant. The third scenario is that the investigation is reclassified under Article 138 of the Criminal Code if the injuries prove to constitute non-severe impairment of health, because both the evidentiary focus and the severity of sanctions would then change. For the victim and her relatives, the most important practical issue is the medical determination of the extent of the injuries, because that will determine whether the case remains at the level of breach of public order and physical pain or moves into the classification of non-severe impairment of health. For the suspected minor, the individual assessment under Article 1891 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the logic of Article 80 of the Criminal Code are important, because the final response must be linked not only to punishment, but also to behavioural change and educational measures. For the other young people who were present at the scene, the legally significant point is that the investigation will examine not only the number of blows, but also the role of each participating person, because criminal liability may be considered only on the basis of specifically established acts. From the perspective of compensation for damage, Article 7 of the Law on Compensation for Damage Caused by Violent Crimes is significant, because it provides the limits for compensation of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage established by a court, including separate limits where damage caused by a violent crime was inflicted on a minor or where a minor’s health was slightly impaired or physical pain was caused to the minor
Could the court deliver a conviction without adjourning the hearing when a participant in the proceedings was receiving medical assistance in the courtroom due to extremely high blood pressure, and the judgment itself resulted not only in a fine of 1,000 roubles but also in exclusion from this September’s parliamentary elections.
No direct Russian legal provision on the display of “extremist symbols” or deprivation of electoral rights is provided in the evidence, so the conclusion regarding disqualification rests on the reported fact that such a conviction will prevent him from standing as a candidate. From a comparative perspective, the cited rule in Article 1622 of the Lithuanian Code of Civil Procedure indicates a procedural standard: a case is adjourned where it cannot be heard at that sitting for important reasons, although illness is generally not treated as a sufficient reason in itself. In this situation, the relevant point is not merely “illness”, but the fact that medical assistance was being provided in the courtroom itself immediately before the judgment, in circumstances of extremely high blood pressure and known heart problems.
The stronger legal argument is therefore not a formal request for adjournment on health grounds, but that the court was required to assess individually the defendant’s actual ability to participate in the proceedings and to understand the delivery of the judgment.
In practice, this case should not be assessed by reference to the amount of the 1,000-rouble fine, because the real sanction, on the reported facts, is the political and legal consequence: exclusion from the September elections. That changes the proportionality analysis: a formally minor monetary penalty becomes an instrument for removing an opposition candidate’s passive electoral right. For a professional audience, the key point is not the amount of the fine, but the chain of three facts: the 2023 video featuring a photograph of A.
Navalny, the charge of displaying “extremist symbols”, and the automatic or practical inability to stand as a candidate. The weaker argument for the authorities is that the case supposedly ended with a lenient sanction; the stronger argument for the defence and for legal analysis is that procedural haste and disregard of the defendant’s health acquire a different weight where the conviction directly affects electoral competition.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether the court, in pronouncing a conviction immediately after emergency medical assistance had been provided in the courtroom and in rejecting the defence request to postpone the procedural act, reconciled procedural efficiency with the accused’s rights to defence, health, and effective judicial protection. This question must primarily be assessed under Article 22(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, which grants the accused the right to have defence counsel, submit motions, present evidence, participate in its examination, receive emergency medical assistance, and appeal the court’s judgment and rulings. Article 5 of the Law on Courts of the Republic of Lithuania is also relevant, as it guarantees the accused the right to defence and the right to have a lawyer from the moment of detention or first questioning. From the standpoint of procedural status, Article 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania concerning the indictment, Articles 24 and 25 concerning the court of cassation and the cassation appeal, and Articles 381 and 382 concerning adjournment of cassation proceedings and rulings of the court of cassation are applicable. The aspect of restricting freedom of expression should be assessed under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, as referred to in the source concerning Draft Law No. XIP-2595 amending the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania, and in light of the European Court of Human Rights case law cited there, namely Platform “Ärzte für das Leben” v Austria, 21 June 1988, § 32, and Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Linden v Bulgaria, 2 October 2001, §§ 86-107
Legal assessment. Under Article 22(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, the accused has not merely a formal right to be present in the courtroom, but a real opportunity to make use of defence counsel, submit motions, provide explanations, express views on motions made by other participants, and address the court in a final statement. If, during a court hearing, an ambulance is called because of extremely high blood pressure and an electrocardiogram is performed, the right to receive emergency medical assistance becomes directly linked to the ability effectively to exercise all other rights of the accused. In such circumstances, the defence request to postpone the pronouncement of judgment should, under the cited provisions, be treated not as an ancillary procedural preference but as a request to ensure that the accused can participate genuinely in the proceedings. On the other hand, the source concerning Draft Law No. XIIP-4003 amending Article 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure emphasises that the principle of justice entails a requirement of speed and effectiveness in judicial proceedings; accordingly, the aim of avoiding delay in the case is not in itself unlawful. However, the source concerning Draft Law No. XIP-3423(2) amending Article 81 of the Labour Code states that unjustifiably short procedural time limits may result in the merely formal administration of justice and fail to ensure effective protection of infringed rights. Therefore, procedural speed in this situation cannot be understood as permitting disregard of a medical condition if that condition prevents the accused from exercising the rights enshrined in Article 22(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Article 381 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania directly addresses adjournment of cassation proceedings where a participant whose attendance has been recognised as necessary fails to appear at the hearing due to illness or another important reason, but its logic shows that illness is regarded in procedural law as an important reason capable of justifying adjournment of proceedings. The court’s refusal to postpone the pronouncement of judgment while medical assistance was being provided in the courtroom itself raises, in light of the cited sources, the question whether the right to defence under Article 5 of the Law on Courts and Article 22(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania was unduly restricted. Article 44(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, as cited in the source concerning the report under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, requires that the case of an accused person be heard within the shortest possible time by an independent and impartial court under conditions of equality and publicity. This means that the shortest possible time is not an end in itself: it must be reconciled with independence, impartiality, equality, and real defence. As to the substance of the charge itself, it is significant that the fine was imposed for displaying “extremist symbols”, linked to a shared video and the image of Alexei Navalny visible in it. The cited source on freedom of expression states that Article 10 of the Convention protects freedom of expression, while Article 11 protects freedom of peaceful assembly; moreover, according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, states must secure diverse peaceful forms of public expression of opinion even where the opinion irritates, shocks, or offends persons who hold different views. Platform “Ärzte für das Leben” v Austria emphasised the duty to ensure peaceful public expression of opinion, while Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Linden v Bulgaria applied this protection to inconvenient and contentious public views. Accordingly, a sanction for sharing information of a political nature should, under the cited sources, be examined through the lens of necessity and proportionality of the restriction on expression. The source concerning the fourth and fifth periodic report states that freedom to express beliefs and disseminate information may be restricted only by law and only where necessary to protect human health, honour and dignity, private life, morals, or the constitutional order. The mere fact that political content is unfavourable to the authorities or connected with an opposition figure does not, under the cited European Court of Human Rights case law, by itself justify a restriction
Consequences. The immediate practical consequence for the accused is the status of a convicted person under the provision reflected in Article 21(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, because upon conviction the accused becomes a convicted person. Under Article 22(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, the right to appeal the court’s judgment and rulings remains, so the further course would depend on the filing of an appeal and the assessment of a higher court. If the case reached the cassation stage, Articles 24 and 25 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania define the Supreme Court of Lithuania as the court of cassation and a cassation appeal as an appeal against a final judgment or ruling. The outcomes of cassation proceedings set out in Article 382 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania include dismissing the cassation appeal, quashing the judgment and subsequent rulings and discontinuing the case, remitting the case for fresh examination, or amending the judgment or ruling. The health aspect is practically significant not only for enforcement of the penalty but also for the lawfulness of the proceedings themselves, because Article 22(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania lists emergency medical assistance among the procedural rights of the accused. From an electoral perspective, the report states that the fine results in an inability to participate in the September 2026 parliamentary elections, meaning that even a minor financial penalty has an independent political and legal effect. The weight of the dispute is therefore not measured solely by the 1,000-rouble fine: in practical terms, the most significant consequence is the candidate’s exclusion from the September 2026 electoral process. More broadly, cases of this kind are important for all persons who publicly express political views, because, under the cited sources, any restriction on political expression must be based on law, justified by necessity, and compatible with effective judicial protection
Does the public publication of a list of 66 persons, with wording suggesting that Russia could “remove them from Lithuania” and pay a reward “for each head”, amount merely to provocative political speech, or does it constitute, within the meaning of Article 122 of the Criminal Code, a public call to use violence against the Lithuanian state and, within the meaning of Article 118, assistance to another state in acting against Lithuania?
Article 122 of the Criminal Code criminalises not every pro-Russian or threatening statement, but a public call to violently infringe Lithuania’s sovereignty, including calls to encroach upon its independence, territorial integrity, or to commit other crimes against the Lithuanian state. In this situation, the most favourable part of the provision for the prosecution is precisely the reference to “committing other crimes provided for in this chapter”, because the text is linked to the subject of Russian military targets in the Baltic states, while the “removal” list personalises potential actions against specific Lithuanian citizens. Article 118 of the Criminal Code requires more: assistance to another state or its organisation in acting against Lithuania’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, defence capability, or economic power must be established.
Accordingly, the content of the post itself more strongly supports qualification under Article 122, while the Article 118 line will become robust only if the investigation uncovers evidence of an actual assistance element, coordination, an assignment, transmission of information, or another functional link with Russian action against Lithuania.
In practice, the “addressee” of the post matters differently for the defence and the prosecution: under Article 122, the public nature of the call and its direction towards a violent infringement of the state are sufficient, whereas under Article 118 it will be necessary to prove that this was not merely propaganda or a threat, but assistance to another state. The prosecution’s stronger initial argument is that the list of surnames and the wording about payment “for each head” move the text from opinion or geopolitical commentary into a particularised incitement to violent action. The weaker point is Article 118: without additional investigative evidence, it risks being too broad, because the provision punishes assistance to a state in acting against Lithuania, not merely public approval of such a state.
For professionals, it is worth following not only whether suspicions will be brought, but also the factual basis on which the prosecution distinguishes Article 122 from Article 118, because that will determine whether the case remains within the limits of a public call or becomes a case concerning actual action for the benefit of a foreign state.
Core issue. The precise legal question is whether a public post compiling a list of Lithuanian persons for alleged transfer to Russia and promising a reward “for each head” may be regarded as assisting another state to act against the Republic of Lithuania under Article 118 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, liability arises for any person who assisted another state or its organisation in acting against the constitutional order, sovereignty, territorial integrity, defence capability, or economic power of the Republic of Lithuania. By Article 2 of the Law Amending Articles 114, 118, 119, 120 and 121 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, Article 118 of the Criminal Code was reformulated so that the offence is punishable by imprisonment for a term of two to seven years, and, in an aggravated case where the act is committed by taking advantage of an emergency situation, a state of emergency, or mobilisation, by imprisonment for a term of three to ten years. From the perspective of territorial and personal application, Articles 5 and 6 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania are relevant: Lithuanian citizens and other persons permanently residing in Lithuania are liable under this Code for criminal acts committed abroad, while foreign nationals without permanent residence in Lithuania are liable for crimes against the Lithuanian state provided for in Articles 114-128 of the Criminal Code that are committed abroad. Procedurally, the question is addressed in a pre-trial investigation, in which the submission of data is regulated by Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, the purpose and calculation of time limits by Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the purposes and types of coercive measures by Articles 119 and 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the grounds for termination by Article 212 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
Legal assessment. For the application of Article 118 of the Criminal Code, the essential issue is not merely the crude form of the text, but whether the actions of the account operator may be qualified as assistance to another state or its organisation in acting against the Republic of Lithuania. The information provided states that the published video discusses Russia’s preparation of lists of military targets in the Baltic States, while the account’s text supplements that context with a list of persons whom “Russia could remove from Lithuania”. This circumstance is legally significant because the protected interests under Article 118 of the Criminal Code are the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and defence capability of the Republic of Lithuania, and the compilation of lists in the context of hostile-state activity may be assessed as a possible contribution to such activity. At the same time, Article 118 of the Criminal Code requires proof of assistance, so the investigation must consider not only the content of the published text, but also the author’s purpose, any connection with another state or its organisation, the circumstances of publication, and the actual significance of the conduct for action against the Republic of Lithuania. Article 2 of the amending law introduced Article 118(3) of the Criminal Code, which provides for exemption from criminal liability where, before being recognised as a suspect, the person confessed and actively cooperated in identifying representatives of a foreign state or its organisation and their activities against the Republic of Lithuania. Under Article 118(4) of the Criminal Code, that same provision does not apply if the person has previously been exempted on that basis or if the act caused a person’s death or other serious consequences. Liability of a legal person is possible under Article 118(5) of the Criminal Code, as that paragraph expressly provides that a legal person is also liable for the acts provided for in Article 118. Article 119 of the Criminal Code on espionage, in the sources provided, is linked to the collection or transfer of a state or official secret, or information of interest to the intelligence service of a foreign state; however, the list of 66 publicly known persons described in the information in itself directs the assessment toward the elements of assistance to another state under Article 118 of the Criminal Code. This is also consistent with the distinction set out in the explanatory materials for the draft: action against the Republic of Lithuania in peacetime falls under Article 118 of the Criminal Code, while collaboration under Article 120 concerns conditions of occupation or annexation. On the data provided, Article 120 of the Criminal Code is not the principal route of classification in this situation, because its elements require conditions of occupation or annexation and assistance to an unlawful authority. The unlawful stalking provided for in Article 1481 of the Criminal Code requires systematic stalking against a person’s clearly expressed will and an adverse effect on social life or emotional state; moreover, liability is generally linked to a complaint by the victim, a statement by a lawful representative, a prosecutor’s request, or signs of domestic violence. Accordingly, the publication of the names of 66 persons may be significant for the position of the victims, but, in line with the direction indicated by the prosecutor’s office, the core of the investigation is crimes against the Lithuanian state. In a pre-trial investigation, under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, relevant objects and documents may be submitted both by participants in the proceedings and by any natural or legal person; accordingly, copies of the post, account administration data, the time of publication, translations, and related communications may be significant. Article 119 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allows coercive measures to be linked to ensuring participation in the proceedings, an unhindered investigation, the hearing of the case, enforcement of the judgment, and prevention of new offences, while the measures listed in Article 120 of the Code of Criminal Procedure include arrest, intensive supervision, house arrest, bail, seizure of documents, registration with a police institution, and a written undertaking not to leave. Time limits in the investigation are calculated under Articles 99 and 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: procedural time limits determine the commencement, performance, or completion of actions, and a time limit calculated in days expires at twenty-four hundred hours on the final day, except for actions to be performed at an institution, where the end of working hours is relevant
Consequences. The first realistic scenario is that the investigation gathers sufficient data to establish that the account operator’s actions meet the elements of Article 118(1) of the Criminal Code, and the case proceeds to the stages of suspicion, indictment, and possible court hearing. The second scenario is that, if it is established that the act was committed by taking advantage of an emergency situation, a state of emergency, or mobilisation, the classification may be based on Article 118(2) of the Criminal Code, which provides for a more severe custodial range. The third scenario is that, if before being recognised as a suspect the person were to confess and actively cooperate in identifying representatives of a foreign state or its organisation and their activities, Article 118(3) of the Criminal Code on exemption from criminal liability could become relevant. The fourth scenario is that, under Article 212(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the pre-trial investigation is terminated if insufficient data are collected to substantiate the suspect’s guilt in the commission of the criminal act. The practical significance for the 66 persons included in the list is that they may possess data relevant to the investigation, and under Article 98 of the Code of Criminal Procedure such data may be submitted to the proceedings. For the account operator, the legal risk is a custodial sentence under Article 118 of the Criminal Code, and, if a legal person acted or the act was carried out on its behalf, Article 118(5) of the Criminal Code is also relevant. For the state and law enforcement authorities, this investigation is important as a means of determining the boundary between public dissemination on a social network and criminally significant assistance to another state in acting against the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or defence capability of the Republic of Lithuania